Is moral policing a crime in India? What the BNS, POCSO and the Constitution say

Is moral policing a crime in India? The question returns whenever a video of young people being stopped, threatened or assaulted by a group goes viral, as one from Jamui, Bihar, reportedly did in September 2026. The short answer is that Indian law has no offence called “moral policing”, but the conduct behind it, such as restraint, threats, force and sexual harassment, is punishable under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) applies where a child is involved.

This article explains when moral policing becomes a crime, which provisions apply, what the Constitution protects and what a person can do if they are targeted.

Key takeaways

• Moral policing has no statutory definition, but the conduct involved is covered by existing laws.

• Wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation, assault and sexual harassment may apply, depending on the facts.

• Where a child is involved, POCSO applies, and the child’s identity cannot be disclosed.

• Adults’ choice of partner is protected under Article 21.

• A complaint should describe the conduct, not the label “moral policing”.

Jamui Incident

In September 2026, a video from Jamui, Bihar, drew widespread attention after it purportedly showed two minor students being intercepted and harassed by a group of men. According to reports, the students were Class 10 students who had gone to a nearby location after coaching classes and were returning when they were stopped. The boy was allegedly assaulted and the girl was subjected to sexual harassment. The incident was recorded and the footage subsequently circulated on social media. The police registered a case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) and relevant provisions of the Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), constituted a Special Investigation Team and arrested accused persons.¹

The incident was widely described as one of “moral policing”. That expression, however, should not obscure the more fundamental legal issue.

There is no need to determine what relationship existed between the two students. There is equally no need to construct a narrative around why they were together, where they were going or what others may have assumed about them. They were students and, as reported, minors. The legal question is what authority, if any, private individuals possessed to stop them, subject them to intimidation or violence, sexually harass the girl, assault the boy and record or circulate the incident.

That distinction is important because incidents described as moral policing are often discussed by beginning with the conduct of the person who was targeted. The conversation then moves towards whether the person was with a friend, a partner, a member of another community, an unmarried person, or someone whose conduct was considered socially inappropriate. The legal inquiry should work in the opposite direction. Social disagreement does not by itself confer a right to interfere with another person’s liberty.²

The Jamui incident therefore provides an opportunity to examine a recurring problem in India: where does social morality end and the law begin?

What is moral policing?

“Moral policing” has no specific statutory definition in Indian law. Neither the BNS nor any general central law creates an offence called “moral policing”.

The term generally describes attempts by individuals or groups to enforce their own ideas of morality or acceptable behaviour, through questioning, humiliation, threats, surveillance, violence, forced separation or sexual harassment.

But the absence of a specific offence does not make such conduct lawful. Criminal law focuses on what a person does, not the moral justification offered for doing it. Assault does not become lawful because it was meant to “teach someone a lesson”, and a threat does not become acceptable because it is made in the name of family honour.

Academic research has examined this phenomenon as a form of informal policing of public space. Research on anti-Romeo squads and other forms of informal surveillance has documented the scrutiny directed at young people and couples and the attempts to determine what forms of interaction are considered acceptable in public.³

The absence of a statutory definition, however, does not mean that conduct described as moral policing is beyond the law. This is the first principle that must be kept in mind while understanding moral policing: Moral policing is not a standalone offence; unlawful conduct committed in its course can attract criminal liability under several existing laws.

Why does the law not create a separate offence of moral policing?

The absence of a separate offence is not necessarily a legislative omission. “Moral” is a subjective concept. What is considered morally acceptable varies across communities, families, generations and social groups. Criminal law, by contrast, must identify conduct that the State has prohibited and prescribe the consequences for committing it.

If a person disapproves of premarital relationships, inter-caste relationships, inter-faith relationships or live-in relationships, that belief by itself is not ordinarily a criminal offence. The legal position changes when the person converts that belief into conduct prohibited by law. For instance, a person may disagree with two adults sitting together in a park. That disagreement is not, by itself, a criminal offence. But if a group surrounds them, prevents them from leaving and threatens them with physical harm, the legal analysis changes completely. The relevant provisions of criminal law may then concern wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation or assault, depending upon the facts.

