Dependency, Not Marital Status, Governs Eligibility for Welfare Benefits; Married Daughter Cannot Be Excluded from Fair Price Shop Dependent Quota: Supreme Court

Married Daughter Fair Price Shop Allotment

Supreme Court: In an appeal arising from the Allahabad High Court’s judgment which had denied the appellant’s claim for allotment of fair price shop under the dependent quota solely because she was a married daughter of the deceased fair price shop dealer, the Division Bench of Alok Aradhe* and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JJ., quashed the impugned orders of the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, holding that “once dependency is accepted as the governing criterion, exclusion of a married daughter solely on account of her marital status becomes wholly irrational and self-defeating”. The Court held that exclusion of married daughters based upon gender stereotypes violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution.

The Court further held that the expression “daughter” in Clause 2(p), U.P. Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Control Order, 2016 (2016 Order) includes a married daughter who establishes dependency and fulfils all other eligibility conditions.

The Court affirmed the reasoning adopted in Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 6776 and the decisions of the Bombay, Karnataka and Calcutta High Courts recognising the principle that marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying the benefit of a welfare measure to an otherwise eligible daughter.

The Court held that the contrary views expressed in Kusumlata v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 1025 and Saida Begum v. State of U.P., 2023:AHC-LKO:11230-DB, did not lay down the correct law and accordingly overruled the same.

Also Read: Ex gratia, leave encashment cannot be denied to sole legal heir married daughter: Madhya Pradesh HC grants relief to District Court driver’s daughter

Factual Matrix

In the instant matter a fair price shop was originally allotted on 27 October 2012 to the mother of the appellant. Subsequently, the State of Uttar Pradesh notified the 2016 Order under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Essential Commodities Act). While the 2016 Order contemplated appointment of persons to run fair price shops, it did not prescribe marital status as an eligibility criterion. However, the State Government later issued Government Order No. 6 of 2019 (government order) dated 5 August 2019 governing identification, reservation and appointment of fair price shops in rural areas.

The government order contained provisions dealing with allotment of fair price shops under the dependent quota after the death of a dealer. Paragraph 4 prescribed eligibility conditions and defined “family”. Under this definition, married daughters were excluded while unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters were included.

On 4 March 2024, the appellant’s mother died. The appellant asserted that she continued to reside with her mother even after marriage and remained responsible for the maintenance of her 4 sisters, one of whom was visually impaired. Following the death of the dealer, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate attached the fair price shop and the appellant applied for allotment under the dependent quota. Her application was rejected on 16 July 2024 solely because she was a married daughter and therefore not covered by the definition of “family” under the Government Order. The Deputy Commissioner affirmed this decision on 7 January 2025.

The appellant challenged both orders before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court held itself bound by earlier Division Bench decisions in Kusumlata and Saida Begum and therefore dismissed the writ petition. At the same time, the Single Judge observed that the issue concerning rights of married daughters raised an important question of law, and noting a contrary view adopted by the Bombay High Court in Ranjana Murlidhar Anerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 910 and granted a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Also Read: Divorced daughters eligible for Freedom Fighter Pension like unmarried daughters: Madras HC

Issue for Consideration

  1. Whether exclusion of married daughters from definition of “family” under the applicable regulatory framework was constitutionally sustainable and whether such exclusion could be justified in a welfare-oriented scheme intended to provide immediate relief to the dependents of a deceased fair price shop dealer?

  2. Whether the words “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” under Clause 2(p), 2016 Order required to be struck down or can be read in a manner so as to include married daughters?

Analysis

Relevant Provisions of the 2016 Order and Government Order

The Court examined Clause 2(p), 2016 Order which defined “family” to include:

  1. Head of the family;

  2. Husband or wife and adopted children;

  3. Adult children fully dependent upon the head of the family;

  4. Unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters; and

  5. Fully dependent parents.

Clause 7 empowered the State Government to prescribe qualifications and conditions for persons running fair price shops.

The Court also analysed Para 4, government order which prescribed qualifications such as financial capability, educational qualifications, age, local residence, character requirements and absence of criminal antecedents. Para 5 laid down the procedure for allotment under the dependent quota after the death of a dealer and expressly adopted the definition of “family” contained in Para 4(10).

The Court noted that while local residence was an independent eligibility condition, the Government Order simultaneously excluded married daughters from the definition of family.

Constitutional Framework

The Court observed that Article 14 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws, while Article 15 prohibits discrimination on prohibited grounds including sex and Article 21 protects the right to live with dignity. These guarantees must be interpreted in harmony with the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), particularly Article 39(a), which seeks to secure equal right of men and women to adequate means of livelihood and Article 39(c) which provides that the State shall direct its policy to ensure that operation of economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.

The Court noted that the Essential Commodities Act and the 2016 Order are designed to ensure equitable distribution of essential commodities through the public distribution system. Fair price shop dealers therefore perform an important public function. The dependent quota scheme serves a welfare purpose by mitigating hardship suffered by the family of a deceased dealer while simultaneously ensuring continuity in the functioning of the public distribution system.

