President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, Judge of the Jharkhand High Court, to be the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court with effect from 07-06-2019.
[Notification dt. 22-05-2019]
Ministry of Law and Justice
President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, Judge of the Jharkhand High Court, to be the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court with effect from 07-06-2019.
[Notification dt. 22-05-2019]
Ministry of Law and Justice
Justice D.N. Patel is a senior puisne Judge from Gujarat High Court and at present is functioning, on transfer, in Jharkhand High Court. Having regard to all relevant factors, the Collegium is of the considered view that Justice D.N. Patel is suitable in all respects for being appointed as Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. The Collegium resolves to recommend accordingly.
[Resolution dt. 10-05-2019]
Proposal for appointment of following four Judicial Officers as Judges of the Delhi High Court:
On the basis of interaction and having regard to all relevant factors, the Collegium is of the considered view that S/Shri (1) Talwant Singh, (2) Rajnish Bhatnagar, (3) Ms Asha Menon, and (4) Brijesh Sethi, are suitable for being appointed as Judges of the Delhi High Court.
Collegium comprising of Ranjan Gogoi, CJ and S.A. Bobde and N.V. Ramana, JJ. resolves to recommend that S/Shri (1) Talwant Singh, (2) Rajnish Bhatnagar, (3) Ms Asha Menon, and (4) Brijesh Sethi, Judicial Officers, be appointed as Judges of the Delhi High Court. Their inter se seniority be fixed as per the existing practice.
[Notification dt. 06-05-2019]
Supreme Court of India
This relates to the proposal for appointment of following two Advocates as Judges of the Delhi High Court:
On the basis of material on record and having regard to all relevant factors, the Collegium is of the considered view that the proposal for elevation of Shri Krishnendu Datta, Advocate, deserves to be remitted to the Delhi High Court. The Collegium resolves to recommend accordingly.
The proposal for the elevation of Shri Saurabh Kirpal, Advocate is deferred.
[Notification dt. 01-04-2019]
S.O. 1491(E)— Whereas the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Mohd. Yasin Malik faction) (JKLF-Y) has been declared as unlawful associations, vide, notifications number S.O. 1069(E) dated the 28th February, 2019 and S.O. 1403(E) dated the 22-03-2019, respectively;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), the Central Government hereby constitutes an Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal consisting of Mr Justice Chander Shekhar, High Court of Delhi, for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause of declaring the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Jammu and Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Mohd. Yasin Malik faction) (JKLF-Y), as unlawful association.
[Notification Dt. 29-03-2019]
Ministry of Home Affairs
No. F. 6/21/2018-Judl./Suptlaw/608-615 — In pursuance of the provisions of Section 10 of Delhi Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 2001, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi, is pleased to designate the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-02 in each District under Delhi Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 2001.
[Notification dt. 25-03-2019]
Department of Law, Justice and Legislative Affairs
S.O. 931 (E)—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 read with sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), the Central Government hereby constitutes the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal consisting of Ms. Justice Mukta Gupta, Judge, High Court of Delhi, for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) as an unlawful association.
Ministry of Home Affairs
Delhi High Court: The Delhi High Court took suo motu cognizance of violence and vandalism against members of the Delhi Bar. The Bar in it’s resolution dated 23rd January, 2018 and 22nd January, 2018 mentioned that the Counsel who were victimised were so victimised because they were appearing as counsel for a lady advocate.
The Court noted that there was shocking similarity in the design and manner of the execution of the incidents of violence and vandalism and hence, opined that the incidents could not be treated as separate incidents. The court noted that FIRs have been filed in relation to the incidents but even after a month, minimal steps have been taken by the police in providing assistance and carrying out investigation. The Court, stating that such violence to thwart legal assistance in pending cases is tantamount to criminal contempt of court. In view of above observations, the Court invoked it’s suo motu jurisdiction to call upon an immediate report from the Delhi Police. Also, it directed the matter to be treated as a writ in public interest. [Court on it’s own motion v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7221, decided on 29.01.2018]
Delhi High Court: Taking note of the fact that the legal practitioners are under a genuine doubt whether they require to get themselves registered under the Central Goods and Service Tax Act 2017 (CGST Act), the Delhi Goods and Service Tax Act 2017 (DGST Act) and the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (IGST Act), the Court directed that that no coercive action be taken against any lawyer or law firms for non-compliance with any legal requirement under the CGST Act, the IGST Act or the DGST Act till a clarification is issued by the Central Government and the Govt. of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD) and till further orders.
