Buying the Flat Does Not Buy the Parking Space: Maharashtra Co-operative Appellate Court

Parking slots in a co-operative housing society

Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.

Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court: In an appeal against the rejection of an application for interim injunction in a dispute concerning the use of a parking space in a co-operative housing society, the Single Judge Bench of Sau. S.S. Sapatnekar, President, dismissed the appeal, holding that a purchaser of a flat cannot claim a specific parking space merely because it had been allotted to the predecessor-in-title. The Court observed that under the Model Bye-laws, the allotment of parking spaces is the exclusive responsibility of the society’s Managing Committee, and a member has no right to transfer the parking space allotted by the society. Since the appellants had neither obtained such allotment nor established prima facie right over the disputed parking space, the Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant interim relief.

Also Read: Auction purchaser cannot claim cooperative housing society membership without clearing previous owner’s pending dues: Bombay High Court

Background

The appellants purchased Flat No. 402 in 2007 from the original member of the respondent co-operative housing society. According to them, the previous owner had been allotted a parking space pursuant to a Managing Committee resolution dated 24 March 2002, and they continued using the same parking space after purchasing the flat. On 23 October 2021, Respondent 2 allegedly started parking his second vehicle in the said parking space despite already having one parking space allotted by the society. Although the appellants repeatedly complained to the society, no action was taken. The appellants contended that they had been in continuous, uninterrupted use of the parking space since 2008, a period of roughly 15 years, without any objection from the society or Respondent 2, until the latter began parking a second vehicle there in October 2021.

The appellants thereafter instituted a dispute before the Co-operative Court seeking, inter alia, an injunction restraining the respondents from obstructing their use of the parking space and directing restoration of possession. Pending the dispute, they sought interim relief, which came to be rejected by the Co-operative Court. Aggrieved thereby, they preferred the present appeal.

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Analysis, Reasoning and decision

The Court noted the rival submissions that while the appellants claimed uninterrupted use of the parking space allotted to their predecessor-in-title since purchasing Flat No. 402 in 2007 and alleged that Respondent 2 had unlawfully occupied it for parking his second vehicle, Respondent 2 contended that the parking space was neither specifically allotted to the appellants nor transferable under Bye-laws 78(b) and 82. It was further contended that the appellants had never applied for allotment of a parking space in their own name and had approached the Court after an unexplained delay of nearly 2 years, disentitling them to equitable relief.

1. Whether the appellants had made out a case for grant of interim injunction by establishing prima facie right over the disputed parking space, balance of convenience and irreparable injury?

At the outset, the Court observed that the scope of an appeal against an order refusing interim relief is limited and that appellate interference is unwarranted where the trial court has exercised its discretion judiciously and therefore examined the trial court order. Before considering the rival contentions, the Court noted the admitted facts that the appellants and Respondent 2 were members of the respondent society, that the appellants had purchased Flat No. 402 from the original member on 26 December 2007, and that the society had, by a resolution dated 24 March 2002, allotted a parking space to the appellants’ predecessor-in-title.

Referring to Model Bye-laws 78(b), the Court noted that the parking space allotment is the prime responsibility of the Managing Committee of society and that a member has no right to sell or transfer a parking space allotted by the society, thus, the appellants’ predecessor-in-title could not transfer the allotted parking space along with the flat, and the appellants could not claim any right over it merely by virtue of the purchase. The Court then referred Bye-law 82, and noted that the member desiring a parking slot may make an application to secretary of the society, however, such an application was never made by the by the appellant. In absence of a specific procedure followed by the appellant for getting a parking for their flat, they cannot claim any right, interest over the parking slot of their predecessor in title. The Court observed that the appellants cannot claim the parking slot allotted to their predecessor in title by the society as a matter of right and thus they do not have any authority to question the act of Respondent 2. Hence, if injunction is not granted, no irreparable loss will be caused to the appellants.

The Court reiterated that “delay defeats equity” and noted that although the alleged cause of action arose on 23 October 2021, the dispute was instituted only on 6 November 20231, after an unexplained delay of nearly 2 years. The Court held that such delay disentitled the appellants from claiming equitable relief. The Court further observed that the appellants sought the same mandatory relief in the interim application as in the main dispute, namely, restoration of the disputed parking space. Since a temporary mandatory injunction, if granted, would virtually amount to granting the final relief itself, and such relief is to be granted only in exceptional circumstances, the appellants were held not entitled to interim injunction.

2. Whether interference is called for into the impugned order?

Holding that the trial court had judiciously exercised its discretion in refusing interim relief, the Court held that no interference with the impugned order was warranted and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs.

[Harshad Dholakia v. Mahavir Cooperative Housing Society, A.O. NO.5 OF 2026, decided on 10-7-2026]


Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the appellant: M.S. Prabhune, Advocate

For the respondent: Devki Govekar, Advocate


1. Ed note: The judgment itself gives two different filing dates for the dispute — 06-11-2023 (para 21, in the Court’s own analysis) and 10-11-2023 (para 15, in the recap of counsel’s submission). This report follows the date used in the Court’s operative reasoning.

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