Appointments & TransfersNews

Collegium Statement

On 5th March 2021, Supreme Court Collegium approved the proposal for the appointment of the following Additional Judges as Permanent Judges of Allahabad High Court:

  1. Shri Justice Ali Zamin,
  2. Shri Justice Vipin Chandra Dixit,
  3. Shri Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav,
  4. Shri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari,
  5. Shri Justice Deepak Verma,
  6. Shri Justice Gautam Chowdhary,
  7. Shri Justice Shamim Ahmed,
  8. Shri Justice Dinesh Pathak,
  9. Shri Justice Manish Kumar, and
  10. Shri Justice Samit Gopal.

Supreme Court of India

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Suresh Kumar Gupta, J., while addressing an issue with maintenance allowance determined a very significant point of whether rent allowance is included under maintenance allowance or not.

Factual Matrix

OP 2 had filed an application against the revisionist under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 before the Principal Judge/Family Court on 26-04-2014.

It has been submitted by the OP -2 that presently the daughters of OP-2 and revisionist are in the care and custody of OP-2.

OP-2 alleged that during her pregnancy of her second daughter, the revisionist solemnized marriage in USA with John NG and totally neglected OP-2 due to which she had to move out to Bangalore taking shelter at her parental house in NOIDA.

Family Court had directed the revisionist to deposit Rs 25,000/- maintenance each to the two minor daughters of the revisionist and Rs 20,000/- as rent, cumulatively Rs 70,000/- in exercise of powers under Section 125 CrPC.

During the pendency of interim maintenance, the revisionist moved the application to quash and modify the interim maintenance order.

High Court on perusal of the facts and circumstances of the case, observed the following:

 “…findings recorded in proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are not final and parties are always at liberty to agitate their rights in Civil Court.

Order under Section 125 CrPC does not finally determine the status, rights and obligations of the parties and it only provides for maintenance of indigent wives, children and parents.”

Bench relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353, Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705, Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715 and various other decisions in order to reach a conclusion in the present matter.

In view of the decision cited, it is not permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence and nothing on record was present to show Family Court’s proceedings to be perverse.

In the case of maintenance, the Court has to see whether the wife has refused to live with her husband without any sufficient reason and it is also to be seen whether the husband has neglected to maintain his wife, without any valid reason.

In the present matter, wife and husband have been living separately due to the physical and mental cruelty meted out to the wife along with the extramarital relationship of the husband with another woman.

Bench also added that merely because the wife was capable of earning, this would not be a sufficient ground to refuse claim of maintenance to minor daughters.

If the husband is healthy, able-bodied and is in the position to support himself, thus, he is under the legal obligation to support his minor children and her wives.

Hence Family Court’s order for maintenance is appropriate, just and legal.

Bench on noting the fact that as per the OP-2’s salary slip she was already getting the house rent allowance, therefore, the same is not permissible under the maintenance allowance. In view of the same, the Judgment of the family court regarding Rs 20,000 as rent allowance was liable to be quashed.

“…rent allowance does not come in the purview of maintenance allowance under Section 125 CrPC.”

Concluding the decision, Court partly allowed the revision while upholding the maintenance allowance of Rs 25,000 each for minor daughters. [Ankur Gupta v. State of U.P., Criminal Revision No. 2541 of 2019, decided on 03-03-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Counsel for Revisionist:- Rajiv Lochan Shukla, J.B. Singh

Counsel for Opposite Party:- G.A., Nipun Singh

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J., expressed that:

The remedy of writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a person seeking to obtain possession of someone whom he claims to be his wife would therefore not be available as a matter of course.

The present matter for writ of habeas corpus was filed to produce the corpus of petitioner 1 stated to be under detention.

On investigation, it was revealed that petitioner 1 had left her matrimonial home on her own on account of discord with her husband, petitioner 2 for the reason that he is stated to have entered into another marriage and a child was also stated to have been born out of the wedlock.

Petitioners counsel though disputing the factum of the second marriage did not controvert the fact of petitioner 2 being in an extra marital relationship and also that a child was born out of the said relationship.

Analysis and Decision

The writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ and an extraordinary remedy.

Bench observed that writ of habeas corpus is of right and not a writ of course and may be granted only on reasonable ground or probable cause being shown, as held in Mohammad Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., 1964 AIR 1625 and Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674.

Elaborating more on writ of Habeas Corpus, Court added that it has been held as a festinum remedium and accordingly the power would be exercisable in a clear case.

Hence, High Court held that in view of the other remedies available for the purpose under criminal and civil law, issuance of writ of habeas corpus at the behest of a husband to regain his wife may not be available as a matter of course and the power in this regard may be exercised only when a clear case would be made out.

Therefore, petitioner 1 having left the matrimonial home on her own due to a matrimonial discord, the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the behest of husband would not be entertainable.[Soniya v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 174, decided on 10-02-2021]

Appointments & TransfersNews

Supreme Court Collegium has approved the proposal for elevation of the following Judicial Officers as Judges of the Allahabad High Court:

1. Shri Mohd. Aslam,

2. Shri Anil Kumar Gupta,

3. Shri Anil Kumar Ojha,

4. Smt. Sadhna Rani (Thakur),

5. Shri Om Prakash Tripathi,

6. Shri Naveen Srivastava,

7. Shri Umesh Chandra Sharma,

8. Shri Syed Aftab Husain Rizvi,

9. Shri Ajai Tyagi,

10. Shri Syed Waiz Mian, and

11. Shri Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I.


Supreme Court of India

[Collegium Statement dt. 04-02-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Y.K. Srivastava, J., expressed while deciding the present application that:

“Proceeding for interim maintenance, shall as far as possible, be disposed of within 60 days from the date of service of notice on the husband.”

Instant application was filed under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of order in proceedings in a case filed under Section 125 of CrPC.

Additional Advocate General appearing for the State respondents raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the present petition on the ground that the order sought to be quashed, related to grant of interim maintenance, is subject to a final adjudication on the main petition filed under Section 125 CrPC It is submitted that it is open to the applicant to raise all his objections before the Family Court.

Section 125 CrPC falls under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and it contains provisions whereunder, an order for maintenance of wives, children and parents can be made. The object of the provisions contained under Chapter IX is to provide a speedy and effective remedy against persons, who neglect or refuse to maintain their dependent wives, children and parents.

It was observed that the proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC are of a summary nature and the purpose and object of the same is to provide immediate relief to the applicant.