The law therefore does not need an offence called “moral policing” in order to address such conduct. What is required is that existing laws be properly recognised and enforced when private moral judgment crosses into unlawful interference.

Statutory Framework: When moral policing becomes a crime

There are several provisions that may become relevant depending upon the facts of a moral-policing incident.

• Wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement

Section 126 BNS deals with wrongful restraint. A person commits wrongful restraint when that person voluntarily obstructs another so as to prevent the person from proceeding in a direction in which that person has a right to proceed. Section 127 BNS deals with wrongful confinement, which involves restraining a person within circumscribed limits.

These provisions are particularly relevant to incidents in which a group stops a person or surrounds someone and prevents them from leaving. The important point is that private individuals do not acquire a general power to stop another person merely because they disapprove of that person’s conduct. The law recognises limited circumstances in which individuals may exercise certain lawful powers, but moral disapproval by itself is not such a power.

Thus, where a group intercepts two people and prevents them from proceeding, the circumstances may have to be examined under the law relating to wrongful restraint or confinement.

• Assault and criminal force

The BNS separately deals with force, criminal force and assault. The applicability of a particular provision depends upon the nature of the conduct and the intention with which the force was used.

A moral-policing incident can therefore move from a social dispute into criminal conduct the moment physical force is unlawfully used. The justification that the victim was allegedly behaving improperly does not itself provide a defence.

• Criminal intimidation

Section 351 BNS deals with criminal intimidation. It covers threats of injury to a person, reputation or property, where the threat is made with the intention of causing alarm or compelling a person to do something which the person is not legally bound to do, or to omit something the person is legally entitled to do. This provision can become relevant in moral-policing situations where individuals are threatened with violence, exposure, harm to family members or reputational consequences to compel them to end a relationship or submit to demands.

The distinction between advice and intimidation is therefore important. A person may express disagreement. The law intervenes when disagreement is accompanied by a threat satisfying the ingredients of the offence.

• When the persons involved are children: POCSO changes the legal position

The legal position becomes considerably more protective when the person subjected to sexual conduct is below 18 years of age.

Section 2(d) of the POCSO defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years. The Act establishes a special legal framework for protection of children from sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography. Sections 7 and 8 POCSO deal with sexual assault and punishment for sexual assault, while Sections 11 and 12 POCSO address sexual harassment of a child and its punishment.

The importance of POCSO in incidents like Jamui lies in the fact that the law is concerned with the protection of the child. An adult cannot justify sexual conduct towards a child by invoking the child’s alleged relationship with another person or by claiming that the child was behaving in a manner the adult disapproved of. Child protection and moral policing are therefore conceptually different.

If an adult genuinely believes that a child is in danger, the lawful response is to seek assistance from the police or appropriate child-protection authorities. It is not to physically punish, humiliate, sexually harass or publicly expose the child.

• The child’s identity is also protected

The problem does not necessarily end with the physical incident. Section 23 of POCSO places restrictions on disclosure of the identity of a child involved in proceedings under POCSO. The restriction extends to information that can lead to identification of the child, including details such as name, address, photograph, family details, school or neighbourhood, subject to the statutory exception permitting disclosure by the Special Court in the child’s interest and for reasons recorded in writing. This becomes especially important in the age of social media.

In the Jamui matter, police reportedly took action to remove the video from social-media platforms, and subsequent reporting stated that FIRs were registered against a large number of social-media accounts allegedly involved in revealing the minor girl’s identity or circulating the footage. ⁴

The public circulation of such footage should therefore not be viewed simply as “sharing a newsworthy video”. When a child victim can be identified, the legal and ethical implications are considerably more serious. A person who receives such a video should not download, forward, repost or circulate it merely because it has gone viral. The fact that the material is already available online does not make further dissemination lawful.

