POCSO proceedings cannot be quashed based on settlement between accused and victim even for lesser gravity offence: Kerala HC

Kerala High Court holds that POCSO settlement quashing cannot ordinarily be permitted merely because the victim, after attaining majority, expresses no objection to the proceedings being terminated or enters into a settlement with the accused. The Court observed that offences under the POCSO Act are not purely private disputes but offences having a substantial societal impact and affecting the larger public interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation.

settlement cannot justify quashing POCSO proceedings

Kerala High Court: While answering a reference regarding the scope of the High Court’s inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings involving offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the victim or the victim’s family, the Division Bench of Raja Vijayaraghavan V.* and K.V. Jayakumar, JJ., held that compromise or settlement cannot justify quashing POCSO proceedings, even where the offence is alleged to be of comparatively lesser gravity.

Also Read: Delhi HC: Settlement can’t quash POCSO Child and Marriage case

Background

The reference arose from a petition filed by an accused who was working as an Ustad in a Madrassa. The allegations were that he had sexually assaulted a 17-year-old child by touching her breast on one occasion and thereafter on subsequent occasions, thereby committing repeated sexual assault. Based on a complaint lodged by the victim’s father, a crime was registered for offences punishable under Section 354-A(1)(i), Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 7, 8, 9(l), 9(f) and 10, POCSO Act.

The accused initially approached the Court seeking quashment of the proceedings. Though an earlier affidavit produced in support of the petition was not accepted, the victim, after attaining majority, filed another affidavit stating that the crime had been registered without properly appreciating the true facts and circumstances of the case. She asserted that the complaint had been lodged under a mistaken impression and due to ill-advice from persons who were inimical towards the accused. She further stated that she had no grievance against the accused and that the continued pendency of the proceedings was adversely affecting her future prospects. She therefore expressed no serious objection to the proceedings being quashed.

While dealing with the petition, the Single Judge noticed a divergence of judicial opinion among Single Judges of the Court on the issue of whether criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act could be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction on the basis of a settlement between the parties. The view in Abdul Salam v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 5215, stood in contrast to that adopted in Vishnu v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 3357, and XXXX v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 40511. Therefore, the matter was referred to a Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

The accused’s counsel cited Ayyub Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 637, and Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1707, contending that the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court had quashed proceedings involving POCSO offences in peculiar circumstances arising out of subsequent developments in the relationship and settlements between the parties. It was argued that offences under the POCSO Act are not entirely immune from the exercise of inherent powers and that proceedings involving offences of comparatively lesser gravity should be capable of being quashed where a genuine settlement has been voluntarily entered into. On the other hand, the prosecution opposed the plea and submitted that although the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) and Section 528, Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is of wide amplitude, the power can be exercised only to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court.

Also Read: Can Serious POCSO Offences Be Quashed Based on Settlement Between Parties: Kerala High Court answers

Analysis

The Court observed that the POCSO Act is a special legislation enacted with the specific object of protecting children from sexual assault, sexual harassment and exploitation. The statutory framework recognises the vulnerability of children and is founded on the legislative recognition that children may not possess the maturity and capacity to comprehend the consequences of sexual conduct and that the law must intervene to protect children against such exploitation.

The Court highlighted that offences under the POCSO Act are not merely offences against an individual victim. Such offences implicate a larger public interest in ensuring that children grow up in an environment free from sexual abuse and exploitation. Consequently, prosecution of such offences cannot be treated as a matter that the victim or her family is free to terminate through a private arrangement with the accused.

The Court explained the distinction between compounding of offences under Section 320 CrPC and quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The fact that an offence is non-compoundable does not, by itself, preclude the High Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction in an appropriate case. However, the existence of such jurisdiction does not mean that every non-compoundable offence can be quashed merely because the parties have arrived at a settlement.

The Court referred to Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein it was observed that though the power to quash is distinct from the power to compound and may extend to non-compoundable offences in appropriate cases, serious and heinous offences involving mental depravity and having a significant impact on society cannot ordinarily be quashed merely because the parties have settled their disputes.

The Court also relied on State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, wherein it was emphasised that the nature and gravity of the offence, the impact on society and the likelihood of conviction are relevant considerations and that serious offences cannot be treated as private disputes merely because the parties have arrived at a compromise. The Court noted that these principles become even more significant in prosecutions under the POCSO Act because a victim attaining majority during the pendency of proceedings does not retrospectively alter the legal character of the alleged act committed when the victim was a child.

The Court relied on State of M.P. v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, wherein the Supreme Court emphasised that offences involving sexual assault cannot be treated as matters capable of compromise. It was highlighted that the dignity and bodily integrity of the victim cannot be made the subject-matter of a negotiated settlement. The Court also referred to Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611, and observed that the Supreme Court had stressed the need to interpret and enforce the POCSO Act in a manner that advances its protective object and recognises the grave and lasting consequences of sexual exploitation of children.

The Court observed that the victim’s willingness to forgive the accused, or the desire of the family to put an end to the proceedings, cannot by itself determine whether a prosecution involving a serious sexual offence should be permitted to continue. The Court is required to examine the nature of the offence, the legislative policy underlying the enactment and the larger public interest involved.

The Court distinguished Ayyub Malik and Harmeet Singh and observed that those decisions arose from exceptional factual circumstances where the parties had entered into matrimonial relationships, continued cohabitation, and had children born out of the relationship. Those judgments could not be treated as laying down a general rule permitting quashing of POCSO prosecutions whenever a victim or her family expressed a willingness to settle.

The Court also referred to Gopal Lodhi v. State of M.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1795, wherein the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding quashing of serious criminal proceedings solely based on compromise. The Court highlighted the possibility of victims being subjected to pressure, coercion or inducement to enter into settlements. These concerns assume particular importance in cases involving children.

The Court opined that the concept of “lesser gravity” cannot be employed to dilute the legislative intent underlying the POCSO Act. Even offences involving physical sexual contact that may not amount to aggravated forms of sexual violence can still have serious consequences for a child’s dignity, bodily integrity and psychological well-being. The Court observed that factors such as the age of the child, the circumstances of the offence, the relationship between the accused and the victim, and any position of trust or authority occupied by the accused are all relevant considerations.

The Court concluded that criminal proceedings involving offences under the POCSO Act cannot be quashed solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise between the accused and the victim or the victim’s family, even where the offence is alleged to be of comparatively lesser gravity. At the same time, the Court clarified that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court remains available where the allegations are inherently improbable, the essential ingredients of the offence are absent, or the proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, or amount to an abuse of process within the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. However, such jurisdiction must be exercised on the merits of the case and not merely because a settlement has been reached.

Also Read: Quashment of POCSO FIR amid compromise and pregnancy: Allahabad HC

Decision

Answering the reference, the Court held that criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act cannot ordinarily be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers solely on the basis of settlement or compromise between the accused and the victim or the victim’s family. The Court directed that the matter be placed before the Single Judge for consideration of the petition on its merits in light of the principles laid down in the reference order.

[Ummer v. State of Kerala, ICR (Crl. MC) No. 9 of 2025, decided on 5-11-2026]

*Judgment authored by: Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V.


Advocates who appeared in this case :

For the Petitioner: Cibi Thomas, Swarna Thomas, Anusree K., Advocate.

For the Respondents: Ambika Devi, Spl PP; K. Praveen Kumar; Raji P. Mathews, Sr. PP.


1. [2024 KLT OnLine 2075]

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