Know Thy Judge | Supreme Court of India: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan’s illustrious career and notable judgments

“The biggest challenge or loophole in contemporary legal education is the wide disparity in the quality of students and quality of teaching in different law colleges. This issue needs to be addressed as otherwise it will have a telling impact on the district judiciary where bulk of the litigation is fought.”¹

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan is a man of whose interests extend beyond upholding the black and white letter of law. Even though he was born in a family of legal professionals, Justice Bhuyan has carved an illustrious path for himself in the field of law and justice. Let’s delve into his remarkable journey that led him to become the Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

Early Life and Education

Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was born on 02-08-1964, in Guwahati, to Suchendra Nath Bhuyan, who was a highly esteemed Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of Assam.² He completed his schooling at Don Bosco High School, Guwahati before pursuing his higher education at Cotton College, Guwahati.³

Justice Bhuyan obtained a degree in Arts from Kirori Mal College, Delhi. He pursued his LL.B. degree from Government Law College, Guwahati and later earned his LL.M. degree from Gauhati University.⁴

Did you Know? Justice Ujjal Bhuyan has a deep interest for acting and music and sporting activities and often expressed his regrets at not being able to play the guitar and pursue swimming⁵.

Career as an Advocate

Marking the beginning of his legal career, Justice Bhuyan enrolled with the Bar Council of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh on 20-03-1991. He practiced law at the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court in Guwahati and appeared before its Benches in Agartala, Shillong, Kohima, and Itanagar. His expertise extended to other forums, including the Central Administrative Tribunal in Guwahati, the Assam Board of Revenue, the Labour Court in Guwahati, various Civil Courts, and the State Consumer Forum in Arunachal Pradesh.⁶

Justice Bhuyan’s remarkable legal acumen led him to hold several prominent positions, such as- the Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department and later Senior Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department, the Additional Government Advocate of Meghalaya in the Principal Seat of the Gauhati High Court from April 2002 to October 2006, the Special Counsel of the Forest Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, from December 2005 to April 2009 and the Standing Counsel of the Gauhati High Court.⁷ Justice Bhuyan served as the Standing Counsel of the Income Tax Department for a period of 16 years.⁸ The Gauhati High Court designated Justice Bhuyan as a Senior Advocate on 06-09-2010. He was appointed as the Additional Advocate General of Assam on 21-07-2011.⁹

Throughout his career, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan actively participated in various legal associations. He was a valued member of the Gauhati High Court Bar Association, Lawyers Association in Guwahati, Bar Association of India, All India Federation of Tax Practitioners, and Indian Law Institute, Assam Chapter. Justice Bhuyan also has been closely associated with the Judicial Academy, Assam, and the National Law University, Guwahati.¹⁰

Career as a Judge

Justice Bhuyan’s judicial career began when he was appointed as an Additional Judge of the Gauhati High Court on 17-10-2011. His commendable performance led to his confirmation as a Permanent Judge of Gauhati High Court on 20-03-2013. During his tenure as Judge, Justice Bhuyan also served as the Executive Chairman of the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority.¹¹

Justice Bhuyan was transferred to the High Court of Bombay and took the oath as a Judge on 03-10-2019.¹² He was transferred to the High Court for the State of Telangana and assumed office as a Judge on 22-10-2021. He was entrusted with the responsibility of being the Executive Chairman of the Telangana State Legal Services Authority.¹³ Justice Bhuyan was appointed as the Chief Justice of the High Court for the State of Telangana¹⁴ and sworn in and assumed charge as the Chief Justice at Raj Bhavan in Hyderabad on 28-06-2022.

On 05-07-2023, the Supreme Court Collegium had recommended the appointment of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan to the Supreme Court of India¹⁵ and on 14-07-2023, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was sworn in as a new Judge of Supreme Court of India.¹⁶ This remarkable achievement reflects his exceptional legal knowledge, integrity, and commitment to delivering justice.

