Delhi High Court: In a writ petition concerning the legality of disciplinary proceedings culminating in the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner, an officer of the Central Warehousing Corporation (Corporation), based on findings that lacked consistency and evidentiary coherence across the inquiry report, disciplinary order, and appellate decision, the Single Judge Bench of Sanjeev Narula*, J., held that failure of core charge in disciplinary proceedings, i.e., corruption under Article III, vitiated the penalty of removal from service and punishment must be reassessed on surviving minor charges under Article I and limited part of Article II. The Court set aside the disciplinary order dated 29 November 2022 and appellate decision dated 31 August; quashed the findings of corruption under Article III and “sleeping on duty” allegation under Article II; directed the reinstatement of petitioner with continuity of service, while monetary benefits were kept open. It further permitted the respondents to reconsider the penalty only on the surviving charges on the existing record, only after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Factual Matrix
The petitioner joined the Corporation as a trainee in 2014 and, after completion of training, was appointed as Senior Assistant Manager (General). He served at different locations and was posted as Warehouse Manager at Hanumangarh-II between February 2019 and October 2020, after which he was transferred to the Regional Office at Hyderabad.
The disciplinary proceedings were initiated by memorandum dated 22 December 2020 under Regulations 59 and 61 of the applicable Staff Regulations. Three articles of charge were framed. The first alleged that the petitioner had permitted a casual labourer to operate the weighbridge instead of authorised staff. The second alleged that he was found sleeping during working hours and that on 11 September 2020 he left his station without permission after marking attendance. The third article concerned allegations of illegal gratification, including receipt of Rs 75,000 from a trader’s representative and failure to explain other credits.
The petitioner denied the charges in his written statement and contested the proceedings. An inquiry officer was appointed, and the inquiry proceeded with examination of 7 prosecution witnesses and 2 defence witnesses. The inquiry report ultimately held Articles I and II proved, while Article III was held to be only partly proved.
A copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner, who submitted a detailed representation disputing the findings. The disciplinary authority thereafter imposed the penalty of removal from service, though without disqualification for future employment. The petitioner’s appeal was rejected by the Executive Committee, which affirmed the conclusion that the charges were serious and that acceptance of gratification stood established. This led to the present writ petition.
Issues for Determination
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Whether the findings on Article III (corruption) were supported by legally sustainable evidence?
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Whether inconsistencies between the inquiry report, disciplinary order, and appellate decision vitiated the penalty?
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Whether the penalty of removal was disproportionate in light of the surviving charges?
Analysis
At the outset, the Court reiterated the settled limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters and stated that “the primary responsibility for fact-finding lies with the disciplinary authority and, in appeal, with the appellate authority, which assess the material on record and determine both misconduct and penalty”. The writ court does not sit in appeal over findings of fact, nor does it reweigh evidence merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted where findings are unsupported by evidence or where the conclusion is one that no reasonable authority could have reached.
The Court noted that the challenge in the present case, however, was not an invitation to reappreciate evidence but a contention that the findings on the gravest charge, corruption, did not proceed on a consistent or coherent basis across different stages. Where the most serious component of the case was treated differently at successive stages, the Court was entitled to examine whether the ultimate penalty can be sustained.
The Court further observed that when an extreme penalty is imposed on the basis of grave misconduct, its legitimacy depends upon the reliability of that serious finding. If the foundation itself was unstable, the punishment could not be sustained merely because lesser lapses might still remain.
Article III: Allegations of Illegal Gratification
The Court noted that a close reading of the inquiry report revealed that all elements of the charge was not proved. While noting the transfer of Rs 75,000, the report also recorded that there was no material evidence of sharing of margins or illegal gratification and that no vigilance angle was observed. The allegation relating to Rs 1,13,610 was not proved. Thus, the conclusion of the inquiry report was that the charge stands only partly proved.
The Court noted that despite the afore findings, the inquiry report characterised the transfer of Rs 75,000 as a “clear case of bribery” and was unsupported by any reasoning or evidence of sharing of margin or illegal gratification. The report did not identify who demanded a bribe, what favour was extended, or how the transfer was linked to any proved act of misconduct.
The Court observed that the disciplinary authority, instead of addressing the qualified nature of the inquiry findings, proceeds on the footing that acceptance of gratification stood established. The appellate authority adopted the same premise without examining the internal limitations of the inquiry report.
