Delhi High Court: In a petition filed under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’) , seeking quashment of FIR, for offences under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34, Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), a Single Judge Bench of Madhu Jain, J., partly allowed the petition.
The Court held that the allegations of cruelty and harassment, taken at face value, disclosed a prima facie case under Section 498A IPC. However, the complaint and chargesheet did not disclose that the alleged stridhan had been entrusted to the petitioner or that the petitioner had exercised dominion over it. Consequently, the proceedings under Section 406 IPC were quashed qua the petitioner.
On limitation, the Court held that Section 468 CrPC could not, at this stage, operate as an automatic ground for quashing the Section 498A proceedings. The Trial Court was directed to independently consider the limitation plea, including the exclusion contemplated under Section 470 CrPC and the extension contemplated under Section 473 CrPC.
Background
The case arose out of a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner, a medical practitioner and citizen of the United States of America, and Respondent 2, his wife.
The parties were introduced in April 2007, and their marriage was solemnised on 16 October 2007 at a Gurudwara in New Delhi. The marriage was subsequently registered on 11 January 2008. After the marriage, the petitioner returned to the United States, while Respondent 2 continued to reside in India.
A spousal visa application was thereafter pursued to enable Respondent 2 to join the petitioner in the United States. The United States Embassy declined to issue the visa at that stage and subsequently recorded an adverse entry under the category “Alien Smuggling”.
In 2013, the petitioner instituted annulment proceedings before the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri. By judgment and decree dated 15 January 2015, the Missouri Court annulled the marriage on the ground of fraud. The petitioner subsequently instituted proceedings under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court at Delhi, which were later withdrawn.
The matrimonial dispute subsequently led Respondent 2 to lodge a complaint before the Crime Against Women Cell alleging matrimonial cruelty, demands for cash and an Innova vehicle, a demand of approximately ₹16—17 crore for purchase of land and establishment of a hospital, and non-return of jewellery.
Following the complaint and investigation, FIR was registered under Sections 498A and 406 read with Section 34 IPC.
The investigation was completed and a chargesheet was filed. However, as on the date of reservation of the judgment, the Trial Court had not taken cognizance, and no charges had been framed. The parties had also been referred to mediation before the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre, but the mediation remained unsuccessful.
Issues
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Whether the allegations against petitioner, disclosed a prima facie case under Sections 498-A and 406 read with 34 IPC?
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Whether the criminal proceedings arose from the FIR concerned were liable to be quashed on the ground that cognizance had not been taken, is now barred by limitation under Section 468 CrPC?
Analysis The Court, first considered the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in relation to quashing an FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom
Relying on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Court reiterated that such jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, with circumspection. Where the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from undertaking an enquiry into their reliability or correctness at the threshold.
The Court also referred to Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, and observed that where an accused seeks quashing on the basis of defence material, the material must be of sterling and impeccable quality, conclusively rule out the allegations, and be incapable of being justifiably refuted.
Applying this test, the Court held that the foreign annulment decree, visa records and communications with immigration lawyers relied upon by the petitioner did not meet the required standard. While these materials could support the petitioner’s defence concerning the matrimonial relationship and the visa proceedings, they did not conclusively rule out the specific allegations of cruelty allegedly committed in India.
The Court further referred to Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of A.P., (2007) 13 SCC 165, in the context of matrimonial offences, noting that the power under Section 482 CrPC may be exercised where prosecution is barred by limitation, but the statutory scheme governing limitation and the circumstances of the particular case must be considered before terminating the proceedings.
On the allegations under Section 498A IPC, the Court found that the complaint could not be characterised as containing merely vague or omnibus allegations. Respondent 2 had attributed specific allegations to the petitioner, including demands for an Innova vehicle and money, a demand of approximately ₹16—17 crore for purchase of land and establishment of a hospital, payment of ₹7 lakh to the petitioner’s brother, and allegations of physical and sexual cruelty. The Court said that taken at face value, these allegations disclosed a prima facie case of cruelty and harassment. Whether the alleged incidents actually occurred and whether they could ultimately be proved were matters of evidence and could not be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.
