Supreme Court: In a reference on whether the nearly 5 decades old landmark decision in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213, which laid down the “Triple Test” for determining whether an undertaking falls within the ambit of “industry” under Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Industrial Disputes Act), remains a good law, the Constitution Bench of Surya Kant*, CJ, and Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe, Vipul M. Pancholi, B.V. Nagarathna**, P.S. Narasimha**, Dipankar Datta**, Ujjal Bhuyan and Joymalya Bagchi**, JJ., by 5:4 ratio, established that the “Triple Test” remained the governing legal framework for Section 2(j) of the repealed Industrial Disputes Act. The Court held that:
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All matters currently pending before courts, tribunals, and labour authorities under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act continue to be governed and adjudicated under the original Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply.
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Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (Industrial Relations Code) was an independent, distinct enactment that must be interpreted entirely on its own terms, text, and statutory scheme whenever a proper controversy arises under it.
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Background
The present reference arose from the continuing controversy surrounding the interpretation of the expression “industry” under Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act. The issue had its roots in Bangalore Water Supply, wherein a seven-Judge Bench laid down the well-known “Triple Test” for determining whether an undertaking falls within the ambit of “industry”. Despite the authoritative pronouncement, divergent views continued to emerge in subsequent decisions, ultimately leading a five-Judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1, to refer the correctness of Bangalore Water Supply to a larger Bench, a seven-Judge Bench, by judgment dated 2-1-2017 [(2017) 3 SCC 311], directed that a nine-Judge Bench hear the matter, and by order dated 16-2-2026 the Court framed the following four questions for consideration.
Issues for Determination
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Whether the Triple Test, as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra), is correct law;
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Whether the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 and the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IR Code, 2020) have any legal impact upon the interpretation of “industry” as contained in the Principal Act;
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Whether the social welfare activities and schemes of Government Departments or their instrumentalities can be construed to be “industrial activities” for the purpose of Section 2(j); and
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What are the “sovereign functions” of the State that fall outside the purview of Section 2(j).
Analysis
At the outset, the Court noted that Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act defined “industry” as “any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers” and included “any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”.
The majority opinion in Bangalore Water Supply, authored by Krishna Iyer, J., for himself, Bhagwati and Desai, JJ., formulated the now-famous Triple Test and held that an undertaking would prima facie constitute an industry where there existed:
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systematic activity,
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organisation through cooperation between employer and employee, and
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production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.
The Triple Test did not insist upon a direct or proximate nexus between every employee and the ultimate output. The expression concerning human wants and wishes excluded activities which were purely spiritual or religious, while material goods and services connected with religious activities could nevertheless fall within the definition. Large-scale preparation and distribution of food or prasad was given as an illustration. The absence of a profit motive or gainful objective was expressly held to be immaterial. An undertaking could be an industry whether operating in the public, private, joint or other sector. The inquiry was principally functional and concerned the nature of the activity and the employer-employee relationship. It was stressed that the Act’s purpose was industrial peace, orderly regulation and resolution of industrial disputes.
The Court clarified that the present reference had been validly made and rightly entertained. There is no legitimate doubt on its maintainability, and accordingly, the reference is answered on the merits.
Whether Triple Test in Bangalore Water Supply Required Reconsideration
Surya Kant, CJI, speaking for himself, Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ., held that although the essential framework of the Triple Test had stood the test of time, but certain aspects of the test and the accompanying guidelines were capable of refinement.
Therefore, the Court set out a hypothetically reformulated Triple Test and stated that an “industry” would prima facie exist where there is (i) a systematic activity, (ii) organised through cooperation between employer and employee, and (iii) involving production, distribution or provision of goods or services “possessing a discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business” and calculated to satisfy material human wants and wishes. The absence of profit motive or gainful objective would remain irrelevant.
The Court emphasised that the inquiry is essentially functional, focusing upon the nature of the activity and the existence of employer-employee relations. An undertaking does not cease to be an industry merely because philanthropy animates the undertaking “in its official documentation but on enquiry it is found otherwise”.
At the same time, the wide words employed in Section 2(j) could not be allowed to “magnified to overreach itself”. The expression “undertaking” was required to undergo “contextual and associational shrinkage”. Thus, an organised activity not strictly amounting to trade or business could nevertheless constitute an industry where its nature, together with the employer-employee relationship, bore the requisite resemblance to trade or business.
The Court further held that professions, clubs, educational institutions, cooperatives, research institutes, charitable projects and similar undertakings could not be excluded merely on account of their character or motivation if they satisfied the Triple Test.
For composite undertakings, the dominant nature test remained relevant. Where different activities formed part of an integrated undertaking, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated character of the departments would determine the character of the undertaking as a whole.
However, the Court opined that although the reformulated test reflected the proper interpretation of Section 2(j), it was not intended to displace the governing position in pending proceedings. Pending matters under the Industrial Disputes Act could continue to be decided in accordance with the Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply.