Other facet of moral policing

• When the person being policed is a woman

Where the target is a woman, the conduct may also attract provisions specifically dealing with offences against women.

The BNS contains provisions addressing assault or criminal force against a woman with intent to outrage her modesty, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual misconduct. The precise provision depends upon the conduct proved. This is significant because moral policing often carries a gendered dimension. A woman’s movement, clothing, friendships, relationships and presence in public spaces may be subjected to scrutiny that is not similarly imposed upon men.⁵

The legal system cannot treat such conduct as merely a disagreement about social values where it involves prohibited sexual or physical conduct. The question is not whether the woman conformed to somebody else’s idea of respectable behaviour. The question is whether another person violated a legal right protected by criminal law.

• Protecting a child is not the same as policing a child

This distinction deserves separate consideration. A person may genuinely believe that a child is unsafe. The law does not discourage intervention to protect a child. What the law does not permit is for private persons to transform that concern into a self-appointed system of investigation and punishment. A private group cannot decide that a child has behaved improperly, interrogate the child, threaten the child, assault another person accompanying the child and record the entire incident as a form of “lesson”.

Child protection is the responsibility of institutions established for that purpose.⁶ The appropriate response where a child is believed to be at risk is to contact the police, Child Welfare Committee, child-protection authorities or other competent mechanisms, depending upon the nature of the concern. The objective should be the child’s safety, not humiliation.

The constitutional question: Does personal choice have legal protection?

The statutory framework tells us when conduct becomes criminal. Constitutional law answers a broader question: how far can the State or society interfere with an individual’s personal choices?

Article 21 of the Constitution protects life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 21 has expanded considerably over time and now includes dignity, privacy and aspects of individual autonomy.

The nine-Judge Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right and connected privacy with dignity, liberty and individual autonomy. The Court recognised that privacy protects a zone within which individuals can make personal decisions without unwarranted interference.

This principle is directly relevant to moral policing because many forms of moral policing are essentially attempts to control private choices through social pressure. The Constitution does not require every personal choice to be approved by society before it receives legal protection.

Social morality and constitutional morality

One of the most important developments in Indian constitutional jurisprudence has been the distinction between social morality and constitutional morality.⁷

Social morality changes according to time, place and social attitudes. Constitutional morality is anchored in the constitutional guarantees of liberty, equality, dignity and fraternity.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 is particularly important in this context. While considering the constitutional validity of Section 377, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), the Court emphasised autonomy, dignity and the right of an individual to make choices concerning intimate aspects of life. The judgment recognised constitutional morality as distinct from majoritarian or prevailing social morality.

“The grundnorm of Indian legal system is that the Constitution and constitutional principles must be upheld and we believe that obscure notions of “public morality” cannot be used by the state machinery to trample individuals’ decisional autonomy; constitutional morality must prevail over social morality.”⁸

However, this does not mean that every form of conduct is constitutionally protected merely because an individual describes it as a personal choice. Individual liberty operates within the framework of law. But it does mean that mere social disapproval cannot automatically become a legal prohibition.

“Morality” and “Criminality” are not the same

The Supreme Court expressed this principle particularly clearly in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600.

The case arose in the context of public statements concerning premarital relationships. The Court observed that notions of social morality are inherently subjective and that criminal law cannot be used to unduly interfere with personal autonomy. It expressly stated that morality and criminality are not coextensive.

The principle has broader relevance.

A person may consider premarital relationships undesirable. Another may disagree. The State does not criminalise every morally disapproved conduct. Criminal liability depends upon whether the ingredients of a particular offence are established.

“While there can be no doubt that in India, marriage is an important social institution, we must also keep our minds open to the fact that there are certain individuals or groups who do not hold the same view. Notions of social morality are inherently subjective and the criminal law cannot be used as a means to unduly interfere with the domain of personal autonomy. Morality and criminality are not coextensive.”⁹

That principle is fundamental to understanding moral policing. If society disagrees with someone’s personal choices, disagreement may be expressed. But disagreement cannot automatically be converted into coercion.

