Supreme Court Collegium has approved the proposal for elevation of the following persons as Judges in the Andhra Pradesh High Court:
Dr K. Manmadha Rao
Supreme Court of India
President of India, in exercise of the power conferred by clause (l) of Article 217, Article 224 and Article 222 of the Constitution of India, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, has made the following appointments/transfers:
|No.||Name (S/Shri)||Name of High Court|
|1.||Uma Shanker Vyas, Judicial Officer||As Judge of the Rajasthan High Court.|
|2.||Vikram D Chauhan, Advocate||As an Additional Judge of the Allahabad High Court.|
|3.||Shri Justice Joymalya Bagchi, Judge||Transferred from Andhra Pradesh HC to Calcutta HC.|
Ministry of Law and Justice
Notification dt. 25-10-2021]
Andhra Pradesh High Court: Opining that, a Math, which is a separate institution rendering certain religious and other functions pertaining to a particular denomination is different from a temple which is open to all for worship, D.V.S.S. Somayajulu, J., held that,
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 will not be applicable to the Math.
Instant petition was filed by the petitioner – Math to seek reliefs.
Senior Counsel, C.R. Sridharan, for the petitioner submitted that petition was a Math which is a specific religious denomination.
He added that the petition was filed because the respondent was attempting to interfere with the activities of the Math and directing the petitioner to pay minimum wages, etc. to the persons employed in the Math.
Respondent’s action was challenged.
Senior Counsel added that respondent-State does not have the right to interfere with the Management of the math and issue the directions contained in the impugned memos.
Petitioner’s counsel submitted that there is a fundamental distinction between a Math and a temple although both can be called a religious institution.
Government Pleader argued that coming to the issue of wages, the respondents are not insisting upon the payment of the wages, more so, under the Minimum Wages Act, but are essentially trying to ensure that the equal pay for equal work principle as enunciated in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148, is actually followed.
High Court noticed that it is a fact that a “Math” is distinct from a “Temple”.
Temple and Math are both religious institutions, but the purposes for which they are established and the manner in which they function are clearly specified in Section 2(17) of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 Act.
As per the above-stated Sections, Math is an institution headed by a person whose primary job is to engage himself in teaching, propagation of religious philosophy etc., and impart religious training etc.
On the other hand, Temple is a place, which is dedicated to and keep used as a place of public religious worship.
Hence in view of the above distinction between the two institutions is clear.
Under Section 6 of the Act also, the income or the change in income of the Math cannot lead to a change in the classification of the Math. It is only possible for the institutions and endowments under Section 6(a), 6(b) and 6 (c) of the Act, which are included in this section. If their income exceeds or falls below the stipulated limit, for the three years, their position can be changed, but this is clearly not applicable to a Math.
Whether Commissioner’s power extends to giving the direction to pay Minimum Wage of the Minimum Time Scale?
In Court’s opinion, the general power of superintendence given to the Commissioner does not extend to interfere in the secular activity and was limited in its scope.
Section 8 makes it clear that the superintendence and control includes the power to pass an order to ensure that institution is properly administered and the income is spent for the purpose for which they were found.
Section 8 (1) is to ensure that the funds are spent for the purposes for which they are intended only.
Section 8(2) which starts with a non-obstante clause also talks of exercise of powers ‘conferred’ on him or the functions ‘entitled’ to him by the Act.
No statutory provision has been pointed out by which this particular power to give directions to pay minimum wages etc., is shown to the Court.
Further, Court also added that on the issue that, if Section 8(1) and Section 49 of the Act are read together, the limited powers of the Commissioner become clear. They are limited to the fixing/spending/utilization of the “dittam‟ only. In case of disagreement, the matter has to be referred to a Court for decision (Section 49-Proviso). Similarly, the amendments to Sections 51-53 etc., where the Commissioner has been substituted by the “Dharmika Parishad” also makes it clear that the role of the Commissioner is very limited.
The Minimum Wages Act applies to certain employments (preamble) which are specified as “scheduled employments” Section 2(g). Employments specified in Part-I/II of the Schedule (Section 3). The schedule is silent about employment in a Math.
“…only in cases of misconduct or mismanagement of the properties by the Mahant, it would be permissible for the State to interfere under Section 51 of the Act.”