The matter was brought before the Court by Mr. J.K. Mittal, advocate, who contended that he provides legal services including consultancy, opinion, drafting, appearances before Courts etc. and although he has an office only in Delhi, he represents his clients throughout the country before various High Courts and Tribunals outside Delhi. The petitioner had challenged the validity of the Notifications issues by the Central Government and the GNCDT for being violative of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act 2017 (CGST Act), the Delhi Goods and Service Tax Act 2017 (DGST Act) read with Article 279 A of the Constitution of India. He has also challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9 (4) of CGST Act, Section 5(4) of The Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (IGST Act) and Section 9 (4) of DGST Act.
The division bench of S. Muralidhar and Pratibha M. Singh, JJ noticed that as of date there is no clarity on whether all legal services (not restricted to representational services) provided by legal practitioners and firms would be governed by the reverse charge mechanism and if all legal services are to be governed by the reverse charge mechanism than there would be no purpose in requiring legal practitioners and law firms to compulsorily get registered under the CGST Act, IGST Act and/or DGST Act. Those seeking voluntary registration would anyway avail of the facility under Section 25 (3) of the CGST Act (and the corresponding provision of the other two statutes).
The Court further clarified that any lawyer or law firm that has been registered under the CGST Act, or the IGST Act or the DGST Act from 1″ July, 2017 onwards will not be denied the benefit of such clarification as and when it is issued. Listing the matter to be taken up on 18.07.2017, the Court said that if the Central Government and GNCDT fail to give an appropriate clarification by the next date, the Court will proceed to consider passing appropriate interim directions. [JK Mittal & Company v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9087, order dated 12.07.2017]
Delhi High Court: Coming down heavily upon the current Education system, the Court that the Education system has become completely dehumanised and has become a machine that mass produces clones as individuality is frowned upon now.
The Court was hearing the matter of the suicide committed by an Amity University student, Sushant Rohilla, on 10.08.2016 due to allegedly being harassed for low attendance. The Supreme Court had taken suo motu cognizance of the matter on 05.09.2016 after the former CJI, Jutice T.S. Thakur received a letter from the deceased student’s friend and had transferred the case to Delhi High Court in March earlier this year.
Considering the fact that the student was barred from sitting in exams due to low attendance, the Court said that despite the fact that the student approached the University for help as he wasn’t able to attend the classes due to health issues, there was no response to his pleas and he was forced to take his life because system was not in place in his University. The Court said that there was perhaps an element of callousness in how the University handled the deceased student’s cry for help before he took the extreme step.
Delhi High Court: Deciding the issue of ban on the telecast of the BBC documentary “India’s Daughter” by the Central Government and Delhi Police, the Court observed that as there is a judicial order prohibiting telecasting and the matter is still pending before the competent court of law, more particularly as the investigation is still in progress, interference either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution was not warranted.
The petitioner had questioned the action of the Central Government and Delhi Police in banning the telecast of the documentary as illegal and without jurisdiction, violating the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was also contended that the prohibitory order was issued on a mere apprehension that it may lead to serious law and order problem is wholly unwarranted, apart from being without jurisdiction since the same is not authorised by any law. Since the documentary in question being a mirror reflection of the ground reality of the mindset of one of the convicts, the same needs to be appreciated and accepted so as to enable correction of the societal mindset of gender bias and social norms and to bring out the systemic changes in societal behaviour.
The documentary film is about the gang rape and brutal assault of a young woman on December 16, 2012 in a moving bus in New Delhi, known as “Nirbhaya case”. On February 28, 2015 BBC announced that the documentary film which included the interview of one of the convicts, would be aired on the International Women’s Day on March 8. An FIR was registered on the basis of newspaper and internet reports that the convict in the interview had made highly objectionable, grossly offensive, malicious and derogatory remarks hurting the feelings of women and that the publication and telecast of the same in print and electronic media may provoke breach of peace and cause public mischief. The Government issued an advisory on March 3, 2015 advising all private satellite TV channels not to telecast the documentary “India’s Daughter” or any excerpts from it or any programmes based on the said excerpts.
The Division Bench held that it is apparent from the facts borne out of record that the “advisory” was a mere advice to the private satellite TV channels hence, the petitioner’s contention regarding the validity of the “advisory” deserved no consideration at this stage. So far as the judicial orders dated March 3 and 4, 2015 are concerned, since the matter is pending before the competent court of law and more particularly the investigation is still in progress, the interference either under Article 226 or under Article 227 was not warranted. Disposing of the petitions, the Court left it to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to proceed with the matter following the due process of law and granting liberty to the petitioners or any aggrieved party to work out the other remedies under law. [Kritika Padode v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4360, decided on August 5, 2016]
Picture Credits: Indiatoday
Delhi High Court: Dealing with the question of situs or location of intellectual property rights in logos, trade marks and brands with reference to the income accruing in India from intangible assets, the Court held that income accruing from the transfer of intangible assets like intellectual property whose owners were not based in India cannot be taxed in India.