An application under Section 125 CrPC can be moved by the wife on fulfilment of two conditions :-

a) the husband has sufficient means and;

(b) he neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, who is unable to maintain herself. The Magistrate, in such a case, may direct the husband to pay such monthly sum of the money, as deemed fit taking into consideration the financial capacity of the husband and other relevant factors.

Bench observed that Section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a benevolent provision having a social purpose with the primary objective to ensure social justice to the wife, child and parents, who are unable to support themselves so as to prevent destitution and vagrancy.

With regard to the third proviso of Section 125 CrPC, Court expressed that it gives a timeline by providing that the proceeding for interim maintenance, shall as far as possible, be disposed of within 60 days from the date of service of notice on the husband.

Hence, an order granting interim maintenance is subject to a final adjudication on the main petition and the interim maintenance granted during the pendency of the proceedings is only provisional maintenance subject to final determination to be made on the conclusion of the proceedings.

In light of the above discussion, the Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction in respect of the reliefs prayed for.

Counsel for the applicant at this stage made a prayer that he may be permitted to withdraw the present application and stated that the applicant would contest the proceedings before the court below.

The present application filed under Section 482 CrPC stood, accordingly, dismissed. [Mithilesh Maurya v. State of U.P., Application u/s 482 no. – 19612 of 2020, decided on 08-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Manju Rani Chauhan, J., expressed that:

“At the present time, only from the temple of justice like Courts, everyone hopes for right and fair justice.”

Pursuant to an order, a letter had been sent by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra along with the explanation, who has passed the cognizance/summoning order on a printed proforma.

For what reasons did the Magistrate tender apology?

Magistrate, in the explanation given, submitted that due to huge workload and by mistake, he/she passed the cognizance/summoning order on a printed proforma for which he/she has tendered his unconditional apology.

Observation

Bench stated that the explanation given by the Magistrate concerned could not be acceptable for the reason that:

“If a Judge makes such a mistake, then from where will the general public get fair justice.

A Judge acts like a God, he/she should not make mistakes due to haste or excess of work. How will a normal man get justice when a judge makes a mistake because of the excess of his/her work?”

Court stated that it would not be in the interest of justice to proceed against the concerned Magistrate.

Bench warned the concerned Judicial Magistrate to remain more careful and cautious in future while passing any judicial orders. Further, added that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra shall ensure that such orders on a printed proforma are not passed by any judicial officers of Judgeship Agra.

With regard to the application filed under Section 482 CrPC being filed for setting aside the Order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra for quashing the entire proceedings under Sections 498A, 323 IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act, Court observed that the cognizance/summoning order was passed without application of mind on a printed format.

Further, summoning orders passed on a printed proforma had already been set aside by this Court in Application under Section 482 No. 41617 of 2019 (Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.).

Hence, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra after perusing the entire records shall pass a fresh speaking and reasoned order, in accordance with law. [Sanjay v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 44, decided on 18-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Ajay Bhanot, J., while allowing the present petition, on e-bail applications, said, “The process of law cannot move at a bullock cart pace in the age of information technology. Institutions have to upgrade with the latest technological developments. Fruits of technology have to be put in the service of the people. In the legal process technology can play a critical role in effectuating the fundamental rights of the citizens in particular, and in upholding the process of law in general.”

Amendments to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, made in the year 2016, brought an alteration in the practice and procedure for hearing of bail applications. Present petition has been moved to seek directions in remedy of certain anomalies as pointed out by the petitioners, including, inconsistencies in the procedure for hearing of bail applications and bail appeals, uncertainty in the period of maturation of bail applications and bail appeals, and deferment of hearing of bail applications or bail appeals under the Act for undefined periods.

Issue

  1. What is the agency and mode for service of notice of bail applications/bail appeal upon the victim under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act?
  2. What is the time period for maturation of a bail application/bail appeal before the High Court which implements the mandate of the Act (as amended from time to time) and agrees with the requirements of constitutional liberties?

 Observations

On Right to Bail

Court placed reliance on the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240, “Bail or jail?” — at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage — belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely hinges on the hunch of the Bench, otherwise called judicial discretion. The Code is cryptic on this topic and the Court prefers to be tacit, be the order custodial or not. And yet, the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process”

Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14, “The principle to be deduced from Sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, is that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. That this must be so is not at all difficult to see. An accused person is presumed under the law to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. It goes without saying that an accused person, if he enjoys freedom, will be in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody”

Reinforcing the connection between the concept of liberty and the process of criminal law, the Supreme Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine 964, said, “Courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally, it is the duty of courts across the spectrum – the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court – to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum – the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment.”

Highlighting provisions for bail in High Court Rules

“Bail applications have to be processed expeditiously and placed before the court for hearing in a reasonable and definite time frame. The procedure for processing the bail application needs to be consistent, and the time period for hearing of the bail application has to be certain.

A bail processual framework violates fundamental rights and personal liberties of an accused guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India in the following situations:

  1. Provisions with an unreasonably large time for maturation of a bail application;
  2. Procedures where the time period for hearing of a bail application is undefined;
  3. Practices causing indefinite deferment of hearing of a bail application.
  4. Failure of police authorities to provide timely instructions to the Government Advocate before the hearing of bail application.”

Court further reproduced the process of maturation of a bail application as contained in Rule 18 of Chapter 18 of the Allahabad High Court Rules.

The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989: Relevant Provisions and Discussion

“The Constitution of India asserts the equality of all its citizens. However, the founding fathers were equally conscious of inequalities which blight our society. Many sections of our society are downtrodden and oppressed because of historical reasons. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as amended from time to time), is a recognition of the fact of inequalities in our society; and a reflection of the resolve to do equal justice.”

Citing relevant provisions, Court observed,

“Section 15A(3) has two limbs: The first is the nomination of the agency to inform the victim about such proceedings under the Act before the Court. The second limb provides for ‘reasonable, accurate and timely notice’ of any criminal proceedings including a bail application/bail appeal to the victim or his dependent. Section 15(A) 3 visualizes some elements of process of maturation of bail, for being placed before the Court. However, it does not disclose any time frame for the same.”

