Bombay High Court: In a review application challenging the judgment disallowing the law student from appearing in the exam for lacking the minimum attendance of 75 per cent, the Division Bench of Vibha Kankanwadi and Ajit B. Kadethankar*, JJ., held that the review application was drafted and argued as if it were an appeal. The Court observed that,
“to overcome her own defaults the applicant adopted such extreme measures, which not only makes her case an abuse of process, but we are afraid, that it would hamper her own career too”.
The Court observed that the examination had already concluded and declined the applicant’s prayer for a direction to the University to conduct a special examination, holding that such relief was beyond the scope of review jurisdiction.
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Background
The applicant, a postgraduate law student at Maharashtra National Law University, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar (MNLU), was disallowed from appearing in the second and final semester examination for failing to meet the minimum 75 per cent attendance requirement prescribed under the Maharashtra National Law University Regulations, 2020 (MNLU Regulations).
Challenging the University’s decision, the applicant filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking permission to appear in the examination, which was ultimately dismissed.
Aggrieved thereby, and after the examination had concluded, the applicant filed the present review application under Order XLVII, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), seeking reconsideration of the judgment and a direction to the University to conduct a special examination.
Issue
Whether the applicant touched at least 75 per cent attendance mandated by the 2020 Rules or at least 67 per cent with a convincing case for the grant of additional attendance?
Analysis, Findings and Decision
At the outset, the Court stated that it would examine each objection of the applicant in light of the parameters governing review under Order XLVII CPC.
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Ground “A”: Apparent error in mandatory attendance requirement, minimum attendance, and the scope for relaxation
The Court noted that the requirement of 75 per cent attendance was prescribed under the MNLU Regulations and was binding on the University. The Court held that the provision permitting relaxation of attendance between 75 per cent and 67 per cent was neither arbitrary nor erroneous and was supported by the resolution of the Postgraduate Academic and Examination Committee.
The Court further observed that the applicant had not claimed to have secured even 67 per cent attendance. Holding that no error of fact apparent on the face of the record had been made out, the Court concluded that Ground “A” did not satisfy the requirements for review under Order XLVII CPC.
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Grounds “B” and “C”: Reliance on the final attendance sheet and attendance calculation
The Court observed that the applicant had relied upon a final attendance sheet dated 23 April 2024 but had failed to place it on record, instead seeking a direction to the University to produce it despite claiming that it had already been served upon her. The Court found the explanation for not producing the document unacceptable and noted that there was no reference to such attendance sheet in the writ petition, although the applicant had admittedly been aware of it before appearing before the Grievance Redressal Committee. The Court further noted that, even according to the applicant’s own calculations, her attendance could at best reach 51.12 per cent after adding 3 attendance credits, which fell short of both the mandatory 75 per cent attendance and the 67 per cent threshold for relaxation. It therefore held that Grounds “B” and “C” did not make out a case for review.
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Challenge to the Grievance Redressal Committee
The Court noted that although the applicant had admittedly not attended the meeting of the Grievance Redressal Committee, she had challenged its composition and procedure, sought information under the Right to Information Act, prayed for production of CCTV footage, and alleged that the Committee’s decision was arbitrary, procedurally improper, and based on incorrect documentation. The Court observed that the applicant had also failed to place on record the very document on which the review was founded, despite claiming that it had been served upon her. Noting that the University’s reliance was on the applicable Rules and institutional records, the Court stated that the contents of the review application were absolutely reckless and irresponsible.
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Grounds “D” and “G”: Allegations of favourable treatment to other students
The Court observed that the applicant’s allegations of favourable treatment extended to other students were founded on hearsay information and an attempt to question the attendance record of her batchmate by referring to his engagement as a Law Clerk in the High Court. The Court deprecated the practice of raising such contentions in a review application and observed that they were absolutely reckless and irresponsible. It held that these grounds did not assist the applicant in seeking review of the judgment passed in the writ petition.
