Murder is “Heinous Offence” under JJ Act; JJ Board Must Holistically Evaluate All Relevant Material During Preliminary Assessment: SC

Supreme Court: The appeal arose from the Patna High Court’s judgment dated 24 July 2025 affirming the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chapra, directing that the appellant, a child in conflict with law aged above 16 years, be tried as an adult for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 34, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Court examined the legality of the preliminary assessment under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act), the classification of murder as a “heinous offence” the scope of appellate powers under Section 101(2), JJ Act, and the principles governing preliminary assessment under Section 15. The Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., upheld the High Court’s judgment, the trial court’s order directing trial before the Children’s Court and the classification of murder under Section 302 IPC as a “heinous offence” under the JJ Act.

The Court also held that

1. An offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is a “heinous offence” within the meaning of Section 2(33), JJ Act because imprisonment for life constitutes its minimum punishment by necessary implication.

2. Section 21, JJ Act modifies only the manner in which punishment is served by a child and has no bearing upon classification of offences.

3. The expression “may” in Section 101(2), JJ Act is directory. The Sessions Court possesses discretion to obtain assistance from psychologists or medical specialists whenever the facts of the case make such assistance necessary.

4. While conducting preliminary assessment under Section 15, the Juvenile Justice Board (JJ Board) must independently evaluate the expert opinion together with the social background report, social investigation report, witness statements, interaction with the child and every other relevant circumstance. No single piece of evidence can exclusively determine the outcome.

Also Read: Bail may be denied to juvenile if release would defeat the ends of justice: Chhattisgarh HC denies bail to 16-year-old murder convict

Factual Matrix

The complainant reported that on 1 May 2022, her son left home in the company of the appellant and another juvenile. Subsequently, the deceased became untraceable, and his mobile phone was switched off. On the following morning, villagers informed the complainant that the body of a young boy had been found in agricultural fields. She identified the deceased as her son and named the appellant and another juvenile as the principal suspects.

An FIR was registered under Sections 302, 201 and 34 IPC. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against both juveniles. The appellant claimed juvenility under Section 9, JJ Act. The JJ Board determined his age to be 16 years and 4 months on the date of occurrence and declared him to be a child in conflict with law.

During investigation, it emerged that the appellant had allegedly slit the throat of the deceased with a knife; the weapon of offence was recovered at his instance; and he had been apprehended while allegedly attempting to flee.

Since the appellant was above 16 years of age and the allegation involved an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, the JJ Board conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15. Considering the counselling report, the social investigation report, and the answers given by the appellant during interaction, JJ Board, by majority, concluded that although the appellant was above 16 years of age, he did not possess the mental and physical capacity to commit the alleged offence and therefore directed that the matter should continue before the Board itself.

The Presiding Magistrate dissented. According to the minority opinion, the appellant possessed sufficient understanding of the nature and consequences of his conduct and therefore deserved to be tried as an adult.

The complainant challenged the majority decision before the Additional District and Sessions Judge. The appellate court allowed the appeal and held that the appellant should be tried as an adult. Consequently, it directed transfer of the case to the Children’s Court.

The appellant challenged this appellate court’s order before the Patna High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, noting that the Children’s Court had already commenced trial, charges had been framed, several witnesses had been examined, and during his stay in the Children’s Home, the appellant was alleged to have been involved in another murder. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issues for Consideration

1. Whether an offence prescribing punishment of “death or imprisonment for life” could be said to be an offence falling within the phrase “maximum imprisonment for a term more than 7 years but no minimum imprisonment” under Section 2(54), JJ Act?

2. Whether, the expression, “may” used in Section 101(2), JJ Act should be construed as mandatory or directory?

3. What type of material and other factors should be considered by the Juvenile Justice Board while conducting a preliminary assessment under Section 15, JJ Act?

Alos Read: “Being done arbitrarily in absence of any definite parameters”: Allahabad HC issues guidelines for preliminary assessment under S. 15 Juvenile Justice Act

Analysis

Whether Section 302 IPC is a “Serious Offence”

The Court noted that the principal question before it was whether an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, which prescribes punishment of death or imprisonment for life, falls within the category of a “serious offence” under Section 2(54)(b), JJ Act or a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33), JJ Act.