Did You Know? While recommending his elevation to the Supreme Court, the Collegium gave particular emphasis to Justice Bhuyan’s expertise in taxation law.¹⁷

Important Judgments

In K. Umadevi v. State of T.N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1204, while considering the instant matter wherein the appellant who was denied maternity leave for a third child on account of her re-marriage, challenged the said rejection; the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ., held that the appellant was entitled to maternity leave. The Court explained that the appellant has two biological children out of her first wedlock; however, that was before entry into her service. Post her entry into service and from her subsisting marriage, this is her first child. Furthermore, the Court took note of the record that the two children out of her first wedlock were not residing with her but with their father, who had their custody. The Court emphasised that State’s policy to limit population boom via population control is a laudable objective; however, so is the objective of granting maternity benefit to women employees. The object of having two child norm as part of the measures to control population growth in the country and the object of providing maternity benefit to women employees including maternity leave in circumstances such as in the present case are not mutually exclusive. The two must be harmonized in a purposive and rationale manner to achieve the social objective.

In Patanjali Foods Ltd. v. Union of India, (2025) 151 GSTR 157, while considering the instant appeal revolving around refund of customs duty thereby challenging the decision of Gujarat High Court in Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 10110; the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ., opined that in the instant case, the Customs Department resorted to arbitrary encashment of the bank guarantees. Such encashment of bank guarantees cannot be treated as payment of customs duty or duty paid by a claimant. In such circumstances, the doctrine of unjust enrichment or Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 would not be applicable. “It is evidently clear that respondents are holding on to money of the appellant which they are not authorized to do so (…) They have no authority in law to hold on to such money and, therefore, the same has become totally untenable”.

In Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, a criminal appeal against the Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby the accused persons’ revision application against the Trial Court’s order dismissing their discharge applications for death of the deceased-employees, ultimately for the offence under Sections 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision for absence of the basic ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The Court added that nothing was discernible from the record of the case that the accused persons had the knowledge that by asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their death.

In Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 503, a criminal appeal against the Gujarat High Court’s decision, whereby the appeal by the present four accused against the Trial Court’s decision convicting them for offences punishable under Sections 306 and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decisions, as no offence of abetment to commit suicide could be made out against the accused persons considering that act of incitement on the part of the accused persons proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide was absent.

In Abdul Wahid v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 453, an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the Rajasthan High Court whereby the High Court has upheld the judgment and order dated 10-03-2003 passed by the Trial Court convicting the convicts under Sections 302 read with 148 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), with the modification that the conviction was under Sections 302 read 149 IPC, the division bench of Pankaj Mithal and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court, stating that there is a complete lack of credible evidence to connect the convicts to the deceased’s homicidal death.

In Mohd. Bani Alam Mazid v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 391, a criminal appeal against the Gauhati High Court’s decision, whereby, the criminal appeal against the Trial Court’s decision convicting the accused under Sections 366(A)/302/201/34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), was dismissed, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision considering that none of the circumstances put forth by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the convict were proved. The complete chain of circumstances, to dispel any hypothesis of innocence of the convict was also incomplete.

In Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 3 SCC 565, a criminal appeal against the Bombay High Court’s decision, whereby the Trial Court’s decision convicting the accused under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, was affirmed, the Division Bench Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal holding that the evidence on the basis of which the prosecution sought conviction of the accused i.e. extra-judicial confession made before the witnesses, lacked credibility. The Court also added that the evidence suffered from material contradiction. Thus, the Court quashed the High Court’s decision affirming the Trial Court’s view.

“A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt.”

In Somdatt Builders -NCC – NEC(JV) v. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 170, a civil appeal against the Delhi High Court’s decision allowing the respondent- National Highways Authority of India’s (‘NHAI’) appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’) and setting aside the Single Judge’s view, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision. The Bench restored the Arbitral Tribunal’s award holding that the Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted Clause 51 in a reasonable manner based on the evidence on record and this interpretation was affirmed by the Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Bench held that the Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’. The Court reiterated that it is necessary to remind the Courts that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act.