The right to choose a partner

The Supreme Court has repeatedly protected the ability of an adult to make decisions concerning marriage and intimate relationships.

In Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, the Court dealt with harassment faced by an adult woman who had married against the wishes of her family. The Court held that an adult is free to marry a person of her choice and strongly condemned threats, harassment and violence against couples who marry outside caste or community expectations.

The significance of Lata Singh¹⁰ lies in the fact that the Court did not treat family disagreement as a justification for interference. Once a person is a major, the family’s disagreement does not create a legal authority to threaten or harm that person.

In Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368, the Supreme Court similarly emphasised the importance of an individual’s choice of partner as part of personal liberty. The Court rejected the idea that courts or families could substitute their judgment for the decision of an adult concerning whom to marry. The Court’s broader jurisprudence recognises intimate choice as falling within a protected sphere of autonomy.

When family or community interference becomes a threat

Perhaps the most directly relevant judgment for the problem of moral policing is Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192.

The case concerned honour crimes and community interference with marriages and relationships. The Supreme Court made it clear that the choice of an individual cannot be crushed in the name of family or community honour. The Court described the assertion of choice as an inseparable facet of liberty and dignity.

“The choice of an individual is an inextricable part of dignity, for dignity cannot be thought of where there is erosion of choice. True it is, the same is bound by the principle of constitutional limitation but in the absence of such limitation, none, we mean, no one shall be permitted to interfere in the fructification of the said choice. If the right to express one’s own choice is obstructed, it would be extremely difficult to think of dignity in its sanctified completeness.”¹¹

More importantly, the judgment went beyond a declaration of principle. It laid down preventive, remedial and punitive measures for dealing with threats to couples. The Court directed States to establish special cells, helplines and safe houses and required prompt police action where threats were brought to the notice of authorities. The judgment also contemplated situations involving young couples whose relationships were opposed by families, clans or communities. This is important because legal protection should not begin only after a person has been killed or assaulted. Where a credible threat exists, the State has a preventive responsibility.

What about two adults simply sitting together?

Not every socially disapproved interaction is an offence. Two unmarried adults sitting together in a public place do not, merely by doing so, commit a general criminal offence. A public authority can impose lawful regulations concerning opening hours, safety, nuisance and use of public property. Similarly, specific criminal provisions may apply where their ingredients are actually satisfied.

But the mere fact that two adults are together, unmarried or presumed to be in a relationship does not give strangers a general power to interrogate or punish them. This distinction is particularly important because public spaces are shared spaces. The law regulates conduct in public spaces; it does not generally give private individuals the authority to enforce their personal conception of respectable behaviour.¹²

Valentine’s day and the recurring problem of public scrutiny

The problem is not confined to a single incident or a single date. Every year, reports of young people being stopped, threatened or harassed around Valentine’s Day and other occasions associated with relationships bring the issue back into public discussion. The recurrence is significant because it shows that moral policing is not merely a reaction to one particular incident. It is part of a wider debate about who is entitled to decide how young people may interact in public.

Academic research has documented surveillance of couples and public displays of affection in Indian cities. Research on informal moral policing in Mumbai, for instance, examines the everyday surveillance of young lovers and attempts by non-state actors to regulate public behaviour according to their understanding of sexual propriety.¹³

Such research also shows why the issue should not be reduced to a debate about “modern” versus “traditional” generations. The phenomenon involves questions of gender, access to public space, class, safety and the informal exercise of authority. The law, however, remains concerned with conduct. A person’s moral or cultural objection to Valentine’s Day does not create a legal right to assault somebody celebrating it.¹⁴

Young people and the right to public space

For many young people, public spaces are among the few places where they can meet friends, classmates or partners without having access to private spaces of their own. Parks, cafes, libraries, college campuses and other public places consequently become important spaces for social interaction. The problem arises when the presence of young people, particularly a young man and woman together, is itself treated as suspicious.

