Sexual harassment cases cannot be quashed on basis of compromise between parties: SC

Supreme Court: In a criminal appeal against a decision of the Rajasthan High Court quashing the FIR against the accused teacher/ 3rd respondent considering that a compromise was reached between him and the father of the minor girl/ victim, the Division Bench of CT Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar, JJ. held that quashing the FIR in the serious offence of sexual assault solely pn the basis of settlement and compromise between the parties was erred and required interference. Hence, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order. Consequently, the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto proceeded against the accused, in accordance with the law.

Background

An FIR was filed by the father of the minor girl against the accused under Sections 354A, 342, 509 and 504 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘the POCSO Act’) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘SC/ST Act’). It was alleged that in 2022 when the minor girl, a student of Class XI in was alone in the classroom, the teacher (3rd accused) patted her cheeks and assaulted her. The accused teacher hurled abuses with ugly words like ‘dedh Chamar’ etc. The minor girl ran away and prayed to the teachers for help, but it was of no avail. Meanwhile, one teacher went to the minor girl’s house and informed her mother that her daughter was not feeling well. On reaching there the mother found the daughter in a deadly terrified and numbed state and she could say nothing to the mother. It was only after reaching home that she divulged the incident, to her mother.

Considering that the accused teacher and father reached a compromise, an application was moved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), seeking quashment of the said FIR and all further proceedings thereon. As per the impugned order dated 04-02-2022 the High Court, quashed the subject FIR and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof.

Present appeal

The present appeal was moved by spirited citizens residing in the same District as the minor girl’s father, raising concerns that the FIR contained serious allegation of commission of acts involving offence(s) under various sections of the IPC, and POCSO Act; that they are not purely private in nature; that they are offences against the society; and that the quashment of the subject FIR was solely based on a compromise between the accused and minor’s father.

The accused teacher and the father of the minor girl vehemently challenged the locus standi of the present appellants to challenge the order dated 04-02-2022.

Analysis and Decision

The Court said that it is disheartening that with tooth and nail, the counsel appearing for the father of the victim, challenged the appellants’ locus standi to maintain the Special Leave Petition against the impugned order.

On perusing the statement of the objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act, the Court noted that quashing the proceedings initiated under POCSO Act abruptly by invoking the power under Section 482 of CrPC without permitting it to mature into a trial, except on extremely compelling reasons initiated solely to settle the score etc., would go against the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment. The Court said that ‘rubbing the breast of a child’ would constitute an offence of ‘sexual assault’ under Section 7 of POCSO Act, punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years and may extend to five years and also fine.

Locus Standi of the Appellants

The Court pointed out that through an order passed on 02-12-2022, the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution was converted as a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. To elucidate on the power of this Court, the Court referred to Article 136, Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 and Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh (1954) 2 SCC 20 wherein it has been laid down that Article 136 is an overriding provision conferring a special jurisdiction providing for invoking of the appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court not fettered by the sweep of preceding articles.

The Court cited Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai (2003) 12 SCC 395, wherein while allowing an SLP by a third party to the proceedings, the Court ruled that power vested in this Court under Article 136 is not to be confused with the ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific statutes….Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. The exercise of the power of this Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it.

The Court opined that the right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a case where a seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither the State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.

In the matter at hand, the Court said that the case stood on a firmer footing and was not one where the third party sought leave to challenge a judgment of acquittal. The Court pointed out that being ordinary citizens, there was no case that they filed the SLP due to any private revenge or personal vendetta. Considering the nature of the offences alleged against the accused teacher, the Court viewed that if they are proved they could be treated only as offences against the society and prosecuting an offender against whom such allegations are made would only be in the interest of the society.

Whether the power to quash criminal proceedings/ FIR for heinous and serious offences can be exercised merely on the basis of compromise, relying on the dictum laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303?

The Court examined Gian Singh (supra) at lengths and noted that it was clarified and laid down that, settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court; quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not same as compounding of offence; for serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all; each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed; and the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end.

On perusing the impugned order, the Court held that the High Court erred in not properly considering Gian Singh (supra) and misread and misapplied the law.

The Court also noted that in terms of the decision in Gian Singh (supra) an irrecusable duty of the Court to consider whether the compromise could be acted upon or not in the interest of justice, was also not properly considered. The Court added that therein, it was held that the power under Section 482 of CrPC could not be used to quash proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. Hence, the Court held that when an incident of serious nature occurred in a school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and have no serious impact on the society.

CASE DETAILS

Citation:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193

Appellants :
Ramji Lal Bairwa

Respondents :
State of Rajasthan

Advocates who appeared in this case

For Petitioner(s):
Mr. Vikas Jain, AOR; Ms. Shrawani, Adv.; Mr. Hardik Jayal, Adv.

For Respondent(s):
Mr. Milind Kumar, AOR; Mr. B.s. Rajesh Agrajit, Adv.; Mr. Divyank Panwar, Adv.; Ms. Jyoti Rana, Adv.; Ms. Priya Nagar, Adv.; Mr. Sarad Kumar Singhania, AOR; Mr. Anuj Bhandari, AOR; Mr. Anuj Bhandari, Adv.; Mr. Gaurav Jain, Adv.; Mr. Rajat Gupta, Adv.; Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Adv.; Mrs. Anjali Doshi, Adv.; Mr. R. H. A. Sikander, AOR; Mr. Jatin Bhatt, Adv.; Mr. Sanawar, Adv.; Mr. Harshit Gahlot, Adv.; Mr. Kshitij Singh, Adv.; Ms. Nujhat Naseem, Adv.; Ms. Sadiya Sultan, Adv.
Mr. R Basant – Amicus Curiae, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Aviral Saxena, AOR; Mr. Manu Krishnan, Adv.