Madras High Court: In a batch of petitions filed by Agri S.S. Krishnamurthy, the official whip and authorised signatory of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), and, in one petition, by Desiya Makkal Sakthi Katchi, challenging the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly’s acceptance of the resignations of 6 AIADMK MLAs who subsequently joined the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), the Division Bench of Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari*, CJ. and G. Arul Murugan, J. held that the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly may accept an MLA’s resignation even when proceedings seeking the member’s disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution are pending. However, acceptance of the resignation does not render the disqualification proceedings academic or infructuous, and the Speaker must still decide them in accordance with law. Directing expeditious adjudication, the Court ordered the Speaker to conclude the pending disqualification proceedings within 2 months and publish a timetable for their disposal within 7 days.
The Court upheld the acceptance of the resignations and the consequential declaration of vacancies, rejecting the contention that the Speaker was required to undertake a detailed inquiry into the alleged political motives behind them. It nevertheless held that the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to ensure that the Speaker discharged his constitutional duty within a reasonable period.
Background
The dispute arose following the formation of the 17th Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly after the election held on 23 April 2026. The fractured mandate left no political party with a clear majority. The TVK, having emerged as the single largest party, staked its claim to form the government, and its leader, C. Joseph Vijay, was required to establish his majority in the Assembly by 13 May 2026.
According to the pleadings, a vertical split occurred in the AIADMK on 11—12 May 2026, with a rival faction led by S.P. Velumani writing to the pro-tem Speaker proposing a different legislature party leader and official whip. All six MLAs in this batch were part of that faction. However, on 13 May 2026, 25 AIADMK MLAs defied the party whip and voted in favour of the confidence motion supporting the TVK-led government. The AIADMK consequently initiated disqualification proceedings under Para 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Tenth Schedule, alleging that the members had voluntarily given up their party membership and acted contrary to the party’s directions.
On 27 May 2026, the AIADMK sought condonation of the conduct of 14 MLAs who had defied the whip, including 2 members who subsequently resigned and joined the TVK. The party requested that the disqualification proceedings against those 14 members be dropped in relation to their voting against the whip. The condonation was expressly confined to the members named in the communication and did not extend to the proceedings against the remaining members. Four MLAs, S. Jayakumar, Maragatham Kumaravel, P. Sathyabama and Dr Esakki Subaya, did not apologise or seek condonation, and the disqualification proceedings against them remained pending.
The present batch concerned 6 AIADMK MLAs who subsequently resigned and joined the TVK. The 3 members, namely S. Jayakumar, Maragatham Kumaravel and P. Sathyabama, tendered their resignations on 25 May 2026. The Speaker accepted their resignations that day, within about two hours of their being tendered, and the vacancies were notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette the same evening. Dr Esakki Subaya resigned on 26 May 2026, and his resignation was accepted on the same day. Dr C. Vijaya Bhaskar resigned on 16 June 2026, while M.R. Vijaya Bhaskar resigned on 29 June 2026; both resignations were accepted on the respective dates. The three MLAs met Chief Minister Vijay that afternoon and joined the TVK the same day. Dr Esakki Subaya joined the TVK on 26 May 2026, and the two Vijaya Bhaskars on 2 July 2026.
The AIADMK’s official whip challenged the Speaker’s acceptance of the resignations, contending that the decisions had been taken without a proper inquiry into whether the resignations were genuinely voluntary and free from coercion or inducement. The petitioners also argued that the resignations should not have been accepted while the disqualification proceedings were pending, particularly in light of allegations of horse-trading and financial inducements surrounding the political developments.
The petitioners sought to set aside the acceptance of the resignations and the consequential notifications declaring the constituencies vacant. They also sought directions requiring the Speaker to decide the pending disqualification petitions within a time-frame fixed by the Court. Desiya Makkal Sakthi Katchi separately challenged the acceptance of the resignations of the 3 MLAs who had resigned on 25 May 2026.
A material distinction emerged between the 4 MLAs against whom disqualification proceedings remained pending and the 2 Vijaya Bhaskars. The latter had been included among the 14 members whose conduct was condoned, and the pleadings did not establish that fresh disqualification proceedings had subsequently been instituted against them.
Issues
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Whether the Speaker was required to conduct a detailed inquiry before accepting the resignations and whether their acceptance in the circumstances was arbitrary or unconstitutional.
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Whether the Speaker could accept the resignations while disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule were pending.
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Whether acceptance of the resignations rendered the pending disqualification proceedings academic or infructuous.
