Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: Bibek Chaudhari, J., considered the question as to whether Section 482 CrPC is applicable in relation to an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

The following is a summary of High Court’s determination on legal points that were before it for consideration.

 Issue

In a case set in the backdrop of allegations of violence and harassment advanced by the daughter-in-law against her husband and in-laws, the High Court determined the following questions:

(1) Whether Magistrate’s order in a proceeding under Section 12 read with Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on the point of maintainability of said proceeding can be quashed under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

(2) Whether an appeal under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act shall lie against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate upon an application filed by the respondent(s) challenging maintainability of the application under Section 12 of the said Act?

Determination

After a comprehensive discussion revolving around various provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, inherent powers of High Court and the judicial opinion on the same, the Court concluded that:

(i) Respondent(s) can challenge maintainability of an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act filed by the aggrieved person before the Court of the Magistrate immediately after appearance in the proceeding by filing appropriate petition.

(ii) The Magistrate shall dispose of such application challenging maintainability of the proceeding under Section 12 after giving the opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved person. An aggrieved party may file an appeal under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act against the order passed by the Magistrate before the Sessions Judge.

(iii) Against the order passed by the court of appeal, a revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC shall lie.

(iv) Alternatively, a respondent may file an application under Section 482 CrPC challenging maintainability of a proceeding under Section 12 of the Act for quashing of the proceedings immediately on receipt of notice before the High Court.

(v) An order upon an application challenging maintainability under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act shall not be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

While so holding, the High Court differed from the decision of the Single Judge of Madras High Court in P. Pathmanathan v. V. Monica, (2021) 2 CTC 57, which inter alia held that the petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable. The Madras High Court said that the relief under the Domestic Violence Act will be granted by a civil or criminal or family court.

It is also important to note that the High Court held that a proceeding under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act is final in nature affecting the rights and/or liabilities of the parties in relation to the question as to whether the aggrieved person is entitled to get relief under Section 18-22 and Section 23(2) of the said Act. [Chaitanya Singhania v. Khushboo Singhania, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2602, decided on 27-09-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioners:

Mr. Sabyasachi Banerjee, Adv. Mr. Anirban Dutta, Adv.

Mr. Abhishek Jain, Adv.

For the Respondent:

Sanjoy Bose, Adv.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Emphasizing on the gravity of seriousness of Section 307 Penal Code, 1860, Subramonium Prasad, J., observed that,

“…an offence under Section 307 IPC will fall under the category of heinous offence, and therefore, has to be treated as a crime against the society and not against the individual alone and the proceedings under Section 307 IPC cannot be quashed only on the ground that the parties have resolved the entire disputes amongst themselves.”

Present matter was in the Court for quashing an FIR registered for offences under Section 307/34 of Penal Code, 1860.

Factual Matrix

It was stated that victim was assaulted by some unknown persons and the nature of injuries was opined to be serious, for further treatment he was shifted to RML Hospital.

Since the victim was unfit for treatment, his father gave a statement wherein he stated that Hannan and petitioner were quarrelling with his son. They both were holding the victim and then stabbed him. After stabbing, they escaped from the spot.

On father’s statement, the FIR was registered for offences under Sections 307/34 IPC.

Hannan was declared as a Proclaimed Offender.

Further, the charge sheet was filed and enough material against the accused was there to proceed against him under the above-stated Sections.

Later the parties entered into a compromise and as per the compromise deed accused was to pay a sum of Rs 3,00,000 as compensation/medical charges. Accused had paid Rs 1,00,000 at the time of settlement and remaining amount would be paid at the time of quashing the FIR.

Crux

Quashing of criminal proceedings for offences under Section 307 IPC on the ground that parties had entered into a settlement.

It was noted that Supreme Court had a conflict of opinion with regard to whether an offence under Section 307 IPC could be quashed by the High Court while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC.

In the decision of State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2104) 4 SCC 149, it was held that an offence under Section 307 IPC is a serious offence and ordinarily should not be quashed by the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the parties have settled their disputes.

Further, Supreme Court in the decision of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 had quashed the proceedings under Section 307 IPC after noting the judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2104) 4 SCC 149.

In view of the conflict of opinion in the above two decisions, matter was referred to a larger bench of Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, wherein it was observed that,

“…It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove”

 (emphasis supplied)

In the above decision, Court also stated that the powers conferred on the High Court under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised keeping in mind the injuries sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.

High Court stated that in view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it can be seen that the fight involved in the present matter was not an ordinary fight between the neighbors, infact petitioners should be thankful that they are not facing trial in a case of murder because in ordinary circumstances the injuries inflicted by the petitioners were sufficient to cause death.

Victim was stabbed with a dangerous weapon i.e. a knife and the injuries caused were of such nature that they would have caused death in ordinary circumstances.

Hence, Court declined to quash the FIR solely on the ground that the parties entered into a compromise. [Mukhtiyaar Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4428 , decided on 20-09-2021]


Advocates before the Court

For the Petitioners: Rishipal Singh, Advocate with petitioners in person

For the respondents: Meenakshi Chauhan, APP for the State with ASI Naresh, PS Jaffrabad Complainants in person

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The Division Bench of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and MR Shah, JJ., while addressing a matter expressed that,

The administration of criminal justice is not a private matter between the complainant and the accused but implicates wider interests of the State in preserving law and order as well as a societal interest in the sanctity of the criminal justice administration.

Judges speak through their judgments and orders. The written text is capable of being assailed. The element of judicial accountability is lost where oral regimes prevail. This would set a dangerous precedent and is unacceptable. Judges, as much as public officials over whose conduct they preside, are accountable for their actions.

Background

 Instant appeal arose from Gujarat High Court’s Judgment.

Appellant and the first respondent had entered into a partnership deed under which a firm was constituted. Share of the first respondent in the profit/loss was alleged to be 55% while the share of the appellant – 45%.

Further, in the year 2017, a document styled as “sammati-lekh” was allegedly entered into by the appellant consenting to the execution of a sale deed in favour of a third party and the appellant agreed not to make any claim in the amount of Rs 3.89 crores from his capital investment. The appellant also agreed to relinquish a certain parcel of land belonging to the firm.

Anshin H Desai, Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that:

(i) An FIR was lodged on 6 December 2020 containing serious allegations involving:

  1. Interpolation of the deed of relinquishment executed by the appellant with the consequence that whereas the interest in only one property at Akota was relinquished, several additional properties have been included and the nature of the interpolation would be obvious on a bare perusal of the documents which have been annexed to the paper book;
  2. The deed of dissolution of partnership is purported to have been executed on a day when the appellant was not present in India but was traveling to Dubai;

(ii)  The FIR has been registered on the basis of the above allegations implicating the commission of offences punishable under Sections 405, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code;

(iii)  On the representation made by the first respondent, successive Memorandum of Understandings (“MoU” or “MoUs”) were entered into between the appellant and the first respondent; and

(iv)  Pursuant to the settlement, the cheques which were issued by the first respondent have been dishonoured and the title to the lands which were purported to be transferred to the appellant is under a cloud and is not marketable.

Bench in view of the consistent position of the Supreme Court, opined that the High Court was not justified in issuing a direction restraining the arrest of the first respondent till the next date of listing without reasons.

Court stated that the procedure followed by the High Court of issuing an oral direction restraining the arrest of the first respondent was irregular.

Oral observations in court are in the course of judicial discourse. The text of a written order is what is binding and enforceable. Issuing oral directions (presumably to the APP) restraining arrest, does not form a part of the judicial record and must be eschewed.

Absent a written record of what has transpired in the course of a judicial proceeding, it would set a dangerous precedent if the parties and the investigating officer were expected to rely on unrecorded oral observations.

Further, the Bench noted that the Single Judge by an impugned order had issued an ad interim protection against arrest till the next date of listing. The reasons recorded were as follows:

  • Proceedings are pending between the parties;
  • Both of them have set the criminal machinery in action.

