Position of law vis-a-vis woman being the sole owner of ‘Stridhan’ is consistent and unequivocal: Supreme Court

Supreme Court: While considering the instant appeal challenging the order passed by Telangana High Court, refusing to quash proceedings under Section 406 of Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; the Division Bench of J.K Maheshwari and Sanjay Karol*, JJ., pointed out that the position of law has remained consistent throughout since 1985, till date, regarding the sole authority of the woman in respect of her ‘stridhan’ as has also been held recently in Mala Kar v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1049. The jurisprudence as has been developed by the Supreme Court, is unequivocal with respect to the singular right of the female (wife or former wife), being the sole owner of ‘stridhan’ with husband having no right over it.

The Court further concluded that a father too, has no right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable of making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of her ‘stridhan’.

Furthermore, the Court quashed the proceedings finding that no charge under S. 406, IPC and S. 6, Dowry Prohibition Act was made out against the appellants.

Background and Legal Trajectory: 2nd Respondent (complainant hereinafter) filed a complaint against the former in-laws (appellants) of his elder daughter for not returning the gold ornaments (around 40 Kasula gold and other articles) which he had given at the time of her marriage. The marriage was solemnized on 22-12-1999.

After a period of approximately 16 years, the complainant’s daughter on 14-8-2015 filed for divorce in the United States of America. The decree of divorce was granted by mutual consent by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, on 3-2-2016. At that time, all possessions, material and financial, were settled between the parties by the Separation Agreement. Hence, all issues arising out of matrimony stood closed as the daughter got remarried in the U.S.A. in May 2018.

Upon returning from the USA after attending the remarriage of his daughter, the complainant allegedly made requests to the appellants to return the articles entrusted to them. Such requests remained unheeded with the articles yet to be recovered.

Thereafter, the complainant lodged an FIR January 2021, under Section 406 IPC pertaining to the return of the jewellery which he had given to his daughter at the time of her marriage as ‘stridhan’ but entrusted it to the appellants. The appellants denied the allegations and contended that the complaint was filed to cause harassment.

After completion of the investigation, the Police filed a final report under the aforementioned provisions of IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court under Section 482, CrPC. However, the High Court found the allegations made in the chargesheet to be prima facie triable.

Issue for Consideration: Whether the complainant had any locus to file the FIR which led to the instant proceedings keeping in view that the same was affected by delay and laches, thereby expressly being non-maintainable? Furthermore, whether Telangana High Court was correct in refusing to exercise its inherent power in quashing the proceedings under the CrPC?

Court’s Assessment and Findings:

While deliberating over the afore-stated issues, the Court noted that sum and substance of the instant dispute lie in a father’s right over the ‘stridhan’ given by him to his daughter at the time of marriage. The Court pointed out that the generally accepted and judicially recognized rule, is that the woman exercises an absolute right over the property.

The Court further pointed out the ruling in Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397, wherein the position of wife or woman being the sole authority in respect of ‘stridhan’ was emphatically stated. In this case the Supreme Court had observed that, “(…) properties gifted to her before the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving farewell or thereafter are her stridhana properties. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose of at her own pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property. A husband may use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. Therefore, stridhana property does not become a joint property of the wife and the husband and the husband has no title or independent dominion over the property as owner thereof.”

The Court further pointed out that position of law on stridhan since 1985 has remained consistent and unequivocal that woman is the sole owner of stridhan and a husband has no right over it similarly a father too, has no right when the daughter is alive, well, and entirely capable of making decisions such as pursuing the cause of the recovery of her ‘stridhan’.

Further deliberating over time lapses in the case, the Court noted that that action was initiated for securing possession of the articles and ornaments after a passage of more than 20 years since the date of marriage and 5 years after the settlement of all marital issues at the time of divorce and that too, not by the former wife, i.e., the complainant’s daughter, but by the complainant himself. “This coupled with the fact that there is no authorization on the part of the complainant’s daughter in his favour to initiate proceedings for recovery of ‘stridhan’ exclusively belonging to her, beckons the question on the basis of which the complainant has initiated the present proceedings”.

Taking note of S. 5 of Power of Attorney Act, 1882, wherein a woman may, in law, grant a person of her choosing the authority to do any act which she may herself execute, the Court pointed out that no such power of attorney, within the meaning of the Act, stood executed by the daughter, in favour of her father i.e., the complainant.

Considering several precedents vis-a-vis exercise of inherent power under S. 482, CrPC, especially State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court noted that FIR was registered under Section 406 IPC which prescribes a punishment for a criminal breach of trust. Section 405 defines the said offence and provides for the ingredients that are required to be fulfilled for the offence to be made out.

Perusing the facts of the case and the FIR, the Court found that there was no iota of proof on record to show that the complainant had entrusted the ‘stridhan’ of his daughter to the appellants which allegedly was illegally kept by them. Furthermore, the ingredient of dishonest misappropriation or conversion for own use, also stood unfulfilled, for there was nothing on record to substantiate that the appellants converted the ‘stridhan’ allegedly kept in their custody, for their own use. The Court further pointed out that apart from a statement of the complainant, there was nothing on record to substantiate the factum of stridhan being actually in possession of the appellants.

Thus, the Court found that insofar as Section 406, IPC was concerned, no cognizable offence was visible on the face of the record. Furthermore, the action initiated over 5 years after the divorce of the complainant’s daughter and 3 years after her second marriage demonstrates the same to be hopelessly belated in time.

Stating that object of criminal proceedings is to bring a wrongdoer to justice, and it is not a means to get revenge or seek a vendetta, the Court pointed out that the complainant’s FIR was silent as to a satisfactory explanation regarding delay in filing. The Court further noted that in the FIR the authorities are requested to take action against the appellants for not returning the gifts given by the complainant to his daughter at the time of the marriage, however, in the charge-sheet such a complaint turns into a demand of dowry and being pressured into incurring expenses for marriage related functions. “The question that is to be answered is that when the point of genesis is separate and distinct, how does the end result turn into something that is entirely foreign to the point of genesis?”

Perusing the timeline, the Court noted that FIR was filed in 2021, whereas the matrimonial relations between the complainant’s daughter and her former husband ended in 2015 and she subsequently got remarried in 2018. It was noted that the grounds the complainant filed the FIR in 2021 remained unexplained. Furthermore, these proceedings had been initiated in the face of the Separation Agreement entered into by the parties to the marriage at the time of dissolution, that too, without any express authorization by the daughter of the complainant.

Therefore, the Court found that charges under S. 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act were not made out, therefore the complaint must be set aside and any action commenced as a result thereof is bad in law.

Therefore, with the afore-stated assessment, the Court also set aside the impugned order of Telangana High Court.