With respect to the word ‘shall’ as added by the legislature, Court referred to the case of Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of MP, (1976) 1 SCC 560, wherein the Supreme Court said, “It is well settled that such a penal provision must be strictly construed ; that is to say, in the absence of clear compelling language the provision should not be given a wider interpretation and no case should be held to fall within which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. If two construction are possible upon the language of the statute, the Court must choose the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness and eschew the other which makes the operation unduly oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, or which would lead to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainty and practical inconvenience in the working of the statute.” The position which thus emerges is that under the Act the State Government or Special Public Prosecutor is nominated as the sole agency with the exclusive statutory duty to inform the victim about the bail proceedings. Any practice to create an intermediate agency or alternative method for service of notice upon the victim should be avoided.

Directions issued

  1. The notice of the bail application or bail appeal under the Act shall be served upon the Government Advocate before 12:00 PM of any working day.
  2. The State Government shall ensure that service of notice of the bail application or bail appeal is effected upon the victim not later than 96 hours after the receipt of the said notice.
  3. The victim will be entitled to 72 hours after the receipt of notice of bail.
  4. Save in exceptional circumstances which are accepted by the Court, the bail application or bail appeal under the Act shall be placed before the Court immediately after the expiry of 168 hours or 7 days from the time of service of notice of bail application or bail appeal upon the Government Advocate as aforesaid.
  5. The report of the service of notice of bail application or bail appeal shall be submitted by the State authority before the court showing due compliance of the provisions of Section 15(3) of the Act.
  6. In case the counsel for the applicant does not move the bail application or bail appeal as per the current procedure to enable it to be placed before the Court 7 days after the initial service of notice, this procedure shall be followed. The applicant or his or her counsel shall give 96 hours of notice to the Government Advocate as to the exact date on which such application is intended to be moved. The State shall thereafter cause such notice to be served again upon the victim so as to enable him to have “accurate, notice of the proposed bail application”.
  7. During this period of 7 days notice of the bail application under the Act, the police authorities shall ensure that appropriate instructions are available with the Government Advocates to assist the Court at the hearing of the bail application or bail appeal.
  8. The SSP/DCP/SP (in districts where there is no post of SSP) of the concerned district shall be the nodal officer, who shall supervise the staff charged with the duty of actually serving the notice upon the victim and to provide instructions and relevant material to the Government Advocate on the bail application. In case, there is default on part of such official, the SSP/DCP/SP of the concerned district shall take immediate action in accordance with law against such erring official.
  9. Before parting the Court cannot but take notice of the fact that we live in the age of information technology. The process of law cannot move at a bullock cart pace in the age of information technology. Institutions have to upgrade with the latest technological developments. Fruits of technology have to be put in the service of the people. In the legal process technology can play a critical role in effectuating the fundamental rights of the citizens in particular, and in upholding the process of law in general. The State Government and the Bar are stakeholders in the matter. On behalf of the State, it has been submitted that the office of the Government Advocate does not have the infrastructure and trained personnel to accept and process e-notices of bail applications.
  10. Accordingly, the State Government is directed to ensure that requisite infrastructure and trained personnel in the High Court (Office of Government Advocate), as well as in police stations are available to process the traffic of notices by e-mail. The bail application/ bail appeal may be served upon the Government Advocate by e-mail. In case the notice is fully accurate and contains all the relevant annexures, the said service by e-mail shall be sufficient service upon the State.
  11. In the event of service of notice of bail application or bail appeal upon Government Advocate by e-mail, the time limit for effecting service of the said notice by the State upon the victim shall be 72 hours and not 96 hours. The bail application in such cases shall be placed before the Court in 144 hours or 6 days.
  12. The option of e-filing of notice of bail applications/ bail appeals under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, shall be made effective w.e.f. 01-05-2021.

 Decision

While allowing the present petition, Court made significant observations upon objective of Bail and the undue delay caused in granting the same under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.[Ajeet Chaudhary v. State of UP, 2021 SCC OnLine All 17, decided on 11-01-2021]


Sakshi Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Appointments & TransfersNews

President appoints Justice Pankaj Mithal, Judge of the Allahabad High Court, to be the Chief Justice of Common High Court for the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh with effect from the date he assumes charge of his office.

ORDER


Ministry of Law and Justice

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division bench of Govind Mathur, CJ and Saumitra Dayal Singh, J., directs the Chief Judicial Magistrate to submit a report after conducting an inquiry in regard to a matter wherein a Practicing Advocate was beaten and manhandled by the police at Etah.

The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of this Court with a request to take appropriate action in relation to an incident said to have taken place at Etah on 21-12-2020.

As per the averments contained in the letter, it was submitted that Rajendra Sharma, a practicing advocate at Etah was beaten and manhandled by the police along with humiliation and harassment to his relatives.  Secretariat of the Chief Justice from the High Court Bar Association also had sent a letter in regard to the same issue.

Bench in light of the above held that it would be appropriate to have a complete report of the said incident through Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah.

Hence, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah shall make a necessary inquiry by availing all relevant facts including audiovisual electronic documents and submit to this Court.

District Magistrate, Etah as well as Senior Superintendent of Police, Etah have been directed to co-operate with the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah and they shall supply all relevant facts and documents as desired by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah to furnish a report of the incident to this Court.

Matter to be listed on 08-01-2021.[Suo Moto Cognizance of The Police Atrocitities Over an Advocate, In Re., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1556, decided on 29-12-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Pankaj Naqvi and Vivek Agarwal, JJ., directed for no coercive action to be taken against a person booked under Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, and highlighted the significance of the right to privacy.

Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned FIR under Sections 504, 506 and 120-B IPC and Section 3/5 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance 2020.

The victim is the informant’s wife and mother of two children. Allegation against the petitioner was that he used to visit informant’s house and taking due advantage of acquaintance with the informant’s wife, he attempted to persuade her to change her religion so that he may marry her.

Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that as far as the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance 2020 was concerned, same is the subject matter of challenge in Writ (PIL) Nos. 1756 of 2020 and 1757 of 2020, but the present case, is in regard to upholding the right of privacy as a basic fundamental right covered by Part-III of the Constitution.

Further, it was added to the submissions that no material to substantiate the above contentions were raised and were based on mere suspicion.

Decision

Article 25 provides that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of Part-III of the Constitution.

Bench observed that no material was placed before the Court which would show that any force or coercive process was being adopted by the petitioner to convert informant’s wife.

Adding to its observation, the Court also expressed that the victim being an adult understands her well being.

She as well as the petitioner have a fundamental right to privacy and being grown up adults who are aware of the consequences of their alleged relationship.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the Bench stated that Right to Privacy was upheld in the said decision.

In Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, issue of the right to privacy has been held to depend on the exercise of autonomy and agency by individuals.

Present is a case where all the allegations are prima facie based on suspicion.

In view of the above discussion, the Court stated that the matter requires consideration.

The matter has been listed for consideration on 07-01-2021 and till the next date, no coercive measure shall be taken against the petitioner.[Nadeem v. State of U.P.,  2020 SCC OnLine All 1496, decided on 18-12-2020]


Advocates who appeared before the Court: 

Counsel for Petitioner: Syed Ahmed Faizan, Syed Farman Ahmad Naqvi (Senior Adv.), Zaheer Asghar

Counsel for Respondent: G.A.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Pankaj Mithal and Saurabh Lavania, JJ., directed the District Magistrate to provide protection to senior citizens being troubled by their children.

Petitioners claimed themselves to be senior citizens and were entitled to receive protection and security from the State.

It was alleged that their two daughters along with their sons-in-law were interested in grabbing the house of the petitioners and have inducted one stranger named Sudha in the house due to which petitioners social life has been disturbed.

For attaining protection for their own safety and security, petitioners moved an application before the District Magistrate, Lucknow, but no action was taken.

The Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014 framed under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 casts an obligation upon the district administration, especially, the District Magistrate to ensure that the life and property of senior citizens of the district are protected and they are able to live with security and dignity.

Bench stated that in view of Rule 21 of above-stated Rules, District Magistrate is duty-bound to take appropriate steps and action on the aforesaid application of the petitioners.

Court directed the District Magistrate to take immediate action as far as possible within a period of one month.

Petition to be listed for admission/final disposal after 6 weeks. [Dr Krishna Pal Singh v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1467, decided on 02-12-2020]


Advocates who appeared in the matter:

Petitioner’s Counsel: Daya Shanker Tripathi

Respondent’s Counsel: C.S.C

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Sudhir Agarwal, J., found a government servant to be guilty of the offence of bigamy.

The instant petition was filed against the decision passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Agra dismissing the petitioner from the post of Fireman and therefore mandamus was sought to direct respondent not to interfere in working of the petitioner as a fireman and to pay his full salary for the period of suspension.

Another challenged placed by the petitioner was with regard to the validity of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, claiming the same to be unconstitutional.

Factual matrix

Petitioners wife i.e. respondent 5 had alleged him of bigamy since he had married another woman.

Petitioner submitted that respondent 5 was married to his maternal uncle and after his death, she started living with an elder maternal uncle from whom she conceived a child also. She has also been receiving the pension of his maternal uncle. Further, he added that there is no relationship between husband and wife with respondent 5 and on the other hand he married Anita Yadav in the presence of all relatives and friends.

Further, the petitioner added that respondent 5’s motive and the intent was only to extract some monetary benefits from him.

In view of respondent 5’s complaint, petitioner was suspended.

Chief Fire Officer, Agra in his report submitted that there was no evidence of respondent 5’s marriage with the petitioner. However, both were living together and their relationship resulted in the birth of a child.

S.P. City Agra in his report submitted that respondent 5 and the petitioner were married. In 1994, petitioner without respondent 5’s knowledge solemnised the second marriage. Respondent 5 on knowing the said fact took various legal steps and also filed maintenance applications, wherein she was awarded the same by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.

Thereafter, a regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner under the U.P. Subordinate Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1991, after the enquiry was completed, petitioner was held guilty of bigamy and, therefore, guilty of misconduct under Rule 29 of Conduct Rules, 1956.

Disciplinary Authority in light of the above-stated passed the impugned order of dismissal.

Analysis and Decision

Judicial Review

Bench observed that in the cases pertaining to the disciplinary enquiry, the scope of judicial review is very limited and is confined to the extent of decision-making process and not to appreciate the decision itself unless it is found to be vitiated in law on account of malafide, bias or in violation of natural justice, or in case it can be shown that the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings are based on no evidence at all.

With regard to the contention that the charge of bigamy is false and there is no proof or evidence showing the valid marriage of the petitioner with respondent 5 i.e. Munni Devi, counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no evidence of solemnization of marriage between the petitioner and Munni Devi who claimed to be his legally wedded first wife. It is also submitted that assuming that the petitioner and Munni Devi were living together and maintaining a relationship of husband and wife, yet in the absence of any proof of solemnization of marriage it cannot be held that the petitioner was guilty of bigamy and therefore violated Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules.

A very significant observation made by the Court was that,

Admittedly there was no evidence showing solemnization of marriage with Hindu rituals but there was evidence that petitioner and Munni Devi married in Court, blessed with a daughter out of their relationship of living together as husband and wife and in various documents Munni Devi was shown as the wife of the petitioner.

In these circumstances, Bench stated that it cannot be stated that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the Disciplinary enquiry that the petitioner was guilty of bigamy are based on no evidence at all. The evidence of a marriage between the petitioner and Munni Devi does exist and the sufficiency or adequacy thereof is not within the realm of judicial review of this Court.

Court cited the decision of Supreme Court, R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90, wherein it was held that the standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings is that of the preponderance of probability and where there is some relevant material which the competent authority has accepted and such material if can reasonably support the conclusion drawn by the disciplinary authority regarding the guilt of the employee, the court will not reappreciate such evidence to arrive at a different conclusion since the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence can not be canvassed before the court.

In Bombay High Court’s decision of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, it was held that the disciplinary authority, is the sole judge of the facts if the enquiry has been properly conducted. If there is some evidence on which the findings can be based then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter to be canvassed before the Court

Hence, in view of the above discussion, petitioners contention that he was not guilty of bigamy was not accepted.

The validity of Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules

Petitioner contended that Rule 29 is arbitrary, unjust and illegal, no guidelines have been given as to when the permission will be granted for the purpose of second marriage under the proviso to the said rule and therefore, it is ultra vires.

Bench found the above-stated submission to be wholly baseless and misconceived.

No law, custom or practice has been brought to the notice of the Court showing that solemnizing more than one marriage is necessary religious or otherwise activity.

Decades ago people used to marry more than once inspite of having spouse living. It is said that in Muslim Personal Law, marriage with four women is permissible.

However, to the knowledge of the court, no personal law maintains or dictates it as a duty to perform more than one marriage.

