“Not an ordinary case of impersonation”: Inside Tis Hazari Court’s sentencing of Sukesh Chandrasekhar for posing as a Supreme Court Judge

Tis Hazari Court: In a case concerning the impersonation of a Supreme Court Judge and an alleged attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Harshita Mishra, convicted Sukesh Chandrasekhar under Sections 170, 189 and 507 IPC, holding that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused used the mobile phone of a police official to make calls to the Judicial Officer and impersonated a sitting Supreme Court Judge with the object of influencing her to grant bail. The Court held that the testimony of the Judicial Officer was cogent, consistent and substantially corroborated by CDRs and circumstantial evidence, and that the discrepancies and investigative lapses highlighted by the defence did not create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.

The Court further held that the alleged conduct was qualitatively different from an ordinary case of impersonation or cheating, as it constituted an attempt to intrude upon judicial decision-making and strike at the institutional integrity of the Judiciary. While severely criticising the investigation for being marked by “utter indifference, investigative naivete and apathy”, the Court held that such lapses did not render the otherwise credible prosecution evidence unreliable. On sentencing, the Court awarded rigorous imprisonment of 2 years under Section 170 IPC, 2 years under Section 189 IPC and 4 years under Section 507 IPC, with the sentences directed to run consecutively, observing that the cumulative impact of the offences upon the administration of justice warranted a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the conduct.

Background

The prosecution case was that accused Sukesh Chandrasekhar @ Sukash Chandrasekar, while in police custody in connection with FIR No. 56/2017, obtained access to the mobile phone of the police official in whose custody he was, and used it to contact the official landline and mobile number of Special Judge-07 (PC Act cases, ACB), who was seized of the corruption case against him. The accused allegedly impersonated first as the Private Secretary of a then sitting Judge of the Supreme Court of India and subsequently as the Judge himself, with the object of persuading the Judicial Officer to grant him bail at the earliest. He allegedly invoked the authority of the highest judicial office and threatened the Judicial Officer with adverse professional ramifications if bail was not granted.

The Court observed that the case was qualitatively different from an ordinary case of cheating or impersonation, as the allegation concerned an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice by impersonating a Supreme Court Judge and using the assumed identity to influence a Judicial Officer.

“The allegation, if proved, is not merely an allegation of an improper telephone call made to an individual Judicial Officer. It represents an alleged attempt to strike at the very foundation upon which the judicial process rests—namely, the independence of the Judiciary, the sanctity of judicial proceedings and the assurance that cases are decided only upon the basis of law and evidence and not upon private communications, pressure, deception or impersonation.”

The Judicial Officer lodged a complaint on 29 April 2017, pursuant to which FIR No. 100/2017 was registered at PS Subzi Mandi on the same day. The chargesheet was filed on 20 April 2018, and cognizance was taken on the same day. Charge under Sections 170, 189 and 507 IPC was framed on 14 December 2018, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

The prosecution examined 16 witnesses, with evidence being recorded from 2 February 2019 to 9 April 2026. The accused’s statement was recorded on 17 April 2026. He denied the allegations and challenged the prosecution evidence, and also led defence evidence by examining his wife, Leena Paulose. His proposed witnesses Gopi and Manoharan could not be examined, as Gopi had committed suicide and Manoharan was untraceable. The accused’s right to lead further defence evidence was consequently closed on 10 August 2026. Final arguments were heard on 17 August 2026, with the defence also placing on record a 34-page note of written submissions.

Issues for Determination

1. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused made the telephone calls in question to the Judicial Officer?

2. Whether the accused, while making such calls, impersonated himself as a Judge of the Supreme Court?

3. Whether, by making such calls and assuming such false identity, the accused intended to influence or interfere with the Judicial Officer in the exercise of her judicial functions and to secure an order favourable to himself?

4. Whether the prosecution has established the requisite mens rea and all the essential ingredients of the offences with which the accused has been charged?

5. Whether the discrepancies and inconsistencies highlighted by the defence, including the discrepancy regarding the date of the calls, are material contradictions going to the root of the prosecution case or are merely minor discrepancies attributable to lapse of time and human recollection?

6. Whether the testimony of the Judicial Officer inspires confidence and is corroborated, wholly or substantially, by the surrounding circumstances and other evidence on record?