While reaching the conclusion, Bench expressed that the autonomy given to a Math to maintain and administer its activities also supports the view that the respondents cannot interfere in every activity, in case respondents have such a power to interfere every activity it would run contrary to the constitutional and other guarantees given to the religious denominations to carry their own activities.
Therefore, in view of the above analysis, High Court held that the memos dated 04.07.2018; 05.12.2018 and the consequential memo dated 19.04.2021 will not be applicable to the petitioner – Math. [Sri Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine AP 2938, decided on 21-9-2021]
Advocates before the Court:
Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri C.R. Sridharan, Senior counsel rep. Sri G.V.S.Ganesh
Counsel for the Respondents: Government Pleader for Endowments
Andhra Pradesh High Court: While explaining the law on whether father is obligated to provide maintenance to his daughter irrespective of the fact that she has turned major, Joymalya Bagchi, J., refused to interfere with the decision of lower court.
The father challenged the lower court’s decision for recovery of maintenance to the tune of Rs 22,000 for a period of 11 months on the ground that 2nd respondent, his daughter, had attained majority.
Court took note of the fact that the maintenance order passed in favour of 2nd respondent-daughter was not modified under Section 127 CrPC and she was unmarried and had no source of income.
It was argued that maintenance order would not survive as the daughter had attained the age of majority and this Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction ought to set aside the order directing realization of dues payable to 2nd respondent after her attaining majority.
Whether Magistrate was justified to order recovery of maintenance due to 2nd respondent, who was unmarried and pursuing her education, and who had had attained majority.
Supreme Court in the decision of Abhilasha v. Parkash,2020 SCC OnLine SC 736, observed that though a Family Court is entitled to grant maintenance to a major in-married girl by combining the liabilities under Section 125 CrPC and Section 20(3) of the Act of 1956, a Magistrate exercising powers under Section 125 CrPC was not authorized to do so.
Bench stated that Magistrate is entitled to entertain an application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and grant monetary relief to meet expenses incurred and losses suffered by an aggrieved person under Section 20 of the DV Act, in the event of domestic violence by way of economic abuse is established.
Conjoint reading of Section 2(a) and 2(f) of the DV Act would show that a daughter, who is or was living with her father in a domestic relationship by way of consanguinity, is entitled to seek reliefs including monetary relief on her own right as an aggrieved person under Section 2(a) of the DV Act irrespective of the fact whether she is a major or minor.
In the present matter, the relation between the parties as father and daughter was admitted and they both had stayed together in a shared household.
Hence, in Court’s opinion, the decision of the Magistrate directing recovery of maintenance was not illegal on the mere ground that she turned major.
Further, the Court clarified that in Abhilasha v. Parkash,2020 SCC OnLine SC 736, the power of the magistrate to grant monetary relief under the DV Act did not fall for consideration and further the Bench added citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajput Ruda Meha and v. State of Gujarat, that it is settled law that a judgment is not an authority for a proposition which was neither raised nor argued.
Therefore, Court concluded by denying to interfere with the impugned order. [Menti Trinadha Venkata Ramana v. Menti Lakshmi, 2021 SCC OnLine AP 2860, decided on 9-09-2021]
Advocates before the Court:
For the Petitioner: T.V. Sridevi
For the Respondent 3: Additional Public Prosecutor
Andhra Pradesh High Court, Amaravati: Cheekati Manavendranath Roy, J., addresses whether a girlfriend or concubine who is not connected by blood or marriage can be prosecuted under Section 498-A of Penal Code, 1860.
In the instant matter, it was stated that a case under Sections 498-A, 114 Penal Code, 1860 was registered against the petitioner along with other accused.
Allegation against the petitioner was that she was the girlfriend of A-1, who is the husband of de facto complainant and A-1 developed illegal intimacy with A-2.
Vide the present petition, petitioner sought quashing of the FIR mainly on the ground that only relative of the husband connected by blood or marriage alone was liable for prosecution under Section 498-A IPC and a girlfriend or concubine was not liable for prosecution under Section 498-A IPC as she was not relative either by blood or marriage to A-1, who is the husband of the de facto complainant.
High Court’s Decision
Bench stated it is well-settled law that only a relative of a husband by blood or marriage is liable for prosecution under Section 498-A IPC.
Girlfriend or concubine, being not connected by blood or marriage, is not a relative of the husband for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC.
