Delhi High Court: In an appeal filed under Section 19, Family Courts Act, 1984, assailing the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court, whereby the divorce petition filed by the appellant-husband under Sections 13(1-A) and (1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) was dismissed, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising Vivek Chaudhary and Renu Bhatnagar, JJ., examined whether the mere expiry of the statutory period following a decree for restitution of conjugal rights entitles a spouse to a decree of divorce. The Court held that Section 13(1-A) HMA does not confer an absolute or vested right to divorce merely upon proof of non-resumption of cohabitation; the relief remains subject to Section 23(1)(a) HMA, which bars a petitioner from taking advantage of his or her own wrong. Finding that the appellant-husband had himself failed to make bona fide efforts towards reconciliation, had frustrated the respondent-wife’s attempts to enforce the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and had simultaneously disputed the validity of the marriage while seeking its dissolution, the Court held that he was disentitled to relief. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Family Court’s decision.
Background
The parties, were married on 20 February 2008 according to Hindu rites and customs. No child was born from marriage. Shortly after the marriage, the wife filed a complaint under Section 498-A, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against the husband and his family. She subsequently filed a petition under Section 9 HMA, seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in her favour on 17 September 2013. Despite the decree, the parties did not resume cohabitation. In 2016, the husband filed a divorce petition under Sections 13(1-A) and (1)(ib) HMA, contending that there had been no restitution of conjugal rights for more than 1 year after the decree. The Family Court dismissed the divorce petition, leading to the present appeal before the High Court.
Analysis and Decision
The Court’s analysis proceeded on several interconnected issues. First, the Court considered the appellant-husband’s contention that there was no valid marriage because, although the marriage ceremonies had been performed, he was allegedly under the influence of a sedative substance at the time of the marriage. The Court rejected the argument that marriage was void. It explained that a marriage is void under Sections 5 and 11 HMA only where one of the statutory conditions under Section 5 is contravened. The appellant’s allegation of being under the influence of a sedative did not fall within any of those conditions. At the highest, according to the Court, such an allegation could attract Section 12(1)(c) HMA, which concerns a voidable marriage where consent has been obtained by force or fraud. Such a challenge, however, had to be brought within the statutory limitation period. More importantly, the appellant had already raised the issue concerning the validity of the marriage in the earlier Section 9 restitution proceedings, where the issue had been decided against him. That decision had attained finality. Therefore, the Court said that the appellant could not reopen the validity of the marriage in the present proceedings.
The Court next examined the legal effect of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 HMA. The respondent-wife obtained such a decree on 17 September 2013. Section 13(1-A) permits either spouse to seek divorce where there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for a period of 1 year or more after the passing of such a decree. The appellant relied heavily on the fact that the parties had not resumed cohabitation for more than the prescribed period and argued that this entitled him to divorce. The Court, however, clarified that satisfaction of the period prescribed under Section 13(1-A) does not automatically result in a decree of divorce. Section 13(1-A) has to be read together with Section 23(1)(a) HMA, which requires the Court to be satisfied that the person seeking relief is not taking advantage of his or her own wrong. Thus, the statutory period creates a ground for seeking divorce, but it does not create an unconditional or vested right to obtain divorce.
In this regard, the Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, (2001) 4 SCC 125. The Supreme Court had clarified that the purpose of Section 13(1-A) was to enlarge the class of persons who could seek divorce after a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights; it was not intended to make divorce compulsory merely because the requisite period had elapsed. Section 23 continues to govern proceedings under the HMA. Therefore, even where non-resumption of cohabitation is established, the Court must examine whether the petitioner is seeking to take advantage of his or her own wrong.
The crucial factual question, therefore, was who was responsible for the continued non-resumption of cohabitation. The appellant alleged that the wife had remained separate despite obtaining the decree for restitution and had not made sufficient efforts to resume matrimonial life. He also relied upon the fact that she was prosecuting the criminal proceedings under Section 498-A IPC. The Court, however, found that the evidence did not support the appellant’s version. In his cross-examination, the appellant admitted that he had made no efforts to reconcile with his wife or bring her back after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. This admission was significant because it directly contradicted his assertion that he was willing to resume matrimonial relations.