The Court observed that the 2021 Amendment to the JJ Act accepted the position earlier explained in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787, by introducing clause (b) to Section 2(54), thereby covering offences where the maximum punishment exceeds 7 years but no minimum punishment, or a minimum punishment of less than 7 years, is prescribed.

The Court noted that “JJ Act categorises offences into three categories, namely petty, serious, and heinous based on the term of imprisonment prescribed for each offence.” It further noted that:

1. Where the minimum punishment is 7 years or more, the offence is a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33).

2. If the minimum punishment is less than 7 years, or no minimum punishment is prescribed, the Court must examine the maximum punishment.

   (a) Where the maximum punishment does not exceed 3 years, the offence is a “petty offence”.

   (b) Where the maximum punishment exceeds 3 years, it becomes a “serious offence”, falling either under clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 2(54).

Rejecting the appellant’s reliance on Shilpa Mittal, the Court held that the fourth category recognised in Shilpa Mittal was intended only for offences where the sentencing court possesses discretion to award a sentence below 7 years. That category was never intended to include murder under Section 302 IPC. The Court observed that the appellant’s contention was “completely misconceived, meritless, inconceivable and deserves to be rejected at the threshold”.

The Court emphasised that imprisonment for life under Section 302 is not merely one of the available punishments but represents the minimum punishment by necessary implication. Since no court can award a sentence lower than life imprisonment upon conviction under Section 302 IPC, the absence of the word “minimum” in the statutory text is immaterial. Legislative drafting cannot defeat legislative intent.

The Court further rejected the argument founded on Section 21, JJ Act. According to the appellant, because a juvenile cannot be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, Section 302 should not be regarded as prescribing life imprisonment as its minimum punishment.

The Court stated that Section 21 merely regulates the manner in which the sentence is to be served after conviction. It does not alter the punishment prescribed for the offence itself. Classification depends upon the punishment attached to the offence under substantive criminal law and not upon the special sentencing protection extended to children in conflict with law. Accordingly, murder under Section 302 IPC squarely falls within the statutory definition of a heinous offence.

Also Read: Gravity of offence justifies denying bail to juvenile accused of heinous crime: Rajasthan High Court

Section 101(2): “May” Does Not Mean “Shall”

The Court stated that the next question concerned with whether an appellate court is bound to obtain the assistance of psychologists or medical specialists while deciding an appeal against a preliminary assessment under Section 15.

The Court relied on State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5, wherein it was held that the expression “may” ordinarily confers discretion and cannot automatically be construed as mandatory. Whether discretion becomes obligatory depends upon the statutory purpose and the factual context.

The Court distinguished Section 15 from Section 101(2) on 3 important grounds, namely:

1. Section 101(2) merely provides that the appellate court may obtain assistance from experts. The provision neither incorporates nor reproduces the proviso to Section 15.

2. The Sessions Court functions as an appellate court. Unlike the JJ Board, it examines the legality and correctness of the preliminary assessment on the basis of material already collected. Therefore, it need not invariably undertake a fresh psychological evaluation.

3. The object of an appeal differs fundamentally from the object of preliminary assessment. Section 15 requires a first-hand assessment of the child’s mental and physical capacity, whereas an appeal is concerned with whether the JJ Board correctly appreciated the available material.

Consequently, the Court held that the Sessions Court possesses a discretionary power which must be exercised depending upon the facts of each case. The word “may” in Section 101(2) cannot be judicially rewritten as “shall”.

Alos Read: “Punishment of juvenile in conflict with law is not the purpose of juvenile justice”; Patna HC sets aside order of conviction against juvenile under Arms Act

Proper Approach to Preliminary Assessment under Section 15

The Court observed that preliminary assessment is not a trial. Its limited object is to determine whether a child above 16 years should be tried as an adult. The JJ Board must not express any opinion regarding guilt or innocence. Any such observation would undermine the child’s right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence.