The issue related to the transfer of 16 trade marks and Foster’s brand intellectual property of the petitioner, Foster’s Australia Ltd. to SABMiller executed in Australia. By a brand licence agreement executed earlier, Foster’s India Ltd. had been permitted to use 4 trade marks in India. The licensed trade marks continued to remain the absolute property of the petitioner who received royalty and was subjected to withholding tax in India. The petitioner sought an advance ruling from the Authority for Advance Ruling (Income Tax) under Section 245-Q of the Income Tax Act regarding the issue of taxability in India having regard to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Australia.
The AAR ruled that the income accruing to the applicant from the transfer of its right, title and interest in and to the trade marks and Foster’s brand intellectual property is taxable in India under the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the subject-matter of assignment/transfer were situate in India.
The petitioner’s plea was that in the case of intangible capital assets the situs thereof has to be determined by the situs of the owner. Because of the nature of an intangible capital asset, the common law principle ‘mobilia sequuntur personam’ had been evolved, whereby a fiction is created to the effect that the situs of an intangible capital asset would be the situs of the owner of that asset. In this backdrop, since the owner of the intangible assets in question was located in Australia, the petitioner, being an Australian company, the intangible assets, which include the intellectual property rights of the petitioner, were also located in Australia. Therefore, the transfer of those assets would not result in any income deemed to have accrued in India and would not be exigible to tax in India. The AAR was of the view that since the intellectual property rights pertain to India, as they were used and nurtured in India and some of them were registered in India, the same had taken roots in India and therefore, were completely situate in India.
Upholding the petitioner’s contention, the Division Bench of Badar Durrez Ahmed and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ. observed that in the absence of a specific provision regarding intangible assets, the well-accepted principle of ‘mobilia sequuntur personam’ would have to be followed. The situs of the owner of an intangible asset would be the closest approximation of the situs of an intangible asset. This is an internationally accepted rule, unless it is altered by local legislation. Since there is no such alteration in the Indian context, the situs of the trademarks and intellectual property rights, which were assigned pursuant to the ISPA, would not be in India. This is so because the owner thereof was not located in India at the time of the transaction.The Court held that the income accruing to the petitioner from the transfer of its right, title or interest in and to the trademarks in Foster’s brand intellectual property is not taxable in India. [CUB Pty Ltd. (formerly known as Foster’s Australia Ltd.) v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4070, decided on July 25, 2016]
Delhi High Court: Disposing of a petition which sought freezing of the symbol “elephant” as the reserved symbol of Bahujan Samaj Party, the Court held that there is no power in the Election Commission of India under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 to withdraw/freeze an election symbol once allotted and/or reserved for a recognised political party and the only manner in which the symbol once allotted/reserved is lost, is on loss of recognition.
The petitioner had sought to draw the attention of the EC to the practice of erecting at public places and at State expense, statutes of political functionaries and symbols of the the ruling party, especially in Uttar Pradesh and to freeze the symbol “elephant” under Clauses 6 and 6-A of the Symbols Order.
Observing that recognition as a political party carries a right to a reserved symbol, the Court held that it appears that a symbol once reserved for a recognised political party under the prevalent laws, cannot be taken away. This is certainly a lacuna and which, if the averments of the petitioner are correct, has indeed been exploited by BSP. The Court held that a political party in power cannot use development activities carried out by it and which the government in any case is expected to perform, to propagate its symbol or its leaders so as to come in the way of a free and fair election. The performance of a political party in governance should be allowed to speak for itself.
The Bench of Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J. issued the following directions to the EC:
[Common Cause v. Bahujan Samaj Party, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3787, decided on July 7, 2016]
Delhi High Court: Deciding on the issue of legality and validity of the fee schedule prescribed by the Delhi Pollution Control Committee, wherein the petitioner Hotel was served with show-cause notices under Section 33-A of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 31-A of the Air (Prevention Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 the learned Single Judge Manmohan, J., observed that a writ petition solely praying for refund of money against the State is not maintainable. The Court held that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed not only on the grounds of statutory non-compliance of the environmental law, but also since the petitioner did not approach this Court with clean hands.