High Court relied on the Supreme Court case in U. Suvetha v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 757, held that persons who can commit an offence under Section 498-A IPC are husband and relatives only. A girlfriend, being not a relative, cannot be charged under Section 498-A IPC.
Hence, in the instant matter, the petitioner made out a strong case and warranting interference of the Court under Section 482 CrPC to ascertain whether launching criminal prosecution under Section 498-A IPC is legally sustainable or not and whether the aforesaid FIR registered against her is liable to be quashed or not.
High Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to registration of FIR only in respect of petitioner A-2.[Anumala Aruna Deepika v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine AP 1934, decided on 12-07-2021]
Advocates before the Court:
Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Naga Praveen Vankayalapati
Counsel for Respondent 1: Public Prosecutor
“Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to affect public order.”
Justice L. Nageswara Rao
Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 258
Born on 08.06.1957 at Chirala, Prakasam District, Andhra Pradesh, Justice L. Nageswara Rao enrolled as an Advocate at Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh in July 1982 after getting a degree in B.Com., B.L., from Nagarjuna University, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh.
Starting his practice at the District Court, Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, Justice Nageswara Rao, started practicing in the Andhra Pradesh High Court from January, 1984.
One year later, he started practicing at the Supreme Court of India and continued to do so till 2016, when he was elevated as the Supreme Court Judge.
♦Did you know? Justice Nageswara Rao is the 7th person to be elevated directly from the Bar as a Supreme Court judge.
Justice Nageswara Rao also served as Additional Solicitor General of India from August 2003 to May, 2004 and again from 26.08.2013 to 18.12.2014.
He was took oath as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India on 13.05.2016.
♦Did you know? Justice Nageswara Rao was offered Supreme Court judgeship in 2014 by then Chief Justice of India RM Lodha. He had, however, turned down offer, citing personal and professional reasons.
Justice Nageswara Rao is due to retire on 07.06.2022.
The 9-judge bench of SA Bobde, CJ and R Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan, L Nageswara Rao, M M Shantanagoudar, S A Nazeer, R Subhash Reddy, B R Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ, hearing the Sabarimala reference has held that the Supreme Court can refer questions of law to a larger bench while exercising its review jurisdiction, after renowned jurist and senior advocate Fali Nariman objected to the manner in which the Supreme Court turned a review of the Sabarimala case into an opportunity to set up a nine-judge Bench and examine whether certain essential religious practices of various faiths, including Islam and Zoroastrianism, should be constitutionally protected.
Stating that re-promulgation of ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution and a subversion of democratic legislative processes, the 7-judge bench held that the Ordinance making power does not constitute the President or the Governor into a parallel source of law making or an independent legislative authority.
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J writing down the majority judgment for himself and S.A. Bobde, A.K. Goel, U.U. Lalit and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ, laid down the principles for promulgation of ordinances.
Giving a 4:3 verdict, the 7-Judge Bench held that an appeal in the name of religion, race, caste, community or language is impermissible under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and would constitute a corrupt practice sufficient to annul the election in which such an appeal was made regardless whether the appeal was in the name of the candidate’s religion or the religion of the election agent or that of the opponent or that of the voter’s.
Justice Rao joined T.S. Thakur, CJ and Madan B. Lokur, and S.A. Bobde, JJ to give the majority verdict in the 4:3 verdict, while Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Adarsh K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ dissented.
The 5-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan, S.A. Nazeer, L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ quashed the much in debate Maratha Reservation and has held that the Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 [ 2018 Act] as amended in 2019 granting 12% and 13% reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is not covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case.
The 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao*, Hemant Gupta and S. Ravindra Bhat has issued extensive directions in relating to selection, appointment, tenure, conditions of service, etc. relating to various tribunals, 19 in number, thereby calling for certain modifications to the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities [Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members] Rules, 2020.
The 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has upheld Kerala High Court’s decision holding that Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) mandating the District Magistrate to deliver possession of a secured asset within 30 days, extendable to an aggregate of 60 days upon reasons recorded in writing, is a directory provision.
Interpreting Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the Court said that
“… the secured creditor has no control over the District Magistrate who is exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act for public good to facilitate recovery of public dues. Therefore, Section 14 of the Act is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act. If any other interpretation is placed upon the language of Section 14, it would be contrary to the purpose of the Act.”
