Service Law Archives

2022 SCC Vol. 3 Part 4

In Part 4 of 2022 SCC Volume 3, read some very pertinent Supreme Court decisions, involving aspects regarding reservation, accountability of social media platforms, service law and more.

Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15, 16 and 226 — Writ of mandamus in matters of reservation — Scope and limit: Order of High Court directing State Government to increase the percentage of reservation for a particular category, that is, to provide for 3% reservation/quota for sportspersons, instead of 1% provided by State Government, held, beyond its jurisdiction and a grave error. Court cannot issue a mandamus: (i) to provide for reservation or reservation for any particular community even on basis of any quantifiable data brought to its notice, or (ii) to collect quantifiable data to justify their action of not providing reservation. [State of Punjab v. Anshika Goyal, (2022) 3 SCC 633]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) & (2) and Arts. 194 & 105 — Accountability of Social media platforms, for posts made on such platforms by third parties: Extent of accountability of Social media platforms for posts made by third parties to House Committee of State Legislature, determined. [Facebook v. Delhi Legislative Assembly, (2022) 3 SCC 529]

Criminal Law — Public Accountability, Vigilance and Prevention of Corruption — Constitutional Authorities/Functionaries/High Public Offices — Security of Prime Minister of India: Directions issued for judicial inquiry into breach and lapses as the convoy of PM was stuck on a flyover for around 20 minutes. Records relating to PM’s visit seized and secured. Directions also issued for constitution of Enquiry Committee, terms of reference and stay of ongoing proceedings by Central and State Governments. [Lawyers Voice v. State of Punjab, (2022) 3 SCC 521]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 389: Suspension of sentence by Supreme Court on ground of plea of juvenility taken before Supreme Court for the first time, when warranted, explained. [Sagar Behara v. State of W.B., (2022) 3 SCC 526]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Bail: Grant of bail without considering relevant aspects and recording reasons is not justified. Law summarised regarding principles for grant of bail and considerations to be balanced therefore. [Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan, (2022) 3 SCC 501]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Failure to exercise quashment power — When not proper: In this case of alleged misappropriation of monies of complainant and others, main allegations are against other co-accused, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that to continue criminal proceedings against both appellant-accused herein would be abuse of process of law and court and unnecessary harassment to appellants. Hence, High Court ought to have exercised its powers and discretion under S. 482 CrPC and ought to have quashed criminal proceedings against appellants. Hence, criminal proceedings under Ss. 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC including charge-sheet, quashed and set aside insofar as appellants herein are concerned. [Rekha Jain v. State of U.P., (2022) 3 SCC 497]

Service Law — Pension — Computation/Calculation of pension: In this case, respondent retired after one month of rejoining from leave for about two years without allowances. Cl. 2(2) as modified vide Circular GO (P) No. 230/2012/Fin. dt. 19-4-2012 envisaged that for computing 10 months’ emoluments for purpose of average emoluments in respect of employee who retired from service on or after 1-1-2006 and who during part 10 months drew pay in pre-revised scale, their pay in pre-revised scale was to be enhanced notionally to initial pay drawn in revised scale. For calculating average emoluments as per Kerala Services Rules, if during period of ten months, employee was absent from duty, on leave with or without allowances which qualified for pension, or having been suspended was reinstated in service without forfeiture of service, his emoluments for ascertaining average were to be taken, at what they would have been, had he not been absent from duty or suspended provided that benefit of pay in any officiating post would be admissible only if it was certified that he would have continued to hold that officiating post but for leave or suspension. Thus, part of 10 months not equivalent to past 10 months. Hence, impugned judgment finding fixation of pension @ Rs 19,334 in revised scale justified considering last drawn pay of Rs 46,400 by respondent, calls for no interference. [State of Kerala v. Anie Lukose, (2022) 3 SCC 629]

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Supreme Court April 2022 Roundup: Anganwadi Workers’ right to gratuity; Regulation of Foreign donations; Lakhimpur Kheri violence case; and more

Most Read story of the Month

Producing false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct; Dismissal of service justified in such cases

“The question is one of a TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such a certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate.”

Explainers

Cases Reported in SCC

2022 SCC Vol. 2 Part 4

In 2022 SCC Volume 2 Part 4, read a very interesting decision, wherein a death row convict subjected a 5-year-old girl to rape, killed her by strangulation, and then disposed of her body, tied in a gunny bag, into a stream and the 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court finding hope for reformation and rehabilitation commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment.

