Delhi High Court: In a petition seeking quashing of a First Information Report (FIR) registered during the COVID-19 lockdown, the Single Judge Bench of Madhu Jain, J., held that mere movement on a public road during the lockdown, without proof of knowledge of a duly promulgated prohibitory order or satisfaction of the essential statutory ingredients of the offences alleged, cannot attract criminal liability under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 336, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The Court observed that knowledge of the order is the sine qua non for an offence under Section 188 IPC, while prosecution under Sections 269 and 270 IPC necessarily requires material showing that the accused was infected with, or had reason to believe that he was carrying, a disease dangerous to life. Finding that the prosecution had failed to establish these foundational requirements, the Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings as an abuse of the process of law.
Background
The petitioner approached the Delhi High Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), seeking quashing of FIR registered for offences under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 336 IPC, along with all consequential proceedings.
The FIR arose out of an incident that occurred on 28 March 2020, during the nationwide COVID-19 lockdown. At about 2.00 p.m., police were deployed at a police picket on Aruna Asaf Ali Marg to enforce the lockdown restrictions. The petitioner was noticed walking from the Kishangarh side towards JNU and was stopped for questioning. According to the prosecution, when asked about the purpose of his movement, the petitioner stated that he had stepped out because he was unable to remain confined at home and had gone for a walk. Treating this explanation as a violation of the lockdown directions issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the order dated 24 March 2020 promulgated by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, the police registered an FIR under Section 188 IPC. The petitioner was arrested on the same day and subsequently released on police bail.
During investigation, the police additionally invoked Sections 269, 270 and 336 IPC, alleging that the petitioner’s act of moving in a public place during the pandemic endangered public health and safety. The investigation, however, rested exclusively on the statements of 3 police officials, the complainant-cum-investigating officer, another police constable, and the Duty Officer. No independent public witness was examined, no evidence was collected to establish that the petitioner had endangered any person, and significantly, no COVID-19 test or medical examination of the petitioner was ever conducted to ascertain whether he was infected with the virus. Subsequently, the ACP filed a complaint under Section 195 CrPC, pursuant to which the Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance and summoned the petitioner.
Before the High Court, the petitioner disputed the prosecution’s version and asserted that he had not stepped out merely for a casual walk. He contended that he was suffering from severe back pain and had gone out for a medical follow-up, relying on a medical certificate dated 21 March 2020, issued a week before the incident. The State, upon verification, acknowledged the genuineness of the medical certificate. The petitioner further argued that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. He submitted that the lockdown order purportedly violated had neither been annexed to the chargesheet nor was there any material to show that it had been duly promulgated or that he had knowledge of its contents. He also contended that the invocation of Sections 269 and 270 IPC was legally untenable in the absence of any allegation or evidence that he was infected with COVID-19 or knew himself to be carrying an infectious disease. Finally, he challenged the fairness of the investigation on the ground that the complainant himself acted as the investigating officer and that the prosecution was based solely on police witnesses without any independent corroboration.
Analysis and Decision
The Court observed that knowledge of a duly promulgated order is the sine qua non for constituting an offence under Section 188 IPC. Referring to Bhoop Singh Tyagi v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2002 SCC OnLine Del 277 and Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4951 the Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish that the ACP’s order dated 24 March 2020 had been publicly promulgated or that the petitioner had any knowledge of it. The charge-sheet did not even annex the alleged order, nor did it contain any material demonstrating its publication or dissemination. The Court further noted that the prosecution had failed to show that the petitioner’s solitary act of walking on a public road caused or was likely to cause any obstruction, injury, or danger to human life or public safety, as required under Section 188 IPC. Moreover, the petitioner’s explanation that he was travelling for a medical follow-up was supported by a genuine medical certificate, and the lockdown guidelines permitted movement for essential medical purposes.
“The present prosecution collapses at the threshold. A perusal of the record shows that the order which is alleged to have been violated by the petitioner does not accompany the chargesheet. Furthermore, neither the FIR, the chargesheet, nor the statement of the police contains a single averment that the said order was promulgated by way of proclamation, publication, affixation, or any other public mode, or that it was published in any newspaper or other media circulating in the area where the petitioner resided, or that the petitioner had knowledge of it. There is, quite literally, nothing on record in this regard. Knowledge cannot be presumed in a vacuum, least of all on the fourth day of an unprecedented nationwide lockdown.”
With respect to Sections 269 and 270 IPC, the Court held that both provisions require the accused to be infected with, or have reason to believe that he is carrying, a disease dangerous to life. Since the petitioner was never tested for COVID-19 and there was no allegation or evidence suggesting that he was infected or symptomatic, the foundational ingredients of these offences were entirely absent. Similarly, the invocation of Section 336 IPC was found to be unsustainable as there was no material to show that the petitioner’s conduct endangered the life or personal safety of any person.
Holding that the allegations in the FIR, even if accepted at face value, did not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence; the Court concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC and relying upon the principles laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings pending against the petitioner. The judgment reiterates that criminal liability for alleged violations of lockdown orders cannot be fastened in the absence of proof of the accused’s knowledge of a duly promulgated order and the essential statutory ingredients of the offences invoked.
[Anupam Shahu v. State, CRL.M.C. 3629/2023 & CRL.M.A. 12652/2026, decided on 21-7-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner: Ashima Mandla, Mandakini Singh, Advs. with petitioner-in-person.
For Respondent: Nawal Kishore Jha, APP, SI Parag, PS Kishangarh.
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