The 3-judge bench of Ranjan Gogoi, CJ and L. Nageswara Rao and SK Kaul, JJ held that woman driven out of matrimonial home can file case under Section 498-A from the place she has taken shelter at. The bench said,
“the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.”
In a case where abuses were hurled by a person of upper caste at a person belonging to Scheduled Caste due to a property dispute between them, the 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has held that no offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is made out as the allegations of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property and not on account of them being a member of the Scheduled Caste.
“The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste.”
Dealing with the case where the husband had sought divorce from his wife on the ground that she was forcing him to leave his parents as he was proving them financial support, the Court said that in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents.
The Bench of A.R. Dave and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ added that no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income, the Court also said that the persistent effort of the wife to constrain the husband to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and will constitute as an act of ‘cruelty’.
While stressing upon the alarming statistics on the occurrence of road accidents due to drunken driving the Full Bench comprising of T.S. Thakur, CJ., D.Y. Chandrachud, L Nageswara Rao, JJ. prohibited all States and Union Territories from granting licenses for the sale of liquor along national and state highways.
In 2007, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways had issued a circular to all the State Governments advising them to remove liquor shops situated along national highways and not to issue fresh licenses. Moreover, the Union Government had formulated for adoption by the States a Model Policy, which provided for a minimum distance from the state/national highways for locating liquor shops. However, an exception was carved out to the effect that the national or state highways would not include such parts of them as are situated within the limits of local authorities.
Giving the Haji Ali Dargah Trust two weeks’ time to restore status-quo ante in regard to women pilgrims entering the sanctum sanctorum at par with men, the 3-Judge Bench of T. S. Thakur, C.J. and D. Y. Chandrachud and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ said that in case there is any default or neglect on the part of the Trust in complying with the direction of the Bombay High Court, the respondents-writ petitioners shall be free to approach the High Court for appropriate redress in the matter.
After noticing common deficiencies which occur in the course of criminal trials and certain practices adopted by trial courts in criminal proceedings as well as in the disposal of criminal cases and causes, the 3-judge bench of SA Bobde, CJ and L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhatt, JJ has directed all High Courts to take expeditious steps to incorporate the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice, 2021 as part of the rules governing criminal trials, and ensure that the existing rules, notifications, orders and practice directions are suitably modified, and promulgated (wherever necessary through the Official Gazette) within 6 months.
Noticing that the summary trials of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are being routinely converted to summons trials in a “mechanical manner”, the Constitution bench of SA Bobde, CJ and L. Nageswara Rao, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ has directed the High Courts to issue practice directions to the Magistrates for recording cogent and sufficient reasons while doing so.
The 2-judge bench of Indu Malhotra and L Nageswara Rao, JJ has held that even when the entire sale consideration has not been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the Sale Deed.
The Court relied on the it’s verdict in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573, wherein it was held that non-payment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record.
The bench comprising of L.Nageswara Rao and Navin Sinha, JJ. held that in the absence of conclusive and consistent proof of circumstantial chain of evidence which lead to the only “hypothesis of guilt” against the accused then, only circumstance of last seen cannot be made basis of conviction.
Emerging trends in judgment writing introduced by Justice L Nageswara Rao, by Sameer, Updated: 18th August 2020, https://www.siasat.com/emerging-trends-in-judgment-writing-introduced-by-justice-l-nageswara-rao-1951146/
 L Nageswara Rao recommended for the post of SC judge, by Utkarsh Anand, May 5, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/l-nageswara-rao-recommended-for-the-post-of-sc-judge-2784921/
Supreme Court: In a relief to Justice V. Eswaraiah, former judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court, the bench of Ashok Bhushan* and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ found no reason to allow the enquiry by Justice R.V. Raveendran as directed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
The case pertains to an alleged phone conversation of Justice Eswaraiah and S. Ramakrishna, a suspended District Munsif Magistrate of Andhra Pradesh, over the conspiracy to malign the reputation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
BC SC ST Minority Student Federation, a registered society under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 has filed a Public Interest Litigation praying for relief relating to following of COVID-19 protocol in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
It was, however, pleaded by the High Court that the PIL was not a genuine PIL having substantial public interest. Further, it was pleaded that “after retirement Justice V. Eswaraiah had obtained a post retirement office and after achieving the said post retirement office, he wants to support the State Government under the cover of BC association maligning the High Court.”