No religious or other authority has been brought to Court’s notice providing that marrying more than one woman is a necessary religious sanction and any law providing otherwise or prohibiting bigamy or polygamy would be irreligious or offence the dictates of the religion.

Polygamy cannot be said to be an integral part of any religious activity, may be Hindu, Muslim or any other religion.

A distinction has to be drawn between religious faith, belief and religious practices. Even Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees only the religious faith and belief and not the religious practices which if run counter to public order or health or policy of social welfare which the state has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the state as a whole.

Bench also observed that various statutes have prohibited both bigamy and polygamy.

A Division Bench of this Court also considered the validity of Rule 27 of the U.P. Government Servant (Conduct) Rules (old) prohibiting bigamy in the case of Ram Prasad Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1960 SCC OnLine All 128 and the  Court observed that there is no law, making it necessary to solemnize a second marriage. It was held that even under the Hindu religious belief marrying a second wife in order to obtain a son when the first wife can not provide one was only a practice followed by the people and not a sanction or mandate of law.

In view of the above discussion, the Court held that Rule 29 cannot be said to be non-arbitrary or illegal and ultra vires.

Concluding with its decision, Bench held that

In any country where bigamy is an offence, a government servant guilty of committing an offence cannot ask to continue in service after award of the minor or lesser punishment.

In view of the above, petition was dismissed. [Veerpal Singh v. SSP, Agra, 2006 SCC OnLine All 1628, decided on 18-05-2006]


Read more:

Bigamy [S. 494 IPC, S. 17 Hindu Marriage Act]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Anjani Kumar Mishra and Prakash Padia, JJ., addressed a petition wherein, two major adults who were in a live-in relation sought protection from harassment for living together.

The facts in the instant case are that petitioner 1 is a major and is aged about 24 years and petitioner 2 is aged about 28 years.

Both the petitioners decided to be in a live-in relationship without any compulsion or coercion.

Though respondents 4 and 5 forcibly tried to solemnize petitioner 1’s marriage against her wishes and on knowing the said fact, petitioner 1 decided to live with Ajay Kumar with her own free will and without fear and pressure.

It has been added that both the petitioners have been happily living with each other but respondent 4 and 5 tried to harass them.

In view of the harassment, petitioner 1 had filed a complaint seeking protection, but no action has been taken till date. Further, it was argued the law laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time petitioners are legally entitled to Live-­in relationship without any fear or pressure more especially when they are major.

Since no action was taken by the police authorities, the present petition was filed.

Decision

In the Supreme Court decision of Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral.

In order to provide a remedy in civil law for the protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having a relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc.

Few other legislations have been provided with respect to reliefs to women placed in certain vulnerable situations.

The issue in the instant matter had been already dealt with in the Supreme Court decision of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sharma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

Apart from the Supreme Court decision, a long line of decisions has settled the law that:

where a boy and a girl are major and they are living with their free will, then, nobody including their parents has the authority to interfere with their living together.

Bench further opined that the petitioners are at liberty to live together and no person shall be permitted to interfere in their peaceful living.

Court further added that, in case any disturbance is caused in the peaceful living of the petitioners, the petitioners shall approach the Senior Superintendent of Police.[Kamini Devi v. State of U.P., Writ C No. 11108 of 2020, decided on 23-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Pankaj Mithal and Saurabh Lavania, JJ., dismissed a Public Interest Litigation.

The petitioner in Public Interest had sought quashing of letter of the Chief Engineer (Purchase) of U.P. Jal Nigam requesting  Crown Agents (India) Pvt. Ltd. to inspect Rashmi Metaliks Ltd., Kolkata and issuance of mandamus directing respondent 2 and 3 not to permit re-inspection of Rashmi Metaliks Limited, Kolkata.

The Court while explaining the purpose of PIL said that normal rule was that a person, who suffered a legal injury or whose legal right was infringed, alone had locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction to avoid miscarriage of justice but the said common rule of locus standi stood relaxed where the grievance was raised before the Court on behalf of poor, deprived, illiterate or the disabled persons, who cannot approach the Court independently for redressal of the legal wrong or the injury caused to them on account of violation of any constitutional or legal right. However, the relaxation was misused by unscrupulous persons seeking cheap publicity quoting the judgment of Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402.

The Court further observed that in the present petition the petitioner had not mentioned anything substantial other than he was a Lawyer and was involved in social work, thus not fulfilling the conditions of the rule laid down in the above case. The Court further stated that the petitioner in filing this petition in Public Interest had not even disclosed that he was filing this petition on behalf of such disadvantageous persons or that injustice was meted out to a large number of people and therefore it has become necessary for him to come forward on their behalf.

The Court while dismissing the PIL held that the petitioner was not a person, who had any credentials to move in Public Interest. Simply on the allegation that he was a Lawyer and a person involved in social work without disclosing his credentials and in the absence of the fact that the petition had been preferred in the interest of justice for large number of downtrodden persons who are unable to approach the Courts of Law, the petitioner was not entitled to maintain this petition in the public interest that too in a matter which does not involve basic human rights.

The Court, however, mentioned that U.P. Jal Nigam was not directly involved in the purchase of any material from any firm, rather it awarded contracts on a turn-key basis and it was the contractor who made purchases of the material from amongst firms prescribed by the U. P. Jal Nigam, provided there was otherwise no legal impediment thus letter of the Chief Engineer (Purchase) on record, since the purchases from the aforesaid firm would be taken subsequent to its certification by the inspecting agency, thus interference by the Court was not required.[Narendra Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1395, decided on 05-11-2020]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Shashi Kant Gupta and Shamim Ahmed, JJ., addressed whether public Interest litigation in service matters are maintainable.

Instant Public Interest Litigation was filed by the petitioner, who is an elected village Pradhan of Village Panchayat and further claimed that he is also doing social work for public welfare and public money.

Purpose of filing the petition was to secure the public money and to cancel the appointment of respondent 6 as Assistant Teacher in Junior High School which was obtained by illegal mode.

Analysis and Decision

Upon perusal of the averments made in the public interest litigation and documents appended thereto, petitioner sought direction cancelling the appointment of respondent 6 as Assistant Teacher and directing the State to initiate recovery proceedings against the respondent 6.

Court noted that when maintainability of the present public interest litigation, in-service matters, was raised by us no suitable reply was given by the counsel for the petitioner. The preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the instant PIL was raised by the Standing Counsel and submitted that in-service matter PIL is no longer res-integra, lacks bonafide and rather it is a proxy petition.