In Arvind Kejriwal v. CBI, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2550, a set of two criminal appeals by Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal seeking bail in the Central Bureau of Investigation’s (‘CBI’) case in the Delhi Excise Liquor Policy matter and challenging the legality of his arrest by the CBI, the Division Bench of Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. granted him bail. While separate judgments were penned by Justice Bhuyan and Kant, however, there was a concurrent opinion that Kejriwal was entitled to be released on bail, subject to the terms and conditions. Justice Surya Kant dismissed the appeal challenging the legality of his arrest, holding that arrest by CBI was justified and that there was no procedural infirmity. Justice Bhuyan in his separate judgment differed on this and said that Kejriwal’s arrest by the CBI was perhaps only to frustrate the bail granted to Kejriwal in the ED case. He stated that, when CBI did not feel the necessity to arrest him for 22 long months, he failed to understand the great hurry and urgency on the part of the CBI to arrest Kejriwal when he was on the cusp of release in the ED case.

In Bijender Singh v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895, a civil appeal filed by the appellant challenging the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal which had denied him disability pension holding that his disability was less than 20% and not attributable to military service, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. set aside the Tribunal’s order, holding it unsustainable in law. The Court emphasized that if no disability was noted at the time of entry into service, it should be presumed that the disability was due to military service, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the employer. The Court also reiterated that a disability leading to invaliding out of service should be assumed to be above 20% and attract a 50% disability pension. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to grant the appellant disability pension at 50% with arrears and interest.

“The morale of the armed forces requires absolute and undiluted protection. If any injury leads to loss of service without any recompense, this morale would be severely undermined.”

In Ram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 4 SCC 208, a criminal appeal filed by accused challenging his conviction under Section 301 read with 302 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Division Bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ., held that the non-recovery of a firearm and the omission of a ballistic expert’s opinion are not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case. The Court observed that the law on this subject depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and the significance of such omissions must be weighed against the entirety of the other evidence on record. The Court further observed that the evidence tendered on behalf of the prosecution was not full proof so much so that non-recovery of the weapon of offence, non-obtaining of ballistic opinion and non-examination of ballistic expert would be immaterial. Hence, the Court set aside the conviction of the accused.

In Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, a set of two criminal appeals preferred by the accused and the State against Uttarakhand High Court’s decisions for compounding and quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused/ appellant, and allowing the co-accused’s application for discharge from allegations of wrongfully confining and trafficking of a female domestic worker——the complainant, the Division Bench of Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. allowed the accused’s appeal and set aside the High Court’s decision considering that no prima facie offence under Section 370 and Section 343 of the Penal Code, 1860 was made out, as there was no evidence of neglect or exploitation of the complainant. The Bench also dismissed the State’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision discharging the co-accused. The Court observed that there is a legal vacuum which exists vis-à-vis the rights and protection of domestic workers. Indeed, domestic workers in India remain largely unprotected and without any comprehensive legal recognition. As a result, they frequently endure low wages, unsafe environments, and extended hours without effective recourse. In light of the doctrine of parens patriae, the Court said that it is imperative that the Legislature takes steps towards ensuring an equitable and dignified life for domestic workers. The Court directed the Ministry of Labour and Employment in tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and the Ministry of Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending a legal framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of the rights of domestic workers.

In Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Noida Residents Welfare Assn., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3831, a civil appeal by NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Limited (‘NTBCL’) against a decision of Allahabad High Court concerning a challenge to the collection and levying of toll on Delhi-Noida Direct Flyway (DND) wherein the agreement between NTBCL, the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and the Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (IL&FS) was held to be bad in law and directed NTBCL to cease the imposition of toll upon commuters using the DND Flyway, the Division Bench of Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. upheld the High Court’s decision. The Court held that NTBCL has recovered the project costs and substantial profits, hence, the continued imposition or collection of user fees or tolls was eliminated.