B.V. Nagarathna, J., took a different view and opined that the the reference made by the five-Judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1, was unnecessary; nonetheless, she held that Bangalore Water Supply did not warrant reconsideration.
It was stressed that the Industrial Disputes Act had been repealed with effect from 21 November 2025, while the Industrial Relations Code, containing a new definition of “industry” in Section 2(p), had come into force from the same date. Bangalore Water Supply had held the field for approximately 48 years. It was opined that there was broad consensus in the majority opinions in that case and the differences between the opinions did not dilute its binding ratio. Accordingly, Nagarathna, J., held that the Triple Test laid down by Krishna Iyer, J., was correct law and that no reconsideration was called for.
It was further reasoned that pending proceedings under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act ought to be decided according to the law declared in Bangalore Water Supply, particularly since the 1982 Amendment had never been notified. Reconsideration could unsettle long-pending matters and would not serve the objectives of industrial peace and certainty.
P.S. Narasimha, J., similarly considered that there was no justification for modifying Bangalore Water Supply merely for the purpose of disposing of the remaining pending cases. It was observed that such modification could have the direct consequence of taking certain entities outside the definition of “industry”, thereby removing long-pending disputes from the protective regime of the Industrial Disputes Act. Industrial disputants who had been contesting their claims for years could then be forced to pursue ordinary civil remedies.
Narasimha, J., described the prospect as a “sad story”, emphasising that it would be inconsistent with the fundamental principle of easy, effective and expeditious judicial remedies and access to justice. Therefore, he favoured disposing of pending matters under the repealed Act according to the Bangalore Water Supply ratio, rather than creating a separate set of principles applicable only to such cases.
“It is prudent to dispose of the pending cases on the basis of the ratio laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (supra) without attempting to create a third set of principles applicable only to pending cases.”
Dipankar Datta, J., speaking for himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J., stated that their understanding of “industry” aligned with Bangalore Water Supply. Drawing the attention to para 145 of that judgment, where Krishna Iyer, J., had himself recognised that the interpretation was transient and contemplated legislative intervention, it was observed that what had originally been conceived as an interim judicial formulation had, through more than 4 decades of executive inertia, acquired the character of settled law. “Time, by itself, cannot confer permanence upon what was intended to be transient; yet, neither can the passage of time and consistent reliance upon a legal position be disregarded without compelling justification.” It was opined that the reference disclosed no compelling justification for disturbing that settled position.
Dipankar Datta, J., held that the references made State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 [5-J], followed by State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 311 [7-J] were unnecessary and served no practical, jurisprudential or doctrinal purpose. The continued application of Bangalore Water Supply for nearly half a century had converted an initially transient arrangement into an institutionalised legal position. It was held that since the Industrial Relations Code had become operational, Bangalore Water Supply does not require reconsideration. Accordingly, it was held that Krishna Iyer, J.,’s opinion in Bangalore Water Supply, concurred in by Beg, CJ, and Chandrachud, J., correctly interpreted “industry” under Section 2(j).
Bagchi, J., opined that the manner in which the ratio in Bangalore Water Supply had been referred for reconsideration was in conformity with Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, as affirmed in Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, (2025) 6 SCC 1, and therefore the reference requires to be answered on merits.
Bagchi, J., strongly affirmed the Triple Test, describing it as possessing “rare felicity in judicial interpretation” and as faithful both to the text and beneficial object of the Industrial Disputes Act.
“Through such triple test, Bangalore Water Supply (supra) while remaining faithful to the text, extended the beneficial object of the law to all employer employee disputes wherever the stakeholders are engaged in an organised systematic activity akin to trade and commerce to produce goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs and did not restrict it merely to activities which are run on commercial lines.”
It was held that the criticism that the Triple Test converts every organised human endeavour into an industry was misplaced. The test itself leaves outside its scope casual or non-systematic activities, including domestic service, individual professionals and small, unorganised clubs or associations.
Effect of the 1982 Amendment and the Industrial Relations Code
Surya Kant, CJI, expressly refrained from examining the correctness, applicability or consequences of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 and the definition under the Industrial Relations Code. The reformulated Triple Test was confined to the Court’s interpretation of Section 2(j) and was not intended to govern the new statutory framework.
It was held that Bangalore Water Supply should not be treated as the “sheet anchor” for interpretation of the Industrial Relations Code or its provisions. Any issue arising under the Industrial Relations Code should be determined on the basis of its own text, scheme, object, and legislative framework, uninfluenced by the reformulation of the Triple Test undertaken in the present judgment.
Nagarathna, J., held that the 1982 Amendment was never notified and therefore had no legal impact upon the interpretation of the repealed Section 2(j). Likewise, the new definition of industry in Section 2(p), Industrial Relations Code could not be employed to reinterpret Section 2(j). It was opined that the interpretation of the word “industry” in Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act may have a bearing on the interpretation of Section 2(p), Industrial Relations Code “and not vice versa”.