Having recorded the above, the Single Judge had granted a stay of arrest “to strike” a balance between both the parties while observing that the investigation may proceed. To this, the Court expressed that how this would strike a balance between both the parties was unclear from the reasons adduced.

The formulation of reasons in a judicial order provides the backbone of public confidence in the sanctity of the judicial process. While directing that the proceedings are to be listed on a future date, the High Court is undoubtedly not expected to deliver a detailed judgment elaborating upon reasons why a stay of arrest has been granted.

In the recent judgment in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, this Court through one of us (Justice MR Shah) formulated the principles which have to be borne in mind by the High Court, when its intervention is sought under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash an FIR.

Supreme Court observed that while there may be some cases where the initiation of the criminal proceedings may be an abuse of law, it is in cases of an exceptional nature, where it is found that absence of interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution.

Adding to the above, Court emphasized that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the principles which have been consistently laid down by Supreme Court and reiterated in the above decision.

High Court was moved for the grant of ad-interim relief in a petition for quashing the FIR. The considerations which ought to weigh in whether or not to exercise the jurisdiction to quash must be present in the mind of the Judge while determining whether an interim order should be made.

In view of the above discussion, appeal was allowed and the impugned order was set aside. [Salimbhai Hamidbhai Memon v. Niteshkumar Maganbhai Patel, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 647, decided on 31-08-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court: Ali Mohammad Magrey, J., held that FIR under Section 482 of CrPC cannot be quashed at the threshold stage. The Bench stated,

“It is not proper to scuttle away the investigation at its thresh-hold stage, if FIR discloses the commission of offences; High Court should not interfere with the investigation which would amount to stalling the investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise powers in accordance with the provisions of criminal Code.”

 The instant petition was filed assail the impugned FIR under Section 5(1)(e) read with 5(2) of J&K Prevention of Corruption Act 2006 read with Section 168 Ranbir Penal Code and to seek directions commanding the respondents not to cause any kind of interference into the business activities as well as the properties of the petitioner in any manner.

The Petitioner claimed to have resigned from the post of Junior Assistant in the Rural Development Department in 2017, which stated to have been accepted by the respondents on 15-01-2018 and thereafter he was doing his business and trading, paying his regular income taxes, but while doing so, he was stated to be implicated in corrupt activities stating that he had indulged in business activities while in active Government Service and, had, therefore, accumulate disproportionate assets beyond his known source of income in the shape of moveable/immoveable properties on his own name.

The petitioner challenged the FIR and subsequent investigation on the grounds that the very context/reading of the FIR did not disclose the commission of offence under Section 5 (1) (e) read with 5 (2) of J&K Prevention of Corruption Act 2006 read with Section 168 RPC as the language used in the FIR did not meet the ingredients for commission of aforesa0id offences. The petitioner submitted that the property mentioned in the FIR did not belong to him and was owned by different entities. Calling the FIR a misconduct on the first count, the petitioner contended that he was not a public servant and had retired three years ago from the Government employment and was not indulged in any business activities during his service.

Whether the FIR containing allegations which set the police in motion, can be quashed at the threshold stage?

Answering the question in negative, the Bench stated that the remedy under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked into service only in the following circumstances:

  1. to pass orders in order to give effect to an order passed under CrPC
  2. to prevent abuse of process of Court
  3. to secure the ends of justice: and
  4. to prevent mis-carriage of justice

Keeping in view the allegations contained in the FIR, the Bench opined that it could by no stretch of imagination be said that the case of petitioner fell within the ambit/contours of section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court in catena of decisions had discussed the scope of Section 561-A CrPC corresponding to Section 482 CrPC of Central Code and had laid down the following tests:

  1. “Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint even if are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
  2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
  3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
  4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
  5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
  6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party:
  7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

 Applying the tests laid down above, the Bench stated that the entire matter was at its infancy stage and did not fall within the four corners of the tests laid down. The Bench stated,

 “This Court has only to ascertain whether the allegations made in the FIR do disclose or do not disclose the commission of offences, if it does, then it cannot be quashed at its thresh-hold stage.”

 In Som Mittal v. State of Karnataka, 2008 AIR SCW 1003, the Supreme Court had held that,

“It has been consistently held that the power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under section 482 of the CrPC is not the rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that grave miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal.” 

While keeping in view the scope of section 482 CrPC the Court should refrain from making prima facie decision at interlocutory stage when entire facts of the case are incomplete, hazy and more so, when material evidence is yet to be collected and issues involved could not be seen in their true perspective.

In the backdrop of above, the Bench held that prima facie it appeared that the allegations contained in the FIR relate to the offences which were cognizable and non-cognizable and hence, warrant investigation. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. [Mohabat Ali Khan v. UT of JK, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 595, decided on 20-08-2021]


Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.


Appearance by:

For the Petitioner: Sr. Advocate Mohsin Qadri with Advocate Mohammad Tahseen

For UT of J&K: Sr. D.A.G. B. A. Dar and Inspector Irfan Ul Hassan (IO) Anti-Corruption Bureau (in person)

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. dismissed the petition and declined to entertain the present application in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The instant application was filed under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code seeking to quash the proceedings of Complaint Case No.10 of 2019 under Section 500 IPC, pending before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court. The present application also assails a summon order dated 18-01-2020.

Counsel for the applicant Mr Birendra Prasad Shukla submitted that the offence under Section 499 IPC is not made out inasmuch as the case is covered under the first exception to the section which provides that if the imputation is made for the public good, the same would not amount to defamation.

Counsel for the opposite party submitted that the question as to whether imputation is made for public good or not would be a question of fact which is to be seen in the trial and the same cannot be taken as a ground to seek quashing of the proceedings.

The Court observed that Section 499 of the Penal Code states as to when an act of imputation amounts to defamation. It contains four explanations and ten exceptions and section 500 prescribes punishment in such cases. The ten exceptions to Section 499 state the instances in which an imputation, prima facie defamatory, may be excused. The first exception corresponds to the defence which may be set up by taking the plea of the imputation being true and for public good. This exception recognizes the publication of truth as a sufficient justification, if it is made for the public good. Truth by itself would be no justification in criminal law, unless it is proved that its publication was for the public good.

The Court relied on Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590 and observed that while considering the plea of defence of public good, under the first exception to Section 499, it was held that public good is a question of fact and the onus of proving the two ingredients under the first exception i.e. the imputation is true and the publication is for public good, is on the accused.

The Court observed that defamation is both a crime and a civil wrong. In a civil action for defamation in tort, truth is a defence, but in a criminal action, the accused would be required to prove both the truth of the matter and also that its publication was for public good and no amount of truth would justify a defamatory act unless its publication is proved to have been made for public good. It further observed that the benefit of the first exception to Section 499 IPC being a question of fact, can be decided during trial only and cannot be claimed at the stage of issuance of summons.

The Court held “The protection of the first exception to Section 499 of the Penal Code, which is being relied upon on behalf of the applicant, is not to be seen at this stage.”[Rajesh Churiwala v. State of U.P, 2021 SCC OnLine All 501, decided on 14-07-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Vivek Varma, J., held that factum of disputed service of notice requires adjudication on the basis of evidence and the same can only be done by the trial court.

In the instant matter, OP had filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the applicant as the cheques issued by the applicant was returned by the bank with the remark “fund insufficient”.

A legal notice in view of the above-stated circumstances was sent. There is a presumption of service of the said notice and despite service of notice, the applicant did not make any payment nor sent any reply.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Bench stated that Section 138 NI Act was considered by the Supreme Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555, wherein the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act was enunciated.

The above-stated case was followed by the Supreme Court in Ajeet Seeds Limited v. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685 and held that absence of averments in the complaint about service of notice upon the accused’s is the matter of evidence.

