Can a Regulator Be Held Liable for the Consequences of Implementing a Safety Regulation?

The new FDTL Rules are safety regulations issued by the DGCA prescribed how long pilots can remain on duty, how many hours they can fly, the number of night landings permitted and the minimum rest they must receive.

In December 2025, the airline industry in India faced severe disruption, marked by large-scale flight cancellations and passengers being stranded at airports for extended periods. This incident exposed systemic gaps within the aviation sector and highlighted the urgent need for stronger institutional mechanisms to ensure smooth and reliable operations.

The disruption began on 2 December 2025, when IndiGo flights operating from major cities started experiencing operational issues due to shortages of pilots and crew. What initially appeared to be isolated incidents quickly escalated into a widespread crisis. On the 5th of December, 2025 alone, significant cancellations were reported across Bengaluru, Mumbai, New Delhi, and Hyderabad. Between the 5th and the 8th of December, 2025, an estimated 3400 IndiGo flights were cancelled. As one of India’s largest domestic airlines, operating nearly 2200 flights daily, IndiGo was the most severely affected.¹

The primary cause of this disruption can be traced to the implementation of the Civil Aviation Requirement, Section 7 — Flight Crew Standards Training and Licensing, Series J Part III Issue III, dated the 24 April 2019 (CAR 2024), i.e., Flight Duty Time Limit Rules, 2024 (FDTL Rules).² The FDTL Rules were introduced by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) in exercise of its powers conferred under Rule 42-A, Aircraft Rules, 1937 read with Rule 133-A, Aircraft Rules, 1937 with the objective of reducing pilot fatigue, enhancing flight safety, and balancing growth in the aviation sector. The Rules also aligned Indian aviation standards with international requirements under International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 6, Part 1, which mandates fatigue management systems for flight operations.³

The new FDTL Rules are safety regulations issued by the DGCA prescribed how long pilots can remain on duty, how many hours they can fly, the number of night landings permitted and the minimum rest they must receive. The FDTL Rules are intended to prevent pilot fatigue, reduce human error and enhance aviation safety.

Some of the measures prescribed are highlighted herein below:

1. The new rules require a weekly rest of 48 hours for pilots, increasing the mandatory consecutive weekly rest from 36 hours earlier to 48 hours.

2. The new rules impose a night landings cap by reducing permitted night landings for flight crew to two from six earlier, and by disallowing more than two continuous night duties.

3. Airlines must implement mandatory roster adjustments by redesigning crew rosters to remain within the new duty and rest limits.

4. Airlines must submit quarterly fatigue-related reporting to the DGCA as part of the fatigue risk management expectations under the revised framework.

The introduction of these rules followed litigation initiated by various pilot’s associations across the country owing to the delayed implementation of the FDTL Rules.⁴ These were eventually disposed of through an order of the Delhi High Court on 7 April 2025, directing all the airline operators to submit their respective Flight Duty Time Limit schemes.⁵ Despite this, several airlines failed to comply within the stipulated timeframe, leading to further legal proceedings. Ultimately, a clear directive emerged that all airlines must fully implement the FDTL Rules by 1 November 2025.⁶

The disruptions that followed in December 2025 can be directly linked to the improper and unprepared implementation of these rules. IndiGo, due to the scale of its operations, was particularly affected. The airline did not have sufficient pilots and crew to meet the requirements under the new regime. As a result, mass cancellations occurred and passengers were left stranded. The Regulatory Authority, the DGCA, imposed a Rs 22-crore fine on IndiGo Airlines and substantial refunds were also issued by the airline, which adversely affected its financial position.⁷

However, the issue cannot be viewed solely as a failure on the part of the airline. While IndiGo Airline’s lack of preparedness is evident, the role of the regulator must also be examined. The DGCA, the apex authority governing civil aviation in India, is responsible not only for policy formulation but also for ensuring effective implementation. The enforcement of such significant regulatory changes without ensuring industry readiness raises concerns regarding regulatory oversight.

India’s aviation sector is one of the fastest growing in the world, with increasing demand and continuous expansion of infrastructure. Air travel has become an essential component of economic growth and daily life. Even minor disruptions in this sector can have far-reaching consequences on passengers, businesses, and the broader economic interests of the country. The Government of India has actively promoted aviation growth through infrastructure development and enhanced connectivity. In this context, disruptions of the scale witnessed in December 2025 must be carefully analysed to prevent recurrence.

The aviation industry is highly competitive and volatile. The history of Indian aviation reflects the rise and fall of several airlines, demonstrating the sector’s sensitivity to operational and financial instability. In such an environment, regulatory interventions must be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences. The consequences of the disaster that ensued for IndiGo Airlines after December 2025 did not stop with the fined imposed by the DGCA. Reports and speculations suggest that IndiGo Airlines witnessed a $ 63 million hit in the third quarter of the Fiscal Year 2025-2026 owing to mass cancellations of flights. Further, IndiGo Airline’s quarterly profit plunged 75 per cent to $ 66.9 million due to a one-time charge related to disruptions that forced the airline to cancel thousands of flights in early December due to poor roster planning.⁸

The financial damage that IndiGo Airlines has faced is a cause for concern for the larger public owing to the fact that when large aircraft operators reels in losses, there is potential for the average cost of flying an aircraft seat to increase. Projections estimate that the average cost of flying an aircraft seat is expected to rise in the mid-single digit percentage range for the fiscal year ending in March 2026.⁹

It is from this vantage that this article argues that the structure of India’s aviation regulatory framework places a disproportionate burden on private operators while limiting the accountability of the regulator. This structural imbalance has contributed to the crisis witnessed in December 2025. Not to mention that the burden imposed on airline operators permeates to the larger public/passengers by way of increased air ticket prices.