In Right to Privacy of Adolescent, In re, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1877, a suo motu cognizance of the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Probhat Purkait v. State of W.B., (2023) 1 HCC (Cal) 626, whereby the High Court issued a slew of advisories to the male and female adolescents regarding the respect of a woman, protection of self-worth, dignity and privacy, and right to autonomy of the female’s body, and advised the female adolescent, identifying the duty or obligation to control sexual urge/urges as in the eyes of society she is the looser when she gives in to enjoying the sexual pleasure of hardly two minutes, the Division Bench of Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. set aside the impugned decision. The Court observed that the High Court was called upon to adjudicate only on the merits of the appeal and nothing else. But the High Court has discussed so many issues which were irrelevant. Prima facie, the Court was of the view that while writing a judgment in such appeal, the Hon’ble Judges are not expected to express their personal views. They are not expected to preach. The Court found certain portions of the judgment objectionable and completely unwarranted and completely in violation of the rights of the adolescents guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

While dealing with the issue that whether State Governments are deprived of powers to tax and regulate activities concerning mines and minerals in view of the enactment of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act (‘Mines Act’) in Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1796, the Nine Judge Constitution Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, BV Nagarathna, J.B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih JJ., held that royalty paid by mining operators to the Central government is not a tax and that States have the power to levy cesses on mining and mineral-use activities. Whereas, Justice BV Nagarathna, gave a dissenting opinion.

In Ashish Mishra v. State of U.P.,¹⁸ a matter concerning Lakhimpur Kheri violence case relating to the killings in October 2021, when vehicles of Ashish Mishra’s convoy allegedly ran over a group of farmers who were protesting the new farm laws, the division bench of Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ. has granted bail to Ashish Mishra and other co accused persons, subject to certain conditions.

In Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1755, a criminal appeal against decision of Allahabad High Court, wherein the bail application of the accused person/ appellant for offences under Sections 489-B and 489-C of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (‘UAPA’) was dismissed, the Division Bench of JB Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ. taking note of nine long years of imprisonment and following Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 set aside the impugned decision and directed to release the accused on bail. In Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. National Investigating Agency, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185, the accused under various provisions of IPC and UAPA was released on bail by the High Court, conducting a mini trial and determining admissibility of certain evidence which clearly exceeded the limited scope of a bail proceeding, hence, the Supreme Court in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, cancelled the said grant of bail. The Court clarified that the decision in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) is to be read and understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a precedent to deny bail to an accused- undertrial suffering long incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial.

In Shiv Pratap Singh Rana v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1653, an appeal challenging the Madhya Pradesh High Court’ judgment, which dismissed Criminal Revision against the Additional Sessions Judge’s order framing charges under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 of the IPC against the appellant and rejected the appellant’s discharge application, a division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ., found that the physical relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix appeared consensual, and the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges of rape and criminal intimidation. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the orders framing charges against the appellant.

“It appears to be a case of a consensual relationship which had gone sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the circumstances, Court is of the view that compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial on these materials would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court, result of the trial being a foregone conclusion.”

In Excise Commissioner Karnataka v. Mysore Sales International Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1660, an appeal against the judgment and order dated 13.03.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court affirming the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax’s order that the respondent, MSIL is a “seller” and the liquor vendors (contractors) are “buyers” under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and consequently, the respondent was required to collect income tax at source from the liquor vendors for various assessment years, a division bench of B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ., held that —

1. Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is not applicable to the respondent.
2. Liquor vendors (contractors) who bought the vending rights from the respondent on auction cannot be termed as “buyers” within the meaning of Explanation (a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act.

3. The High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions and writ appeals challenging the orders dated 17-01-2001.

In Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 941, an appeal against the Bombay High Court’s judgment which upheld the appellant’s conviction by the trial court for the murder of his wife under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, a division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ., upheld the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- based on the evidence, particularly the dying declaration which established the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Commr. of Central Excise Belapur v. Jindal Drugs Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 682, an appeal by the revenue under Section 35L(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 against the CESTAT’ order held that affixing additional labels by the respondent at its Taloja unit amounted to ‘manufacture’ under Note 3 to Chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, a division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ., held that re-labelling amounts to manufacture under Note 3 to Chapter 18 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, as amended with effect from 01-03-2008.