The petitioner had contended that under the threat of imminent closure and penal actions, it was forced to pay an amount of Rs 41 lakhs as condonation fee under protest, seeking consent to operate and that it was liable to pay Rs. 46,000 only as per the previous fee structure and sought for the refund of the remaining amount. The Court held that, to treat the omission on the part of petitioner to comply with the laws as innocent non-compliance trivializes the statutory provisions which has a vital and direct impact on the lives of the citizens. The petitioner continued to run his hotel without obtaining any “consent to establish” and “consent to operate” and without installation of any anti-pollution equipment for the past twenty years. Since a very important and salutary provision of the environmental law was not complied with by the petitioner, the Court decided not to entertain the writ petition in exercise of equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was dismissed. [Krishna Continental Ltd.v. Delhi Pollution Control Committee, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3629, decided on May 2, 2016]
The President appointed (i) Shri Justice Parkash Singh Teji, (ii) Shri Justice Inder Singh Mehta, (iii) Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Gauba, and Smt. Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal, Additional Judges of Delhi High Court, to be Judges of the Delhi High Court with effect from the date they assume charge of their respective offices.
Ministry of Law and Justice
Delhi High Court: Disposing of a petition wherein the petitioner had sought a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to produce her minor adopted child, whose custody had been illegally handed over to an NGO in pursuance of the orders of the Child Welfare Committee dated May 16, 2016, the Bench of G.S. Sistani and Sangita Dhingra Sehgal, JJ. observed that the procedure adopted by CWC was extremely unusual and dangerous in forcibly taking a child from the custody of her adoptive mother, and not in the interest of the child. This act of CWC had created a traumatic situation for the child.
The petitioner had contended that the custody and guardianship of the child were given to her in 2008, when the child was barely four days’ old by the child’s mother vide an adoption deed. Hence, CWC had exceeded its jurisdiction and its order was illegal and bad in law, in view of the adoption deed. She contended that in June 2015, the biological mother had lodged a complaint with the Delhi Commission for Women that the petitioner had kidnapped her child. After verifying the adoption deed and the relevant photographs, the police cancelled the FIR and the CWC passed an order in favour of the petitioner on October 19, 2015. However, the CWC suo moto took up the matter based on a newspaper report that the child’s biological mother had filed a protest petition before the Magistrate Court. The petitioner was directed to be present before CWC, whereupon on May 16, 2016 the custody of the child was forcibly taken by CWC and handed over to an NGO in the presence of the biological mother.
On the other hand, the biological mother contended she was forced into in to sex trade on account of her vulnerable condition of having lost her husband and none to support her family. On account of her pitiable condition, she was also forced to part with the child and made to sign various documents, which were not even explained to her.
The Court held that the petitioner cannot be deprived of the child’s custody without following the due process of law, when the investigation carried out by the police and the CWC were in favour of the petitioner. The Court directed the custody of the child to be handed over to the petitioner in the court itself and observed that this order would not come in the way of the proceedings, if any, by the biological mother seeking cancellation of the adoption deed. [Sulekha v. State NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3566, decided on June 1, 2016]
Delhi High Court: Disposing of a batch of petitions dealing with a matter of public importance involving the functioning of courts and their orderly conduct, and the duty owed by the Bar to the courts, which variously contended that :
Bar Associations and the procedure for free and fair conduct of elections;
the Bench of Ravindra Bhat and Siddharth Mridul, JJ. by a common judgment directed that the principle of “one Bar, one vote” shall be applicable henceforth in every Bar Association across Delhi and also that “one person , one chamber, one court complex” shall be applicable for allotment of chambers to advocates in all the court complexes subject to the administrative control of the Delhi High Court.
As to the maintainability of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court held that the nature of relief sought is intrinsically connected with public functioning of the court, as the activities of Bar Associations have a predominantly public character and can in many instances, affect court functioning.
The Court held that the rule incorporating the “one Bar, one vote” principle shall stand incorporated forthwith in relation to every Bar Association in Delhi including the Delhi High Court Bar Association, the Delhi Bar Association, the New Delhi Bar Association, the Rohini, Shahdara, Saket and Dwarka Courts Bar Association and all other courts or Tribunals attached Bar Associations. This condition shall be deemed to be incorporated in the conditions of eligibility applicable for voting as well as candidature for the post of member of any executive body (by whatever name called) and every office bearer of each association (President, Vice-President, General or Honorary Secretary, Assistant, Joint Secretary, Treasurer, Asst. Treasurer, or any other office bearer of each Association (by whatever other name called), immediately and shall be given effect to in every election to each Bar Association hereafter. This condition shall remain in force and bind all Bar Associations as condition for their recognition.
The “one person one chamber, one court complex” rule applicable for allotment of chambers to advocates in all Delhi Court complexes shall be deemed to have been incorporated with immediate effect.