Indian aviation has historically been a loss-making sector, burdened by regulatory constraints such as the Route Dispersal Guidelines.¹⁰ The Route Dispersal Guidelines require airlines to allocate a portion of their operational capacity to servicing remote and less profitable regions, effectively imposing a public service obligation.¹¹ These measures, among others, illustrate how the DGCA imposes multiple obligations on an already volatile and financially strained industry.

This leads to a critical legal question. To what extent can the DGCA be held accountable for systemic disruptions arising from the enforcement of regulatory measures without ensuring industry readiness. Further, given the constraints of State liability and principles governing administrative action, does Indian law provide an effective mechanism to examine and remedy such regulatory mismanagement.

This article argues that there exists a portion of the liability on the State, herein DGCA, for not properly implementing a much needed policy initiative effectively, leading to the disturbances caused to passengers.

The doctrine of proportionality under Indian administrative law offers a useful framework to analyse this issue. This principle has its roots in the German legal system, where it is known as “Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip”.¹² The principle was later adopted by other European countries, including France, Italy, and the Netherlands.¹³ The doctrine of proportionality has also been accepted and applied in various Indian cases such as Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P.¹⁴

The doctrine of proportionality has three elements, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. However, in India, the doctrine has been tweaked to state that a limitation of a constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if:

60. … (i) it is designated for a proper purpose;

(ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose;

(iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally

(iv) there needs to be a proper relation (“proportionality stricto sensu” or “balancing”) between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the limitation on the constitutional right.¹⁵

However, the application of the doctrine requires a closer examination of the manner in which the rules were implemented. The first element, namely, that the measure must be designated for a proper purpose, is satisfied in the present case, as the rules are aimed at improving aviation safety and ensuring better fatigue management. There is no dispute that the objective pursued by the regulator is legitimate and falls within the scope of its statutory mandate.

The second element requires that the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose. While the rules are directly connected to the goal of improving safety, their immediate implementation led to large-scale disruption. This raises questions as to whether adequate assessment of airline readiness was undertaken. Although airlines are better placed to evaluate their operational capacity, the regulator also bears a responsibility to ensure that its directives are capable of being implemented without causing systemic failure. In this context, the implementation raises concerns regarding its rational suitability.

The third element requires that the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve the same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation. Although the rules were introduced after a significant period, and airlines had time to prepare, the absence of a phased or gradual implementation strategy contributed to the crisis. In a sector as complex as aviation, abrupt enforcement of stringent norms can disrupt operations. A more calibrated approach could have reduced the impact while still achieving the intended objective. Therefore, the manner of implementation appears to fall short of the necessity requirement.

Finally, the fourth element requires that there be a proper relation, or proportionality stricto sensu, between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the limitation on the constitutional right. In the present case, the long-term benefits of enhanced safety and better fatigue management are significant. Following the disruption, temporary exemptions were granted and airlines have since moved towards compliance, indicating that the regulatory objective will ultimately yield positive results. However, the immediate consequences included financial losses, passenger inconvenience, and operational instability. The key question, therefore, is whether these costs bore a reasonable relationship to the benefits sought, or whether they could have been avoided through a more balanced and carefully planned implementation.

It must be made clear that the implementation of the FDTL Rules is essential. The introduction of a fatigue management system is necessary to ensure passenger safety and prevent accidents caused by pilot fatigue. The legitimacy of this objective is beyond dispute. However, the manner of its implementation imposes a disproportionate burden and is capable of attracting State liability due to the disruption caused.

It is vital to note that the application of the doctrine of proportionality is invited only when there is a limitation of a constitutional right. The implementation of the FDTL Rules does not infringe any fundamental rights per se, but the manner of its implementation has disrupted the passengers of air travel in an inexcusable fashion, which has led to the violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens to travel freely. The right to travel outside/within the country has been held to be fundamental right by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India¹⁶, holding that the right to travel outside the country is included in the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, it can be said that the ineffective implementation of the FDTL Rules by the DGCA has resulted in the infringement of fundamental rights of the passengers and can be subject to the application of the doctrine of proportionality and warrants judicial scrutiny.

It is well settled that under the doctrine of proportionality, not only the objective of a policy but also the means adopted for its implementation must withstand judicial scrutiny. As held in various judgments, the execution of policy may be struck down if it is excessive, lacks procedural safeguards or fails to adopt less restrictive alternatives.¹⁷

In the present context, the abrupt and rigid implementation of FDTL Rules, without adequate transitional mechanisms or industry accommodation, has resulted in widespread operational disruption, including flight cancellations and resource strain. Such consequences indicate that the burden imposed is disproportionate to the intended objective.

It is evident that the FDTL Rules were a necessary and important reform. However, their implementation highlights serious challenges in regulation, execution and coordination. The events of December 2025 demonstrate that even well-intended policies can produce adverse outcomes if not supported by adequate preparation and institutional foresight.

In conclusion, the crisis in the aviation sector reflects not only operational shortcomings on the part of airlines but also gaps in regulatory planning and accountability. A balanced approach is required where both regulators and industry participants share responsibility for ensuring smooth implementation of reforms as if this is left unchecked, such regulatory overreach risks normalising a model where the costs of governance failures are externalised onto the public.