7. Whether the testimony of defence witnesses, including Leena Paulose, is sufficiently credible and reliable to create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case?

8. Whether the lapses and deficiencies in the police investigation, as brought out on record, affect the prosecution case to such an extent as to entitle the accused to the benefit of reasonable doubt?

The Court held that reasonable doubt must be founded upon reason and evidence and cannot be imaginary, speculative or fanciful. There is no rule requiring corroboration of a complainant’s testimony merely because the occurrence took place in private; cogent, coherent and trustworthy testimony, supported by reliable electronic and circumstantial evidence, can sustain a conviction.

Rejecting the defence challenge based on the one-day delay in lodging the FIR, the Court held that the Judicial Officer had acted with “prudence, circumspection and institutional responsibility” by first verifying the authenticity of the purported communication from a Supreme Court Judge and lodging the complaint on the very next day. The complaint was therefore lodged with “commendable promptness.”

The Court found the testimony of the Judicial Officer consistent, cogent and materially corroborated by the CDRs. Her return call to the number from which she was contacted did not render her testimony improbable, particularly as she had candidly disclosed the same and furnished a plausible explanation. The Court also rejected the allegation of false implication, noting that she had first independently verified the communication and had not immediately named the accused as the caller.

The discrepancy regarding whether the calls were received on 27 April 2017 or 28 April 2017 was held to be a minor error of recollection and not a material contradiction. The judicial record and CDRs established 28 April 2017 as the date of the calls. Accordingly, the Court held that the discrepancy did not discredit the otherwise consistent and corroborated testimony of the Judicial Officer.

The Court held that the mere absence of an immediate order-sheet entry dated 28 April 2017 recording the alleged call from a person impersonating a Supreme Court Judge was not fatal to the Judicial Officer’s testimony. Considering the extraordinary nature of the allegation, the Court held that she was entitled to proceed with “caution and deliberation” and first verify the identity and authenticity of the communication. The omission could not be elevated into a contradiction, particularly when the receipt of calls was supported by CDRs and her testimony remained consistent.

The Court rejected the defence contention that the Judicial Officer’s mobile and landline numbers were not in the public domain. It observed that institutional contact details may be accessible through court directories, administrative records, staff, intermediaries or other channels. The precise manner in which the number was procured was not a prerequisite for establishing the alleged offence. A “seasoned conman does not require a telephone directory to commit an offence.”

The Court held that the non-examination of certain court staff and PD Balodi from the Supreme Court Registry did not render the prosecution case fatal. While the investigation could have been more comprehensive, “preferable is not synonymous with indispensable” and an investigative omission is not synonymous with a fatal defect. Criminal trials are not a numbers game; the Court must “weigh” the evidence rather than count witnesses. Since the defence failed to demonstrate any specific material fact or prejudice that could have resulted from the non-examination of these witnesses, the contention was rejected.

The Court accordingly held that the omissions relied upon by the defence did not undermine the otherwise cogent, consistent and corroborated prosecution case.

The Court further held that the prosecution case did not rest merely on the uncorroborated testimony of the Judicial Officer. Her testimony was substantially corroborated by the CDRs, which established receipt of calls from the relevant mobile number, and by the evidence of Subhash Rathi, Ct. Manjeet and HC Anoop, which connected the accused with the mobile phone used for making the calls. The Court observed that the individual pieces of evidence were required to be appreciated cumulatively and that the oral testimony, electronic record and surrounding circumstances converged towards a common factual narrative. The circumstance of motive, arising from the impending judicial proceedings and the alleged attempt to secure bail, further strengthened the evidentiary chain. The Court accordingly held that the prosecution evidence had passed the requisite evidentiary muster.

The Court rejected the reliance placed by the defence upon the testimony of wife of the accused, observing that though her relationship with the accused did not render her testimony inadmissible, it required heightened scrutiny. Her testimony was not considered independent or non-partisan and did not inspire sufficient confidence to displace the otherwise reliable prosecution evidence corroborated by the CDRs. The Court further noted that the other proposed defence witnesses remained unexamined, one having died and the other being untraceable, and therefore the defence version remained uncorroborated and in the realm of unproven assertions.