Narasimha, J., held that the authoritative fresh interpretation of Section 2(j) had become unnecessary because the provision itself stood repealed from 21 November 2025. It was opined that it was prudent to dispose of pending disputes under the repealed Act by applying the Bangalore Water Supply ratio, while leaving the interpretation of Section 2(p), Industrial Relations Code to be undertaken independently, on its own text and context.
Dipankar Datta, J., held that the 1982 Amendment, having never been brought into force, could not be used to unsettle the interpretation of Section 2(j). Similarly, the Industrial Relations Code did not warrant reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply. It was directed that pending references under the Industrial Disputes Act be taken to their logical conclusion according to the law that governed the expression “industry” before operationalisation of the Industrial Relations Code.
Bagchi, J., held that the 1982 Amendment, never having been notified, could not be treated as an operative legislative basis for redrafting or restricting Bangalore Water Supply. The Court could not use an inert law to reconstruct the statutory meaning. Further the Industrial Relations Code was prospective. In view of Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897, rights and liabilities arising under the repealed legislation continued to receive legal protection. Therefore, Bangalore Water Supply remained relevant to legacy proceedings under the repealed Act, while the Industrial Relations Code would have to be independently interpreted.
Whether Performance by the State Makes an Activity a “Sovereign Function”
Surya Kant, CJI, specifically addressed the sovereign-function exception while reconsidering the dominant-nature test. It observed that Bangalore Water Supply had construed the sovereign-function exception in a markedly narrow manner, because the modern welfare State performs numerous activities traditionally associated with industry and commerce. It was therefore considered inappropriate to exclude governmental undertakings “merely because they were carried on by the State or its instrumentalities”.
“…merely because an activity is undertaken by the State, whether in furtherance of welfare objectives or through departmental organisation, does not, by itself, attract the sovereign functions exception, particularly where such activity bears the indicia of organised service or commercial engagement.”
The Court was entirely ad idem with 2 aspects of Bangalore Water Supply, as it saw “no reason to depart” from this position:
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Governmental functions governed by distinct constitutional or statutory frameworks, including those falling within Articles 310 and 311, stand on a separate footing and are ordinarily outside the operation of the Industrial Disputes Act.
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Public utility services expressly contemplated and regulated by the Industrial Disputes Act remain amenable to the Industrial Disputes Act.
Further, the Court retained the dominant nature test of Bangalore Water Supply. Where an undertaking comprises several activities, some potentially exempt and some not, the Court must look at the “true character of the enterprise as a whole”. The predominant nature of the services and the integrated character of the departments remain relevant. It further retained the principle that even in a department discharging sovereign functions, a substantially severable unit which itself constitutes an industry may fall within Section 2(j).
The Court held that the distinction lies not in the identity of the actor but in the nature and character of the activity; hence, mere performance of an activity by the State does not make it a sovereign function or automatically exclude it from Section 2(j), while governmental activities lacking the commercial or economic character contemplated by the reformulated Triple Test cannot be brought within “industry” merely because they involve organised employer-employee cooperation.
B.V. Nagarathna, J., held that the question whether State activities constitute sovereign functions did not require reconsideration. She reaffirmed that the determination of whether a State activity is a sovereign function depends upon the nature of the activity. State performance alone does not confer the character of sovereignty. It was specifically held that the dominant nature of the activity, rather than the dominant purpose, is the relevant consideration.
P.S. Narasimha, J., did not separately explore the contours of sovereign functions.
Dipankar Datta, J., also opined that there was no need to undertake a fresh exploration of sovereign functions as whether an activity is described as a “sovereign function” has little relevance in determining if it is an “industry” under Section 2(j). It was held that the correct approach, therefore, was to apply the functional test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply, focusing on the nature of the activity and the employer-employee relationship. “Any exclusion must emanate from a clear constitutional or statutory provision, and not from an uncertain and undefined notion of sovereignty.”
Joymalya Bagchi, J., pointing out that sovereign functions are “not excluded by any express words in Section 2(j)”, the exclusion is judicially recognised because certain State functions are so closely connected with the State’s core identity that they cannot be treated as ordinary industrial activity. However, he cautions against allowing this narrow exception to become “a general protection for every activity undertaken by the Government”.
It was explained that, in a constitutional democracy, sovereign powers vest in the people and the State exercises them as representative of the “will of the people”. Therefore, the task is to identify the “narrow inalienable and non-justiciable field of activities” without allowing sovereignty to become “a convenient shield for every public, statutory, or welfare-oriented enterprise”.
It was further stated that welfare, developmental, administrative and public-service activities do not become sovereign merely because they are undertaken by the government or pursuant to statutory, constitutional or Part IV obligations. The decisive enquiry is whether the activity is so bound to the constitutional personality of the State that it cannot be alienated or delegated and remains outside ordinary adjudicatory scrutiny. Functions such as defence, foreign affairs, war and peace, legislation, taxation, eminent domain, core police power, justice, maintenance of law and order, security, repression of crime and pardon fall within this restricted sovereign domain. Even within a department performing sovereign functions, substantially severable units having an industrial character may fall within Section 2(j).