In Sadanand Gangaram Kadam v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 142, a criminal appeal filed by Sadanand Kadam, a close associate of Shiv Sena (UBT) MLC Anil Parab, accused in a money laundering case in connection with the construction of an allegedly illegal resort named ‘Sai Resort’ in Dapoli, situated in Maharashtra’s Ratnagiri district, the division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., directed that Sadanand Kadam to be produced before the Special Court within one week from the date of this order. Further, it directed the Special Court to enlarge him on bail on appropriate terms and conditions, till the trial of the complaint case concludes.

In Ram Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 170, a criminal appeal directed against the judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the convict for the offence under Section 301 read with Section 302 of the IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, the division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ., while setting aside the conviction and sentence of the convict in a 42-year-old murder case, said that the convict should be given the benefit of doubt as the prosecution could not prove his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt as the evidence tendered by the eyewitnesses suffer from serious lacunae. Thus, their evidence cannot be said to be credible.

“Any lingering doubt about the involvement of an accused in the crime he is accused of committing, must weigh on the mind of the court and in such a situation, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.”

In Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 216, an appeal against conviction of appellant under Section 306 of IPC, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ. discussed the importance of recovery of trace of poison consumed or administered to the deceased and held that there was no evidence based on which the appellant could be held guilty of abetting suicide and set aside his conviction under Section 306 of IPC.

In V. Vasanta Mogli v. State of Telangana, 2023 SCC OnLine TS 1688, a case wherein prayer was made to declare Telangana Eunuchs Act, 1329 Fasli (‘Telangana Eunuchs Act’) as ultra vires and unconstitutional, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan, CJ.* and C.V. Bhaskar Reddy, J., opined that the Telangana Eunuchs Act was violative of the human rights of the third gender community besides being an intrusion into their private sphere as well as an assault on their dignity. It was thus offensive of both right to privacy and right to dignity of transgender persons. Moreover, it was not only violative of Article 14 but also clearly violated Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, the Court opined that such an enactment could no longer continue to find a place in our statute book and thus, was accordingly declared as unconstitutional.

“Constitutional morality impacts upon any law which deprives the LGBT individuals of their entitlement to a full and equal citizenship. LGBT individuals living under threats of conformity grounded in cultural morality have been denied basic human existence. Constitutional morality does not permit such discrimination and must supersede cultural morality.”

In SKS Micro Finance Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2023 SCC OnLine AP 285, a case wherein the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 was challenged on the ground that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature, the Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan,* C.J. and C.V. Bhaskar Reddy, J. refused to declare the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 and the Telangana Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 as unconstitutional and held that the NBFCs operating in the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh registered with the RBI would be excluded from the purview of the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 and the Telangana Micro Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011.

While allowing the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in Srico Projects (P) Ltd. v. Telangana State Authority for Advance Ruling, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1527, for quashing the impugned order dated 03-06-2022 passed by Telangana State Authority for Advance Ruling (‘Authority’) and to consider the application for advance ruling under Section 98 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (‘CGST’), the division bench of Ujjal Bhuyan*, C.J., and C.V. Bhaskar Reddy, J., held that the investigation post filing of the application will not debar the applicant from seeking an advance ruling.

In VANPIC Ports (P) Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1793, a landmark judgment on Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), a Division bench comprising of Ujjal Bhuyan,* C.J. and Surepalli Nanda, J., while interpreting Sections 5 and 8 of the PMLA, the Court held that on the anvil of both provisions, it was to be examined whether ATPMLA had erred in abdicating its adjudicatory functions, whilst relegating the appellant to Special Court for seeking release of attached properties after having found the attachment to be illegal. The sine qua non for exercising powers under Section 5(1) was found to be that attaching authorities must have “reasons to believe”, recorded in writing, as the basis for inferring that the person is in possession of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed. The reasons to believe must have direct nexus or live link with the material in possession pertaining to above two aspects.

In V. Vijay Sai Reddy v. Enforcement Directorate, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1604, a single bench of Ujjal Bhuyan,* C.J., while interpreting various provisions of PMLA, specially the non obstante clause of Section 44, held that trial of both the offences viz. that of scheduled/predicate offence and the other one of PMLA offence has to be carried out before the same court. The case related to scheduled/predicate offence even if being tried in another court shall stand committed to the Special Court where the trial arising out of PMLA offence is instituted or pending.