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Whether the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus under Article 226 directing the Speaker to decide the pending disqualification proceedings within a fixed timeline.
Analysis
1. Scope of the Speaker’s inquiry into resignations
The Court examined Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution, read with Rules 21—24, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules. It observed that the constitutional framework requires the Speaker to ascertain whether a resignation is voluntary and genuine before accepting it.
“The present batch of cases poses an unforeseeable dilemma before this court. The ongoing conflict between constitutional morality and political morality. The desirability of a particular rule or law with the state of affairs of this Court vis-à-vis the actual existence of such rule or law, with the diametrically opposite state of affairs.”
The Bench explained that the inquiry is directed towards determining whether the resignation has actually been tendered by the member concerned, or through an authorised representative, and whether it is free from duress, compulsion or undue influence. The Speaker is not required to undertake a roving inquiry into the political background, reasons or alleged motives underlying the resignation.
The petitioners had emphasised the short interval between the resignations and their acceptance, particularly in the case of the 3 MLAs who resigned on 25 May 2026. They argued that the Speaker could not have adequately investigated the allegations of inducement and horse-trading within such a short period.
The Court, however, noted that the pleadings did not allege that the resignation letters were forged or fabricated, or that they had been delivered by impostors. The principal allegations concerned the suspected political and financial considerations behind the members’ decisions to resign. Such allegations, without more, did not require the Speaker to conduct a detailed inquiry into their political motives.
The Bench also took note of the respondents’ case that the MLAs had appeared personally before the Speaker, submitted written resignation letters bearing their signatures, names and seals, and expressed their intention to resign.
Accordingly, the Court held that the resignations were genuine and voluntary, and that the Speaker was not constitutionally obligated to investigate their alleged political motives in detail. It upheld the acceptance of the resignations and the consequential notifications declaring the seats vacant.
2. Whether pending disqualification proceedings prevented acceptance of the resignations
The Court rejected the contention that the Speaker was required to decide the disqualification petitions before accepting the resignations.
It held that the 2 exercises arise under distinct constitutional provisions and serve different purposes. While acceptance of a resignation is governed by Article 190(3)(b) of the Constitution and the relevant Assembly Rules, disqualification on the ground of defection is governed by the Tenth Schedule.
In the former exercise, the Speaker must determine whether the resignation is genuine and voluntary. In the latter, the Speaker exercises the adjudicatory jurisdiction contemplated under Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule to determine whether the member has incurred disqualification under the anti-defection provisions.
The Court observed that the pendency of disqualification proceedings does not, by itself, constitutionally prevent the Speaker from processing and accepting a resignation. Nor does it require the Speaker to keep a resignation in abeyance until the disqualification proceedings have concluded.
The Bench relied on the constitutional scheme and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 for the position that the Speaker acts as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule, and on Subhash Desai v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 2 SCC 719, and Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595
for the principles that mere institution of a disqualification petition does not trigger its consequences and that resignation and disqualification are distinct mechanisms. It also referred to Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2020) 17 SCC 1. Consequently, the Court held that the Speaker had not acted unconstitutionally merely by accepting the resignations while disqualification proceedings were pending.
3. Whether acceptance of resignation renders disqualification proceedings infructuous
The Court rejected the contention that the acceptance of the resignations had left nothing further to be decided in the pending disqualification proceedings.
It explained that the Tenth Schedule serves to preserve the integrity of legislative functioning and political party discipline. A determination of disqualification may carry constitutional consequences independent of the member’s subsequent resignation from the Assembly.
The Bench accepted that the legal consequences of a disqualification determination cannot necessarily be avoided merely because a member resigns after the alleged act of defection. The Bench noted that disqualification relates back to the date of the act of defection and does not come to an end on resignation where the defection preceded the resignation. The disqualification proceedings must therefore be adjudicated on their own merits, and the consequences prescribed under the Tenth Schedule, i.e. including the bar on appointment as a Minister (Articles 75(1-B) and 164(1-B)) and on holding a remunerative political post (Article 361-B) until the term of the House would have expired or the member is re-elected, must follow if disqualification is established.
The Court also clarified that this does not mean that an MLA is prohibited from resigning merely because disqualification proceedings are pending or that the resignation must be withheld in anticipation of a possible adverse decision. The constitutional processes remain distinct: the Speaker may accept a genuine and voluntary resignation but must nevertheless adjudicate the pending disqualification petition.