The District Judge concerned of each court complex and the Registrar of the Delhi High Court were directed to ensure that the above conditions are suitably incorporated in the Chamber Allotment Rules, within two weeks and till then, the same are applicable and shall govern all chamber allotments. [P.K. Dash v. Bar Council of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3493, decided on May 31, 2016]
Delhi High Court: While dismissing a writ petition that challenged a Central Information Commission order, a single-judge bench of Manmohan, J., held that the High Court is not an appellate Court of the CIC and thus technical and procedural arguments cannot be allowed to come in the way of substantial justice.
In the instant case, the petitioner have challenged an order whereby CIC, on an RTI application by an NLSIU student, has directed the petitioner to upload all the latest amended bare Acts and to examine the functionality of its e-mail ID and develop an appropriate RTI filing mechanism. It was contented by the petitioner that the respondent has never filed an RTI application in the prescribed form. Moreover, the respondent had not filed the first appeal and hence the second appeal could not have been entertained by the CIC. The Court observed that the order has been challenged on mere technical and procedural grounds and the directions given by the CIC are not only fair and reasonable but also promote the concept of rule of law.
The Court further noted that public can be expected to follow the law only if law is easily accessible and Section 4(1) of the RTI Act itself mandates the Government to place the bare acts in public domain. The CIC has also directed the petitioner to pay Rs.10,000/- under Section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act to the library of NLSIU. The Court took notice of the fact that in challenging the imposition of costs of Rs.10,000/-, the petitioner would have spent more money in filing the present writ petition. Consequently, the costs of Rs.10,000/- was directed to be recovered from the salary of the Government officials who authorized the filing of the writ petition. [Union of India v. Vansh Sharad Gupta, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3383, Decided on 24.05.2016]
Delhi High Court: The Single Judge Bench of S.P. Garg, J cautioned the lower court Judges that the identity of the victim or prosecutrix in a sexual assualt case should not be disclosed in the judgment passed by them, in order to protect her reputation. The Court categorically observed, “Before parting with the case, it is noted that in the impugned judgment dated 21.10.2013, name of the prosecutrix/victim has been disclosed/mentioned. The trial court was not expected to indicate the victim’s name in the judgment. The mistake has been carried out by the learned District and Sessions Judge too while disposing Crl. A. 73/2013. Learned Presiding Officers must avoid disclosing identity of the victim/prosecutrix in such cases in the judgment to protect her reputation.”
Deciding a revision petition challenging the legality and correctness of the Sessions Court’s order by which the petitioner’s conviction under Section 354 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year was upheld, the Court observed that the petitioner did not furnish any plausible explanation to the incriminating circumstances proved against him. The concurrent findings of the courts below based upon fair and proper appreciation of the evidence deserved no intervention. The Court held that considering the gravity of the offence whereby an innocent child aged about seven years was sexually assaulted by the petitioner, aged about 65 years, further leniency was uncalled for. Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the petitioner was well aware of the consequences of his act, as the prosecutrix was like his granddaughter. [Gopal Yadav v. State (GNCT) Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3275, decided on May 25, 2016]
Delhi High Court: A Single Bench of Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J., while relying upon Punjabi University v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3496, and Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India, 2003 SCC OnLine Del 953 dismissed the petition for annulment of Dronacharya Award given to wrestling coach Mr Anup Singh and noted that the selection for excellence in sports cannot be scientific and mathematical and necessarily entails a discretion.
The petitioner has contended that he was the more deserving candidate for the Award since under the prescribed point-based criteria for selection he was nominated with 420 points as against 377 points of Mr Anup Singh. However, it was noted that besides laying down the point-wise criteria, sufficient leeway has also been given to the Selection Committee’s discretion for the choice of the recipient for the Award. As per Clause 1 of prescribed criteria, 80% weightage was to be given for the medals won in various Championships by the sportsperson trained by the Coach, whereas 20% weightage has to be given to Selection Committee’s assessment. Moreover, the petitioner didn’t challenge the prescribed criteria, rather he pointed out errors in application of the criteria. The Court noted that the judicial review is of the decision-making process and not of the decision and thus dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The Court was pained to see that the petitioner himself claimed to be entitled to the award and observed that the as per the scheme, it was not open to any person to nominate himself. The grievance, if any, for non-selection should have been of the person/body who had nominated the petitioner instead of the petitioner himself.
However, the Court also added that such awards would lose their sheen and cease to be coveted and perceived as indicative of the excellence of the holder thereof if they are conferred on persons not deserving thereof or if selection thereof is guided not by the spirit of award and identifying excellence but for extraneous reasons. Utmost care and transparency should be observed in the selection of the recipient of such awards and the awards ought not to be conferred on those who are not perceived by those having expertise in the subject as deserving thereof. [Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3122, decided on 18.05.2016]