The Gamut of Miranda Rights in the United States: A Constitutional Conundrum

The United States Constitution (US Constitution) is one of the smallest constitutions globally with only seven articles. There have been a total of twenty-seven amendments to the US Constitution, beginning with the Bill of Rights i.e. the first ten amendments. When the US Constitution was adopted in 1789, it did not contain the Bill of Rights, and did not, therefore, provide for the privilege against self-incrimination. It was only on 15-12-1791, when the Fifth Amendment was ratified that brought several protections for the people, including protection against self-incrimination. Similar to Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India¹, the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution² expounds, inter alia, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Prior to 1966, the privilege against self-incrimination in the United States was interpreted in a narrow manner and did not extend to custodial interrogation. Essentially, there was no protection against statements made by arrestees during custodial interrogation. Finally, the United States Supreme Court in , Miranda v. State of Arizona³, deprecated this practice while categorically putting the constitutional issue of the admissibility of statements obtained from an arrestee, holding that the prosecution could not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court went on to say, “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Identifying the evils in a coercive interrogation atmosphere, it was held that when an individual was taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and was subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination was jeopardised. Thus, such an individual would have to be apprised of his right to silence and that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law; that he had had the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he could not afford one, he could be provided with one if he so desired. It was further held that unless the said individual to whom the warnings were issued did not knowingly and intelligently waive these rights, his statements could not be used against him. However, while parting with the ruling, the Court interjected that the decision in no way created a constitutional straitjacket that would handicap sound efforts at reform, nor was it intended to have such an effect. “We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed,” the Court concluded.

The effect of this ruling had far-reaching consequences not only in the United States but also in India. The Supreme Court of India referenced Miranda⁴ in landmark judgments such as Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani⁵ and Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.⁶ In fact in Nandini Satpathy case⁷, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer, while examining the interrelation of Section 161⁸ CrPC with Article 20(3), observed that the Miranda ruling⁹ clothed the Fifth Amendment with flesh and blood (emphasis added) and so must we (India), if Article 20(3) is not to prove a promise of unreality. However, the US Supreme Court, on several occasions, declined to follow Miranda—either by carving out exceptions to it or declining to entertain petitions for violation of the so-called “Miranda rights”. The conundrum about Miranda’s true constitutional status began in Michigan v. W. Tucker¹⁰ where the arrestee was not fully advised of his Miranda rights before being questioned in custody. Despite noting this, the US Supreme Court held that the statements were admissible because the records clearly demonstrated that the statements were not involuntary. Thereafter, in New York v. Quarles¹¹, the defendant who was apprehended in a supermarket while purportedly carrying a gun, upon being asked about it—without administering Miranda rights—responded by nodding in the direction of some empty cartons and said, “the gun is over there”. The New York Courts excluded the defendant’s statements as well as the gun itself because it was obtained in violation of Miranda. The matter came up for consideration before the US Supreme Court which, however, declined to follow Miranda, instead carving out a “public safety” exception. The Bench, interestingly, reiterated an excerpt from Tucker¹² in its opinion, “The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are “not themselves rights protected by the constitution but are instead measures to ensure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected,” while holding that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda¹³ were inapplicable to a situation in which police officers asked questions reasonably prompted by a public safety concern.

In wake of multiple Supreme Court decisions labelling Miranda as “prophylactic,” and that Miranda was not a “constitutional straitjacket,” Congress enacted a section addressing admissibility of confessions¹⁴ which melted down the rigours contemplated in Miranda¹⁵, making all incriminating statements made in custody admissible so long as they were voluntary. This law appeared to be in consonance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Tucker¹⁶ which set the stage to override Miranda. However, the US Supreme Court struck down this law. In Dickerson v. United States¹⁷, the Court held that Miranda¹⁸ being a constitutional decision, could not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. It was observed that while Congress had the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any rules that were not constitutionally required, it could not have superseded the Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. The Court observed, “Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda’s warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as “prophylactic,” New York v. Quarles¹⁹, and “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” Michigan v. Tucker²⁰, the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda²¹ are not constitutionally required. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court.” In essence, the Court seemed to deviate from Tucker²² in holding that the constitution required Miranda warnings, suggesting that mere voluntariness was not the standard.

In this backdrop, and placing reliance on Dickerson²³, the respondent in Vega v. Tekoh²⁴, who was acquitted, brought an action against the prosecution seeking damages for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, including his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination because he was not informed of his Miranda rights. The jury decided in favour of the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff appealed. The Appeals Court reversed, holding that the use of an un-Mirandised statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding violated the Constitution which very well could give rise to a claim for violation of constitutional rights. Despite acknowledging that the Supreme Court had repeatedly said that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules designed to protect against constitutional violations and that contravention of those rules did not necessarily constitute a constitutional violation, the Appeals Court observed that Dickerson²⁵ had made it clear that the right of a criminal defendant against having an un-Mirandised statement introduced in the prosecution’s case in chief was indeed a right secured by the Constitution. Interestingly, this decision was revered by the US Supreme Court holding that Miranda rules were “prophylactic” and a violation thereof did not necessarily result in an outright Fifth Amendment violation.

The US Supreme Court’s approach with respect to Miranda has muddied the waters raising questions about the significance of rulings qua constitutional interpretations. On one hand, the US Supreme Court in Tucker²⁶ held admissible incriminating statements administered without full Miranda warnings because they were not involuntary and on the other, Dickerson²⁷ struck down 18 USC § 3501²⁸—a law essentially stemming from Tucker²⁹ and other decisions—, holding that Congress could not supersede the Supreme Court’s decision in interpreting and applying the Constitution. While striking down the law, Dickerson³⁰ also categorically observed that the Miranda warnings were constitutionally required. However, the Vega Court, by once again labelling Miranda as a “judicially crafted prophylactic rule” that applies “only where its benefits outweighed its costs,” appears to have restored the views rendered in Tucker case³¹ and other decisions supporting the constitutionality of 18 USC § 3501³².