In view of the above-stated submission of the respondents, the Court considered it appropriate to take the question of maintainability of the Public Interest Litigation as a preliminary issue.

In the Supreme Court decision of Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 273, Court dealt with an issue as to whether a Public Interest Writ Petition, at the instance of a stranger, could be entertained by the Administrative tribunal and held that in service matter PIL should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matter continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained.

Orissa Administrative Tribunal’s decision in Amitarani Khnutia v. State of Orissa, 1996 (1) OLR (CSR)-2, the tribunal after considering the provisions of the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not entitled to approach the Tribunal.

The following passage from the above judgement is relevant:

“…A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that an application for redressal of grievances could be filed only by a ‘person aggrieved’ within the meaning of the Act.
Tribunals are constituted under Article 323 A of the Constitution of India. The above Article empowers the Parliament to enact law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government and such law shall specify the jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be exercised by each of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows that Administrative Tribunals are constituted for adjudication or trial of the disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and powers have been well-defined in the Act. It does not enjoy any plenary power.”

High Court agreeing with the above reasoning answered the first question in negative and held that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot entertain public interest litigation at the instance of a total stranger.

In the Supreme Court’s decision of Dr D.B. Singh v. Union of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363, Bench decided that the case on the same lines and held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters.

Further, the Court also relied on the decision of Neetu v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 614, the Supreme Court held as follows:-

“The scope of entertaining a petition styled as public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. Referring to the decisions in Dr Duryodhan Sahu  v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 273 and Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. in (2004) 3 SCC 349, cited supra, the Supreme Court held that PIL in service matters has been held as not maintainable.”

Relying on the above-referred Supreme decisions, Court deemed it necessary to extract Article 141 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:

141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts — The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”

Hence, the Court held that when the PIL is not maintainable in service matters and time and again the same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in series of decisions, the public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in law and the same is dismissed accordingly. [Jagdish Prasad v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1411,  decided on 24-08-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Surya Prakash Kesarwani and Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, JJ., while addressing the matter with regard to the assignment of the registration number of a motor vehicle made an observation that:

Reservation of registration numbers considered attractive is only as an exception to the general procedure of assignment of registration numbers falling in serial order after the last registration mark assigned, and the same is to be made as per the procedure prescribed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A.

The instant petition was filed seeking for a direction to respondent 2 to provide Registration No. U.P. 85BQ-0001 of LMV to the petitioner and extend the period of two weeks for getting the stated registration number.

Petitioner’s Counsel, Ghanshyam Dwivedi submitted that the petitioner had applied for getting a V.I.P number of the vehicle by depositing Rs 1,00,000 as a fee, however, he wasn’t able to purchase the vehicle.

Since petitioner now wanted to purchase the vehicle, therefore he sought a direction to grant two weeks time to purchase the vehicle and accordingly the V.I.P number may be allotted.

Standing Counsel, Girish Chandra Vishwakarma submitted that in view of the provisions of clauses (v) and (vi) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1981, neither registration number can be allotted nor reservation fee can be refunded to him.

Analysis and Decision

Section 41 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides the manner in which registration is to be made.

As per Section 41(6), the registering authority is to assign to the vehicle, for display thereon, a distinguishing mark, referred to as the registration mark, consisting of one of the groups of such of those letters and followed by such letters and figures as are allotted to the State by the Central Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette, and displayed and shown on the motor vehicle in such form and in such manner as may be provided by the Central Government.

Rule 51-A of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 relates to the allotment of registration marks.

Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 51-A of the above-stated rules provides that the assignment of registration mark to motor vehicles shall be as per the Central Government’s notification issued under Section 41(6) of the Act, 1988.

As per the procedure under sub-rule (2), on receipt of an application in the prescribed format under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, the Registering Authority shall assign a registration number which falls in serial order after the last registration mark assigned subject to the provision for reservation of any registration number as considered necessary to be assigned to the vehicles of Government, as provided under clause (i) of sub-rule (2), or to reserve registration numbers considered attractive as per the procedure provided under sub-rule (2).

Bench stated that in the instant case, although the reservation of the registration number was obtained by depositing the prescribed fee but the vehicle was not purchased so far.

Since, the petitioner failed to produce the vehicle within 30 days as prescribed with an application namely Form-20 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1983, the registration number shall be cancelled, the same number hence can be allotted to any other person.

The registration fee deposited also cannot be refunded in view of the bar contained in clause (v) of Rule 51-A (2).

Assignment of Registration Number

Court observed that the assignment of registration numbers as per the statutory provisions are to be made in serial order after the last registration mark assigned, the reservation of registration numbers can be made only as are considered necessary to be assigned to the vehicles of the Government, or in case of registration number considered attractive, the reservation may be made for any person who submits an application and makes the payment as per the procedure prescribed.

The conditions prescribed in respect of reservation of registration numbers, as are considered attractive, include a clear stipulation under clause (vi) of sub-rule (2) that the reservation of registration number shall be cancelled if the vehicle is not produced within thirty days from the date of reserving the registration number and the number so cancelled can be allotted to any other person by Registering Authority who makes an application along with the fees prescribed.

Petitioner’s application for reservation of a V.I.P number is therefore subject to the conditions provided with regard to the same under sub-rule (2) of Rule 51-A of the Rules, 1998, hence no relief was granted to the petitioner.[Rajesh Gaur v. State of U.P.,   2020 SCC OnLine All 1315, decided on 15-10-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Kaushal Jyendra Thaker, J., decided an appeal with regard to the claim petition being filed beyond 6 months and the same being dismissed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on the said ground in light of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act as amended in 2019.

The instant appeal was filed at the behest of claimants whose claim petition came to be dismissed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal holding it barred by limitation as the accident took place on 24-12-2019 and the petition was filed on 20-08-2010 (sic).

The claim petition by MACT was dismissed on the ground of filing of the same beyond 6 months of the date when the accident took place.

The above-stated claim was barred under provisions of Section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicle Act as amended in 2019.

It has been contended in the present appeal that the Tribunal mechanically held that amended Section 166 (3) of the MV Act subscribes a period of 6 months for filing claim petition and hence the matter could not be entertained.

Appellants counsel submitted that question of law is involved in the present appeal and hence contended that the order of the Tribunal was passed against the settled principle of law.