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Ground “E”: New facts and documents in review
The Court held that the applicant could not fill up lacunae in her case through a review application by relying upon documents and facts that had not been disclosed while arguing the writ petition. It found the contentions under Ground “E” to be irrelevant and observed that the applicant had, for the first time, relied upon her illness and treatment despite these facts being within her knowledge during the writ proceedings. Reiterating its earlier finding, the Court held that the applicant could not take benefit of her own wrong.
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Grounds “F” and “H”: Non-compliance with mandatory attendance requirements
The Court held that Grounds “F” and “H” had been drafted and argued in an entirely irrelevant manner. It observed that the applicant had not attended the semester lectures as required under the Maharashtra National Law University Regulations, 2020, and that the University was bound by those Rules. The Court further noted that the applicant had failed to meet even the minimum 67 per cent attendance required for seeking relaxation and had not disputed this fact. Instead, the applicant had submitted that her attendance could, at best, have been 51.12 per cent. In these circumstances, the Court held that Grounds “F” and “H” did not make out a case for review under Order XLVII CPC.
The Court observed that the review application had been drafted and argued as though it were an appeal against the judgment passed in the writ petition. The Court noted that each objection raised by the applicant had already been argued at length in the writ proceedings and had been dealt with on its own merits based on the available record. The Court held that the applicant had failed to make out a case for review and had instead sought a reappreciation of the case as though the Court were sitting in appeal over its own judgment. The Court further observed that the examination had already concluded and declined the applicant’s prayer for a direction to the University to conduct a special examination, holding that such relief was beyond the scope of review jurisdiction.
The Court stated that it was guided by the principles governing review under Order XLVII CPC, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 and State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315. The Court observed that neither an appeal in the guise of a review nor subsequent developments in law or the subject matter constituted a valid ground for review.
The Court expressed its disappointment and concern over the applicant’s approach. Noting that the applicant was a law graduate pursuing postgraduate studies and would soon enter the legal profession. The Court observed that, in attempting to overcome her own defaults, she had adopted extreme measures which rendered her case an abuse of process and, in the Court’s view, could also hamper her own career.
The Court recorded three instances where, in its view, the applicant had taken impermissible liberty.
Firstly, it noted that although the applicant had never contended in the writ petition that she did not attend the meeting of the Grievance Redressal Committee, she subsequently stated on oath in the review application that she had been unable to attend the meeting due to unavoidable circumstances, while also making allegations against the University and the Committee and seeking production of CCTV footage of the proceedings.
Secondly, the Court observed that the additional medical documents relied upon in the review application had always been in the applicant’s own custody, yet neither the treatment nor the documents had been referred to in the writ petition.
Thirdly, the Court noted that the applicant had named her batchmate in an attempt to demonstrate discriminatory treatment by the University and had made allegations against the batchmate, the faculty members, the University and the Grievance Redressal Committee. While refraining from making any further comments, the Court recorded its serious displeasure and disappointment with the applicant’s conduct.
The Court observed that the applicant had yet to enter legal practice and was at a formative stage of learning the practice and procedure of advocacy. It expressed concern that if appearances before courts were undertaken in an undisciplined and scurrilous manner and without clean hands, it would have implications for the professional standards of new entrants to the legal profession. The Court stated that such practice deserved to be deprecated.
The Court reiterated that the applicant had failed to make out a case for review under Order XLVII CPC. It observed that proceedings before courts must be pursued bona fide and that, although every proceeding seeks justice, the concept of justice does not mean “whatever I want and howsoever I put it”.
The Court observed that it had been seriously inclined to impose heavy costs for the reasons recorded in the judgment, but refrained from doing so, considering that the applicant was a student. Before parting, it directed the Registry to mask the name of the applicant’s batchmate appearing in the review application to protect his privacy and avoid future unpleasant consequences. The Court accordingly held that no case for interference had been made out.
[X v. Maharashtra National Law University, Citation No. of 2025, decided on 18-6-2026]
*Judgment authored by Justice Ajit B. Kadethankar
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Party-in-Person
For the respondents: S. K. Kadam, Advocate