2022 SCC Vol. 3 Part 1

In a pertinent decision, Supreme Court while rejecting claim for interest the compared it to the Shakespearean character Shylock and remarked,

“…the holder of the Bond has received their ‘pound of flesh’, but they seem to want more. Additional sum in our estimation is not merited as SIBCO has already received their just entitlement and burdening the defendant with any further amount towards interest would be akin to Shylockian extraction of blood from the defendant.”

2022 SCC Vol. 3 Part 2

In 2022 SCC Volume 3 Part 2, read a very interesting case wherein a case where a Constable’s name was recommended by the Superintendent of Police but the same was dropped down by the Inspector General of Police for promotion under the 10% quota of outstanding performance for inclusion in the B-I List for promotion to the post of Head Constable in the year 2004, Supreme Court held that mere recommendation of the SP at the initial stage is not sufficient to claim a right for promotion.

Case Briefs Supreme Court

Insertion of meritorious OBC candidates into general category list without disturbing the appointment of general category candidates? Supreme Court strikes balance

Supreme Court: In a service matter where upon reshuffling and on insertion of two OBC candidates into general category select list, two general category candidates already appointed and working since long would have been expelled or removed, thereby unsettling the entire selection process, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice to all the candidates involved.

Factual Background

BSNL issued notification in 2008 for filling up the post of Telecom Technical Assistants (TTAs). The recruitment was to be made by conducting a competitive examination of eligible candidates in an objective type paper of 200 marks. However, in the exam which was conducted no person from general category candidate got more than 40% marks. However, four candidates from OBC category obtained more than 33% marks.

Despite the poor pass percentage of candidates in the TTA examination, BSNL relaxed the qualifying marks by 10% for all candidates owing to the acute shortage of manpower. Accordingly, the qualifying marks were refixed at 30% for general category and 23% for reserved category.

However, two candidates, who were found to be more meritorious than the general category candidates subsequently were found eligible to be appointed against the reserved category – OBC. Therefore, the respondent No.1, who was wait listed No.1 in OBC category, approached the Tribunal for a direction to prepare a fresh list for all candidates based on relaxed standard and act on the said combined merit list. It was, inter alia, pleaded that there cannot be two cut-off marks for a single selection. It was submitted that there was an unreasonable classification by providing another set of cut-off marks and the action was discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

It was the case on behalf of the original applicant that those two candidates belonging to OBC category, who were having more merit were required to be adjusted against the general category seats and consequently the seats reserved for OBC category were required to be filled in from remaining reserved category candidates on merit.

Tribunal’s ruling

Tribunal directed BSNL to consider the candidature of the respondent No.1, if sufficient vacancies exist for placement of the candidates of OBC and further his candidature shall be considered against the present and future vacancies on OBC category.

High Court’s Ruling

Rajasthan High Court dismissed the writ petition preferred by BSNL by observing that the BSNL should have given appointment to the two candidates belonging to OBC category, against the vacancies which were not reserved vertically in the event of shuffling the said two persons to general category (admittedly both the candidates have secured and/or have more merit than the general category candidates, who were appointed). The High Court further observed that consequently the respondent no. 1 could have been selected against the vacancies reserved for the OBC.

Supreme Court’s Ruling

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, various decisions were taken note of wherein it was held that the reserved category candidates securing higher marks than the last of the general category candidates are entitled to get seat/post in unreserved categories. Further, even while applying horizontal reservation, merit must be given precedence and if the candidates, who belong to SCs, STs and OBCs have secured higher marks or are more meritorious, they must be considered against the seats meant for unreserved candidates. It is further observed that the candidates belonging to reserved categories can as well stake claim to seats in unreserved categories if their merit and position in the merit list entitles them to do so.

Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions to the facts of the case on hand, the Court noted that the two candidates, namely, Alok Kumar Yadav and Dinesh Kumar, belonging to OBC category, were required to be adjusted against the general category as admittedly they were more meritorious than the last of the general category candidates appointed and that their appointments could not have been considered against the seats meant for reserved category. Consequently, after considering their appointments in the general category, the seats meant for reserved category were required to be filled in from and amongst the other remaining reserved category candidates on merit such as respondent No.1.