Thus, it was held that “ordinary administrative, developmental or welfare activities of the State cannot, by any automatic rule, be treated as naturally immune” and organised government enterprises providing public services or pursuing welfare objectives cannot be excluded merely because they serve a public purpose or constitutional duty.
Whether Social-Welfare Activities of the State Constitute “Industry”
While explaining the position in Bangalore Water Supply, Surya Kant, CJI, noted that the decision had made it clear that “professions, clubs, educational institutions, cooperatives, research bodies, charitable undertakings, and other analogous ventures” could not be excluded from Section 2(j) merely by reason of their form or avowed purpose, so long as they satisfied the Triple Test. Further, the Court had also recognised a limited qualification. An institution may fall outside the definition where, applying the dominant nature test, its activity is essentially carried on without the employment of a substantive workforce and there is only minimal or marginal engagement of labour. In such circumstances, the absence of a structured employer-employee relationship of real significance would preclude its characterisation as an “industry”.
The Court held that the absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant in determining whether an undertaking constitutes an “industry”. The decisive inquiry is functional and turns upon “the nature of the activity and the existence of employer-employee relations”. Thus, an undertaking does not cease to have the character of a trade or business merely because philanthropy animates it in its official description, if an actual enquiry shows otherwise. Accordingly, activities which lack any discernible commercial or economic character and have no meaningful analogy to trade, business or economic enterprise would ordinarily fall outside Section 2(j).
Thus, the Court did not hold that every charitable, educational, religious or welfare activity is an “industry”, but held that such activities were not exempt merely because of their charitable, educational, religious, professional or non-profit character. The controlling enquiry remains whether the activity satisfies the reformulated Triple Test, including the requirement of a “discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business” and a real employer-employee relationship.
B.V. Nagarathna, J., opined that social welfare activities and schemes or other enterprises undertaken by the Government Departments or their instrumentalities can be construed to be “industrial activities” for the purpose of Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act depending upon the nature of the activities. The mere fact that a welfare activity is undertaken by a Government Department or its instrumentality does not per se exclude it from Section 2(j), particularly when similar activities may also be undertaken by private entities or through public-private partnerships.
Thus, it was held that “the test of who carries out the activity is not relevant”. But what the nature of the activity is and all other relevant factors of the activity had to be considered to determine whether the activity is an “industrial activity” within the meaning of Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act.
P.S. Narasimha, J., did not separately reconsider the law concerning charitable, educational, religious, professional, social-welfare or other non-profit activities and held that Bangalore Water Supply should continue to govern proceedings under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act, without creating a third set of principles.
Dipankar Datta, J., did not favour any fresh or restrictive categorisation of charitable, educational, religious, professional, social-welfare or other non-profit activities. It was held that the law declared in Bangalore Water Supply had already settled the interpretation of “industry” under Section 2(j), and “does not require reconsideration”.
Bagchi, J., expressly held that charitable undertakings, temples and educational institutions must be examined primarily through their employer-employee relationship and the Triple Test, rather than their spiritual, religious or benevolent objectives.
“From the lens of industrial law, charitable undertakings, temples and educational institutions are all viewed not by the spiritual, religious or benevolent object they pursue, but by the character of the employer employee relationship through which they function.”
A charitable or benevolent object does not, by itself, remove an organised undertaking from Section 2(j). Where the activity is systematic and the employer-employee relationship satisfies the statutory test, the undertaking may constitute an industry notwithstanding the absence of a profit motive.
Effect on Pending Proceedings and Finality of Law
While observing that the essential framework laid down in Bangalore Water Supply had stood the test of time, Surya Kant, CJI, held that certain aspects of the Triple Test and the accompanying guidelines in Bangalore Water Supply were susceptible to further refinement and set out a hypothetically reformulated Triple Test for the proper interpretation of Section 2(j) as discussed above.
However, the Court expressly clarified that the reformulation “is not intended to displace the governing legal position in respect of pending proceedings.” Accordingly, “all matters presently pending before courts, tribunals, labour authorities, or other fora under the Industrial Disputes Act may be adjudicated in accordance with the Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply”.
The Court further directed that the reformulation would operate prospectively and would not reopen, disturb or otherwise affect proceedings which had attained finality. Judgments, awards, settlements and determinations no longer open to challenge were to “remain undisturbed”, notwithstanding the reformulation. The same principle was expressly extended to proceedings, appeals and hearings that were still being adjudicated before different fora.
The Court clarified that the present judgment was confined to disputes arising under the Industrial Disputes Act and the interpretation of Section 2(j) thereof. “Nothing contained herein shall be construed as governing disputes arising under any other enactment, nor shall these observations be treated as determinative of questions that fall to be decided under a different statutory framework.”
