Supreme Court: In an appeal concerning with the validity of change in categorisation of certain land situated in District Hardoi, Uttar Pradesh, the subsequent grant of pattas in favour of the appellant by Sub-Divisional Officer and the authority of consolidation authorities to correct revenue records where such pattas were found void, the Division Bench of Prashant Kumar Mishra* and N.V. Anjaria, JJ., upheld the High Court’s judgment holding that change in categorisation of land illegal and grant of pattas in favour of the appellant void ab initio. The Court held that land falling under Section 132, Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (1 of 1951) (Zamindari Abolition Act), being a public utility land, cannot be converted or recategorised by subordinate revenue authorities, and any pattas granted on such invalid re-categorisation are void ab initio and confers no bhumidhari rights.
Factual Matrix
The subject land, prior to 31 October 1992, stood recorded in Category 6 in the khatauni in terms of Para A-124, U.P. Land Records Manual. Category 6 denotes barren or uncultivated land, including land covered with water, sites, roads, buildings and other non-agricultural uses. The area in question was governed by the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Category 5, on the other hand, represents cultivable land (Krishi Yogya Bhumi) with sub-classifications such as new fallow and old fallow land.
The appellant’s case was that a process was initiated to bring the land (Category 6) within the Category 5. On 5 April 1992, the Lekhpal submitted a report stating that the Land Management Committee (Gaon Sabha) had resolved to change the category of the subject land from Category 6 to Category 5. This recommendation was successively supported by the Revenue Inspector on 12 April 1992 and the Naib Tehsildar on 16 April 1992. Acting on these reports, the Tehsildar recommended reclassification of land on 31 October 1992, which was approved by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the same day. Consequent to this approval, pattas were granted in favour of the appellant and certain others, and their names came to be recorded in the revenue records.
Subsequently, consolidation operations were introduced in the village under a notification issued under Section 4, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (5 of 1954) (U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act). During these proceedings, the land settled in favour of the appellant was assigned valuation and corresponding chaks were carved out. The appellant’s name continued in the records under Section 23, and possession of the chaks was delivered on 1 July 2013. The appellant asserts continuous possession from the date of grant of pattas and thereafter.
Meanwhile, certain individuals had initiated proceedings under Section 198(4), Zamindari Abolition Act seeking cancellation of pattas granted to 68 persons including the appellant. The Additional Collector, Hardoi, by order dated 19 August 1994, rejected the proceedings, observing that there was no prima facie evidence to establish execution of the pattas. A revision against this order was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, by order dated 4 August 1999.
During consolidation proceedings, however, a report dated 8 February 2016 submitted by the Consolidator indicated that the land had been recorded in 1379 Fasli as public utility land, including khalihan and pasture land, referable to Section 132, Zamindari Abolition Act, and that pattas could not legally be granted in respect thereof. Acting on this report, and upon reference made by the District Collector, the Consolidation Officer by order dated 12 February 2019 expunged the name of the appellant and directed restoration of the land to its original category. This order was upheld by the High Court, leading to the present appeal.
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the Sub-Divisional Officer lacked jurisdiction to change the categorisation of the land and, consequently, whether the pattas granted in favour of the appellant were void ab initio?
Statutory Framework
At the outset, the Court examined the statutory framework in detail and noted that Section 129, Zamindari Abolition Act enumerated the classes of tenure holders, including bhumidhars and asamis. Section 195 provided for admission to land by the Land Management Committee, subject to the condition that the land must not fall within the categories specified in Section 132. Section 117 dealt with vesting of land in the Gaon Sabha, while Section 132 expressly prohibited accrual of bhumidhari rights in respect of certain lands, including pasture land and land set apart for public purposes.
The Court emphasised that Section 132, Zamindari Abolition Act was of crucial significance, as it created a clear bar against conferral of bhumidhari rights in respect of specified categories of land, particularly those meant for community and public utility purposes.
Analysis and Findings
The Court found that the land in question was admittedly recorded as Category 6 and was specifically described as khalihan and pasture land. Such land, being communal in nature, falls squarely within the prohibited ambit of Section 132. A conjoint reading of Para A-124, U.P. Land Records Manual and Section 132 made it evident that such land was excluded from settlement and could not be converted into land capable of conferring bhumidhari rights.
The Court asserted that “once the land is referable to Section 132, Zamindari Abolition Act, bhumidhari rights cannot accrue in respect thereof”. Even if it were assumed that a patta had been granted, it could only have been in the nature of an Asami patta, which under Rule 176-A is limited to a period of five years. Thus, even on that assumption, the rights claimed by the appellant would stand expired upon completion of the said period.
Addressing the contention regarding re-categorisation, the Court held that Para Ka-155-Ka, U.P. Land Records Manual merely prescribed for making entries affecting rights and titles of the khatedars by the competent authority and did not confer power to alter the category of land itself. Clause (9), relating to transfer from one category of khata to another, pertained to the tenure entries and not to land classification. The provision applied only to recorded tenure holders and had no application to change of land category. Thus, reliance on the said provision was held to be misconceived and untenable.
The Court categorically held that the Zamindari Abolition Act did not empower the Sub-Divisional Officer to alter the category of land so as to take it out of the purview of Section 132. The only mechanism for conversion lies with the State Government under Section 117(6) read with Section 77(2), U.P. Land Revenue Code, subject to stringent safeguards. This restriction demonstrates that no subordinate authority possesses such power.
Invoking the well-settled principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly (Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum), the Court asserted that accepting the appellant’s contention would enable subordinate officers to circumvent the statutory prohibition under Section 132 through re-categorisation, thereby defeating legislative intent.
Since the re-categorisation was held to be without jurisdiction, the Court concluded that the pattas granted in favour of the appellant were void ab initio. Thus, the land continued to retain its original character as public utility land.
The Court also relied on Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, (2001) 6 SCC 496, wherein it was held that “the lands meant for public utility and community purposes must be zealously protected and cannot be diverted for public use… Such resources constitute material assets of the community and are essentially for maintaining ecological balance and public welfare”. It reiterated that consolidation proceedings cannot be used as a device to circumvent statutory protections.
On the issue of res judicata, the Court held that the earlier proceedings did not operate as a bar, since the application in 1994 had been dismissed on the ground that execution of pattas was not established, and not on merits. The issue of legality of pattas had never been directly and substantially in issue or finally decided. Therefore, the principle of res judicata had no application.
Decision
In view of the foregoing analysis, the Court found no infirmity in the High Court’s judgment. It held that the Sub-Divisional Officer lacked jurisdiction to change the categorisation of the land, that the pattas granted were illegal and void ab initio, and that the appellant had no enforceable bhumidhari rights.
Accordingly, appeal was dismissed as being devoid of merit.
[Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, Civil Appeal No. 4633 of 2026, decided on 21-2-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