Research concerning public spaces and moral surveillance has documented how assumptions about respectable behaviour can disproportionately restrict women’s mobility and young people’s use of public places. ¹⁵

There is an important legal distinction here. A park authority may regulate conduct for legitimate reasons such as safety or nuisance. A police officer may intervene where an actual offence has occurred. A private individual, however, does not acquire a general power of enforcement merely because he or she considers the conduct morally inappropriate.¹⁶

Accommodation: Another form of everyday scrutiny

The same issue can appear outside public spaces. Unmarried adults, including students, bachelors and young professionals, sometimes encounter difficulties while seeking rented accommodation because of assumptions about their lifestyle or relationships.¹⁷ Unmarried couples may face even greater scrutiny because landlords or housing societies may object to the possibility of a relationship between occupants.¹⁸

The legal position here requires greater nuance than simply stating that every refusal to rent to an unmarried person is illegal. Property owners and housing societies may impose lawful conditions concerning use of premises, payment of rent, nuisance, damage, subletting and compliance with contractual obligations. There is no general central statutory rule requiring every landlord to rent to every applicant regardless of circumstances.

At the same time, the mere fact that an adult is unmarried does not give a landlord unlimited authority over the person’s private life. A contractual relationship concerning property cannot automatically become a licence to regulate every aspect of a tenant’s personal relationships. This is one area in which the law remains less developed than its jurisprudence on violence and threats. The recurring experiences of bachelors, unmarried couples and young professionals suggest a need for a clearer discussion around the boundary between legitimate property management and private moral regulation.

Live-in relationships: The law is moving beyond formal marriage

The law’s treatment of live-in relationships also illustrates the changing relationship between social morality and legal protection. A live-in relationship between consenting adults is not, merely because it is outside formal marriage, a criminal offence. At the same time, Indian law does not treat every live-in relationship as legally identical to marriage.

The Supreme Court has considered relationships “in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

More recently, in Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1470, the Supreme Court considered whether Section 498-A IPC could apply to a live-in relationship. The Court held that protection under Section 498-A IPC could extend to a relationship in the nature of marriage where the requisite intention to marry is established, while also emphasising safeguards against unnecessary arrest.

This development is relevant to the larger discussion because it demonstrates that the legal system is capable of recognising forms of domestic relationships that do not fit within a traditional marriage framework. It does not mean that every live-in relationship automatically attracts every legal consequence of marriage. It means that the absence of a marriage certificate does not necessarily place an individual outside the protection of law.

Landmark cases and what they tell us

Case	Principle relevant to moral policing
Lata Singh v. State of U.P.19	An adult’s choice of partner cannot be subjected to threats or violence merely because the family disapproves.
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal20	Social morality and criminality are not coextensive.
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal21	Examined relationships in the nature of marriage.
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma22	Considered legal protection in live-in relationships.
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India23	Recognised privacy, dignity and decisional autonomy.
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M.24	Reinforced an adult’s autonomy in choosing a spouse/partner.
Shakti Vahini v. Union of India25	Addressed honour-based and community interference and directed preventive protection.
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India26	Developed the ideas of dignity, privacy, autonomy and constitutional morality.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India27	Strengthened the constitutional understanding of individual autonomy and equality.
Supriyo v. Union of India28	Considered constitutional claims concerning marriage and the limits of judicial intervention.
Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka29	Extended Section 498-A protection to qualifying relationships in the nature of marriage under specified circumstances.

The cumulative significance of these decisions is more important than any individual case. The Supreme Court has progressively developed a constitutional framework in which dignity, privacy and personal autonomy are protected against unjustified interference.

What remedies are available against moral policing?

A person subjected to moral policing does not need to use the expression “moral policing” when approaching the police. The complaint should describe the actual conduct.

If a person has been stopped from proceeding, the facts may attract provisions concerning wrongful restraint. If the person has been prevented from leaving a particular place, wrongful confinement may become relevant. If threats have been issued, criminal intimidation may be examined. If physical force has been used, the provisions concerning assault or criminal force may apply. If the victim is a woman and the conduct is sexual, the relevant provisions concerning offences against women must be considered.