In Ritika Prashant Jasani v. Anjana Niranjan Jasani, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 1802, a Division bench of Ujjal Bhuyan* and Madhav J. Jamdar, JJ., while explaining the provisions under Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 also elaborated upon the concept of shared household and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens.

While deciding whether wife’s wish to stay abroad is an act of selfishness and can be a ground for divorce in Prakashchandra Joshi v. Kuntal Prakashchandra Joshi, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 958, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Prithviraj K. Chauhan, JJ., held that wife wishing to stay abroad with the child to maintain her status would not amount to cruelty and desertion when she was already well settled over there.

In Dharmendra M. Jani v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 839, the Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Abhay Ahuja, JJ., gave a splitting verdict on the constitutionality of Sections 13(8)(b) and 8(2) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Ujjal Bhuyan, J., held that Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, 2017 was ultra vires the said Act besides being unconstitutional. However, Abhay Ahuja, J., stated that he was unable to share the opinion of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan.

“By artificially creating a deeming provision in the form of Section 13(8)(b) of the IGST Act, where the location of the recipient of service provided by an intermediary is outside India, the place of supply has been treated as the location of the supplier i.e., in India. This runs contrary to the scheme of the CGST Act as well as the IGST Act besides being beyond the charging sections of both the Acts.”

In Parents Teachers Assn. of United Forum v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 793, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and N.R. Borkar, JJ., has directed State of Maharashtra to not take any coercive action against the schools for providing online teaching to pupils belonging to Class-II and below who are willing to avail such teaching. Adding to the above, no coercive action shall be taken by the schools against those parents who are not willing to force their children studying in class-II and below for availing online classes.

In Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 732, while quashing an FIR against Republic TV’s Editor-in-Chief, Arnab Goswami, a Division bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Riyaz I. Chagla, JJ., held that, “Seventy years into our republic we cannot be seen to be skating on thin ice so much so that mere mention of a place of worship will lead to animosity or hatred amongst religious communities causing upheaval and conflagration on the streets.”

While deciding an issue whether medical termination of pregnancy be allowed beyond 20 weeks gestation period, in Rubina Kasam Phansopkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 765, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and R.I. Chagla, JJ., denied the termination of pregnancy to woman aged 39 years old as the gestation was beyond 20 weeks and medical board’s report had also recommended the same.

A Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Milind N. Jadhav, JJ., while addressing an issue with regard to the appointment of a guardian for a person who is lying in the state of coma in Rajni Hariom Sharma v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 880, held that, “the wife can be said to be best suited to be the guardian of her husband who is under a state of incapacity or disability on account of being in a comatose condition or vegetative state.”

In Akram Ali v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 721, a Division Bench comprising of Ujjal Bhuyan* and Rumi Kumari Phukan, JJ., while allowing a writ petition seeking to quash the order of the Foreigners Tribunal on the ground that petitioner’s his lawyer did not inform him about progress of the case, held that litigant should not suffer for the fault of the lawyer.

In Bhim Turi v. State of Assam, 2017 SCC OnLine Gau 813, a case related to appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Court sentencing the appellants-accused under Sections 302/201/34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) to imprisonment for life. for murdering the deceased/victims by suspecting them to be ‘Dainees’ (witches), The Division Bench comprising of Ujjal Bhuyan* and Paran Kumar Phukan, JJ., confirmed the conviction of two accused and acquitted one giving him the benefit of doubt and held that branding of a man or a woman as a witch and then resorting to witch hunting is the most dehumanizing act and is one of the worst forms of human rights violations.

“Witch hunting as a phenomenon is not only confined to the State of Assam; it has affected large parts of the country. It is rooted in flawed quasi-religious beliefs, antiquated socio-cultural traditions blended with extreme superstitions practices. Branding of a man or a woman as a witch and then resorting to witch hunting is the most dehumanizing act and is one of the worst forms of human rights violations. It can have no place in a civilized society. Therefore, witch hunting as a socio-legal problem has to be confronted at multiple levels.”

* Judge who has penned the judgment.