Hot Off The PressNews

All India Bar Examination- XIV will be held on 25-08-2019. The significant dates have been notified on the official website of AIBE – All India Bar Examination.

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The AIBE will assess skills at a basic level, and is intended to set a minimum benchmark for admission to the practice of law; it addresses a candidate’s analytical abilities and understanding the basic knowledge of the law. After passing the examination candidate will be awarded “Certificate of Practice” by the Bar Council of India.

IMPORTANT DATES FOR AIBE-XIV

  • 10-06-2019 – Online Registrations Begins.
  • 12-08-2019 – Last date for Online Registrations.
  • 21-08-019 – Release of Admit Card Online.
  • 25-08-2019 – All India Bar Examination-XIV in various cities across India.

All India Bar Examination

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: A Division bench comprising of P.R. Ramachandra Menon and Devan Ramachandran, JJ. dismissed a civil writ petition challenging a notification issued by the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) in relation to appointment of the head priest of  Sabarimala temple.

Petitioner, one of the applicants for the post of ‘Melshanthi’ (head-priest) of the Sabarimala temple, filed the instant petition challenging a notification issued by TDB whereby only a ‘Santhi’ (priest) having twelve years experience, out of which ten years being spent continuously serving as a Melsanthi of a temple, would alone be eligible for being selected as the Melsanthi of the Sabarimala temple.

The petitioner contended that the stipulation mandating continuous ten years service as Melshanthi amounts to an illegal classification among the Santhis since it has no rationale nexus to the objective sought to be achieved by such classification.

The court held that the impugned notification was not a classification but it prescribed a specific qualification to identify the best and most suitable candidate. All the Melsanthis were Santhis and therefore, what the notification sought to do was not to classify them into two categories, but to prescribe an additional qualification for the aspiring Santhis, so that TDB could select the best candidate.

Relying on the principles relating to fixing and stipulation of the qualifications of employees enumerated by the Supreme Court in J. Rangaswamy v. Government of A.P., (1990) 1 SCC 288, the High Court held that it was completely proscribed from entering into the said area unless the petitioner showed that TDB’s prescriptions were illegal and void ab initio. Thus, the petition was dismissed for being without merits and holding that the issue in question fell within the realm of policy-creation by the appointing authority – TDB.[Rajesh J. Potty v. Travancore Devaswom Board,2018 SCC OnLine Ker 4115, decided on 12-10-2018]

Hot Off The PressNews

Supreme Court: The notification proposing a social media hub that could act like a monitor regarding the online activities of the citizens has been turned down by Centre. The bench comprising of CJ Dipak Misra and AM Khanwilkar and Dr DY Chandrachud was informed by AG KK Venugopal that the stated notification about “social media hub” was being withdrawn.

The move of creating a social media hub was leading towards the creation of a surveillance state. The petition concerning the same was file by TMC MLA Mahua Moitra in which she stated that the government had issued a Request for Proposal (RFP). The tender will be opened on August 20 for a software that would do 360-degree monitoring on all social media platforms.

Therefore, the bench had sought AG KK Venugopal’s assistance for the same in Mahua Moitra v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 697, for which today the Supreme Court was told that the notification is being withdrawn by the Centre.

[Source: PTI]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: The Court recently addressed a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein the petitioners asked for quashment of the impugned order and for waiver of the detention charges incurred on the subject goods on the basis of Regulation 6(1) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009.

The facts of the case are that the petitioner had filed this petition challenging the original order which was passed by the respondent, in respect of an import made by the petitioner on a certain date for clearance of the imported goods under a certain Customs Tariff heading with a specific IGST rate assigned to it. The petitioner contended that after carrying out a self- assessment of the duty, as specified under Section 17(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, the assessable value came up to a different amount of money from the one that was pronounced by the petitioner. This was because the petitioner argued that to avail the concessional duty, the IGST rate needed to be calculated at 0% based on a previous notification. The respondent argued that the rate had to be calculated at a 5% rate on the basis of a different notification. The respondent thus was of the prima facie view that the exemption claimed by the petitioner for the imported goods did not appear to be correct.

The Court noticed that the respondent while passing the impugned order did not restrict himself only to the life consignment covered under Bill of Entry in question but also in respect of earlier import in Bill of Entry and proceeded to invoke his powers under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, in the sense that the imported goods were liable to be confiscated.

The Bemch of T. S. Sivagnanam J., held that the respondent could not invoke Section 111(m) of the Customs Act as there appeared to be no allegation that the goods did not correspond in respect of the value or in any other particular with the entry made under the Act. In the impugned order, the respondent had accepted that there was no dispute in the classification of the goods. But the Court pointed out that no adjudication was needed on this matter since the petitioner only sought liberty to approach the appellate authority on this matter. Hence, along with granting liberty to file an appeal, the Court also directed the petitioner to pay the differential duty amount in respect of the earlier Bill of Entry and the duty on the Bill of Entry in question that the respondent had laid down following which the respondent would have to provisionally release the cargo within a period of seven days from the date of remittance for both Bills of Entry. [Priyanka Enterprises v. The Joint Commissioner of Customs; 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 9942, order dated 23.11.2017]