Later, S. Ramakrishna intervened stating that “the incumbent Government has unleashed a vicious propaganda against the judiciary to cover up its shortcomings, in which some of the retired judges like Justice V. Eswaraiah had become pawns in the hands of the Government and at their instance, under the guise of some organisations some vested interests have been filing writ petitions to undermine the honesty, integrity and majesty of the judiciary.”
It was alleged that, on 20.07.2020, the Personal Secretary of Justice V. Eswaraiah called S. Ramakrishna on his mobile phone on 20.07.2020 and told him that Justice Eswaraiah wished to speak to him and gave his phone number. During the course of conversation, Justice Eswaraiah asked him whether he was aware of the letter submitted by All India Backward Classes Federation dated 29.06.2020. The transcript of the said conversation alongwith audio recording was filed alongwith affidavit for perusal of the Court.
The High Court by impugned judgment dated 13.08.2020 passed an order requesting Justice R.V. Raveendran, a Retired Judge of this Court to hold out an enquiry to find out the genuineness/authenticity of the conversation contained in the pen drive.
In the affidavit, Justice Eswaraiah admitted that S. Ramakrishna called him over the Whatsapp on 20.07.2020. He, however, stated that he cannot say that if the conversation contained in the pen drive is the exact conversation.
“I have provided a corrected transcript of the English translation of the audio tape contained in the pen drive supplied to me, in the SLP paper book as Annexure P16 at pages 134-154. I reiterate, this is the transcription of the audio version of the conversation which Mr. Ramakrishna has filed in the High Court…………..”
Taking note of this aspect, the Supreme Court noticed that the object and purpose of directing the enquiry was to find out the authenticity/genuineness of the conversation contained in the pen drive and the petitioner having filed affidavit and admitted the conversation dated 20.07.2020 and has also filed the corrected transcript of the English translation of the audio tape, which is admitted to him, there is no reason to allow to continue the enquiry by Justice R.V. Raveendran as directed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
The Court held that the High Court ought not to have embarked on any other enquiry in the matter except to the maintainability of the PIL.
[Justice V. Eswaraiah v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 310, decided on 12.04.2021]
*Judgment by Justice Ashok Bhushan
For petitioner: Advocate Prashant Bhushan
For Union of India: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta
Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Dinesh Maheshwari and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ., has set aside the order of High Court of Judicature for Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and, thereby restored the findings of Trial Court.
In the instant case, a claim for partition and division was made by the appellant in four equal shares amongst herself and her three siblings, who were arrayed as defendants 1, 2 and 3. The property was left by deceased step-mother of the appellant. Defendant 4, brother of step-mother of the appellant, alleged that his sister had sold Item 1 of Schedule A of the plaint to Defendant 15 under an agreement for sale dated 05-11-1976; and that she had also executed a Will dated 15-06-1978 in favour of her mother and an attendant, defendants 14 and 13 respectively. The appellant denied and disputed the alleged agreement for sale as also the alleged Will.
The Trial Court held that both the documents, of the alleged agreement for sale and of the alleged Will, were false and fabricated. The Court observed that the deceased, who was only 45 years of age at the time of her death, would never choose to bequeath the major part of property to her mother, who was about 80 years of age. It was observed that suggestions about the deceased being in her high level of indebtedness were not correct as the defendant could not point out the names of creditors and could not say as to how much was discharged. On contrary, the High Court had affirmed the findings of the Trial Court in relation to Will in question and has held that the Will was not valid. However, it had reversed the findings of the Trial Court in relation to alleged agreement for sale and held that the same was binding on the appellant. It was also ordered that the property forming the subject matter of the said agreement would not be available for partition.
In the backdrop of the aforementioned facts, the Court formed three points for determination in the instant appeal:
Whether suit for partition filed was not maintainable for want of relief of declaration against the agreement for sale deed?
The Court clarified that the expression “declaration”, for the purpose of a suit for partition, refers to the declaration of the plaintiff’s share in the suit properties. It was observed that the appellant had not shown awareness about any agreement for sale initially, and later on, the appellant did raise a claim for sale deed being frivolous.