Further, it was submitted that the instant matter could be viewed from three angles:

Extension of Limitation Period

  • The accident took place in December 2019, even if the assumption made by the Tribunal that Section 166 (3) had been notified and is made applicable is considered, six months’ period would be over during the pandemic. But the pandemic struck us in the month of March, 2020 and the Supreme Court by an omnibus order extended the period of limitation. This aspect should have also been looked into by the Judge. Various orders in reference to the extension of limitation were passed in light of the lockdown.

Therefore it appears that the order passed by the tribunal was done in sheer haste.

No Limitation Period

  • Another aspect to be appreciated was, even if the provisions of Section 166(3) of the MV Act, 2019 were brought on the statute book, Judge could have seen the matter from a different angle that there is substitution of Section 163A with Section 164, where no period of limitation has been prescribed.

Evaluation of the Gazette of India with regard to Amendment Act 2019

  • The third Aspect was that though Section 166(3) of the MV Act was notified but what exactly is the current position of the said provision.

Concluding the instant matter, Bench noted that the provisions under Section 140 of the Principal Act which speaks about the liability of the Owner and/or Insurer to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no-fault, Section 163-A of the Principal Act which provides for the special provisions as to payment of compensation based on a structured formula and under Section 166 of the Principal Act which states that legal representative/s can continue to prefer any of the application mentioned hereinabove for compensation as Sections 140, 163-A and 166 of the Principal Act would continue to operate with full vigor till the time Section 51 to 57 of the Amendment Act are notified in the Official Gazette.

Court enquired from the State Law Officer, Mr Ojha in regard to the position of Section 166(3) of the MV Act and he stated that the same has not been brought on the statute book. Section 166 of the 1998 Act would still govern the litigation as of today.

Hence, High Court held that the alternatives were available for MACT, yet it passed the order in sheer haste of disposal while losing sight of the aspects stated above.

Bench directed Virjendra Kumar Singh, Presiding Officer, MACT to remain more vigilant in future while deciding the claim petition under beneficial legislation.

Judgment/Order passed by the Tribunal was quashed and set aside by the Court and the claim petition has been asked to restore. Further, the Court directed the Tribunal to proceed as per Section 166 read with Section 168 of the MV Act as till date amended section dealing with Chapter X, XI, XII of the Act have not been brought on statute book substituting the earlier provision. [Shailendra Tripathi v. Dharmendra Yadav, 2020 SCC OnLine All 1360, decided on 20-11-2020]


Counsels for the Parties:

Appellant: Yogesh Kumar Tripathi, Sanjay Kumar Singh

Respondent: Rahul Sahai

Appointments & TransfersNews

President of India in the exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 217 of the Constitution of India, appointed Justices Prakash Padia, Alok Mathur, Pankaj Bhatia, Saurabh Lavania,  Vivek Varma, Sanjay Kumar Singh, Piyush Agrawal, Shriaurabh Shyam Shamshery, Jaspreet Singh, Rajeev Singh, Manju Rani Chauhan, Karunesh Singh Pawar,  Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, Manish Mathur, Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, Ram Krishna Gautam, Umesh Kumar, Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, Anil Kumar—IX, Rajendra Kumar—IV, Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, Vikas Kunvar Srivastav, Virendra Kumar Srivastava, Suresh Kumar Gupta, Sushri Ghandikota Sri Devi, Narendra Kumar Johari, Raj Beer Singh and  Ajit Singh, Additional Judges of the Allahabad High Court, as Judges of the Allahabad High Court with effect from the date they assume charge of their respective office.

  • Justice Prakash Padia, B.A., L.L.B, was born on 10.03.1965. He enrolled as an Advocate on 02.02.1989. He had 28 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Constitutional, Company and Service matters with specialization in Corporation and Education. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Alok Mathur, B.Sc (Hons.) Chemistry, LLB, was born on 16.11.1964. He enrolled as an Advocate on 06.10.1989. He had 28 years of practice in Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court in Civil, Constitutional, Taxation, Labour and Service matters with specialization in Constitutional and Taxation matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Pankaj Bhatia, B.Sc., LLB, was born on 15.09.1966. He enrolled as an Advocate on 09.12.1989. He had 27 years of practice (18 yrs. in Allahabad High Court and 9 years in Supreme Court) in Civil, Constitutional, Taxation, and Service matters with specialization in Indirect Taxes. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Saurabh Lavania, B.A., L.L.B, M.L.P.M., was born on 17.04.1966. He enrolled as an Advocate on 22.04.1990. He had 26 years of practice in High Court and Subordinate Courts in Civil, Service and Constitutional matters with specialization in Civil, Service and Constitutional matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Vivek Varma, B.Sc., (Biology), L.L.B., was born on 29.12.1969. He enrolled as an Advocate on 04.09.1992. He had 25 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Constitutional, Education, Service and Local Bodies with specialization in Education, Local Bodies and Service matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, B.Sc., L.L.B., was born on 21.01.1969. He enrolled as an Advocate on 09.05.1993. He had 24 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Criminal, Civil, Service, Education and Misc. Writ Jurisdiction with specialization in Criminal matters relating to economic offences and Narcotics. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Piyush Agrawal, B.Com, LL.B., was born on 06.11.1971. He enrolled as an Advocate on 28.08.1993. He had 24 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Taxation, Company and Constitutional matters with specialization in Taxation matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, B.Sc., LLB., was born on 04.02.1969. He enrolled as an Advocate on 20.11.1994. He had 22 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Criminal, Constitutional, Labour, Service, Arbitration and Electricity with specialization in Constitutional, Civil, Criminal, Arbitration and Service matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Jaspreet Singh, B.Com., LLB., was born on 29.08.1971. He enrolled as an Advocate on 21.12.1994. He had 23 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Constitutional, Taxation and Company matters with specialization in Civil matter. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Rajeev Singh, B.Sc., LLB., was born on 03.04.1968. He enrolled as an Advocate on 15.01.1995. He had 22 years of practice in Lucknow High Court, CAT, UP State Public Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunal, in Criminal, Constitutional, Civil, Labour, Company and Service matters with specialization in Criminal, Constitutional and Service matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Manju Rani Chauhan, M.A., LLB., was born on 29.08.1966.
    She enrolled as an Advocate on 26.11.1995. She had 22 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Criminal and Service matters with specialization in Service matter. She was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. Her present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Karunesh Singh Pawar, B.A., LLB., was born on 19.05.1971. He enrolled as an Advocate on 05.02.1996. He had 21 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Service, Criminal and Constitutional matters with specialization in Service matters, Co-operative Societies, Law relating to Sugar Industries. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Dr Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, M.Sc., D.Phil., LLB., was born on 30.12.1965. He enrolled as an Advocate on 27.05.1996. He had 21 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Criminal, Company, Constitutional, Labour, Service, Revenue and Excise matters with specialization in Civil, Constitutional, Service, Company Matters, Labour and Industrial Laws. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Manish Mathur, B.Com., LLB., was born on 09.06.1972. He enrolled as an Advocate on 27.12.1996. He had 20 years of practice in Allahabad High Court in Civil, Criminal, Constitutional, Labour and Service matters with specialization in Civil and Service matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 2 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, B.A., LLB., was born on 05.07.1971. He enrolled as an Advocate on 20.11.1997. He had 20 years of practice in Civil, Criminal, Constitutional, Taxation, Labour, Company and Service matters with specialization in Civil, Tax, Company matters. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Ramkrishna Gautam, BSc., LL.B., was born on 15.06.1960. He joined the Judicial Service on 08.08.1985. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Umesh Kumar, BA., LL.B., was born on 08.07.1960. He joined the Judicial Service on 05.08.1985. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., was born on 30.09.1959. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Anil Kumar-IX, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 31.05.1959. He joined the Judicial Service on 01.08.1986. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Rajendra Kumar-IV, B.A., LL.B., was born on 01.07.1962. He joined the Judicial Service on 13.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, B.Com (Hons.)., LL.B., was born on 26.01.1963. He joined the Judicial Service on 13.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice VikasKunvar Srivastava, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., was born on 28.06.1960. He joined the Judicial Service on 17.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Virendra Kumar Srivastava, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 01.01.1962. He joined the Judicial Service on 26.10.1984. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Suresh Kumar Gupta, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 21.06.1961. He joined the Judicial Service on 18.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer.He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice GhandikotaSree Devi, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 21.06.1961. She joined Judicial Service on 30.09.2005. She served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. She was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years and transferred to Telangana High Court w.e.f 15.05.2019. Her present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Narendra Kumar Johari, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 20.10.1962. He joined the Judicial Service on 10.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer.  He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Raj Beer Singh, B.Sc., LL.B., LLM, was born on 06.12.1964. He joined the Judicial Service on 26.07.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 02 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.
  • Justice Ajit Singh, B.Sc., LL.B., was born on 30.03.1961. He joined the Judicial Service on 13.06.2005. He served in various capacities as a Judicial Officer. He was appointed as an Additional Judge of Allahabad High Court on 22.11.2018 for a period of 2 years. His present term as an Additional Judge will expire on 21.11.2020.

