Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS): While considering the instant case wherein a public official blocked a private individual on Facebook for expressing his displeasure at the city’s approach to Covid-19 pandemic; the Bench of John Roberts, CJ., Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett* and Ketanji Brown Jackson, JJ., unanimously opined that a public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official’s social-media page engages in state action under 42 U. S. C §19831 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.
It was further stated that because Facebook’s blocking tool operates on a page-wide basis, a court would have to consider whether the City Manager had engaged in state action with respect to any post on which Lindke wished to comment. The Court vacated the matter and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the instant opinion.
Background: The respondent created a private Facebook profile in 2008 and eventually converted his private profile into a public page i.e., anyone could see and comment in his posts. In 2014 when he became a City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the City of Port Huron, MI, he continued to operate his own Facebook page, posting information related to his job, personal life and often solicitated feedback from the public on issues of concern for the city.
The respondent often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasionally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.”
After COVID—19 pandemic began, the respondent posted about it as well. Some posts were personal, and some contained information related to his job. The appellant Facebook user commented on some of respondent’s posts, unequivocally expressing his displeasure with the city’s approach to the pandemic. Initially, the respondent deleted the comments; ultimately, he blocked the appellant from commenting at all.
Thus, the appellant sued the respondent under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that his First Amendment rights have been violated. It was contended that the appellant had the right to comment on the respondent’s Facebook page because it was a public forum. The District Court determined that since respondent managed his Facebook page in his private capacity, and because only state action can give rise to liability under 42 U. S. C §1983, the appellant’s claim cannot succeed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court.
Court’s Assessment: Perusing the facts of the case, the Court pointed out that the instant case requires analysing whether a state official engaged in state action or functioned as a private citizen.
It was noted that Section 1983 provides a cause of action against every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State deprives someone of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Section 1983’s “under color of” text makes clear that it is a provision designed as a protection against acts attributable to a State, not those of a private person.
The Court further noted that the respondent’s status as a state employee is not determinative. The distinction between private conduct and state action turns on substance, not labels: Private parties can act with the authority of the State, and state officials have private lives and their own constitutional rights.
However, the Court pointed out that in the case of a public official using social media, a close look is definitely necessary to categorize conduct. It was noted that a public official’s social-media activity constitute state action under §1983 only if the official (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social media. The appearance and function of the social-media activity are relevant at the second step, but they cannot make up for a lack of state authority at the first.
Focussing on prong (1) vis-à-vis the instant case, the Court noted that unless the respondent was “possessed of state authority” to post city updates and register citizen concerns his conduct is not attributable to the State. Importantly, the appellant must show more than that the City Manager had some authority to communicate with residents on behalf of Port Huron. The alleged censorship must be connected to speech on a matter within respondent’s bailiwick. There must be a tie between the official’s authority and the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint. “Determining the scope of an official’s power requires careful attention to the relevant source of that power and what authority it reasonably encompasses. The threshold inquiry to establish state action is not whether making official announcements could fit within a job description but whether making such announcements is actually part of the job that the State entrusted the official to do”.
Vis-à-vis prong (2) the Court pointed out that for social-media activity to constitute state action, an official must not only have state authority, he must also purport to use it. If the official does not speak in furtherance of his official responsibilities, he speaks with his own voice. In the instant case, if the respondent’s Facebook account had carried a label like “this is the personal page” he would be entitled to a heavy presumption that all of his posts were personal. However, the respondent’s page was not designated either “personal” or “official.”
The ambiguity surrounding respondent’s page requires a fact-specific undertaking in which posts’ content and function are the most important considerations. A post that expressly invokes state authority to make an announcement not available elsewhere is official, while a post that merely repeats or shares otherwise available information is more likely personal. “Lest any official lose the right to speak about public affairs in his personal capacity, the appellant (plaintiff) must show that the official purports to exercise state authority in specific posts”.
[Lindke v. Freed, No. 22-611, decided on 15-03-2024]
*Judgment of the Court delivered by Justice Amy Coney Barrett
1. 42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights | U.S. Code | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute (cornell.edu)