“If such a procedure would have been followed, the original applicant – respondent No.1 would have got appointed on merit in the reserved category seats in the vacancy caused due to the above procedure.”

Therefore, the findings of the High Court were upheld.

The Court, however, was also alive to the fact that by reshuffling and on insertion of two OBC candidates into general category select list, two general category candidates already appointed shall have to be expelled and/or shall have to be removed, who are working since long and it may unsettle the entire selection process. Therefore, to strike a balance and to ensure that the two general category candidates, who are already appointed will not have to be removed and at the same time, respondent No.1 being a reserved category candidate also gets accommodated, if he is so appointed, in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court ordered that on reshuffling and on respondent No.1 being appointed now against the reserved category seats and while the Alok Kumar Yadav and Dinesh Kumar, belonging to reserved category, to be treated in the general category seats, two candidates already appointed and belonging to general category shall not be removed. However, respondent No.1 shall get the seniority from the date the general category candidates were appointed, who were having lesser merit than Alok Kumar Yadav and Dinesh Kumar.

[Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Sandeep Choudhary, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 524, decided on 28.04.2022]

*Judgment by: Justice MR Shah

Counsels

Amicus curiae: Senior Advocate Dr. Rajeev Dhavan and Advocate Gaurav Agrawal

For BSNL: Advocate Pradeep Kumar Mathur

For respondent no.1: Advocate Puneet Jain

Case Briefs Supreme Court

‘Can’t allow mass absorption of over 11,000 workers based on a flawed Report’. SC forms new Committee to put an end to the long drawn LIC versus temporary employees battle

Supreme court: In a long ongoing battle between Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and its temporary/badli/part-time employees over claim for absorption, the 3-judge bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, Surya Kant and Vikram Nath, JJ has appointed a two member committee to carry out fresh verification of the claims of workers who were working between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991 and who claim to have been employed for at least 70 days in Class IV posts over a period of three years or 85 days in Class III posts over a period of two years shall be carried out.

The Committee will consist of:

Justice P K S Baghel, former Judge of the Allahabad High Court; and
Rajiv Sharma, former District Judge and member of the UPHJS

In a 90-pages-long verdict that led to the aforementioned conclusion, the Court observed,

“The dispute is now of an antiquity tracing back to nearly four decades. Finality has to be wrung down on the dispute to avoid uncertainty and more litigation. Nearly thirty-one years have elapsed since 1991. We have come to the conclusion that the claims of those workers who are duly found upon verification to meet the threshold conditions of eligibility should be resolved by the award of monetary compensation in lieu of absorption, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands.”

Background

The genesis of the present dispute relates to a demand raised by the Unions on 4 March 1991, pertaining to the claim for regularisation of those workers who were employed India with LIC as temporary/badli/part-time workers from 20 May 1985 till the date of reference on 4 March 1991.

The Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT) which was presided over by K S Srivastav, directed that the temporary, badli and part-time workers who were employed after 20 May 1985 should be granted absorption on the same terms and conditions as was stipulated in the Tulpule and Jamdar Awards (in respect of workers who were employed from 1 January 1982 to 20 May 1985). LIC was directed to publish a notice in the newspapers for inviting applications from individual workers for absorption. If no regular vacancy was available, the award directed supernumerary posts to be created.

The Delhi High Court, however, set aside the said award.

On 12 December 2018, while dealing with the batch of contempt petitions, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court directed the CGIT to “look into the matter with regard to the claims made by the Union(s) individual workmen”. As many as 15,500 claims were submitted on behalf of the Unions, Associations and individual workers claiming absorption and the benefit of the Srivastav Award dated 18 June 2001. The CGIT submitted its report i.e. the Dogra Report on 31 May 2019.

The Dogra Report was primarily challenged by LIC on the ground that, as a consequence of the same, LIC would be required to regularise about 11,780 workers who claim to have worked for a limited number of days. No verification of these claims has been done either by the LIC or by the CGIT in the Dogra Report. This would amount to an illegal backdoor entry, which would be contrary to the statutory regulations framed by the LIC. Further, LIC would also face the issue of a lack of sanctioned posts for these workers.