Noting the settled legal position in the above cases, Bench expressed that the complaint cannot be thrown at the threshold even if it does not make a specific averment with regard to service of notice on the drawer on a given date. Complaint, however, must contain basic facts regarding the mode and manner of issuance of notice to the drawer of the cheque.

Supreme Court’s decision in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 689, was relevant to the present matter.

High Court elaborated that, notice being sent on 19-09-2012, if the presumption of service of notice within a reasonable time is raised, shall be deemed to have been served, at the best within a period of 30 days from the date of issuance. Applicant was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter.

The factum of disputed service of notice requires adjudication on the basis of evidence and the same can only be done and appreciated by the trial court and not by this Court under the jurisdiction conferred by Section 482 CrPC.

However, since the complaint case was pending since the year 2014, as per the mandate of the Act the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act ought to be concluded within 6 months.

Hence, the Court below was directed to expedite the hearing of the complaint case. [Anil Kumar Goel v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 410, decided on 7-06-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

Counsel for Applicant:- Anand Prakash Dubey, Pradeep Kumar Rai, Saurabh Trivedi

Counsel for Opposite Party:- Govt. Advocate Vikrant Rana

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Dealing with a case where Bombay High Court had granted interim protection from arrest to an accused facing serious charges for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the Penal Code and had ordered “no coercive measures to be adopted/taken”, the 3-judge bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, MR Shah* and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ deprecated the order of the High Court and held that such a blanket interim order passed by the High Court affects the powers of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences, which otherwise is a statutory right/duty of the police under the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C.

“We are at pains to note that despite the law laid down by this Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani[1] (…), deprecating such orders passed by the High Courts of not to arrest during the pendency of the investigation, even when the quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India are dismissed, even thereafter also, many High Courts are passing such orders. The law declared/laid down by this Court is binding on all the High Courts and not following the law laid down by this Court would have a very serious implications in the administration of justice.”

Background

The accused were charged for forgery and fabrication of Board Resolution and the fraudulent sale of a valuable property belonging to the appellant company to one M/s Irish Hospitality Pvt. Ltd.

Apprehending their arrest in connection with the aforesaid FIR, the original accused filed anticipatory bail application before the learned trial Court under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

Sessions Court, Mumbai granted interim protection from arrest to the alleged accused. This interim protection was further extended from time to time and continued nearly for a year thereafter.

The High Court passed the impugned interim order directing that “no coercive measures shall be adopted against the petitioners in respect of the said FIR.

The said order was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that no reasons whatsoever were assigned by the High Court while passing such an interim order of “no coercive measures to be adopted/taken” against the original accused.

“…the High Court ought to have appreciated that the original accused – respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein are facing very serious charges for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and, in fact, the FIR was transferred to the Economic Offences Wing and the investigation was being conducted by the Economic Offences Wing. It is submitted that, as such, the original accused were not co-operating with the investigation after having obtained the interim protection from arrest.”

It was argued before the Court that while enjoying the interim protection from arrest, to file an application for quashing after a period of almost one year and obtain such an order is nothing but an abuse of process.

Analysis

Practice and procedure in case of cognizable offences – Summary of catena of Supreme Court decicions

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr.P.C.

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.

What must be kept in mind before passing an interim order of staying further investigation pending the quashing petition?

Before passing an interim order of staying further investigation pending the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to apply the very parameters which are required to be considered while quashing the proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

“In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation.”

However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences.

“Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process.”

However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.

What happens in a case where the initiation of criminal proceedings may be an abuse of process of law?

In such cases, and only in exceptional cases and where it is found that non-interference would result into miscarriage of justice, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings and even may stay the further investigation.

“However, the High Court should be slow in interfering the criminal proceedings at the initial stage, i.e., quashing petition filed immediately after lodging the FIR/complaint and no sufficient time is given to the police to investigate into the allegations of the FIR/complaint, which is the statutory right/duty of the police under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

Hence, in exceptional cases, when the High Court deems it fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, may pass appropriate interim orders, as thought apposite in law, however, the High Court has to give brief reasons which will reflect the application of mind by the court to the relevant facts.

Why passing blanket order as passed in the present case is not the way forward?

“Granting of such blanket order would not only adversely affect the investigation but would have far reaching implications for maintaining the Rule of Law. Where the investigation is stayed for a long time, even if the stay is ultimately vacated, the subsequent investigation may not be very fruitful for the simple reason that the evidence may no longer be available.”

In case, the accused named in the FIR/complaint apprehends his arrest, he has a remedy to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. and on the conditions of grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C being satisfied, he may be released on anticipatory bail by the competent court.

It cannot be disputed that the anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be granted on the conditions prescribed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. are satisfied. At the same time, it is to be noted that arrest is not a must whenever an FIR of a cognizable offence is lodged.

However,

“So far as the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” till the final report/chargesheet is filed and/or during the course of investigation or not to arrest till the investigation is completed, passed while dismissing the quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and having opined that no case is made out to quash the FIR/complaint is concerned, the same is wholly impermissible.”

Conclusion

i) Such a blanket interim order passed by the High Court affects the powers of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences, which otherwise is a statutory right/duty of the police under the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C.;

ii) The interim order is a cryptic order;

iii) No reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the High Court, while passing such a blanket order of “no coercive steps to be adopted” by the police;

iv) It is not clear what the High Court meant by passing the order of “not to adopt any coercive steps”, as it is clear from the impugned interim order that it was brought to the notice of the High Court that so far as the accused are concerned, they are already protected by the interim protection granted by the learned Sessions Court, and therefore there was no further reason and/or justification for the High Court to pass such an interim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted”.

“If the High Court meant by passing such an interim order of “no coercive steps” directing the investigating agency/police not to further investigate, in that case, such a blanket order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and without even permitting the investigating agency to further investigate into the allegations of the cognizable offence is otherwise unsustainable. It has affected the right of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences.”

[Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, decided on 13.04.2021]


[1] State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779

High Court cannot issue a blanket order restraining arrest while refusing to quash the investigation


Judgment by: Justice MR Shah

Know Thy Judge | Justice M. R. Shah

Appearances before the Court

Senior Advocate K.V. Vishwanathan, Advocates Diljeet Ahluwalia, Malak Manish Bhatt, Sachin Patil and Rahul Chitnis

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division Bench of Z.A. Haq and Amit B. Borkar, JJ., while addressing the matter, observed that:

In the absence of a specific penal provision creating vicarious liability, an administrator of a WhatsApp group cannot be held liable for objectionable content posted by a member of a group.

Common intention cannot be established in the case of WhatsApp service user merely acting as a group administrator.

By the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant laid challenge to charge-sheet filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate in pursuance of FIR registered with non-applicant 1 for offences punishable under Sections 354-A(1)(iv), 509 and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

As per the FIR, applicant was an administrator of a WhatsApp group, that accused 1 used filthy language against non-applicant 2 on a WhatsApp group of which applicant was an administrator, that despite accused 1 using filthy language against the non-applicant 2, applicant had not taken any action against accused 1.

Further, it was alleged that the applicant being the administrator had not removed nor deleted accused 1 from the WhatsApp Group.

In view of the above, non-applicant 2 lodged the FIR against the applicant and accused 1.

Hence, the applicant has, therefore, filed a present application challenging filing of charge-sheet and continuation of proceedings against the applicant.

Crux of the Issue

Whether an administrator of a WhatsApp group can be held criminally liable for the objectionable post of its member for committing offences punishable under Sections 354-A(i)(iv), 509 and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

Powers of the WhatsApp Group Administrator:

A group administrator has limited power of removing a member of the group or adding other members of the group. Once the group is created, the functioning of the administrator and that of the members is at par with each other, except for the power of adding or deleting members to the group.

The administrator does not have the power to regulate, moderate or censor the content before it is posted on the group. But, if a member of the WhatsApp group posts any content, which is actionable under law, such person can be held liable under relevant provisions of law.