Ministry of Law and Justice

[Press Release dt. 17-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J., held that a complaint made in light of dishonor of cheque filed with a delay of one day cannot be dismissed as one day delay has to be excluded.

The instant application was filed under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on being aggrieved by an Order passed by Court of Additional Sessions Judge and another order passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act whereby applicants’ complaint was dismissed on the ground of delay.

Factual Matrix

INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS

Accused/OP 2 had requested for money of Rs 6,00,000 from the complainant/applicant on personal need which was later transferred in the accused’s bank account. At the time of the return of the same, OP 2 gave to the applicant a Cheque which was dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds.

In view of the above, a notice was sent to OP 2, on receiving the same, he again gave a cheque which was presented with a remark “Alteration /Correction on Instruments”. Despite notice OP 2 has so far not given the amount of the cheque, further on being aggrieved, the applicant filed the complaint.

Court concerned in light of the complaint summoned OP 2 after recording the statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC against which the OP 2 preferred revision before the Sessions Judge, Aligarh. Sessions quashed the summoning order holding that legal notice was not sent within the time prescribed and hence matter was remanded back to the Court concerned.

Section 142 of NI Act gives ample power to the Judge to condone delay.

Bench stated that in view of the provisions amended in the Negotiable Instruments Act way back on 06-02-2003, even if Court considers there was a delay in the lodgement of the complaint, applicant’s counsel satisfied the Court’s conscience that the complaint was in time as the period of one day has to be excluded.

Court observed that the respondent wanted to take advantage of loopholes in the Act, hence Judge was directed to pass a reasoned summoning order to the respondents who evaded to appear even before this Court.

In view of the above discussion, the impugned order was set aside and quashed. [Pankaj Sharma v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1339, decided on 22-09-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Disgruntled with the respondent for non-compliance with the Court’s earlier orders, Vivek Kumar Birla, J. allowed the present contempt application and issued a show-cause notice to the concerned delinquent officers.

The present contempt application has been filed by the applicant pleading for an action against the respondent for wilful disobedience of the judgment and order dated 18-09-2018 passed by this Court in Special Appeal Defective No. 656 of 2018 and the order dated 17-09-2019 passed in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 5773 of 2019

Counsel for the applicant, Kushmondeya Shahi has submitted that the copy of the order had been served to the respondent and yet nothing was done in that regard. Left with no other option, the applicant filed the present application seeking relief. The respondent had been granted more time for compliance vide order dated 17-09-2019 but even after the expiry of the period, any decision is yet to be taken by the respondents.

Upon careful perusal of the facts and circumstances, the Court has found it fit to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondent.

Lamenting over the sorry state of affairs with respect to the compliance of its orders, the Court has passed strict remarks taking the concerned administrative officers to the task. The remarks have been reproduced below for reference:

“This Court is noticing every day that apparently the officers concerned, who were directed to act as per the order of the Court, are not complying with the orders at the first instance and the aggrieved party is forced to file contempt application and even after granting further time to comply with the order of the writ Court passed in contempt application, the orders not being complied with. Apparently, the Officers are becoming habitual and not complying with the orders of this Court at the first instance.

This is a sorry state of affairs and it is expected that the opposite party shall make every effort and shall also issue necessary orders in this regard to the subordinate authorities to strictly comply with the orders at the first instance itself, otherwise the Court will take a serious view of the matter.”

 In view of the above, the Court has allowed the present contempt application issuing notice to the respondent to appear in person and show cause as to why charges be not framed against him under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for wilful disobedience of the aforementioned orders. [Arun Kumar v. Renuka Kumar, Contempt Application (Civil) No. 3033 of 2020, decided on 08-09-2020]


Yashvardhan Shrivastav, Editorial Assistant has put this story together