In contrast, the respondent consistently maintained that she was willing to live with the appellant. She stated that she had attempted to contact him for reconciliation and was prepared to withdraw the pending litigation if he was willing to take her back and maintain her. The Court also took note of the respondent’s execution petition, filed to enforce the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In those proceedings, the appellant had categorically refused to join the company of the respondent and even warrants of attachment had been issued by the executing court. The appellant did not dispute the passing of those orders. This conduct provided substantial evidence that it was not the respondent who had prevented cohabitation; rather, the appellant himself had frustrated the execution of the decree.
The Court therefore drew an adverse inference against the appellant. His assertion that he was willing to resume marital relations while the wife was unwilling was inconsistent with the record. The wife’s conduct in seeking execution of the decree demonstrated a positive desire to resume the matrimonial relationship, whereas the appellant had admittedly taken no steps towards reconciliation.
The Court then applied the principle laid down in T. Srinivasan v. T. Varalakshmi, (1998) 3 SCC 112. In that case, the Supreme Court held that where a husband obtains a decree for restitution of conjugal rights but subsequently prevents the wife from joining him, he cannot rely upon the resulting absence of cohabitation to obtain divorce. Such conduct amounts to a positive wrong or misconduct for the purposes of Section 23(1)(a) HMA. The Court found the principle directly applicable because, in the present case, the respondent had attempted to enforce the restitution decree while the appellant had refused to resume the relationship.
An important additional aspect of the Court’s reasoning was the appellant’s inconsistent stand regarding the marriage itself. On one hand, he argued that there was no valid marriage because he had allegedly been under the influence of a sedative during the marriage ceremony. On the other hand, he sought dissolution of that marriage under Sections 13(1A) and (1)(ib) HMA. The Court held that a party cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously; that is, dispute the existence or validity of a marriage while simultaneously asking the Court to dissolve that marriage. The appellant had also failed to challenge the earlier Section 9 decree, which had proceeded based on the subsisting marriage and had rejected his challenge to its validity. His continued attempt to dispute the marriage while seeking divorce was therefore treated as part of the conduct constituting his own wrong under Section 23(1)(a).
The appellant further argued that he could not be regarded as having committed a wrong because he had regularly paid ₹10,000 per month as maintenance to the respondent. The Court rejected this submission. It held that payment of maintenance pursuant to a legal or judicial obligation does not, by itself, establish that the husband had acted properly in relation to the matrimonial relationship. Compliance with a maintenance order is a statutory obligation and does not erase the appellant’s other conduct, particularly his refusal to resume cohabitation and his failure to make reconciliation efforts.
The Court also rejected the appellant’s argument based on desertion. His contention was that the wife had been living separately without sufficient cause after the decree of restitution. However, once the Court found that the appellant himself had refused to resume cohabitation and had frustrated the wife’s attempt to enforce the restitution decree, the allegation that the wife had deserted him could not be sustained. The Court found no positive act on the wife’s part which had made resumption of matrimonial relations impossible.
Finally, the Court considered the argument that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and that, given the passage of time, there was no realistic possibility of reconciliation. The Court acknowledged that considerable time had passed but held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not, by itself, a statutory ground for divorce under the HMA. A court cannot substitute considerations of sentiment or practical inconvenience for the statutory requirements governing matrimonial relief. In the present case, the wife continued to express her willingness to live with the husband, which further weakened the appellant’s argument that the marriage had irretrievably broken down.
The Court held that although the statutory requirement under Section 13(1-A) regarding non-resumption of cohabitation had been satisfied, the husband was not entitled to relief because he was attempting to take advantage of his own wrong under Section 23(1)(a) HMA. His failure to make genuine efforts at reconciliation, refusal to resume cohabitation, frustration of the wife’s execution proceedings, and simultaneous denial of the marriage while seeking its dissolution demonstrated conduct disentitling him to divorce. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the Family Court was affirmed.
[X v. Y, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6229, decided on 18-8-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Appellant: Girish Chander, Vaibhav Gusain, Ashish Kandpal, Advs.
For Respondent: Paritosh Singh Rajput, Advs.