Further, it was expressed that, a group administrator cannot be held vicariously liable for an act of a member of the group, who posts objectionable content, unless it is shown that there was a common intention or pre-arranged plan acting in concert pursuant to such plan by such member of a Whatsapp group and the administrator.

In the FIR it was stated that sexually coloured remarks were made by accused 1 and applicant being administrator of the WhatsApp group had not taken action of deleting the accused 1 from the group, nor had sought an apology from accused 1.

Decision

In Court’s opinion, non-removal of a member by the administrator of a WhatsApp group or failure to seek apology from a member, who had posted the objectionable remark, would not amount to making sexually coloured remarks by the administrator.

Court found that essential ingredients of Section 107 of IPC that the applicant had instigated or intentionally aided by his act or illegal omission to accused 1 to make sexually coloured remarks against non-applicant 2 were conspicuously absent. Hence the said Section will not be attracted in the present case.

Section 509 of the IPC criminalizes word, gesture, or act ‘intended’ to insult the modesty of a woman. In order to establish this offence, it is necessary to show that modesty of a particular woman has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act.

In the present matter, the above-stated offence cannot be made out against applicant, when the grievance of non-applicant 2 was that accused 1 had used filthy language against the non-applicant 2.

To constitute an offence under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, a person must publish or transmit an obscene material in electronic form.

High Court in view of the above discussion, found no allegation or material that the applicant had either published, transmitted or caused to be published or transmitted in electronic form any material, which was lascivious or appealed to prurient interest or its effect was such to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who were likely to read, see or hear the matter contained.

Bench added that the applicant had neither published nor transmitted or caused to be published or transmitted any electronic form, any material which was obscene in nature.

Lastly while concluding, the High Court held that parameters of exercise of the powers conferred on this Court under Section 482 CrPC being settled, that in order to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and to secure the ends of justice, this power can be exercised.

Bench stated that the present case is the one where power needs to be exercised.

Taking the overall view of the matter, Court was satisfied that even if allegations in the FIR were accepted as correct and considering the material in charge sheet on its face value it does not disclose essential ingredients of offences alleged against the applicant under Sections 354-A(1)(iv), 509 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code and section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Hence the continuation of present proceedings against the applicant would amount to an abuse of process of Court. [Kishor v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 654, decided on 01-03-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

Mr R.M.Daga, Advocate for the applicant. Mr T.A.Mirza, A.P. P. for the non-applicant No.1.

Mr Sanjay A. Bramhe, Advocate for the non-applicant No.2.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Manipur High Court: In a petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing criminal compliant filed before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Churachandpur, MV Muralidaran, J., observed that

“It was incumbent upon the court below to have first discovered the basic nature of the dispute which altogether involves question of actual payment.”

The petitioner 1 and 2 are the Chief and Secretary of Lamdan Village Authority. The respondent was the ex-Secretary of Lamdan Village Authority and had voluntarily resigned from the post on 21-10-2013.

The respondent challenged the proceedings of the Special General Body Meeting held on 08-06-2013 thereby appointing the present petitioner-accused 1 as Chief before the customary Court as well as before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur , his objection was, however, rejected as the petitioner-accused 1 was properly appointed. A Civil Suit was also filed by the respondent to restrain petitioner-accused 1 from acting as Chief and declare him the Chief of the Village but he did not succeed in that as well. The present respondent then filed the criminal complained before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Churachandpur regarding cutting down of trees belonging to the common forest and selling them without the consent of the villagers.

The present petition was filed on the ground that the respondent had given the incorrect facts about the civil suit and had also filed a malicious complaint in order to harass the petitioner-accused 1 and failed to appear before the concerned Magistrate. There was a non-disclosure of material facts relating to payment of full transaction in a money claim.

The main issue was as to whether the petition filed by the complainant before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Churachandpur is confined to civil dispute and the course of action so adopted is abuse of process of the Court?

The Court observed that after perusal of the statement of the complainant-respondent and witnesses and careful scrutiny of records, it is established that the dispute relates to the civil nature, moreover, the respondent has concealed the material and relevant facts relating to the actual transaction that took place.

The Court relied on the judgment in the case of GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd., (2013) 2 SCC (Crl) 414 wherein the Supreme Court had elaborately discussed the controversy in hand and held that

“There is no dispute with regard to the legal proposition that the case of breach of trust or cheating are both a civil wrong and a criminal offence, but under certain situations where the act alleged would predominantly be a civil wrong, such an act does not constitute a criminal offence.”

The Court was, of the opinion that the lower Court failed to determine the nature of dispute first which was predominantly of civil nature and was deliberately categorized as a criminal offence in order to wreck vengeance.

The Court also relied on the judgment in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami v.  State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, wherein it was held that,

“The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.”

Applying the said principle to the case at hand, the Court observed that

“The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC is not to be exercised by this Court generally to stifle the legitimate prosecution but here the prosecution has been launched, in concealment of material facts in the name of wrecking vengeance on the applicants”.

Perusing the statement of the complainant and witness recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. respectively, in support of the complaint the Court came to the conclusion that

“no whisper regarding manner of committing forgery has been made which may give credence to the money claim. Perusal of the record further shows that as per annexures appended to the present application, the matter has been finally settled amicably. It is surprising that after the Petitioners had made it specific allegations regarding the respondent.”

The Court noticed that the complainant “very cleverly chose to brand a civil dispute as criminal offence”. It is obvious that the entire proceedings initiated at the instance of the complainant is in abuse of the process of the Court and the ends of justice requires that such proceedings which have been initiated with an ulterior motive should not be allowed to go unchecked as that would adversely affect the ends of Justice. When the dispute in question is discovered to be predominantly of civil nature then an attempt to make it criminal offence should be thwarted and discouraged. The payment made in full satisfaction of the transaction is to be ascertained on the face of evidence and documents which may be scrutinized by the civil court of the competent jurisdiction.

“The complainant instead of choosing proper forum for realization of the claimed outstanding amount, has chosen a different path which will not serve the ultimate purpose of full payment. The dispute in question is purely of civil nature and the proceedings in question are discovered to be misuse of the process of the Court and the same cannot be allowed to go on any further.”

Allowing the petition, the Court held that the entire proceeding was initiated with an ulterior motive and is an abuse of the process of the Court and the ends of Justice and therefore is liable to be quashed.

[M. Khuripou v. Pamei Dimpu, Crl. Petn. No. 24 of 2014, decided on 28-02-2020]


Appearance made before the Court by:

For the Petitioner/Accused (s) : Advocate N. Umakanta

For the Respondent : Advocate S. Abung

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Rajnish Bhatnagar, J., held that:

“Once a cheque is issued by a person, it must be honored and if it is not honoured, the person is given an opportunity to pay the cheque amount by issuance of a notice and if he still does not pay, he is bound to face the criminal trial and consequences.”

Accused 2, 3 and 4 had approached Respondent 2 in January 2009 and allured him into investing Rs 50 lacs in their company with the assurance that the same would be doubled in 5 years and relying on such assurances, he invested his lifetime savings with them.

Accused persons failed to return the principal amount with interest being total of Rs 1 Crore but then he was further inducted to invest Rs 20 lacs more with the promise to return Rs 2 crores on or before March 2019 and that MoU dated 26-07-2018 was executed, whereby accused persons undertook to pay the complainant a sum of Rs 47,53,519 and a cheque was also issued; and that later MoU dated 05-05-2019 was executed and it was promised that the complainant would be made a partner in the business and receipt of Rs 50 lacs as principal amount was retained with the promise that it would be safe and secure with them and it would become Rs 2 crores in 2019.

On 18-02-2019 another Promissory Note was issued by accused 2 in favour of the complainant and his wife acknowledging liability to pay an amount of Rs 2,47,53,000/- payable to the complainant and his wife on or before 30-06-2019.

