Bombay High Court: In a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the School Tribunal’s order setting aside the dismissal of a school peon and directing his reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits, a Single Judge Bench of M.M. Sathaye, J., held that the School Tribunal’s approach was perverse as it focused on the alleged illicit relationship between the employee and a lady teacher rather than the actual charges concerning his conduct allegedly bringing disrepute to the school. The Court observed that procedural violations do not automatically vitiate proceedings and that, except in cases involving “no notice, no opportunity and no hearing”, the question is whether the employee suffered real prejudice in defending himself.
Background
The petitioners, the School Management and the Principal, challenged the judgment and order dated 3 February 2005 passed by the School Tribunal, Pune Region, in an appeal whereby the appeal filed by Respondent 1 was allowed, his dismissal was set aside, and he was held entitled to reinstatement as a peon from the date of dismissal, with full back wages and consequential benefits.
Respondent 1 was initially appointed as a Junior Clerk in a leave vacancy from 9 October 1995 to 31 March 1996 and was subsequently appointed as a peon with effect from 26 September 1997. He was transferred by an order dated 30 January 1999 and his request for posting back to his earlier school was not considered.
According to Respondent 1, he suffered a fracture of his right hip joint in April 2000 and was required to take leave, but the management and the Headmaster refused to grant him leave, compelling him to take leave without pay. In September 2000, the management received complaints from villagers alleging that he had an illicit relationship with a lady teacher working in the school.
According to the management, instead of furnishing an explanation to the allegations, Respondent 1 made allegations against the management’s President and circulated copies of his reply across the State, thereby bringing disrepute to the school. The management initiated proceedings and issued a charge-sheet by letter dated 12 March 2001. An Inquiry Committee was constituted, and 6 meetings were held between 3 May 2001 and 4 September 2001. The Committee found Respondent 1 guilty by a majority of 2:1, with his nominee dissenting. After the findings were communicated and an explanation was sought, his services were terminated by an order dated 20 October 2001.
Respondent 1 challenged his dismissal under Section 9, Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The School Tribunal allowed his appeal and directed reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits. Aggrieved, the management approached the Court. The impugned order had remained stayed since 12 August 2005, subject to the management depositing the back wages awarded by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal had gone into the complaint letter, doubting its authenticity because one signature appeared twice and four signatories later disowned it, noted that the lady teacher’s evidence was never recorded, and held the inquiry committee’s findings baseless without discussing the misconduct and disrepute alleged.
Analysis
The Court referred to State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, and observed that, in case of alleged violation of the procedural requirements, the procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent and violation of each and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under “no notice, no opportunity and no hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedure should be examined “from the point of view of prejudice”, namely, whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent in defending himself properly and effectively. It is further held in the S.K. Sharma that if it is found that the delinquent has been so prejudiced, then appropriate order to repair and remedy the prejudice can be passed, however, if no prejudice is established, no interference is required.
The Court noted that Respondent 1 had received the charge-sheet and replied to it by letter dated 19 March 2001. He had nominated his representative to the Inquiry Committee and the Committee’s report and decision were communicated to him by letter dated 6 October 2001, calling upon him to submit an explanation. The proceedings also showed that the first meeting of the Inquiry Committee was held on 3 May 2001 to decide the course of the inquiry, including calling Respondent 1, his family members and the villagers who had made the complaints. At the subsequent meeting held on 10 June 2001, evidence of Respondent 1 and his family members was recorded, and the President of the management was also examined. Respondent 1’s letter was read out and considered at a later meeting, and he submitted a further explanation on 13 October 2001.
The Court held that the charges were not in respect of the illicit relationship between Respondent 1 and the lady teacher per se. Rather, the charges were in respect of the conduct of Respondent 1 making baseless allegations against the President of the Management and sending them all over the State, bringing disrepute to the institution amounting to misconduct. The School Tribunal should have been concerned with whether the actions of Respondent 1 had resulted in disrepute to the institute amounting to misconduct, not whether the alleged illicit relationship between Respondent 1 and a lady teacher was proved or not.
The Court also considered the School Tribunal’s objections concerning the constitution and procedure of the Inquiry Committee. It was observed that the required three members of the Inquiry Committee were present at the first meeting and that the presence of a fourth member could not, by itself, vitiate the entire inquiry proceedings.
The Court noted that, after his advocate had argued the matter fully, Respondent 1 insisted on being heard in person and also filed representations before the Chief Justice alleging that his lawyer had not argued the case properly. Holding that general and omnibus submissions made after a case is closed for judgment cannot be entertained and that such conduct cannot be countenanced, the Court, however, discounted it as an act that might have been done in frustration.
Upon considering the circumstances, the Court found that Respondent 1 had been given sufficient opportunity to defend himself and that no real prejudice had been caused to him. It was observed that the record showed that Respondent 1 had adopted the approach of not tendering an explanation when called upon to do so. The Court held that no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to Respondent 1, as this was not a case of “no notice, no opportunity and no hearing”. Applying the test of whether, considering all circumstances together, the employee had received a fair hearing, the Court answered the question in the affirmative.
Decision
Consequently, the Court held that the School Tribunal’s order was perverse and could not be sustained. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order dated 3 February 2005 was quashed and set aside.
The Court noted that the impugned order had remained stayed for 21 years, that Respondent 1 had served for approximately 4 years and 1 month, and that there was nothing on record conclusively establishing whether he had been gainfully employed in the meantime. The Court permitted Respondent 1 to withdraw the amount deposited by the management pursuant to the order dated 12 August 2005, together with accrued interest, if any.
The Rule was made absolute in those terms, with no order as to costs.
[Ambegaon Taluka Vidya Vikas Mandal v. Husen Kasam Shaikh, Writ Petition No. 2115 of 2005, decided on 23-10-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioners: Kiran Bapat, Senior Advocate, with Samir Suryawanshi
For Respondent: Kumud Bhatia, Kavita N. Solunke, Additional Government Pleader, with S.L. Babar, Assistant Government Pleader