The Court referred Union of India v. H.C. Goel, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 16 and stated that “even in a domestic inquiry, the conclusion must rest on material which reasonably supports it, and mere suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof”. It stated that an unexplained transfer may give rise to suspicion, but suspicion cannot take the place of proof in the absence of a rational evidentiary link.
The Court asserted that “the law does not permit a silent hardening of a qualified finding into a graver one”. Neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority confronted the internal limitations of the inquiry report and proceeded as though the corruption finding stood fully established from the outset. The Court held that penalty of removal cannot be sustained on these grounds.
Article II — Allegation of Misconduct
On the allegation of sleeping during duty hours, the Court noted that the inquiry report used varying descriptions such as “lying on the cot”, “sleeping”, and “staying in the cabin”. The distinction between lying down and sleeping assumes importance in light of the petitioner’s case as he suffers from back pain. The report did not adequately engage with this distinction and moved from a mixed description of conduct to a firm conclusion of proved misconduct.
Regarding second allegation of marking attendance and thereafter travelling to his native place, the Court noted that the explanation regarding leave application and subsequent approval does not conclusively establish prior permission. It, therefore, found that a limited lapse in leaving the station without proper contemporaneous permission may be made out, though it cannot be equated with grave misconduct.
Article I
With regards to the allegation in Article I, the Court noted that the petitioner allowed the casual labourer to attend the weighbridge was not disputed. However, it noted that the petitioner’s explanation regarding staff shortage and operational constraints was not adequately considered in the inquiry report. It opined that the conduct, viewed in context, might amount to irregular deployment or deficiency in supervision but does not assume the character of same gravity as corruption or moral delinquency.
Appellate Authority’s Decision
The Court noted that the appellate authority rejected the appeal on the ground that no new point was raised. The Court clarified that the purpose of an appeal is to examine the correctness of the decision on the existing record. Relying on Ram Chander v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 103, while concurrence with the disciplinary authority was permissible, but it must be preceded by independent application of mind.
The Court asserted that the appellate reasoning, resting as it does on the assumption that corruption stood established and appeal did not disclose any new or significant matter warranting interference, was “misconceived”.
Decision
The Court held that once the finding of corruption under Article III was found to be unsustainable, the foundation of the penalty stood materially altered. What remained were limited lapses under Article I and part of Article II. The allegation of sleeping on duty did not stand proved in the form charged.
In these circumstances, the Court’s opined that the proper course was to set aside the impugned orders and direct reinstatement of the petitioner, while granting limited liberty to the Corporation to reconsider the question of penalty on the basis of the surviving lapses and the existing record. The issue of monetary benefits for the interregnum should abide the outcome of such reconsideration.
Relief
The writ petition was allowed with the following directions:
1. The disciplinary authority’s order dated 29 November 2022, and the appellate decision of the Executive Committee dated 31 August 2023 were set aside.
2. The finding under Article III was set aside to the extent it treated the case as one of bribery, illegal gratification, or grave corruption. The finding under Article II was also set aside insofar as it held the charge of “sleeping on duty” to be proved.
3. The petitioner should be reinstated with continuity of service for purposes of seniority, length of service, and retiral benefits. The issue of financial benefits, including back wages, was open.
4. The respondents were at liberty to reconsider the question of penalty, confined only to the surviving misconduct under Article I and the second limb of Article II, i.e., unauthorised absence on 11 September 2020.
5. Such reconsideration should be strictly based on the existing record. There should be no reopening of Article III as a corruption charge, nor of the “sleeping on duty” limb of Article II, and de novo inquiry should not be conducted.
6. Before passing any fresh order on penalty, the petitioner should be given an opportunity of hearing limited to the question of punishment.
7. If the respondents choose to exercise this liberty, a fresh decision should be taken within 8 weeks from the date of reinstatement. Failing this, the petitioner’s entitlement to back wages and other monetary benefits should be decided within a further 6 weeks in accordance with law.
[Rajesh Choudhary v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 14348/2023, decided on 29-4-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Sanjeev Narula
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Ms. Prity Sharma and Mr. Ashwini Kaushik, Counsel for the Petitioner
Mr. Balendu Shekhar, CGSC with Mr. Krishna Chaitanya, Mr. Rajkumar Maurya and Mr. Divyansh Singh Dev, Counsel for the Respondent 1
Mr. Prabhas Bajaj, Mr. Rishabh Yadav and Mr. Harsh Chauhan, Counsel for the Respondent 2 and 3