The Court explained that the JJ Board must independently examine 4 statutory parameters:

1. Child’s mental capacity to commit the alleged offence

Mental capacity extends beyond ordinary intelligence. It includes cognitive ability, reasoning, decision-making, developmental maturity and the child’s capacity to appreciate conflict and consequences in the context of the alleged offence.

2. Child’s physical capacity to commit the alleged offence

Physical capacity is not confined to bodily strength. It must be assessed with reference to the manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed and whether the child possessed the physical ability to execute it.

3. Child’s ability to understand the consequences of the offence

Reiterating Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, (2023) 12 SCC 401, the Court observed that “consequences” are not confined to the immediate impact upon the victim. They also include the effect upon the victim’s family, the child’s own future, his family, and the long-term psychological, social and legal consequences flowing from the offence.

4. Circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed.

The JJ Board must evaluate the broader circumstances that may have led to the offence, including poverty, coercion, peer influence, emotional stress, family conditions, greed, fear, or other relevant social and psychological factors. The assessment should not be restricted to the immediate occurrence but should examine cumulative circumstances influencing the child’s conduct.

Further, the Court clarified that preliminary assessment cannot rest exclusively upon expert opinion. The JJ Board must evaluate all relevant material collectively, including, social background report, social investigation report, witness statements, expert’s report, Board’s own interaction with the child, and every other relevant circumstance placed on record.

The Court noted that the social background report enables the Board to understand the child’s antecedents, family background and surrounding circumstances. The social investigation report provides information relating to the child’s economic, social, psycho-social and behavioural profile, together with recommendations concerning rehabilitation. These reports are not supplementary documents but constitute pertinent inputs for the statutory exercise.

Further, the Court made it clear that an expert’s opinion is only one significant input among several considerations. The Board cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility by mechanically adopting the psychologist’s conclusions. Independent application of mind is indispensable.

Applying these principles to the present matter, the Court found that the majority opinion of the JJ Board suffered from a serious legal infirmity. Although the Board relied extensively upon the expert’s report, it failed to discuss or evaluate the social background report and the social investigation report. The majority opinion contained virtually no consideration of the probation officer’s observations or the recommendations of the Child Welfare Police Officer.

The Court asserted that these reports are not peripheral material. They form an integral component of preliminary assessment and must receive due weight along with expert opinion. Therefore, the appellate court had rightly concluded that the JJ Board had failed to properly assess the entire material before it.

Also Read: At what stage the claim of juvenility can be raised by the accused juvenile?: Rajasthan High Court answers

Decision

The Court held that:

1. Section 302 IPC is a heinous offence;

2. the Sessions Court committed no legal error in declining to obtain fresh expert assistance under Section 101(2);

3. the appellate court correctly found that the Juvenile Justice Board had failed to consider all relevant material before directing trial by the Board itself; and

4. the High Court rightly affirmed the appellate order.

The Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, the order directing trial before the Children’s Court and the classification of murder under Section 302 IPC as a “heinous offence” under the JJ Act.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The Court directed that the pending trial should continue uninfluenced by any observations made regarding the preliminary assessment and further directed that a copy of the judgment be circulated to all High Courts.

Also Read: Relief to convict under Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 for crime committed in 1981 at age 12: Inside Supreme Court Ruling

[X4 v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1363, decided on 21-7-2026]

*Judgment Authored by Justice J.B. Pardiwala

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Appellant: Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv. Mr. Kailas Bajirao Autade, AOR Mr. Amaresh Narayan Singh, Adv. Mr. Muhammed Risvi, Adv. Mr. Shobhit Dwivedi, Adv. Mr. Shivkumar Jangwad, Adv. Mr. Shoaib Akhter, Adv. Ms. Vishnu Priya, Adv. Mr. Sadanand, Adv.

For the Respondents: Mr. Samir Ali Khan, AOR Mr. Pranjal Sharma, Adv. Mr. Kashif Irshad Khan, Adv. Mr. Prashant Bhardwaj, AOR Mr. Rishi Bharadwaj, Adv. Mr. Aditya Pratap Singh, Adv. Mr. Rahul Mehalwal, Adv.

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