Supreme Court’s Ruling

Dogra Report is Flawed

Holding the Dogra Report to be flawed, the Supreme Court observed,

“LIC as a statutory corporation is bound by the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. As a public employer, the recruitment process of the corporation must meet the constitutional standard of a fair and open process. Allowing for back-door entries into service is an anathema to public service”

The Court found the Dogra Report to be flawed as,

(a) It failed to carry out an accurate verification of only those Class III workers who had put in at least 85 days of work in a period of two years and Class IV workers who had put in 70 days of work in a period of three years;

(b) The lists which are appended to the report contain patent inconsistencies and errors as a consequence of a failure to carry out an adequate verification; and

(c) The report accepted the claims for absorption of those workers who were specifically governed by the decision of this Court in E Prabavathy v. LIC[1], in spite of an express stipulation to the contrary in the order of the Supreme Court as well as in paragraph 75 of the Srivastav Award;

It was, hence, held that,

“A public employer such as LIC cannot be directed to carry out a mass absorption of over 11,000 workers on such flawed premises without following a recruitment process which is consistent with the principles of equality of opportunity governed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such an absorption would provide the very back-door entry, which negates the principle of equal opportunity and fairness in public employment.”

Directions

A fresh verification of the claims of workers who claim to have been employed for at least 70 days in Class IV posts over a period of three years or 85 days in Class III posts over a period of two years shall be carried out;
The verification shall be confined to persons who were working between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;
All persons who are found to be eligible on the above norm shall be entitled to compensation computed at the rate of Rs 50,000 for every year of service or part thereof. The payment of compensation at the above rate shall be in lieu of reinstatement, and in full and final settlement of all claims and demands of the workers in lieu of regularisation or absorption;
In carrying out the process of verification, the Committee appointed by this Court shall not be confined to the certified list before the CGIT and shall consider the claims of all workers who were engaged between 20 May 1985 and 4 March 1991;
For the purpose of verification, LIC shall make available all the records at the Divisional level to the Committee appointed by this Court;
It will be open to the workers concerned or, as the case may be, the Unions and Associations representing them, to make available such documentary material in their possession for the purpose of verification;
The process of verification shall be carried out independently without regard to the Dogra Report, which is held to be flawed;
The payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement shall be effected by LIC within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the report of verification by the Committee

[Ranbir Singh v. SK Roy, Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 521, decided on 27.04.2022]

*Judgment by: Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud

Counsels

For LIC: Senior Advocate ANS Nadkarni

For Unions, Associations and workers: Senior Advocates Dr Manish Singhvi, Pallav Sishodia, R Singaravelan, V Prakash and Salman Khurshid and Advocates Nandakumar, Rakesh Shukla and Shailesh Madiyal

[1] SLP (Civil) No 10393 of 1992

Case Briefs Supreme Court

Producing false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct; Dismissal of service justified in such cases: Supreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where an employee had produced a fake certificate for seeking employment, the bench of MR Shah* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has held that producing the false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct and dismissal of service is a justified punishment in such cases.

The respondent in the present case was originally appointed as a casual employee with the Indian Oil Corporation. He was later regularized as a Helper after presenting a fake Secondary School Leaving Certificate. The disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service on him. However, the Bombay High Court directed reinstatement of the respondent without any back wages and other benefits.

The respondent had submitted before the Court that he pleaded guilty and admitted that he had submitted a forged and fake certificate on the assurance that lesser punishment will be imposed. However, the Supreme Court found that except the bald statement, there is no further evidence on the same. Nothing has been mentioned on record as to who gave him such an assurance.

The Court observed that,

“The question is one of a TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such a certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate. Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service.”

The Court also observed that no specific reasoning was given by the High Court on how the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority could be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.

“As per the settled position of law, unless and until it is found that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is shockingly disproportionate and/or there is procedural irregularity in conducting the inquiry, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority which as such is a prerogative of the Disciplinary Authority.”