Further, the calls could not be reduced to an ordinary or random hoax. The caller allegedly assumed the identity of a Supreme Court Judge and sought to influence the Judicial Officer to grant bail, thereby attempting to intrude upon the judicial decision-making process. The Court observed that the alleged impersonation, the choice of judicial identity, the communication with a serving Judicial Officer, the reference to the pending matter and the direction to grant bail, taken cumulatively, demonstrated a deliberate intention to deceive and influence. The absence of a voice recording or a formally produced bail application was held not to efface the other corroborative evidence. The Court emphasised that the conduct struck at the institutional integrity of the judicial process and that the judiciary must send an unequivocal message that its authority cannot be misused for transactional fraud.

While holding the prosecution case to be proved, the Court severely criticised the manner in which the investigation had been conducted. It noted that the police failed to promptly examine the complainant and relevant witnesses, collect the CDRs of the Judicial Officer’s mobile and landline, examine court staff and the Supreme Court Registry official, recover the mobile phone and SIM used for the calls, investigate the circumstances in which Ct. Manjeet’s phone went missing, secure CCTV footage from the Crime Branch premises, and collect material documents from the connected FIR. The Court held that the investigation was marked by “utter indifference, investigative naivete and apathy” and that the deficiencies were particularly serious considering that the allegation concerned an attempt to interfere with the independence of judicial decision-making.

The Court nevertheless distinguished between an imperfect investigation and one so fundamentally defective as to destroy the prosecution case. It held that investigative lapses do not automatically render otherwise credible evidence unreliable or entitle the accused to an acquittal. However, the cumulative failure to pursue obvious lines of inquiry, secure potentially decisive evidence and rigorously examine material witnesses warranted serious scrutiny. The Court observed that, when viewed cumulatively, the lapses revealed a failure to investigate the matter with the degree of rigour, objectivity and completeness which the case demanded.

Decision/Present Order

The Court held that sentencing is neither a mechanical nor an arithmetical exercise nor an occasion for judicial indignation, but requires a balance between the interests of the offender, victim and society. It observed that the present case was qualitatively different from an ordinary case of impersonation, as the convict had deliberately manufactured the identity of a Supreme Court Judge with the object of influencing a judicial proceeding and securing bail in another criminal case. Such conduct, according to the Court, struck at the very root of the administration of justice and amounted to an attack upon the integrity of the judicial process.

The Court found the offence to be deliberate, calculated and sophisticated, and held that the failure of the attempted manipulation did not constitute a mitigating circumstance, as the intended consequence was prevented only by fortuity. Taking note of the increasing possibility of deepfakes, AI-generated communications and other forms of technologically sophisticated impersonation, the Court emphasised the need for a stringent approach to protect the sanctity of the judicial process.

Mitigating circumstances

The Court declined to take into account the pending criminal cases against the convict, as he had not been convicted therein. However, it found no mitigating circumstance of any meaningful weight. The absence of genuine remorse or contrition, and the convict’s continued attempt to question the credibility of the complainant Judicial Officer and attribute mala fides to the prosecution, were taken into consideration while assessing the appropriate sentence.

Sentence

The Court sentenced Sukesh Chandrasekhar to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of ₹ 5,000 under Section 170 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of ₹ 5,000 under Section 189 IPC; and rigorous imprisonment for 4 years under Section 507 IPC. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo one month’s additional imprisonment.

Consecutive sentences

Holding that Sections 170, 189 and 507 IPC protect distinct legal interests and address distinct mischiefs, the Court directed the substantive sentences to run consecutively, observing that concurrency would understate the criminality involved and that the cumulative impact of the offences upon the administration of justice warranted a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the conduct. The convict was granted the benefit of the period already undergone in custody.

The Court further called for a report from the Jail Superintendent regarding whether the convict had furnished bail bonds/personal bonds at any stage, and listed the matter for 2 September 2026. Separately, the Court listed 1 October 2026 for a compliance report from the Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police, pursuant to a direction issued in the earlier judgment dated 20 August 2026.

[State v. Sukash Chander Shekhar, 2026 SCC OnLine Dis Crt (Del) 32, decided on 29-8-2026]

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Plaintiff: Amit Yadav, APP for the State

For the Defendants: Convict Sukesh Chandrasekhar produced from JC. Praveen Dabas, Advocate

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