The Court next considered the petitioner’s plea that the prosecution was barred by limitation.
The Court noted that offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC are punishable with imprisonment up to three years and Section 468(2)(c) CrPC, cannot be read in isolation, it must be read with the Chapter XXXVI CrPC, including Sections 469, 470, 472 and 473.
The Court also considered Section 469 CrPC, which deals with when limitation commences on the date of the offence and Section 472 CrPC, which applies to a fresh commencement point for the period of limitation at every moment during which the offence continues.
Relying on Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, (1999) 4 SCC 690, the Court reiterated that cruelty under Section 498A IPC constitutes a continuing offence and that each occasion on which a woman is subjected to cruelty may give rise to a fresh starting point of limitation.
In the present case, however, the complaint did not specify the exact dates of the alleged incidents. April 2012 was stated to be the month of the last alleged in-person incident, while December 2012 was stated to be the month of the last abusive telephone call. The communications of December 2014 and January 2015, which were described as an apology and an assurance of reconciliation, were not themselves alleged to constitute fresh acts of cruelty.
The Court nevertheless held that the question of limitation could not be conclusively determined at the stage of the present proceedings. Section 470(4)(a) CrPC permits exclusion of the period during which an offender remained absent from India. Since the record did not contain complete passport, immigration or entry-and-exit records of the petitioner, a conclusive computation of the period of limitation could not be undertaken.
The Court also considered Section 473 CrPC, which allows cognizance after expiry of limitation if the delay is properly explained or where such extension is necessary in the interests of justice.
Relying upon Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, and Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4 the Court held that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, rather than the subsequent date of cognizance.
Accordingly, the Court held that the plea of limitation did not, at that stage, furnish a conclusive ground for quashing the Section 498A proceedings. The Trial Court was directed to independently consider the plea of limitation, including the applicability of Sections 470 and 473 CrPC, at the appropriate stage.
The Court separately examined the allegations under Section 406 IPC, which criminalises criminal breach of trust. Relying on Abhishek Saxena v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1711, the Court noted that entrustment of property or dominion over property, followed by dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal, constitutes the foundation of an offence under Section 406 IPC.
In the present case, the complaint specifically stated that the jewellery had been handed over to the petitioner’s sister-in-law, for being kept in her locker. There was no allegation that the jewellery had subsequently been entrusted to the petitioner or had come under his dominion or control. Nor was there any specific allegation that the petitioner had dishonestly refused to return, converted or misappropriated the jewellery.
In these circumstances, the Court held that the essential ingredients of Section 406 IPC were absent qua the petitioner. The mere fact that the alleged jewellery was in the possession of a member of the matrimonial family could not, by itself, establish entrustment or dominion over the property by the petitioner.
The Court found support for this conclusion in Raj Kumar Khanna v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1159, where a similar prosecution under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 IPC was quashed under Section 406 for want of entrustment, while the Section 498-A case was permitted to continue. The Court also referred to Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 13 SCC 612, Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttaranchal, (2020) 10 SCC 710 and Arun Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 3 SCC 736 for the principle that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in part where the ingredients of a particular offence are not made out.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the proceedings against the petitioner were liable to be quashed insofar as they related to Section 406 IPC. However, since the allegations under Section 498-A IPC independently disclosed a prima facie case of cruelty and harassment, the proceedings under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC were permitted to continue.
Decision
The Court partly allowed the petition. It quashed the FIR, chargesheet, and all consequential proceedings agaisnt the petitioner only as related to Section 406 IPC. However, the proceedings under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC were permitted to continue. The Trial Court was directed to independently determine the plea of limitation before taking cognizance of the remaining offence, including consideration of the period liable to be excluded under Section 470 CrPC and the applicability of Section 473 CrPC.The Court clarified that its observations were not to be treated as findings on the merits of the remaining Section 498A prosecution.
[Harcharanjeet Bains v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7186, decided on 16-9- 2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For petitioner: Rajeev Sirohi and Puneet Narula, Advocates
For respondent: Manoj Pant, APP for the State, Mahavir Sharma and Neha Bisht, Advs. For Respondent No.2, ASI Surender Singh