Later, in July 2019 nine cheques were issued and the said cheques were dishonored and while cheque at Sr No. 1 was dishonored for the reasons “account closed”, the bank returning memos in respect of other cheques from Sr Nos. 2 to 9 came with the remarks “kindly contact drawer”.

Respondent 2 served a legal notice upon the accused persons, which were duly served upon but since no payment was made under the cheque, the complaint was filed by respondent 2.

Accused 4/ Petitioner was summoned by the MM for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Petitioner sought quashing of the present proceedings on the grounds that neither she was a Director nor she had signed the cheques in question nor she ever participated in any of the meeting or negotiations with the complainant with regard to the transactions in question nor she ever executed any document, hence she had no role in the offence.

Analysis, Law and Decision

“…Negotiable Instruments Act, provides sufficient opportunity to a person who issues the cheque.”

Bench stated that the High Court cannot usurp the powers of the Metropolitan Magistrate and entertain a plea of an accused, as to why he should not be tried under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

The plea regarding why he should not be tried under Section 138 NI Act is to be raised by the accused before the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate.

Further, the High Court expressed that an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is technical in nature and defences, which an accused can take, are inbuilt; for instance, the cheque was given without consideration, the accused was not a Director at that time, accused was a sleeping partner or a sleeping Director, cheque was given as a security etc., etc., the onus of proving these defences is on the accused alone, in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Burden of Proving

Offence under Section 138 NI Act is an offence in the personal nature of the complainant and since it is within the special knowledge of the accused as to why he is not to face trial under Section 138 NI Act, he alone had to take the plea of defense and the burden cannot be shifted to complainant.

“…no presumption that even if an accused fails to bring out his defense, he is still to be considered innocent.”

If an accused has a defense against dishonour of the cheque in question, it is he alone who knows the defense and responsibility of spelling out this defense to the Court and then proving this on the accused.

In the instant case, respondent 2/complainant stated that under Section 138 of N.I. Act has made specific averments that while Accused’s 2 and 3 were directors of the company, accused 4 had been handling finance and accounts of the accused 1 company and responsible for its day to day operations alongwith other accused persons.

Court stated that the plea raised for the petitioner that Summy Bhasin never participated in any negotiations with the complainant cannot be considered at this preliminary stage since such defense can only be considered during the trial stage.

Prosecution under Section 138 of the Act can be launched for vicarious liability against any person, who at the time of commission of offence was in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company.

Petitioners plea that the offences were committed without his knowledge cannot be considered at this stage considering the fact that the Complainant specifically averred that negotiations had taken place with him along with other co-accused persons and they were prima facie aware about the whole series of transaction.

Lastly, Bench expressed that the deal with the complainant was not a trivial or a routine case of marketing, sale or purchase of goods or services.

When such a huge investment was being sought from the complainant and applied for the running of the affairs of the company, it is not fathomable that the accused persons were unaware of the financial implications for themselves and for the accused company.

In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, Court cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint or delve into the disputed questions of facts.

Therefore, it can be concluded from the above discussion that, Section 138 of the NI Act spells out the ingredients of the offence and the said ingredients are to be satisfied mainly on the basis of documentary evidence, keeping in mind the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as the provisions of Section 146 of the Act.

“…trial that alone can bring out the truth so as to arrive at a just and fair decision for the parties concerned.”[Summy Bhasin v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1189, decided 10-03-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., with regard to the settlement of disputes stated that:

“In crimes which seriously endangers the well being of the society, it is not safe to leave the crime doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably. “

The instant petition was filed under Section 482 CrPC for offence under Sections 419, 467, 471, 474, 376, 354, 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860.

Petitioner/Accused had met respondent 2 and revealed that his name to be Shiva and promised the complainant to marry her. Complainant and the Petitioner became intimate and had a physical relationship she had been promised marriage by the petitioner.

Later the respondent 2/complainant came to know that the petitioner had concealed his identity and his real name as ‘Akhtar’.

Respondent 2/Complainant stated in the FIR that the petitioner took her to Arya Samaj Mandir wherein they got married and in the marriage certificate he gave his name as Akhtar. After the marriage, the petitioner started demanding money and when respondent 2 visited his parents, she was driven away with them.

The instant petition was filed as the parties amicably settled their dispute.

A Status Report was also filed wherein it was stated that Akhtar/Shiva hid his identity and was sexually exploiting the respondent 2 for five years. It was also stated that the petitioner forged Aadhaar Cards and has got two Aadhaar Cards, one in the name of Akhtar and the second in the name of Shiva. On further investigation, it was also found that the marriage certificate was also fake.

Analysis and Decision

Bench stated that the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings is those offences which are non-compoundable is recognized.

Court noted that the Supreme Court time and again held that the High Court has to keep in mind the subtle distinction between the power of compounding offences given to the Court under Section 320 CrPC and the quashing of criminal proceedings and the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 CrPC.

For the above purpose, Court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705.

Further, the Bench added that:

“While exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC, High Court is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power.”

 Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein it has been elaborated under what circumstances, criminal proceedings in a non-compoundable case could be quashed when there is a settlement between the parties.

In the case of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Supreme Court laid down principles by which the High Courts should be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties.

Court expressed that:

An offence of rape is an offence against the society at large and apart from offence under Section 376, the petitioner is also accused of committing offences under Sections 419,467,468,471,474,506 and 34 IPC.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, Bench opined that it is not in a position to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties and wherein it was stated that the petitioner/accused and the respondent 2 decide to stay as husband and wife and lead their peaceful marital life.

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when parties reach a settlement and on that basis a petition is filed for quashing criminal proceedings, the guiding factor for the High Court before quashing the complaint in such cases would be to secure; a) ends of justice, b) to prevent abuse of process of any court.

In view of the FIR and Status Report, Bench held that it’s evident that the petitioner has been accused of serious offences like rape and forgery having a bearing on vital societal interest and these offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but rather will have an effect on the society at large.[Akhtar v. GNCTD,  2021 SCC OnLine Del 260 , decided on 01-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Haraprasad Sahu, Advocate

Respondents: Kusum Dhalla, APP for State

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., in regard to quashing of FIRs expressed that:

“High Court cannot mechanically quash FIRs for non-compoundable offences by exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC just because parties have decided to bury their hatchets.”

The instant petition was filed for quashing of an FIR for offences under Section 377 of Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act).

Respondent 2/Complainant stated that after completion of his work when he reached home, he saw his 7 year old son crying, who told him that the accused who stayed in the same building had come and sodomosied him.

It was further stated that the underwear of the child was wet with blood. On completion of investigation, there was enough material to proceed against the petitioner for offences under Section 377 IPC and Section 4 POCSO Act.

The reason that has been stated for quashing of the FIR was due to the intervention of the elders of the society and friends. In view of the same, parties decided to put an amicable end to the disputes.

Analysis and Decision

Bench while analysis the facts and circumstances of the case, stressed that Section 377 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act are non- compoundable offences and while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings for non-compundable offences on the basis of compromise, the High Court should scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and the cruxof the settlement.

While stating the above position, Court referred to the decision of Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29.

Bench also referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court:

The offence in the instant case was of grave nature.

POCSO Act was enacted only because sexual offences against children were not being adequately addressed by the existing laws and the purpose of the Act was to provide protection to children from sexual assault and sexual harassment and for safeguarding the interest and well being of children.

While noting the above stated objective of the POCSO Act, Bench stated that permitting such offences to be compromised and quashing FIRs would not secure the interest of justice.

Calling out the impact of such offences to be a serious one, Court also stated that, an offence under Section 377 IPC committed on a child of 7 years or an offence under Section 4 of the POCSO Act shows the mental depravity of the offender and cannot be said to be private in nature.

Hence, Court opined that the father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle the dispute and the Bench cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused was being prosecuted for an offence that shocks the value system of a society.

Deterrence to others committing similar offence is a must and they cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be compromised.