The Court accordingly held that acceptance of the resignations did not render the pending proceedings academic or infructuous. It stressed that the Speaker must decide those proceedings expeditiously rather than allow the resignation to become a reason for leaving the allegations of defection unresolved.
The Bench separately noted that, in the cases of Dr C. Vijaya Bhaskar and M.R. Vijaya Bhaskar, the petitioners had not demonstrated the existence of pending disqualification proceedings after the earlier condonation. Their cases therefore stood on a different footing from those of the 4 MLAs against whom proceedings remained pending.
4. High Court’s power to direct time-bound disposal of disqualification petitions
On this issue, the Court accepted the petitioners’ contention that a time-bound direction was warranted.
The respondents had opposed judicial intervention, arguing that the Speaker’s constitutional role in deciding disqualification proceedings should not be interfered with at an interlocutory stage. The Court, however, distinguished between interfering with the merits of a disqualification decision and requiring the constitutional authority to discharge its adjudicatory duty within a reasonable time.
The Bench took into account the sequence of political developments, the defiance of the party’s whip, the subsequent resignations and the continued pendency of the disqualification proceedings. It observed that expeditious, fair, and transparent adjudication was necessary to preserve public confidence in the functioning of constitutional institutions.
The Court held that a direction to decide the pending petitions promptly would neither usurp the Speaker’s jurisdiction nor dictate the outcome of the disqualification proceedings. Rather, it would facilitate the discharge of the Constitutional duty vested in the Speaker.
Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Speaker to conclude the pending disqualification proceedings within 2 months from the date of the judgment.
The Speaker was directed to prepare and publish a timetable within 7 days, specifying deadlines for the filing of replies by the defecting MLAs, objections by the complainant, finalisation of pleadings, and the hearing of final arguments. The Speaker was further directed not to permit unnecessary delays and not to grant more than 2 opportunities or adjournments to the defecting MLAs. The Court made clear that the principles of natural justice must be followed and that the final decision must be reasoned and address the pleas and grounds raised by the complainant.
The petitioners were permitted to raise all grounds available to them in law, which the Speaker was required to consider before passing the final order. If the disqualification petitions were not decided within the stipulated 2-month period, any interested party would be at liberty to approach the Court for appropriate further directions. The Court stressed that the two-month timeline is sacrosanct and must be followed rigidly.
Decision
The Court held that the Speaker’s acceptance of the resignations and the consequential declaration of vacancies were constitutionally valid. It rejected the challenge based on the alleged inadequacy of the inquiry into the resignations and held that the pendency of disqualification proceedings did not prevent their acceptance.
“We have consciously, after lot of deliberations and profound thinking, opted to leave the issue of disqualification of various respondents/Members of Legislative Assembly of the Tamil Nadu State legislature to the Speaker trusting that he will discharge his role as a sentinel of the Constitutional morality so designated under the X Schedule of the Indian Constitution by our Parliament.”
At the same time, the Court made clear that the pending disqualification proceedings must continue and be decided on their merits. It directed the Speaker to publish a timetable within 7 days and conclude the pending proceedings within 2 months, with no more than 2 opportunities or adjournments for the defecting MLAs, while complying with the principles of natural justice and passing a reasoned order.
Consequently, writ petitions were dismissed, concerning Dr C. Vijaya Bhaskar and M.R. Vijaya Bhaskar. Other writ petitions were partly allowed, with the time-bound directions concerning the pending disqualification proceedings. There was no order as to costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.
[Agri S.S. Krishnamurthy v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, W.P. Nos. 23081, 23085, 26422, 26155 and 22397 of 2026, decided on 13-10-2026]
*Judgment Authored by: Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Mr V. Giri, Senior Counsel, for M/s Lamech Indian, Harshad Sunder and S. Inbadurai, Mr S. R. Rajagopal, Senior Counsel, for Mr Aditya Sarangarajan and Mr Inbanathan, Mr T. Sivagnanasambandan.
For Respondent Mr C. S. Vaidyanathan, Senior Advocate (through VC), for M/s Arya Raj and Vrinda Bhandari, Mr Vijay Narayan, Advocate General, for M/s Arya Raj and Vrinda Bhandari; assisted by Mr J. Lenin, Special Government Pleader, and Mr Akash Srinanda, Government Advocate, Dr Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate, for M/s K. P. Anantha Krishnan, Dixita Gohil, Pranjal Agarwal and Yash S. Vijay,Mr Niranjan Rajagopalan, Mr Sathish Parasaran, Senior Counsel, for Mr P. J. Rishikesh, Mr K. Suresh.
