Bombay High Court: In a criminal contempt reference arising from allegations that 2 advocates threatened a judicial officer during judicial proceedings, the Division Bench of Urmila Joshi Phalke* and Raj D. Wakode, JJ., held the respondents guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; stated that an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence, nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea.
The Court directed that:
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contemnor-respondents shall pay a fine of ₹2000 each;
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in addition to the fine, the contemnor-Respondents 1 and 2 shall pay costs of ₹50,000 each, to be deposited in the High Court’s Public Welfare Account;
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the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa to initiate the appropriate action against both the respondents.
Background
The criminal contempt reference arose from an incident on 26 November 2021 during proceedings in State v. Nilesh Jadhav, pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First (Judicial Officer) at Arni, District Yavatmal, Maharashtra.
The case was listed for the return of bailable warrants. The accused, Nilesh Jadhav, had been served with a bailable warrant but remained absent. The judicial officer accordingly issued a non-bailable warrant against him and notice to the surety.
Respondent 1, Sagar Durgadas Rathod, appearing for the accused, submitted that the accused was present but had been unable to enter the courtroom. However, when the accused was called, he was found absent. Respondent 1 sought cancellation of the warrant on the ground that the matter had been settled between the parties and insisted that the informant’s evidence be recorded. The judicial officer declined to proceed because the matter was also fixed for the return of warrants against the other accused, whose presence had not been secured, and the question of identification remained relevant.
On the judicial officer declining the request, Respondent 1 allegedly shouted in the courtroom and made wild, unsubstantiated and scandalous allegations against him. Subsequently, Respondent 2, Durgadas D. Rathod, then President of the Arni Taluka Court Bar Association and father of Respondent 1, entered the courtroom while the judicial officer was dictating an order and allegedly threatened him.
The judicial officer recorded the conduct and statements in his order and issued show-cause notices. The respondents did not reply promptly, and he then referred the matter to the High Court after finding their reply unsatisfactory.
The respondents denied the allegations, contending that the incident arose from a misunderstanding while Respondent 1 was representing his client. Respondent 2 maintained that his representations related to grievances of members of the Bar and were consistent with the practice followed by office-bearers of the Bar Association. The respondents also tendered unconditional apologies.
The Court took cognizance of the reference and issued notices. Despite service, the respondents initially failed to appear, leading to the issuance of bailable warrants on 25 September 2023. The proceedings were subsequently prolonged by adjournments and changes of counsel. In its order dated 3 March 2025, the Court expressed serious concern over the alleged threats against the judicial officer, declined to accept the apologies as genuine or bona fide, and ultimately framed charges against both respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act.
Also Read: Scandalous allegations against Judges constitute criminal contempt: Mad HC | SCC Times
Analysis and Findings
1. Contempt of court and interference with administration of justice
The Court examined the principles governing contempt jurisdiction and the circumstances in which conduct directed against a Judge or the judiciary may amount to criminal contempt.
Relying on Prashant Bhushan (Contempt Matter), In re, (2021) 1 SCC 745, the Court noted that contempt jurisdiction may be exercised where an act adversely affects or tends to impede the administration of justice, undermines public confidence in judicial institutions, attacks the dignity and authority of the Court, or is calculated to malign the image of the judiciary.
The Court acknowledged that the judiciary is not immune from criticism. However, criticism based on obvious distortion or gross misstatement, made in a manner designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, cannot be ignored. The Court also referred to C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626, while considering that scurrilous attacks on Judges have an adverse effect on public confidence, which in turn affects the due administration of justice.
In O.P. Sharma v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (2011) 6 SCC 86, referring to Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash, (1998) 4 SCC 577, the Supreme Court held that lawyers and litigants cannot browbeat or intimidate a Presiding Officer to secure a favourable order. Lawyers and litigants cannot be allowed to “terrorise” or “intimidate” Judges with a view to “secure” orders which they want. Such conduct may undermine impartial adjudication, the administration of justice and the rule of law.
Applying these principles, the Court examined the circumstances in which the respondents had addressed the judicial officer. The Court noted that the judicial officer had passed a judicial order against which the respondents could have pursued the appropriate legal remedy. Instead, Respondent 1 made allegations and statements in open Court, while Respondent 2 subsequently threatened the judicial officer and referred to producing evidence of corruption before superior authorities.
The Court found that the statements were apparently intended to “pressurise and terrorise” the judicial officer from passing an order and were not merely submissions made while representing a client. The Court observed that those statements were apparently made to pressurise and terrorise him from passing an order.
The Court rejected the respondents’ attempt to attribute the incident to the judicial order. The Court held that the threats and scandalous allegations could deprive the judicial officer of the ability to discharge his duties fearlessly. The respondents had not specifically denied the incident in their replies.