Therefore, Bench dismissed the petition in view of the above discussion. [Sunil Raikwar v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 258,  decided on 29-01-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Amit Gupta, Advocate

Respondents: Kusum Dhalla, APP for the State and Rahul Raheja, Advocate for R-2

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dinesh Kumar Singh-I, J., while discussing abetment of suicide, stated that:

“…if some act either of omission or commission results in instigation to the victim to commit suicide, that act would also be treated to be an abetment.”

Factual Background of a Woman Subjected to Torture in demand of Dowry

Informant stated that his daughter was married with accused-applicant 1 in accordance with the Hindu rites and as per demands, dowry was provided. At the time of marriage, the applicant 1 (husband), applicant 2, Om Prakash Mishra (father-in-law), applicant 3, Rakesh Mishra, (brother-in-law) started demanding four-wheeler as additional dowry because of which ‘Bidai’ of his daughter could be done.

After a lot of persuasion, the Gauna was performed and when her daughter (deceased) went to her matrimonial home, all the accused-applicants started making taunts that marriage was performed for very cheap, further it was made clear to the deceased that unless the amount asked for is fulfilled, it would be difficult for her to live in matrimonial home peacefully.

Mental and Physical Harassment

Victim was harassed mentally and physically on various occasions, she was pressurized to give her jewellery to which she refused and was beaten up by banging her head against the wall and subjected to filthy language and threat of divorce.

Victim’s husband used to increase the volume of the T.V and close the door of the house so that screaming or weeping of the deceased would not go out, even the family members of the accused-applicant 1 used to call the victim and harass her on the phone.

Accused-Applicant 1 later, dropped the deceased near the house of the informant retaining the jewellery at his home and further filed for divorce.

Suicide

Later it was stated that, since the informant’s daughter used stay disturbed mentally because of the case having been filed against her and having received notices from the Court, she used to say that despite having been tortured, she could not get any case registered against the persons of her sasural and was passing time with her child in her parents’ home and even then, she was not being allowed to remain peacefully and in these circumstances after getting fed-up, on 23-10-2017 she committed suicide by hanging herself by a stole from the ceiling fan, for which the accused- applicants are responsible.

Analysis of the Bench

The above-stated circumstances could be treated to have been driven the deceased to commit suicide which could have taken to fall in the category of abetting the commission of suicide by the deceased.

Court expressed that:

Merely because the deceased died at the parent’s house, is being hammered as the main argument on the part of the applicant, to be the reason why abetment to commit suicide should not be taken to be established in this case even prima-facie.

Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Guru Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200, wherein it was held that in order to give finding of abetment under Section 107, which is necessary to sustain the conviction of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, it must be established that the accused instigated a person either by an act of omission or commission or by persistent cruelty or harassment.

Circumstances or atmosphere in the matrimonial home without the instigation of suicide being established in someway are not enough to sustain the conviction on abetment of suicide.

 Conclusion

In the instant case, Court noted that it came on record that various litigations had been thrust upon the deceased from the side of the accused-applicants which might have generated a situation in which deceased found no way out but to commit suicide.

Bench stated that it may tour out to be not finally proved that the applicants were involved in the commission of this offence but in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC:

this Court cannot give finding in this regard as the evidence, which is likely to be recorded before the trial court, the said evidence would be appreciated by the said court then only finding can be returned on this point.

While dismissing the application, Court held that if the applicants appear and surrender before the Court below within 30 days and apply for bail, then the bail application would be considered and decided in view of the law laid down by this Court in Amrawati v. State of U.P.,2004 (57) ALR 290, as well as a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437.

In case, the applicants do not appear before the Court below within 30 days period, coercive action shall be taken against them. [Kranti Mishra v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 81, decided on 22-01-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Counsel for Applicant: Shailesh Kumar Shukla, Rajiv Lochan Shukla

Counsel for Opposite Party: G.A., Akhilesh Kumar

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Manju Rani Chauhan, J., expressed that:

“At the present time, only from the temple of justice like Courts, everyone hopes for right and fair justice.”

Pursuant to an order, a letter had been sent by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra along with the explanation, who has passed the cognizance/summoning order on a printed proforma.

For what reasons did the Magistrate tender apology?

Magistrate, in the explanation given, submitted that due to huge workload and by mistake, he/she passed the cognizance/summoning order on a printed proforma for which he/she has tendered his unconditional apology.

Observation

Bench stated that the explanation given by the Magistrate concerned could not be acceptable for the reason that:

“If a Judge makes such a mistake, then from where will the general public get fair justice.

A Judge acts like a God, he/she should not make mistakes due to haste or excess of work. How will a normal man get justice when a judge makes a mistake because of the excess of his/her work?”

Court stated that it would not be in the interest of justice to proceed against the concerned Magistrate.

Bench warned the concerned Judicial Magistrate to remain more careful and cautious in future while passing any judicial orders. Further, added that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra shall ensure that such orders on a printed proforma are not passed by any judicial officers of Judgeship Agra.

With regard to the application filed under Section 482 CrPC being filed for setting aside the Order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra for quashing the entire proceedings under Sections 498A, 323 IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act, Court observed that the cognizance/summoning order was passed without application of mind on a printed format.

Further, summoning orders passed on a printed proforma had already been set aside by this Court in Application under Section 482 No. 41617 of 2019 (Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.).

Hence, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra after perusing the entire records shall pass a fresh speaking and reasoned order, in accordance with law. [Sanjay v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 44, decided on 18-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court:  Vivek Singh Thakur, J., while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, allows the present petition,  stating, “… power of High Court under Section 482 CrPC is not inhibited by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC and FIR as well as criminal proceedings can be quashed by exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, if warranted in given facts and circumstances of the case for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, even in those cases which are not compoundable where parties have settled the matter between themselves.”

 Background

The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by petitioner Girdhari Lal, on the basis of compromise arrived at between him and respondent 2, for quashing dated 07-07-2017, registered under Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 and subsequent proceedings arising thereto. It is contended on behalf of respondent 1 that petitioner accused is not entitled to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its power on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties with respect to an offence not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC.

 Observations

Pursuant to its decision, Court placed reliance over the following cases;

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, explaining that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with no statutory limitation including Section 320 CrPC.

Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, where the Supreme Court has summed up and laid down principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with criminal proceedings.

Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, it was emphasized by the Supreme Court that in matter of compromise in criminal proceedings, a commonsense approach, based on ground realities and bereft of the technicalities of law, should be applied.

With respect to the offence committed under the POCSO Act, the Court remarked, “No doubt Section 8 of POCSO Act is not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, as explained by Supreme Court in Gian Singh’s, Narinder Singh’cases, power of High Court under Section 482 CrPC is not inhibited by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC.”

 Decision

Quashing FIR against the petitioner, the Court said, “Keeping in view nature and gravity of offence and considering facts and circumstances of the case in entirety, I am of the opinion that present petition deserves to be allowed for ends of justice and the same is allowed accordingly.” [Girdhari Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. MMO No. 388 of 2020, decided on 04-01-2021]


Sakshi Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: R. Pongiappan, J., addressed the Criminal Original Petition seeking to quash the First Information Report of first respondent police as the same was alleged to be illegal.

The instant petition was filed to quash the FIR. The said FIR was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 294(b), 323, 324, 506(1) and Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002.

Petitioner Counsel submitted that petitioner 1 is the husband of the second respondent. Petitioner 1 had filed the original petition under Section 13(1)(1-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to seek dissolution of marriage. The said petition has been pending for commencement of trial.

In view of the above circumstances, to threaten the petitioners, respondent 2 lodged a false complaint and first respondent police without making my enquiry registered a case.