It was also observed that, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement for sale of immoveable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. A person having an agreement for sale in his favour did not get any right in the property, except the right of obtaining sale deed on that basis and the alleged agreement for sale did not invest the vendee with any such right that the appellant could not have maintained her claim for partition in respect of the properties left by her deceased mother without seeking declaration against the agreement.
What is the effect and consequence of not bringing the legal representatives of defendant who expired during the pendency of appeal in the High Court on record?
Order XXII, Rule 1 of CPC lays down that the death of an appellant or respondent shall not cause the appeal to abate if the right to sue survives. The Court clarified that the same procedure would apply in appeal where one of the several appellants or respondents dies and right to sue survives to the surviving parties alone. Reliance was placed on State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram,(1962) 2 SCR 636, wherein it was held that, “if the court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it.” The Court held that, the instant case could definitely proceed even in the absence of the legal representatives of defendant 2 because in case of success of this appeal, there would be no likelihood of any inconsistent decree vis-à-vis defendant 2 coming into existence. The decree of the Trial Court had been in favour of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 and the result of success of this appeal would only be of restoration of the decree of the Trial Court, which would be of no adverse effect on the estate of the deceased defendant 2.
Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the findings of the Trial Court in relation to the said agreement for sale?
The Court noticed that the two documents were intrinsically intertwined, particularly
because it was suggested by the contesting defendants that in the Will, apart from making bequest, the deceased also directed her mother (legatee) to execute a registered sale deed in favour of defendant 15 after receiving the balance sale consideration from him as per the agreement executed in his favour; and that the deceased also directed her mother to discharge the debts. This unmistakable inter-mixing of the two documents had been the primary reason that the Trial Court examined the matters related with them together, while indicating that to give a colour of reality to the Will and to show that the deceased was highly indebted to others which compelled her to sell the property, the suggestions were made about sale to the husband of the deceased’s sister. The High Court had missed out this fundamental feature of the case that two documents, Will and agreement for sale, as put forward by the contesting defendants could not be analysed independent of each other.
When the Will was found surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the agreement must also be rejected as a necessary corollary.
While examining preponderance of probabilities about the existence of such an agreement for sale, the overall relationship of the parties, the beneficiaries of the alleged agreement and their conduct could not be kept at bay. The Court stated, “If the story of indebtedness of the deceased goes in doubt, the suspicions surround not only the Will but agreement too.” Trial Court was right in questioning that if at all any such agreement was executed on 05-11-1976, there was no reason that the vendee did not get the sale document registered for a long length of time because the deceased expired 1½ years later.
It was held that the Trial Court had examined the matter in its correct perspective and had rightly come to the conclusion that the agreement for sale was as invalid and untrustworthy as was the Will. The findings of Trial Court, based on proper analysis and sound reasoning, called for no interference. On the other hand, the High Court had been clearly in error in interfering with the findings of the Trial Court in relation to the agreement in. Therefore, the Court restored the decree of the Trial Court with further directions that the appellant should be entitled to the costs of the litigation in the High Court and in this Court from the contesting respondents. [Venigalla Koteswaramma v. Malampati Suryamba, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 26, decided on 19-01-2021]
President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, transfers Justice Arup Kumar Goswami, Chief Justice of Sikkim High Court, as Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and directs him to assume charge of the office of the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Ministry of Law and Justice
[Notification dt. 31-12-2020]
President transfers Justice Jitendra Kumar Maheshwari, Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court, as Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court and directs him to assume charge of the office of the Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court.
Ministry of Law & Justice
[Press Release dt. 31-12-2020]
Transfer Orders of Justice Joymalya Bagchi of Calcutta High Court as a Judge Andhra Pradesh
President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Justice Joymalya Bagchi, Judge of the Calcutta High Court, as a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and directs him to assume charge of his office in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Ministry of Law and Justice
[Notification dt. 31-12-2020]
Andhra Pradesh High Court: Battu Devanand, J., while addressing the instant matter, observed that,
The government is not supposed to spend public money as per their whims and fancies as public money is accrued from the payment of the taxpayers.
Discontinuation of Pensions
175 Petitioners filed the petition seeking direction declaring the action of respondents in discontinuing pensions to them as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and against the rules governing the distribution of pensions and direct all the respondents to distribute arrears of pension to the petitioners and continue to pay them thereafter.