The Court further held:
“Interference in the administration of justice by giving threats, addressing the judicial officer in a loud voice and prohibiting him from passing orders are definitely serious acts. More so, when such acts have been done by an advocate who is the officer of the Court, he should promote and see that all others who are present should also maintain the decorum of the Court. Obstruction in judicial process by an advocate cannot be tolerated.”
The Court concluded that the respondents’ conduct interfered with the administration of justice and demoralised the judicial officer in the discharge of his official duties. It also referred to High Court on its own motion v. Pradeep Pandurang Suryawanshi, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 147, concerning threats to a judicial officer and their effect on the administration of justice.
2. Duties of advocates and the proper course for raising grievances
The Court emphasised the role of advocates in assisting courts and protecting litigants’ rights. Although advocates must be fearless and independent in representing their clients, this responsibility does not permit threats or intimidation directed at a judicial officer. The Court observed that:
“Being an Advocate, it was the duty of the present respondents to represent their clients but representing the client does not mean that they should do something for their client which is not acceptable.”
The Court clarified that where an advocate has a proper ground for a serious complaint against a judicial officer, the advocate has the right and duty to submit the grievance to the appropriate authorities. Threatening a Judge during judicial proceedings, however, is not a permissible means of securing a favourable order or raising a grievance.
The Court reiterated that advocates must conduct themselves in a dignified manner and show respect towards the Court. It observed that contempt jurisdiction serves not only to protect the reputation of the Judge concerned, so that justice may be administered fearlessly and fairly, but also to protect “the fair name of the judiciary”.
3. Whether the apologies could be accepted
The Court considered whether the respondents’ unconditional apologies demonstrated genuine remorse and whether they could be accepted to avoid or mitigate punishment.
Relying on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, (2006) 5 SCC 1, the Court reiterated that an apology must be tendered at the earliest opportunity and in good faith. An apology offered when the contemnor anticipates punishment may lack genuine penitence.
The Court reproduced the following principle:
“Apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence, nor is it intended to operate as universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.”
The Court also considered Bal Kishan Giri v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 280, concerning the need for an apology to reflect genuine remorse and repentance rather than a calculated strategy to avoid punishment. It further referred to Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa, (1976) 3 SCC 327; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291; Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta, (1983) 4 SCC 125; and Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 72, in reiterating that an apology is not to be accepted as a matter of course and may be rejected for recorded reasons.
On the facts, the Court found that the respondents had not tendered their apologies at the earliest stage. They failed to appear despite service of notice, the proceedings were prolonged by adjournments, and the apologies were tendered following the Court’s oral directions and after charges had been framed.
The Court consequently found that the apologies were not sufficient to purge the contempt. The respondents’ subsequent apologies were considered while determining the appropriate punishment but did not displace the finding that they had committed contempt of court.
4. Contempt jurisdiction and appropriate punishment
The Court examined Article 215 of the Constitution, which declares every High Court to be a Court of record with the power to punish for contempt of itself. It relied on Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, concerning the inherent contempt jurisdiction of Courts of record, and S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra, (1981) 1 SCC 436, concerning the constitutional source and limits of that power.
The Court also considered Section 12, Contempt of Courts Act, which provides for punishment by simple imprisonment for a term extending to six months, a fine of up to ₹2000, or both. Referring to Pushpaben v. Narandas V. Badiani, (1979) 2 SCC 394, the Court reiterated that a fine is ordinarily the rule, while imprisonment is an exception requiring consideration of the circumstances.
The Court further considered the gravity of the respondents’ conduct, its impact on the administration of justice, their status as practising advocates and their subsequent apologies, although it did not accept the apologies as genuine. It held that imposing fines, directing payment of costs and referring the matter to the Bar Council for disciplinary action would be adequate punishment instead of imprisonment.
Decision
The Bombay High Court held both respondents guilty of contempt of court and directed:
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Fine: Each respondent was directed to pay a fine of ₹2000 within 2 weeks.
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Disciplinary proceedings: The proceedings were referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa to initiate appropriate action against both respondents.
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Costs: Each respondent was directed to pay costs of ₹50,000.
[Sajiduzzaman Mhammad Hanif Shahid v. Sagar Durgadas Rathod, Criminal Contempt Petition Reference No. 1 of 2022, decided on 5-10-2026]
*Judgment authored by Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke.
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Amicus curiae: J.M. Gandhi, Advocate
For the contemnors/respondents: Rahul Mirza, Advocate for Respondent 1
S.P. Bhandarkar and Atharva Khadse, Advocates for Respondent 2