Analysis and Decision

Bench first and foremost referred to the Supreme Court decision on Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 14 SCC 350, wherein it was held that:

“5. Quashing the criminal proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence, or is frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same. It is not necessary that a meticulous analysis of the case should be done before the Trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. If it appears on a reading of the complaint and consideration of the allegations therein, in the light of the statement made on oath that the ingredients of the offence are Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424. disclosed, there would be no justification for the High Court to interfere.”

Bench on perusal of the facts of the case found that the averments made in the FIR clearly constituted the prima facie case for offences under Sections 294(b), 323, 324, 506(1) and Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002,

Court further relied on the Supreme Court decision in CBI v. A. Ravishankar Prasad, (2009) 6 SCC 351, wherein it was held that:

“Inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 CrPC are meant to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. These inherent powers can be exercised in the following category of cases: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution.”

Hence, relying on the above-stated decisions, the Court expressed that:

“…only in the circumstances that registration of case itself is an abuse of process of law, inherent powers can be exercised to prevent abuse of process of law.”

Petitioners in the instant case could not prove that the registration of the FIR was an abuse of process of law, therefore, Criminal Original Petition was dismissed. [Karunamoorthi v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 6026, decided on 02-12-2020]


Advocates for the parties:

For Petitioners: W. Camyles Gandhi

For Respondent 1: S.Karthikeyan Additional Public Prosecutor

For Respondent 2: K.Vasanthanayagan

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gauhati High Court: Soumitra Saikia, J., observed that

“..a valid decree of divorce by itself is no ground to deny the maintenance to a divorced wife.”

The criminal petition filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 sought the quashment of the Judgment and Order.

Wife/OP had filed an application under Section 125 CrPC claiming maintenance from the petitioner/husband @ Rs 5000 per month, later the husband filed a petition seeking to reduce the maintenance allowance stating that there was a substantial loss of income and was facing financial hardship.

In the meanwhile, the divorce case was decreed in favour of the husband. By the said judgment, the marriage was dissolved by decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(i–a) and (i)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Later, the husband’s petition seeking to reduce the maintenance allowance was allowed. The wife again preferred the revision petition stating that she decree of divorce would not automatically disentitle the wife from getting maintenance and the said revision petition was allowed by setting aside by remanding the matter back to the Judicial Magistrate Court.

Being aggrieved with the above, the husband filed the present criminal petition.

Analysis and Decision

On perusal of Section 125 and 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, it revealed that legislature engrafted the said provisions for the benefit of the wife, a child and the parents of any person of any in order prevent them from becoming destitute.

In the instant matter, the concern is with regard to the maintenance in respect of a divorced wife.

“…true purport of the provisions of Section 125 is to ensure that in the event the husband fails to provide for adequate sustenance on an application made before the Magistrate, the sections empower the Magistrate to order the husband to provide for adequate maintenance for the benefit of the wife so as to prevent the wife from being reduced to a destitute or be compelled to live a life of beggary.”

Supreme Court consistently has held that a divorced wife would also be included in the definition of a wife as it defined under Section 125 CrPC.

“…responsibility of the husband towards a wife will not cease merely because a decree of divorce has been passed severing the marriage between the husband the wife.”

Decisions referred by the Court:

Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri, (2000) 3 SCC 180; Manoj Kumar v. Champa Devi,(2018) 12 SCC 748, Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, (2019) 4 SCC 146.

Court upon perusal of the Supreme Court decisions stated that it is evident that Section 125 CrPC being beneficial legislation to provide for protection to the wife, a mere divorce between the husband and wife will not preclude the “divorced wife” from claiming and/or availing of the benefits available to a wife under Section 125 CrPC.

The husband cannot absolve his responsibility to maintain and to provide for the adequate maintenance to the wife unless there are evidences to support that the wife is no longer required to be maintained in view of certain changed circumstances.

Bench also added that the claim for maintenance of a divorced wife can only be defeated either on the ground that she has remarried or that she is able to maintain herself. 

“…a ‘divorce’ does not change the status of a wife in the context of Section 125 CrPC.”

“…power under Section 127(2) CrPC, can only be invoked by a magistrate for cancellation of maintenance granted earlier only when there are changed circumstances after grant of such maintenance under Section 125.”

In the instant matter, there was no change of circumstances, which required the magistrate to invoke its powers under Section 127(2) for cancellation of the order directing payment of maintenance.

High Court directed the trial court to decide the matter afresh. [Bijoy Seal v. Sefali Seal, 2020 SCC OnLine Gau 4024, decided on 30-09-2020]


Advocates who appeared before the Court:

Advocate for the Petitioner: P J SAIKIA

Advocate for the Respondent:  K KALITA

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Sanjay Kumar, J., quashed the proceedings under Section 499 IPC against the petitioner holding that the complainant was neither a family member nor a near relative of the deceased whose defamation was alleged to have been caused by the petitioner, and hence the complaint itself was not maintainable.

The instant petition was filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 seeking to quash complaint titled Sant Kanwar v. Raj Kumar Saini, Complaint No. 83 of 2018 under Sections 499, 500 and 501 of Penal Code, 1860.

It was noted by the Court that the issue of maintainability of the instant petition under Section 482 CrPC stands settled in favour of the petitioner as the inherent powers of this Court cannot be curtailed by existence of the alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 CrPC. 

On perusal of the complaint, respondent-complainant demonstrated that he claimed to be a follower of late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda, an Arya Samajist and freedom fighter. He stated that late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda was an inspiration and a guiding light for him. While so, he claimed to have read newspapers on 02-04-2018 and 03-04-2018, wherein it was reported that the petitioner had made several defamatory statements against late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda. It is on the strength of these newspaper reports that he filed the subject complaint alleging that the petitioner had committed the offence of defamation.

Section 199 CrPC deals with prosecution for defamation. Sub-section 1 thereof states that no Court should take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Penal Code, 1860, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. The said provision mandates that the complaint made by a ‘person aggrieved’.

Section 499 IPC defines defamation and Explanations 1 and 2 appended thereto give an indication as who would be a ‘person aggrieved’. Explanation 1 states that imputing anything to a deceased person would amount to defamation, if such imputation would have harmed the reputation of that person had he been living and such imputation is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2 states that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.

In view of the above, the Court stated that the ‘person aggrieved’ must have an element of personal interest, being either the person defamed himself or in the case of a deceased person, his family member or other near relatives.

Section 320 CrPC permits compounding of the offence of defamation but it is only the person who is defamed who can agree to the same. For the said, Patna High Court’s decision in Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh v. State of Bihar, 1986 SCC OnLine Patna 174 was referred to, wherein it was observed that though generally, the person aggrieved is only the person defamed, an exception has been made in the case of a deceased person but the ‘persons aggrieved’ even in such case are limited only to members of his family or his near relatives, whose feelings would be hurt by the defamatory statement, and none else.

In the instant case, the respondent-complainant did not claim to be a member of the family of late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda or his near relative. The summoning order manifested that he contended before the Magistrate that he fell within the definition of a ‘person aggrieved’ as his family was closely ‘related’ to late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda, but this claim seemed to have been based more on ideological considerations rather than any actual ‘relationship.

Explanation 1 to Section 499 IPC makes it amply clear that it is only the ‘family members’ or ‘near relatives’ of the deceased person, against whom imputations have been made, who can claim to be ‘persons aggrieved’.

Therefore, the respondent-complainant, who is not a ‘family member’ or ‘near relative’ of late Chaudhary Matu Ram Hooda, cannot unilaterally assume unto himself the status of an ‘aggrieved person’ under Section 199 CrPC, whereby he could assert that his feelings were hurt and maintain the subject complaint against the petitioner before the Magistrate for the alleged offence of defamation.

In view of the above discussion, the Court stated that the complaint was deficient and tainted in its very inception, therefore not maintainable. [Raj Kumar Saini v. Sant Kanwar, 2020 SCC OnLine P&H 2165, decided on 02-12-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Suresh Kumar Kait, J., addressed a matter involving the determination of jurisdiction with regard to the occurrence of a crime.