Holding that the High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the Court observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above and considering the charge and misconduct of producing the fake and false SSLC Certificate proved, when a conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss him from service, the same could not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

[Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Rajendra D. Harmalkar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 486, decided on 21.04.2022]

*Judgment by: Justice MR Shah

Counsels

For appellant: Advocate Rajiv Shukla

For respondent: Advocate Suruchi Suri

Case Briefs Supreme Court

It’s time for the University to put an end to ‘Yuddh Kand’ and allow appellant to move from ‘Karm Kand’ to ‘Karm Phal Kand’: Supreme Court

Supreme Court: The Division Bench of Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian*, JJ., reversed the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court holding that where no particular qualification, particularly Master’s Degree in ‘Karm Kand’ was prescribed for the post of Lecturer in ‘Karm Kand’ either by the University Statute or in the advertisement, candidature of the appellant could not be rejected for not holding a Master’s degree in ‘Karm Kand’.

Opining that the appellant’s rejection was a result of stale relationship of the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, the Bench commented,

“…perhaps the entire selection process undertaken in 2006 by the University, became victims of the crossfire between the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor.”

Background

In the instant case, the appellant had approached the Court to assail the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court, which had dismissed his writ petition seeking to quash an order of the Chancellor of the Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapeeth University, rejecting his request to be appointed as Lecturer (Karm Kand). Admittedly, the appellant was engaged as a Guest Lecturer on remuneration from the year 2006 and ever since, he had been teaching students undergoing a one year diploma course in ‘Karm Kand’ for the past nearly 16 years.

Noticeably, the University had invited applications for appointment to the post of lecturer in “Karm Kand”. The genesis of the dispute was that though the Selection Committee had recommended the appellant’s name for appointment but the Executive Council disagreed on the ground that the Vice-Chancellor failed to request the Chancellor to nominate subject experts in the Selection Committee. Hence, initial objection was that the Selection Committee did not include the subject experts nominated by the Chancellor.

Issue before the High Court

Noting that there were no subject experts in ‘Karm Kand’, as no University was offering a specific course in ‘Karm Kand’, the High Court remanded the matter back to the Chancellor to ascertain whether subject experts were actually available and whether the failure of the Vice Chancellor to seek nomination of such experts from the Chancellor vitiated the whole process. Finding that the answer to the said question was too difficult to be provided, the Chancellor went on a detour to find out what are the differences between the subject of Sanskrit and the subject of ‘Karm Kand’. Consequently, the Chancellor held that the appellant did not hold a Master’s degree in ‘Karm Kand’; hence he did not possess the prescribed qualifications for appointment.

Analysis and Findings

Contrary to the order of the Chancellor, the Bench noted that the advertisement did not specify particularly that a candidate applying for the post of Lecturer in ‘Karm Kand’ should hold a Master’s Degree in ‘Karm Kand’. Similarly, the University Statutes did not prescribe any specific qualifications necessary for appointment to the post of Lecturer in ‘Karm Kand’, hence the Bench opined that in the absence of any specific prescription, the University ought to have referred the question of what constitutes relevant subjects, before the process of selection began. Further, the Bench observed that neither the University nor the Chancellor took a stand in the first instance that the appellant was not qualified in the “relevant subject”.

Considering that no candidate was available with a post graduate degree in ‘Karm Kand’ and the Selection Committee which comprised of a representative of the Department of Sanskrit found the appellant to possess a Master’s degree in the relevant subject. Another development that strengthen the case in favour of the appellant was that the Department of Sanskrit by a subsequent meeting had apprised that the Academic Qualification of the Karm Kand and for the post of Professor of Sanskrit be kept one and the same as well as the Specialized experience of karm kand be stipulated as compulsory which was passed unanimously.

Verdict

In the backdrop of above, the Bench opined that dismissal by the High Court was clearly erroneous. The Bench commented,

“…it is time for the University to put an end to this ‘Yuddh Kand’ and allow the appellant to move from ‘Karm Kand’ to ‘Karm Phal Kand’.”

Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the impugned order was set aside. The University was directed to regularize the services of the appellant.

[Dinesh Chandra Shukla v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 353, decided on 24-03-2022]

*Judgment by: Justice V. Ramasubramanian

Appearance by:

For the Petitioner: Advocate Sneha Kalita

For the Respondents: Advocates Sandeep Devashish Das, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi and Kamakshi S. Mehlwal

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together

Case Briefs Supreme Court

Explained| Does ad hoc payment made pursuant to the interim order of the Court form part of wages?

Supreme Court: The bench of Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian*, JJ has held that an ad hoc payment made to the workers pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court in a previous round of litigation does not form part of “wages” within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, for the purpose of calculating gratuity.