Another petitioner consisting of 5 petitioners filed the petition against the respondent’s action to stop old aged/widow pensions.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh vide its order said that the Government of Andhra Pradesh is implementing various pension schemes as part of its welfare programmes for most needy and vulnerable people i.e., the persons in old age, widows, people with disabilities and weavers to provide them some succor.
Court stated that on perusal of the Government Order, it is clear that as part of welfare programmes the Government is implementing various social security pension schemes for the benefit of needy and vulnerable sections of the people to provide them some succor.
“…attempt of the government to implement these “Social security pension schemes” to provide the people belong to vulnerable sections to provide some succor is undoubtedly laudable.”
Bench emphasized the fact that the Government is the trustee of public money and is empowered to utilize the public money in a proper manner for the benefit of the public at large.
Supreme Court’s decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 was also referred, wherein the following was held:
“The discretion of the government has been held to be not unlimited in that the government cannot give or withhold largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will.”
Further, the High Court also noted the fact that earlier crores of public money was spent on different activities in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
In view of the above Court stated that,
Did any person in the State ask the State Government to spend a thousand crores of rupees for organising “Godavari and Krishna Pushkaralu”?
Did any Christian ask for “CHRISTMAS KANUKALU ?”
Did any Muslim request for “RAMJAN THOFA?”
At present, thousands of crores of rupees are being sent under various pogrammes stating that it is for the welfare of the people.
One has to question himself whether the public money is being utilized properly as it seems to be.
Unreasonable to stop payment of meager amount
Hence, the Bench held that Court is of the opinion that while spending crores of rupees of public money for all the programmes as stated above, it is unreasonable to stop payment of meager amount being paid towards social security pension in favour of the petitioners.
Court to fortify its view cited the Supreme Court decision in, Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar, (1989) 1 SCC 229, wherein the following was held:
“…a person adversely affected by order has right of being heard and making representations against order, even though rules do not provide so expressly”.
Concluding with its’ analysis, Court held that stopping payment of social security to the petitioners without conducting any enquiry or without issuing any notice is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and against the object of the social security pension scheme and against the principles of natural justice.
Two directions have been passed by the Bench in the above petitions:
[Seepana Govindamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, WP No. 21104 of 2019, decided on 08-09-2020]
Andhra Pradesh High Court: A Division Bench of M. Satyanarayana Murthy and Lalitha Kanneganti, JJ., ordered an enquiry into a conversation contained in pen-drive disclosing some material about designing a plot against the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and another sitting Judge of the Supreme Court.
Court stated that,
“Unfortunately, today it is an unpleasant or gloomy day in the history of High Court of Andhra Pradesh, because the High court itself has to ward-off the brazen onslaught from the third parties to demean the prestige of the pristine judicial institution in the eye of litigant public.”
Audio conversation contained in the pen drive disclosed that it was a serious conspiracy against the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court by designing a plot and sent a petition by the person who had a conversation with a person named S. Ramakrishna allegedly, but signed by Secretary of BC/SC/ST Association.
The said person insisted on Sri S. Ramakrishna to collect material against another senior most sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to mar his future career.
Bench stated that since the plot is designed against the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court with malafide intention unless the authenticity of the contents is established, Court cannot proceed against anyone.
Further, the Court observed that the way as to how the conversation between the two persons took place, would prima facie establish that there was a conspiracy against the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Senior-most Judge of Supreme Court, pernicious acts of the person who made such allegation to be discouraged. Otherwise, the public may lose faith in the Courts.
Conversation discloses use of intemperate language against two senior most sitting Judges of the Supreme Court and it is a matter of serious concern.
Such conversation will certinly crumble the confidence of the public on Courts and system itself.
Further, the Court added that in the judicial process, it is the solemn duty of the Court to unravel the truth. In the present matter, only way to unravel the truth is to order necessary enquiry.
Truth should be the Guiding Star in the entire judicial process.
Hence, Court found the present case to be appropriate for ordering enquiry to find out the authenticity of the conversation contained in the pen-drive.
Therefore, Justice Raveendran, retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India is requested to hold an enquiry to find out the authenticity of the conversation, with regard to the plot designed against the Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and being designed against senior most sitting Judges of the Supreme Court and undisclosed interest of the third parties.