The Court also clarified that it was not entering into an examination of the definition of “industry” as it presently exists under the Industrial Relations Code or the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982.
B.V. Nagarathna, J., opined that the reference made by the five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh (2005) was not necessary and, in any event, that Bangalore Water Supply did not call for reconsideration. It was held that, because of the changed statutory position and the long-standing operation of Bangalore Water Supply, “it is in the interest of the employers, workmen and industrial activity, as well as the Indian economy itself” that the interpretation of Section 2(j) laid down in Bangalore Water Supply should continue to govern pending cases before the Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals, High Courts and the Supreme Court.
“Any reconsideration of the judgment in Bangalore Water Supply will cause the disputes pending under the erstwhile I.D. Act to be now remanded to their original fora for reconsideration in light of a change in law under the I.D. Act. Such re-consideration will not be in keeping with the declared objectives of the I.D. Act, namely, industrial peace and certainty and relief for parties under the said Act.”
P.S. Narasimha, J., observed that since the nine-Judge Bench had made it clear that its principles would have “no bearing on the interpretation of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020”, there was no justification for creating a modified formulation applicable only to the legacy cases. Such modification could exclude entities from the repealed Section 2(j), forcing parties who had litigated for years under the Industrial Disputes Act to seek fresh civil remedies, and contrary to the principle of “easy, effective, and expeditious judicial remedies”. Since the authoritative determination of Section 2(j) had become unnecessary after its repeal, pending matters should be disposed of on the basis of Bangalore Water Supply, without creating “a third set of principles applicable only to pending cases”; the Industrial Relations Code, should instead be interpreted “on its own text and in its context alone”.
Dipankar Datta, J., held that there was no compelling justification to disturb Bangalore Water Supply, which had acquired the character of settled law after more than 4 decades of consistent application. Holding that the reference “serves no practical, jurisprudential or doctrinal purpose”, he rejected reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply. Consequently, they directed that all pending references arising from industrial disputes under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act were to be taken to their logical conclusion in accordance with the law governing the interpretation of “industry” before operationalisation of the Industrial Relations Code. The new Code was to operate within its own statutory framework, and their observations were not to affect any challenge to its validity.
Justice Bagchi, J., held that Bangalore Water Supply should not be disturbed in relation to proceedings under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Disputes Act was “sunset legislation dealing with legacy matters”, and the Triple Test had governed Section 2(j) for nearly 5 decades, upon which courts, employers and workmen had structured their litigation and rights. Replacing that test at this stage would “change the goalposts” for pending proceedings and unsettle accrued rights and liabilities. Accordingly, it was held that Bangalore Water Supply remains applicable to proceedings pending under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act, but the Industrial Relations Code must be interpreted independently under its own statutory scheme.
Decision
Although, Surya Kant, CJI, led opinion identified areas where the Triple Test could theoretically had been recalibrated, but in light of different opinions of 5 other Judges, existing law was preserved and was to use in deciding all disputes arising under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act.
Surya Kant, CJI., held that:
“The reformulated Triple Test articulated in this judgment is to be understood as no more than our considered opinion… It is not intended to displace the governing legal position in respect of pending proceedings. Consequently, all matters presently pending before courts, tribunals, labour authorities, or other fora under the Industrial Disputes Act may be adjudicated in accordance with the Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply.”
Thus, the Court answered the reference as follows:
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Pending disputes governed by the repealed Industrial Disputes Act are to be decided in accordance with the law declared in Bangalore Water Supply.
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Industrial Relations Code is to be interpreted independently and the Court’s observations concerning Section 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act are not to be treated as governing the interpretation of the new Code.
[State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1684, decided on 20-8-2026]
*Opinion of CJI Surya Kant (for himself Satish Chandra Sharma J., Alok Aradhe J. and Vipul M. Pancholi J.)** Separate opinions of B.V. Nagarathna, J.,P.S. Narasimha, J. , Justice Dipankar Datta (for himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J.), Joymalya Bagchi, J.