Whether Exclusion of Married Daughters is Constitutionally Sustainable

The Court identified the central issue as whether exclusion of married daughters from the definition of family was constitutionally sustainable. It referred to Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, (1954) 2 SCC 791, and reiterated the settled principle that Article 14 prohibits class legislation but permits reasonable classification only when the classification is based on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The Court also observed that equality jurisprudence has evolved beyond traditional classification tests and now extends to State action based on arbitrary, irrational, capricious, or founded on impermissible stereotypes.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of “family” could not be sustained. The object of the dependent quota scheme is to provide immediate assistance to families facing financial hardship. Dependency, financial need, residence and ability to run the fair price shop are relevant considerations. It held that “marital status bears no rational nexus to any of these considerations”.

The Court found that the exclusion rested upon an assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of or dependent upon her parental family and held such an assumption to be constitutionally impermissible. The Court recognised that many married daughters continue to reside with, support, or depend upon their parental families. It held that “dependency is a question of fact and cannot be conclusively determined by reference to marital status alone”.

The Court attached significance to the fact that a married son remained part of the family irrespective of his marital status, whereas a married daughter was excluded merely because she was married. It asserted that such a distinction was founded upon a gender stereotype that a daughter becomes part of another family after marriage and loses ties with her natal family. Therefore, held that such assumptions perpetuate historical notions of gender inequality and are fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of equality.

Rejecting the State’s argument concerning local residence, the Court held that residence is already an independent eligibility criterion and must be assessed on the facts of each case. A blanket exclusion of all married daughters based on the presumption that they necessarily reside elsewhere was overbroad and disconnected from social realities

The Court clarified that the purpose of the dependent quota “is neither to create a right of succession or inheritance in the dealership nor a reward for lineage” but is to provide immediate financial assistance to the dependent family of a deceased dealer and to ensure continuity in the public distribution system. It held that “once dependency is accepted as the governing criterion, exclusion of a married daughter solely on account of her marital status becomes wholly irrational and self-defeating.”

The Court opined that the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of “family” fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary. The distinction created by para 4 (10) of the government order lacked any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of the scheme. Consequently, it was held that exclusion founded solely upon marital status and gender stereotypes violates Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India.

Doctrine Of Purposive Construction

The Court then considered whether the words “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” in Clause 2(p), 2016 Order should be struck down or interpreted in a constitutionally compliant manner.

Invoking the doctrine of purposive construction and relying on Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619, the Court held that where statutory language is capable of more than one interpretation, courts are obliged to adopt a construction that advances the object of the provision and avoids unconstitutional results.

The Court held that the expression “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” should be read broadly to include married daughters, provided they fulfil other eligibility conditions laid down in government order, for several reasons:

  1. the provision contained no express exclusion of married daughters.

  2. the same clause recognised “adult children fully dependent on the head of the family” without distinction based on marital status or gender.

  3. dependency and not marital status constituted the true basis of the welfare measure.

  4. the included categories of daughters shared the common characteristic of remaining within or returning to the natal household. A married daughter who continues to reside in or depend upon that household possesses the same characteristic.

  5. the local residence requirement already provides a factual test and cannot justify wholesale exclusion.

  6. a contrary interpretation would produce a result inconsistent with Articles 14 and 15(1).

  7. excluding a genuinely dependent married daughter would directly frustrate the purpose of the scheme.

Accordingly, the Court held that the expression “daughter” in Clause 2(p) includes a married daughter provided she establishes dependency upon the deceased dealer and satisfies all other eligibility requirements, including local residence.

Overruling Of Contrary Decisions

The Court affirmed the reasoning adopted in Vimla Srivastava and the decisions of the Bombay, Karnataka and Calcutta High Courts recognising the principle that marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying the benefit of a welfare measure to an otherwise eligible daughter. The contrary views expressed in Saida Begum and Kusumlata were declared not to lay down the correct law and stood overruled.

Also Read: Guideline excluding married daughter for issuance of I-cards to dependants of ex-servicemen, held violative of Art. 14; Karnataka High Court struck down the words “till married” from the impugned policy

Decision and Directions

Applying the above principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that the appellant continued to reside in the same village even after marriage and had actively assisted her mother in running the fair price shop. She had also undertaken responsibility for maintaining her sisters, including a visually impaired sister. These factual assertions had never been disputed by the authorities. The only reason for rejection was that she was a married daughter.

The Court held that once the ground for rejection was found constitutionally invalid, no impediment remained for grant of relief. Therefore, the court:

  1. Allowed the appeal.

  2. Quashed the orders dated 16 July 2024 of the SDM, 7 January 2025 of the Deputy Commissioner and 5 March 2025 of the High Court.

  3. Directed the competent authority to issue the necessary allotment order in favour of the appellant within 4 weeks.

Also Read: Excluding married daughters from compassionate appointment violative of Art. 14, 15 and 16; Rajasthan High Court overrules judgments supporting exclusion

[Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1059, decided on 2-6-2026]

*Judgment by Justice Alok Aradhe


Advocates who appeared in this case:

Rohit Amit Sthalekar, AOR and Anand Verma, Vivek Sura, Simran Verma, Shreyuss Shankar Joshi, Siddhant Singh, Advs., Counsel for the Appellant

Mr. Ankur Prakash, AOR, S.R. Singh, Sr. Adv. And Mr. Rajat Singh, Counsel for the State of U.P.

Rukhmini Bobde, Amicus Curiae

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