Director of CBI and Director of Intelligence Bureau are directed to depute responsible officers of the department to collect information from the agencies pertaining to the conversation contained in the pen-drive and other material collected from the Registry and submit the same to Justice R.V. Raveendran, retired Judge of Supreme Court of India.
Matter to be listed in 4 weeks.[BC, SC, ST Minority Student Federation v. Union Of India, 2020 SCC OnLine AP 652, decided on 13-08-2020]
High Court of Andhra Pradesh – Suspension of functioning of the High Court, and Metropolitan Sessions Judge’s Unit, Vijayawada, till 28.06.2020
Functioning of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is suspended till 28.06.2020 (Sunday) due to outbreak of COVID-19. The work of Metropolitan Sessions Judge’s Unit, Vijayawada, Krishna District, is also suspended till 28.06.2020.
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Notification dt. 25-06-2020
President appoints following to be the Judges of Andhra Pardesh High Court in the order of seniority, with effect from the date they assume charge of their respective offices:
Ministry of Law and Justice
[Notification dt. 01-05-2020]
Proposal for the appointment of following 4 Advocates as Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and 3 Advocates as Judges of the Telangana High Court:
1 Shri R. Raghunandan Rao (A.P.),
2 Shri T. Vinod Kumar (Telangana),
3 Shri Battu Devanand (A.P.),
4 Shri D. Ramesh (A.P.),
5 Shri A. Abhishek Reddy (Telangana),
6 Shri N. Jayasurya (A.P.) and
7 Shri K. Lakshman (Telangana)
On the basis of interaction, material on record and having regard to all relevant factors, the Collegium comprising of Ranjan Gogoi, CJ and S.A. Bobde and N.V. Ramana, JJ. is of the considered view that S/Shri (1) R. Raghunandan Rao, (2) T. Vinod Kumar, (3) Battu Devanand, (4) D. Ramesh, (5) A. Abhishek Reddy, (6) N. Jayasurya and (7) K. Lakshman are suitable for being elevated to the High Court Bench.
Therefore, in view of the above, the Collegium resolves to recommend that:
(i) S/Shri (1) R. Raghunandan Rao, (2) Battu Devanand, (3) D. Ramesh and (4) N. Jayasurya be appointed as Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their inter se seniority be fixed as per the existing practice; and
(ii) S/Shri (1) T. Vinod Kumar, (2) A. Abhishek Reddy and (3) K. Lakshman be appointed as Judges of the Telangana High Court. Their inter se seniority be fixed as per the existing practice.
[Collegium Resolution dt. 25-07-2019]
Supreme Court of India
President appoints the following as the Judges of Andhra Pradesh High Court:
in that order of seniority, with effect from the date, they assume charge of their respective offices.
[Notification dt. 12-06-2019]
Ministry of Law and Justice
Appointment of following four Judicial Officers as Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and three Judicial Officers as Judges of the Telangana High Court:
1 Ms. B.S. Bhanumathi (A.P.)
2 Shri Ch. Manavendranath Roy (A.P.)
3 Smt. P. Sree Sudha (Telangana)
4 Shri M.Venkata Ramana (A.P.)
5 Smt. C. Sumalatha (Telangana)
6 Shri A. Hari Haranadha Sarma (A.P.)
7 Shri N. Tukaramji (Telangana)
In order to ascertain suitability of the above-named recommendees mentioned at Sl. Nos. 3, 5 and 7 above, for elevation to the Telangana High Court, we have consulted our colleague conversant with the affairs of the Telangana High Court.
As regards recommendees at Sl. Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 6 above, there is no sitting Judge in the Supreme Court outside the Collegium for being consulted for this purpose.
“The Collegium is of the considered view that S/Shri (1) Ch. Manavendranath Roy, and (2) M. Venkata Ramana (mentioned at Sl. Nos. 2 and 4 above) are suitable for being appointed as Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.”
As regards (1) Ms. B.S. Bhanumathi, (2) Smt. P. Sree Sudha, (3) Smt. C. Sumalatha (4) Shri A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, and (5) Shri N. Tukaramji (mentioned at Sl. Nos.1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 above), consideration of the proposal for their elevation is deferred for the present.
Collegium resolves to recommend that S/Shri (1) Ch. Manavendranath Roy, and (2) M. Venkata Ramana, Judicial Officers, be appointed as Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their inter se seniority be fixed as per the existing practice.
Supreme Court of India