Where a child is involved, POCSO must be considered wherever the alleged conduct falls within its scope. The victim should, wherever possible, preserve relevant evidence such as messages, recordings, photographs, call records, CCTV details and information about witnesses. In cases involving online circulation, screenshots and links may assist investigators, but material identifying a child victim should not be further circulated merely for the purpose of preserving evidence.

Where the threat is continuing or there is a reasonable apprehension of violence, the person can approach the police and senior police authorities for protection. In appropriate cases, constitutional remedies before the High Court may also be available.

The directions in Shakti Vahini ³⁰are particularly important where a couple or family faces threats because of a relationship. The Supreme Court’s framework contemplated special cells, helplines and safe houses and required preventive action rather than waiting for violence to occur.

What if the persons involved are minors?

A minor requires a different legal approach. Children do not possess the same legal capacity as adults in relation to marriage, and POCSO establishes a statutory age threshold for sexual offences. Therefore, one cannot simply apply the constitutional jurisprudence concerning consenting adults to a situation involving a child. At the same time, the fact that the persons are minors does not authorise strangers to discipline them through violence or humiliation.

If an adult genuinely believes that a child is being exploited or is in danger, the appropriate course is to involve the competent authorities. The law provides institutional mechanisms precisely so that protection does not become private punishment. For a child victim of sexual harassment or assault, the priority should be safety, medical and psychological support where required, confidentiality and lawful investigation.

The incident therefore demonstrates two separate propositions that should not be confused: children require greater protection; they do not become less deserving of protection because somebody disapproves of their conduct.

What should a young person do if confronted?

The law protects rights, but exercising a legal right does not mean that a person should physically confront a group of aggressors.

If an adult is confronted by people attempting to intimidate or threaten them, the immediate priority should be safety. Moving towards a populated or secure location, contacting the police or trusted persons and preserving evidence can be more effective than escalating the confrontation. If there is an immediate threat to life or physical safety, emergency assistance should be sought.

Where the person is a minor, the child should, wherever possible, approach a parent, guardian, teacher, trusted adult, police officer or appropriate child-protection authority. A child should not be expected to negotiate alone with a group of adults who are threatening or intimidating them.

The law is not merely about punishment after an offence. It is also about prevention and protection.

Can family or community approval decide an adult’s relationship?

No general rule of Indian law makes family approval a prerequisite for an adult’s choice of partner.³¹, ³² This principle is firmly established in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.

In Lata Singh³³, the Court held that an adult is free to marry a person of her choice and condemned harassment of couples because of caste or community considerations.

In Shafin Jahan³⁴, the Court described the choice of a partner as lying within the exclusive domain of the individual. The decision emphasised that courts cannot substitute their own notions of social propriety for the choice of a competent adult.

In Shakti Vahini³⁵, the Court went further by creating institutional mechanisms for protecting couples from threats arising from community or family opposition.

Therefore, while families may disagree with an adult’s decision, disagreement does not create a right to threaten, confine or assault the person.

The current legal position

The present position in India is therefore not that “moral policing is illegal” in the abstract. The legal position is more precise. There is no standalone statutory offence called moral policing. The expression describes a range of conduct. When that conduct satisfies the ingredients of a criminal offence, the relevant statutory provision applies.

At the constitutional level, adults enjoy protection for privacy, dignity and personal autonomy. The Supreme Court has recognised the importance of personal choice in matters involving marriage and intimate relationships.

At the same time, constitutional autonomy does not mean immunity from generally applicable laws. A person cannot claim privacy as a defence to assault, sexual violence, criminal intimidation or other unlawful conduct. The position concerning children is distinct. POCSO creates a special protective framework for persons below 18. Consequently, the law must distinguish carefully between cases involving consenting adults and cases involving children.

Finally, the jurisprudence has become considerably stronger in dealing with overt violence and threats than with everyday informal forms of moral regulation. Questions concerning public spaces, accommodation and social exclusion remain areas where the law develops incrementally and where policy clarity may still be required.