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv. Mr. Madhav Sinhal, Adv. Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Adv. Mr. Gaurang Bhushan, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Dixit, Adv. Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Adv. Mr. Chitvan Singhal, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Adv. Mr. Kartikay Aggarwal, Adv. Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv. Mr. Aman Mehta, Adv. Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR Ms. Anjali Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Anandh Venkataramani, Adv. Ms. Yamika Khanna, Adv. Mr. Deboshree Mukherjee, Adv. Ms. Thajaswini C.B., Adv. Mr. Devvrat Singh, Adv. Mr. K M Nataraj, A.S.G. Mr. Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. Sudeep Kumar, AOR Mr. Siddharth Thakur, Adv. Ms. Indira Bhaker, Adv. Ms. Manisha, Adv. Ms. Arushi Singh, Adv. Mr. Satwik Misra, Adv. Ms. Rupali, Adv. Ms. Harshita Chawla, Adv. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G. Mr. Ajay Misra, Advocate General Mr. Sudeep Kumar, AOR Mr. Abhishek Saket, Adv. Ms. Poornima Singh, Adv. Ms. Surabhi, Adv. Mr. Kumar Harshvardhan, Adv. Mr. Vikas Singh, Adv. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, ASG Mr. Sharath Nambiar, Adv. Mr. Vinayak Sharma, Adv. Ms. Indira Bhakar, Adv. Mr. Vatsal Joshi, Adv. Mr. Chitransh Sharma, Adv. Mr. Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Adv. Ms. Satvika Thakur, Adv. Ms. Nikita Capoor, Adv. Mr. Yogya Rajpurohit, Adv. Mr. S. Subramanium, Adv. Mr. Ritik Ranjan, Adv. Ms. Madhulika Upadhyay, AOR Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, Sr. Adv. (AAG) Mr. Amit Sharma, AAG Mr. Harmeet Singh Ruprah, AOR Mr. Arkaj Kumar, G.A. Mr. Shashank Shekhar, Adv. Mr. Karan Singh, Adv. Mr. Kanishk Sharma, Adv. Mr. Sidhartha Shrivastava, Adv. Mrs. Rachna Gupta, AOR Mr. K. L. Janjani, AOR Ms. Hemantika Wahi, AOR Mr. Pradeep Misra, AOR Mr. Sanjay Hedge, Sr. Adv. Mr. Nishanth Patil, A.A.G. Mr. Sanchit Garga, AOR Mr. Kunal Rana, Adv. Mr. Shashwat Jaiswal, Adv. Ms. Diksha Arora, Adv. Mr. Arijit Dey, Adv. Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Adv. Ms. Oorja Goel, Adv. Mr. Ashish Kumar, Adv. Mr. Tanay Hegde, Adv. Mr. Ankit Tiwari, Adv. Ms. Bhumi Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Adv. Mr. Awanish Gupta, Adv. Ms. Mythili S., Adv. Ms. Mithu Jain, Adv. Mr. Ashutosh Garga, Adv. Mr. Saket Sikri, Adv. Mr. Viklap Mudgal, Adv. Mr. Ajay Pal Singh, Adv. Mr. Arun Sanwal, Adv. Ms. Madhu Sikri, AOR Mr. D. Kumanan, AOR Mr. Krishan Kumar, AOR Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, AOR Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, AOR Mrs. Deepanwita Priyanka,, Adv. Mr. Adarsh Dubey, Adv. Ms. Apoorva Anand, Adv. Mr. V. Prabhakar, Sr. Adv. Mr. R. Chandrachud, AOR Ms. Jyoti Parashar, Adv. Mr. Saurabh Tiwari, Adv. Mr. Dhuli Venkata Krishna, Adv. Mr. Aryan Singh, Adv. Mr. Sarad Kumar Singhania, AOR Mr. Lokesh Sinhal, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. B. K. Satija, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. Samar Vijay Singh, AOR Mr. Sumit Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Vikas Singh Jangra, Adv. Mr. Nikunj Gupta, Adv. Mr. Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Adv. Mr. Pawan Kishore Singh, Adv. Mr. Rajat Sangwan, Adv. Mr. Chandan Kumar Singh, Adv. Mr. Harsh Mehla, Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Yadav, Adv. Ms. Divya Sharma, Adv. Mr. Aman Dev Sharma, Adv. Mr. Azeem A. Dost, Adv. Ms. Sabarni Som, Adv. Mr. Gaj Singh, Adv. Mr. Amit Ojha, Adv. Mr. Prashant Sharma, Adv. Mr. Azeem A Dost, Adv. Mr. Keshav Mittal, Adv. Mr. Anirudh Sanganeria, AOR Mr. Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv. Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Mr. Varad Kilor, Adv. Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv. Ms. Sushmita Pandey, Adv. Ms. Arunima Das, Adv. Mr. Ashwin Arun Hirulkar, Adv. Ms. Kunika Bansal, Adv. Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv. Mr. Harsh, Adv. Mr. Harshavardhan V. Ghadge, Adv. Ms. Salonee Paranjape, Adv. Mr. Karan Bishnoi, Adv. Ms. Jagruti, Adv. Mr. Senthil Jagadeeshan, Sr. Adv. Ms. Mrinal Kanwar, AOR Ms. Niharika Shukla, Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Rajsingh Rathore, Adv. Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, Sr. Adv. Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, AOR Mr. Arav Pandit, Adv. Ms. Shrutika Garg, Adv. Ms. Shreya Arora, Adv. Ms. Yashika Kapoor, Adv. Ms. Aroha Kadyan, Adv. Mr. Shivam Gandhi, Adv. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR Mr. Ravindra Raizada, Sr. Adv. Mr. Kamlendra Mishra, AOR Mr. Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Adv. Mr. Ruchir Ranjan Rai, Adv. Mr. Ashiwan Mishra, Adv. Ms. Vaidruti Mishra, Adv. Ms. Aditi Mishra, Adv. Mr. Vinod Kumar, Adv. Mr. Aditya Pranav Dwivedi, Adv. Ms. Mugdha Dwivedi Shokeen, Adv. Mr. Suraj, Adv. Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Bharat Sangal, Sr. Adv. Mr. Paras Nath Singh, Adv. Mr. Nagarkatti Kartik Uday, AOR Mr. Hemant Kumar Tripathi, Adv. Ms. Babita Kushwaha, Adv. Ms. Shalini, Adv. Mr. Pradeep Kr. Rai, Sr. Adv. Ms. Modoyia Kayina, Adv. Mr. Vinay Kr. Rai, Adv. Mr. Rajshree Rai, Adv. M/s. R & R Law Associates, AOR
For the Respondent: Mr. E. C. Vidya Sagar, AOR Mr. Hemant Kumar Sagar, Adv. Mr. Shivam Singh, Adv. Mr. Harpreet Singh Gupta, Adv. Ms. Sapoorthi Cotha, Adv. Ms. Nandini Gupta, Adv. Mr. Krishna Kumar, Adv. Ms. Nandani Gupta, Adv. Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, AOR Mr. Naveer Yadav, Adv. Mr. Siddhartha Sati, Adv. Mr. S. K. Verma, AOR Mr. Subhash Sharma, AOR Mr. Vidya Dhar Gaur, AOR Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, AOR Mrs. K.sarada Devi, Adv. Ms. Kaveri Kalyana Ram, Adv. Mr. Challa Sateesh Chandra, Adv. Mr. Thota S V L Narasimha Swamy, Adv. Mr. Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Adv. Mr. Zain Haider, Adv. Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, AOR Mr. Manik Gupta, Adv. Ms. Bina Madhavan, Adv. Mr. S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Adv. M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co, AOR Mr. K. Rajeev, AOR Ms. Niveditha R Menon, Adv. Mr. Aditya Verma, Adv. Mr. Tarun Kumar, Adv. Mr. K. L. Janjani, AOR Mr. S. Ravi Shankar, AOR Mr. Mukesh Verma, Adv. Mr. Pawan Kumar Shukla, Adv. Mr. Kamal Kumar Pandey, Adv. Mrs. Vatsala Tripathi, Adv. Mr. Krishna Pakash Dubey, Adv. Mr. G P Mahto, Adv. Mr. Yash Pal Dhingra, AOR Ms. Shubhra Shahi, Adv. Mr. Saket Sikri, Adv. Mr. Vikalp Mudgal, Adv. Mr. Ajay Pal Singh, Adv. Mr. Arun Sanwal, Adv. Ms. Madhu Sikri, AOR Mr. R. C. Kaushik, AOR Mr. Hitesh Kumar, Adv. Mr. Hardik Giri, Adv. Mr. Pranav Singh Gautam, Adv. Ms. Preeti Kumari, Adv. Mr. Anurag Tomar, Adv. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR Mr. Umesh Kumar Shukla, Adv. Mr. Shishu Pal Singh, Adv. Ms. T. Geetha, Adv. Mr. Pritam Singh, Adv. Mr. Rajiv Agnihotri, Adv. Mr. Shiv Sagar Tiwari, AOR Mr. Pravartak Suhas Pathak, AOR Mr. Ritu Raj, Adv. Mr. Sayid Marzook Bafaki, AOR Mr. Sandeep Gupta, AOR Mrs. Kanchan Gupta, Adv. Mr. Chakit Singhal, Adv. Mr. Aprameya Jaiswal, Adv. Mr. Ramneek Singh, Adv. Mr. Vimal Verma, Adv. Mr. Mukesh Chand Sharma, Adv. Mr. Robin Bhardwaj, Adv. Mr. Abhay Nevagi, Adv. Mr. Krishan Kumar, AOR Mr. Amit Singh, Adv. Mr. Nitin Pal, Adv. Mr. Ravi Kumar, Adv. Mr. Bhagya Juneja, Adv. Mr. Kamlendra Mishra, AOR Mr. K.S. Namdar, Sr. Adv. Mr. R.N. Vanjarani, Sr. Adv. Mr. Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Abhijit S. Kamble, Adv. Mr. Viraz R. Shah, Adv. Mr. Amit Kumar Chawla, Adv. Mr. Anupam Kumar, Adv. Mr. Akhileshwar Jha, Adv. Ms. Anushka Deshmukh, Adv. Ms. Shreya Jha, Adv. Ms. Asmita Mishra, Adv. Mr. Naresh Kumar, AOR Mr. Amrendra Kumar Mehta, AOR Mr. Ranpal, Adv. Ms. Anita Mahapatra, Adv. Mr. Anubhav Bhardwaj, Adv. Ms. Gunjan Kumari, Adv. Ms. Nidhi, AOR Mr. Om Kumar, Adv. Mr. Dhruv Maheshwari, Adv. Mr. Mohit Girdhar, Adv. M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, AOR Mr. Ashok Kumar Sharma, Sr. Adv. Mr. Kshitij Mudgal, AOR Mr. Ansh Mittal, Adv. Mr. Amit Jay Singh, Adv. Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv. Ms. Kavya Jhawar, Adv. Ms. Nandini Rai, Adv. Mr. Aashay Shukla, Adv. Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, AOR Mr. D. Kumanan, AOR Dr. K.S. Chauhan, Sr. Adv. Mr. P.S. Teji, Sr. Adv. Mr. Ajit Kumar Ekka, AOR Mr. Abhishek Chauhan, Adv. Mr. R.S.M. Kalky, Adv. Mr. S.P. Singh, Adv. Mr. Murari Lal, Adv. Mr. Ravi Prakash, Adv. Mr. Sunil Kumar, Adv. Mr. Ramesh Kumar, Adv. Mr. Ravi Shankar Singh, Adv. Mr. Nav Parkash Singh Teji, Adv. Dr. R.k. Chauhan, Adv. Ms. Aditi Chauhan, Adv. Ms. Deeksha Singh, Adv. Mr. Alok Kumar, Adv. Mr. Sumit Kishore, Adv. Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathy, AOR Mr. Aditya Narayan Tripathy, Adv. Mr. Prasad Hegde, Adv. Mr. Sanjeev Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. Sounak S Das, Adv. Mr. Anshul Kumar, Adv. Ms. Megha Gaur, Adv. Mr. Vibhav Mishra, Adv. Mr. Parmanand Gaur, AOR Mr. Samar Vijay Singh, AOR Ms. Misha Rohatgi, AOR M/s. Vkc Law Offices, AOR Mr. Vivek Sharma, AOR Dr. Vijay Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mr. Anand Varma, AOR Ms. Apoorva Pandey, Adv. Mr. Madhav Bhatia, Adv. Mr. Ayush Gupta, Adv. Ms. Simran, Adv. Mr. Parmanand Pandey, AOR Mr. Utkarsh Pandey, Adv. Mr. Vishal Tiwari, Adv. Ms. Shaurya Mishra, Adv. Ms. Anindita Mitra, AOR Ms. Ishita Puranik, Adv. Mr. Vishal Sinha, Adv. Mrs. Jayna Kothari, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rohit Sharma, Adv. Mr. Jatin Lalwani, Adv. Mr. Nikhil Purohit, Adv. Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Adv. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Adv. Ms. Pooja Singh, Adv. Mr. Kumar Dushyant Singh, AOR Mr. Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv. Mr. C. K. Sajji Narayan Throught Its Vc, Adv. Mr. Adarsh Kumar Tiwari, AOR Mr. T. Gopal, Adv. Mr. Yashodhan Chandurkar, Adv. Mr. Raman V. R., Adv. Ms. Vartika Maurya, Adv. Ms. Akanksha Raj Mishra, Through Vc, Adv. Mr. Darshan Lama, Adv. Mr. Amritesh Anand, Adv. Mr. Vinit Pathak, Adv. Mr. Ayush Anand, Adv. Mr. Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Adv. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Arvind Srevatsa, Adv. Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Adv. Ms. Aarthi Rajan, AOR Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Adv. Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Adv. Mr. U.s. Jayapathy, Adv. Mr. R. Anirud Narayen, Adv. Mr. Vishal Sinha, Adv. Mr. Pradyut Kashyap, Adv. Ms. Smruthi Gangadhar, Adv. Mr. Aayushman Aggarwal, Adv. Mr. Shourya Das Gupta, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Venugopal, Adv. Ms. Trisha Chandran, Adv. Mr. Madhav Gupta, Adv. Mr. Tushar Shrivastava, Adv. Ms. Aditi Gupta, Adv. Mr. Aman Rawat, Adv. Ms. Manasigauri Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Adv. Mr. Yajat Kumar, Adv. Mr. Avinash Sharma, AOR Ms. Akanksha Kapoor, Adv. Dr. Joginder Singh Berwal, Adv. Mr. Jayender S. Chandail, Adv. Mr. P.V. Surendranath, Adv. Mr. Manu Krishnan G, AOR Mr. Sawan Kumar Shukla, Adv. Ms. Smrithi V S, Adv. Mr. Ahekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv. Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, Adv. Mr. Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, AOR Ms. Salonee Paranjape, Adv. Mr. Chirag Zanwar, Adv. Mrs. Pradnya Shashibhushan Adgaonkar, Adv. Mr. Karan Bishnoi, Adv. Ms. Shambhavi Kanade, Adv. Mr. Anoop Raj, Adv. Mr. C U Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Jawahar Raja, Adv. Ms. Aditi Saraswat, Adv. Mr. Gautam Bhatia, Adv. Mr. Nitai Hinduja, Adv. Mr. N. Sai Vinod, AOR Ms. Bidya Mohanty, Adv. Ms. Katyayani Suhrud, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Kalaiyarasan, Adv.