The instant petition was filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in regard to quashing an FIR for the offences under Sections 420/406 of Penal Code, 1860.

Facts of the instant case:

Since 2009, the petitioner through his sole partnership had been undertaking the business of fresh/dehydrated onions and garlic and other perishable items export to various countries like Europe, Gulf and rest of Asia.

In January 2018, the Complainant’s office, Tiger Logistics, approached the Petitioner and one Makbul Sheikh- salesman of Tiger Logistics. Makbul Sheikh represented to the petitioner that respondent 2 is a commission agent and can provide cost-efficient and reliable services.

Petitioner, based on the transit time of 21 days promised by Tiger Logistics, entered into a sales contract with his customer Sadro SRL, an importer based in Italy. Upon such commitment, the Petitioner provided 13 bookings to Respondent 1 for 26 containers.

The Petitioner only as a goodwill gesture as a sincere exporter and upon the insistence of the representatives of Tiger Logistics paid an amount of Rs.10,76,100 through cheque.

Over the month of January 2018, petitioner had sent 26 shipments of fresh onions through but the shipment did not reach the Port f Naples within 21 days.

Petitioner issued an email to the representatives of Tiger Logistics based out of Gujarat expressing his concerns with regards to the delay of 14 days in the delivery of the shipment of fresh onions.

Due to the Petitioner’s growing concern over the delay in delivery of shipments and risk of loss with every passing day, the Petitioner on 16-04-2018 issued another email to the representatives of Tiger Logistics based out of Gujarat expressing his concern over the delay.

The above-stated delay was acknowledged and accepted and in light of the same representatives of the Tiger Logistics apologized for the delay in the delivery.

However, to the dismay of the petitioner, there was complete failure on the art of the logistics service as promised.

Petitioners were subjected to a huge loss due to the delay in shipments. Respondent 2 started demanding approximately Rs 37 lakhs from the petitioner. Since there was an utter failure of shipping services provided by Tiger Logistics which cannot claim any part of the payment from the petitioner.

Since the petitioner did not pay the above-stated amount, present FIR was registered against the petitioner.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Bench referred to the Supreme Court decision in V.V. Jose v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78  wherein it was held that even in a case where allegation were made in regard to the failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 IPC could have been said to be made out.

Further, it was held in the above that, a matter which essentially involves dispute of a civil nature should not be allowed to be the subject matter of a criminal offence, the latter being not a shortcut of executing a decree which is non-existent.

Court in regard to the instant matter made an observation that:

“It is trite that an inquiry and trial with respect of an offence shall be conducted by the Court within whose local jurisdiction occurrence in question is said to have taken place and thereby cause of action has arisen. Section 178 and Section 179 of CrPC. are merely exceptions to this principle enumerated in Section 177, and their scope should not be enlarged on analogous consideration.”

Bench added that for determination of offences alleged to have been committed under Section 406 of the Penal Code 1860, Section 181 of CrPC lays down the jurisdiction of such court where “the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained.”

 Jurisdiction and Breach of Trust

In view of the above-stated, Court held that,

Since the transaction between the parties in relation to the transaction of goods took place in Gujarat, the representations and meeting took place in Gujarat, the goods were shipped from Pipavav Port Gujarat, bill of ladings were released from Ahmedabad Gujarat, the invoices were raised by the entity based out of Gujarat and the jurisdiction of such invoices were subject to the court of Gujarat, therefore, applying the direct principles of Section 181, only the court situated in Gujarat can exercise jurisdiction over the alleged criminal breach of trust, if any.

 In case of Jai Prakash v. Dinesh Dayal: (1989) 39 DLT 376, this Court held that where the accused is carrying on business in a city, agreement to supply to complainant’s branch office at that city is entered within the local jurisdiction of that city, institution of complaint at New Delhi on the ground that the complainant’s head office situated there, is without jurisdiction.

In view of the above-discussed law and the facts and circumstances of the case, the registration of FIR in question in Delhi is an abuse of the process of law.

“Investigating Agency and Court should not be made an instrument of compelling a party to come to a place far away from his own place, to submit to the jurisdiction of a Court which actually has none.”

Hence, in the instant case, FIR was without jurisdiction and therefore the complainant attempted to seek unlawful recovery of money which was purely commercial matter.[Ramesh Boghabhai Bhut v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1475, decided on 23-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Ram Krishna Gautam, J., held that as per Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, while exercising the inherent jurisdiction, High Court cannot make any comment on the factual matrix as the same remains under the trial court’s domain.

The instant application was filed under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the State of U.P. and Wsima Begum for quashing the charge sheet as well as the criminal case under Sections 420, 467 and 468 of Penal Code, 1860.

Applicants Counsel, Nazrul Islam Jafri, S.A. Ansari mentioned that allegations made against the applicant made out a case of civil liability as the applicant was alleged to have gotten her name mutated after the death of her husband under Section 34 of Land Revenue Act.

Applicant was married to Sagar Ali under Muslim Rites and customs and was blessed by one female child.

Applicant was subjected to cruelty with regard to dowry hence a criminal case was filed against her husband and in-laws.

Unfortunately, the husband of the applicant and his mother were murdered by unknown assailants. Due to the enmity and litigation, Parvej lodged a criminal case against the applicant and her family members on the basis of frivolous allegations under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 115 and 120-B of IPC read with Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Applicant, after the death of Sagar Ali, filed an application for getting her name along with her minor daughter’s name mutated at the place of Sagar Ali over his agricultural property.

In light of the above-stated, the application was allowed and the names were mutated in the revenue records.

Further, it has been stated that OP-2 claiming to be the second wife of Sagar Ali moved an application before the Court of Nayab Tehsildar challenging the above mutation order on the ground that she was the legally wedded wife of Sagar Ali. Hence the present applicant was fully aware of those facts even then, she got her name mutated with the wrong contention.

Tehsildar on hearing both sides, in 2014 had set aside the mutation order.

Analysis 

Civil Suits regarding agricultural land of Sagar Ali and his mother Ikhlasi Begum, with regard to disputed “will”, said to be executed by Sagar Ali, is pending before the competent Civil Court.

Ummeda Begum claimed herself to be successor along with her daughter Zoya for the property of late Sagar Ali and late Ikhlasi Begum. She claimed herself to be the only successor wit no other inheritor.

Court noted that in many other previous litigations it was fully in the knowledge of Ummeda Fatima that Sagar Ali was married to Wasima Begum, who was blessed with one female child. Even after knowing this fact mutation application was moved with an incorrect affidavit and incorrect application of documents.

U.P. Revenue Code Section 114 (c) provides that “A person who commits the murder of a [Bhumidhar, asami or government lessee], or abates the commission of such murder, shall be disqualified from inheriting the interest of the deceased in any holding.”

The prima facie case was disclosed for cognizable offence and it was not a ground for quashing of the FIR.

Offence of moving application, with false and fictitious contention, claiming herself to be sole survivor along with her minor daughter over the property of late Sagar Ali and his mother Ikhlasi Begum, and thereafter, fabricating oral and documentary evidence for it and getting name mutated, knowing the legal situation of debarring of inheritance and conviction in that criminal case of murder, prima facie, makes out offences for which charge-sheet was filed.

Section 482 CrPC, provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

In the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, Supreme Court propounded that “Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which after filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, or to delay the trial which enable to win over the witness or may disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of Justice.”

Abuse of Process of Court

In the Supreme Court decision of Dhanlakshmi v. R. Prasan Kumar, 1990 Supp SCC 686, it was propounded that “To prevent abuse of the process of the Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive.”

Hence in view of the above, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is within the limits, propounded as above. Therefore, this Court will not make any comment on the factual matrix because the same remains within the domain of the trial court.

Prayer for quashing the impugned order as well as the proceeding of the aforesaid complaint case was refused.[Ummeda Fatima v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1358, decided on 19-11-2020]