Supreme Court: In a pair of civil appeals arising out of matrimonial disputes, a Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*, JJ., set aside and expunged the findings of “cruelty” and “desertion” recorded against the wife by the Family Court and affirmed by the Gujarat High Court, holding that her decision to pursue her professional career as a dentist and reside separately for the welfare and medical care of her minor daughter could not be construed as matrimonial misconduct. Describing the approach of the courts below as “pedantic”, “regressive”, “ultra-conservative” and rooted in patriarchal assumptions, the Court observed that marriage does not eclipse a woman’s individuality or compel her to sacrifice her career aspirations merely because her husband is posted at a remote location as an Army Officer.
The Court observed that,
“We are well into the 21st Century, and yet an attempt by a qualified woman to pursue her professional career and to secure a safe and stable environment for the upbringing of her child has been treated as an act of cruelty and desertion by the Courts below.”
While upholding the decree of divorce in view of the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the Court directed that the divorce would stand on that ground alone and not on cruelty or desertion. The Court also dismissed the husband’s plea seeking prosecution of the wife for perjury under Section 195 read with Section 340, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), holding the allegations to be vindictive and devoid of merit.
Background
The present case arose out of matrimonial disputes between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband, who were married on 3 September 2009. The appellant, a qualified dentist, had established her dental practice in Pune, where the respondent, an Army Officer, was posted. In 2011, upon the respondent’s transfer to Kargil, the appellant discontinued her practice and moved with him. During her stay in Kargil, she conceived but later returned to Ahmedabad owing to inadequate medical facilities and concerns regarding her pregnancy. Differences allegedly stemming from the parties’ distinct religious backgrounds further strained the relationship, leading the appellant to shift to her parental home, where she gave birth to their daughter on 12 April 2012.
Subsequently, the appellant again joined the respondent at Kargil with the child, who developed serious medical complications requiring hospitalisation. As specialised treatment facilities were unavailable there, the parties returned to Ahmedabad. Thereafter, matrimonial discord intensified, prompting the appellant to seek maintenance from the Army Authorities, who directed the respondent to pay a portion of his salary towards maintenance for the appellant and the minor child. Multiple proceedings were thereafter initiated before various forums, including the Family Court at Ahmedabad. During the pendency of the disputes, the Family Court granted interim maintenance of ₹55,000 per month (i.e. ₹35,000 for the appellant and ₹20,000 for the child), which was later modified by the High Court to ₹45,000 per month, comprising ₹25,000 for the appellant and ₹20,000 for the child.
Meanwhile, the respondent instituted divorce proceedings on the grounds of cruelty and desertion and also filed an application under Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC alleging that the appellant had made false statements on oath in maintenance proceedings and sought her prosecution for perjury. By judgment dated 30 September 2022, the Family Court decreed divorce in favour of the respondent on grounds of cruelty and desertion, while simultaneously rejecting the application seeking prosecution of the appellant for perjury. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant challenged the findings relating to cruelty and desertion before the Gujarat High Court, though she did not oppose the dissolution of marriage, whereas the respondent assailed the rejection of his perjury application. The High Court, by judgment dated 12 August 2024, dismissed both appeals, leading both parties to approach the Supreme Court by way of special leave petitions.
Analysis
The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the approach adopted by the Family Court and affirmed by the High Court, observing that the findings branding the appellant-wife’s conduct as “cruelty” and “desertion” were legally unsustainable, pedantic, regressive and rooted in deeply entrenched patriarchal assumptions. The Court emphasised that the appellant, a qualified dentist, could not be expected to sacrifice her professional aspirations merely because her husband, an Army Officer, was posted at a remote location. It held that marriage does not eclipse a woman’s individuality or subordinate her identity to that of her spouse, and that her endeavour to establish a dental clinic and provide a safer environment and better medical facilities for her minor daughter could not, under any circumstances, be construed as cruelty or desertion. The Court observed that what had been portrayed by the courts below as “defiance” was, in reality, an assertion of independence and responsible parenthood, and that expecting a woman to invariably subordinate her career and autonomy to matrimonial obligations reflected an “archaic, ultra-conservative and feudalistic mindset” incompatible with contemporary constitutional values of dignity, autonomy and equal participation of women in society.
“It must be emphasised that a well-educated and professionally qualified woman cannot be expected to be confined within the rigid boundaries of matrimonial obligations alone. Marriage does not eclipse her individuality, nor does it subjugate her identity under that of her spouse.”
The Court further found the Family Court’s observations that the appellant opening her dental clinic without informing the respondent or her in-laws amounted to cruelty, and that it was the “bounden duty” of the wife to reside wherever the husband chose to live to be wholly unacceptable. It observed that the respondent’s conduct reflected an attitude of male chauvinism and domineering control, and that the appellant’s decision to pursue her career independently appeared justified in the prevailing circumstances.
“… a woman can no longer be treated as a mere appendage to the household of the husband, and her independent intellectual and professional identity and aspirations must receive due credence and respect”.
The Court also rejected the allegations that the appellant had attempted to coerce the respondent into converting to Christianity, holding that there was no credible material to substantiate such claims.
Decision
Consequently, the Supreme Court directed that all findings and observations relating to cruelty and desertion recorded by the Family Court and affirmed by the High Court be expunged and set aside. However, since the appellant did not seek restoration of matrimonial ties and the respondent had reportedly remarried, the Court declined to interfere with the decree of divorce and held that the decree would be deemed to have been granted on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
With regard to the respondent’s plea seeking prosecution of the appellant for perjury under Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC, the Court found the allegations to be motivated by personal vendetta, spite and matrimonial acrimony. It held that the allegations did not disclose the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of perjury or giving false evidence, and that the respondent’s grievances stemmed merely from a hypertechnical dissection of the record amidst multiple disputes between the parties. Noting the concurrent findings of the courts below rejecting the plea for prosecution, the Supreme Court refused to interfere and dismissed the special leave petition as being devoid of merit.
[Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 850, decided on 12-5-2026]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta
Buy Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 HERE