What more does India need?

The existence of several criminal provisions does not by itself eliminate moral policing.

The first requirement is better awareness within law-enforcement agencies. A complaint should not be trivialised merely because the underlying dispute concerns a relationship or because family members describe the conduct as a matter of honour or reputation.

The second is preventive protection. Shakti Vahini³⁶ is important precisely because it recognised that the State’s responsibility can arise before violence occurs. Where credible threats are brought to the authorities, preventive measures should not depend upon waiting for an actual attack.

The third is better protection for minors in the digital environment. A child who has already been victimised should not be subjected to a second injury through the circulation of videos, photographs or identifying details.

The fourth concerns public spaces. Authorities should distinguish legitimate regulation of public places from the informal enforcement of morality. Public safety is a legitimate governmental concern; private moral judgment is not a substitute for law.

Finally, there is a broader need for legal literacy. Many people do not know that the Constitution protects individual autonomy or that threats and coercion may constitute offences even when they arise from family or community disagreement. Legal awareness, in this context, should not merely tell people that moral policing is “wrong”, it should explain which part of the law is engaged and what a person can actually do when their rights are violated.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is moral policing a separate offence in India?

No. “Moral policing” is not a standalone offence under the BNS or another general central statute. Depending upon the conduct involved, offences such as wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation, assault, sexual harassment or offences under POCSO may apply.

Can strangers stop two adults because they suspect they are in a relationship?

There is no general legal authority allowing private persons to police the relationships of strangers. If the intervention involves restraint, threats, force or another prohibited act, the relevant criminal provisions may apply.

Can unmarried couples sit together in public places?

There is no general criminal prohibition merely because two consenting adults are unmarried and together in a public place. Specific laws regulating public conduct continue to apply, but moral disapproval alone does not create a criminal offence.

What if the persons involved are minors?

Persons below 18 are children under POCSO. Sexual conduct involving a child must therefore be examined under the POCSO framework. The fact that a child may know or like another person does not authorise adults to subject the child to violence or sexual harassment.

Can parents or relatives stop an adult from marrying someone they disapprove of?

They may express disagreement, but they cannot lawfully threaten, assault or otherwise coerce the adult. The Supreme Court has repeatedly protected an adult’s choice of partner.³⁷

What can a person do if a family or community threatens them because of their relationship?

They can approach the police and seek protection. The preventive and protective mechanisms recognised by the Supreme Court in Shakti Vahini³⁸ are particularly relevant where there is a credible threat to life or liberty.

Does living together without marriage amount to a crime?

A consensual live-in relationship between adults is not, merely because it is outside marriage, a criminal offence. The legal consequences of a particular live-in relationship depend upon the applicable statute and facts.³⁹

Can a landlord refuse accommodation to unmarried persons?

There is no simple blanket rule that every refusal to rent to an unmarried person is unlawful. Property owners can impose legitimate conditions relating to the use and management of premises. However, property arrangements do not automatically give landlords unlimited authority to regulate a tenant’s private life.

Can a person share a video of a minor victim if the video is already viral?

Extreme caution is required. POCSO restricts disclosure of information that can identify a child victim. The fact that material is already circulating online does not make further circulation lawful.

Conclusion

The Jamui incident is disturbing not because it raises another debate about young people and relationships, but because it shows how quickly moral judgment can turn into coercion and violence. The identities, character or presumed relationship of the students should not become the focus of the legal inquiry. The alleged conduct must be examined on its own legal terms.

Society may have its moral beliefs, and families may disagree with personal choices. But no one has a private licence to threaten, assault, sexually harass, restrain or publicly humiliate another person. The Constitution protects dignity, privacy and personal autonomy, while criminal law and POCSO place clear limits on violence, intimidation and exploitation.

The central principle is simple: the law may regulate conduct, but private individuals cannot become the law merely because they believe their morality gives them that authority.