National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi: In the present case, a company appeal was filed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II (Appellant), challenging the impugned order passed by National Company Law Tribunal (Adjudicating Authority). The appeal was accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay in filing of the appeal, which was taken up for consideration. The Bench of Ashok Bhushan, J. (Chairperson) and Barun Mitra (Technical Member), dismissed the delay condonation application and the memo of appeal stating that the Appellate Tribunal had not been vested with any discretionary power to admit an appeal after the expiry of extended 15 days period. The Appellate Tribunal held that the appeal was filed on the 46th day from the date of the impugned order, fell beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days under Section 61(2), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) and was not maintainable.
Background
The present appeal was filed by the appellant under Section 61 IBC, challenging the impugned order passed by the adjudicating authority. Along with the appeal, the appellant has also filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 16 days in filing the appeal.
The grounds for condonation of delay were that the appellant was not a party before the adjudicating authority and acquired knowledge of the impugned order only upon receipt of communication dated 26 December 2025 sent by Respondent 1, which was received by the applicant on 29 December 2025. It was further pleaded that the impugned order was uploaded on the portal on 19-12-2025. Therefore, the limitation had to be computed from the date of uploading of the order and not from the date of pronouncement.
The appellant further submitted that, after receiving the impugned order, some time was spent in seeking legal opinion from its panel counsel, appointing counsel for filing the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and collating voluminous records necessary for preparation of the appeal.
The appellant pleaded that, although bona fide attempts were made to e-file the appeal from 28-1-2026 onwards, the filing could not be completed due to technical glitches and backend defects in the NCLAT e-filing portal. The appeal was ultimately e-filed on 30 January 2026 after the appellant personally approaching the Registry.
Respondent 2 opposed the appellant ’s arguments and contended that it was well settled that the limitation period for filing the appeal has commenced from the date of the impugned order, i.e. 15 December 2025 and not from the date of uploading of the order or the alleged date of knowledge of the impugned order.
Respondent 2 further submitted that the prescribed statutory period of 30 days expired on 14 January 2026, and the further condonable period of 15 days ended on 29 January 2026. However, the present Appeal was admittedly e-filed on 30 January 2026 i.e. on the 46th day. Therefore, it fell beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days prescribed under Section 61(2) IBC.
Respondent 2 further contended that the technical glitches or backend issues with NCLAT e-filing portal which allegedly impeded the filing of the appeal, could not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay. The Appellate Tribunal Could not override the statutory mandate under the IBC on equitable grounds. Since, the appeal was filed beyond the condonable period and outside the statutory limit of 45 days, it was not maintainable.
The question before the Appellate Tribunal were:
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Whether, in the facts of the present case, the limitation period for filing the appeal under Section 61 IBC had to be computed from the date of the impugned order or from the date on which the impugned order was uploaded on the portal and/or when knowledge thereof was allegedly acquired by the appellant.
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Whether the technical glitches in the NCLAT e-portal, which prevented the appellant from filing their appeal on 45th day from the date of impugned order, constituted sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Appellate Tribunal examined the chronology and noted that the impugned order was pronounced on 15 December 2025 and uploaded on 19 December 2025. It observed that the statutory period of 30 days expired on 14 January 2026 and the further extendable period of 15 days as per Section 61(2) IBC expired on 29 January 2026. The appeal was e-filed only on 30 January 2026, i.e. on the 46th day from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order. Prima facie, the appeal fell beyond the statutory outer limit of 30+15 days as prescribed under Section 61(2) IBC.
The Appellate Tribunal rejected the contention that limitation should commence from the date of upload of the order or from the alleged date of knowledge. The Appellate Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd., (2024) 3 SCC 27, wherein it was held that the commencement of limitation is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement of the order. Since the order in the present case was admittedly pronounced on 15 December 2025, the Tribunal held that limitation commenced from that date itself.
The Appellate Tribunal further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 244, wherein it was held that limitation for filing an appeal commenced from the date of pronouncement of the order.
Thereafter, the Appellate Tribunal considered the appellant ’s plea regarding technical glitches in the NCLAT e-filing portal and accepted that technical difficulties beyond the control of the applicant had indeed prevented the filing of the appeal on the 45th day. The registry submitted a report confirming that an email dated 29 January 2026 was received from the appellant by the IT Section at around 12.46 p.m. regarding non-receipt of OTP on mobile and email while attempting registration on the NCLAT e-filing portal.
Also Read: [https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/10/25/nclat-dismisses-condonation-of-delay-application-scc-blog/]
The Appellate Tribunal further held that procedural or technical explanations could not override the express statutory framework governing limitation. Where a special statute prescribed a strict outer limit for condonation of delay, the same could not be extended on equitable considerations beyond the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the statute.
The Appellate Tribunal held that the appeal, having been filed on the 46th day from the date of the impugned order, fell beyond the statutory outer limit of 45 days under Section 61(2) IBC and was therefore not maintainable.
The Appellate Tribunal further held that inconvenience caused to any litigating party could not be considered as a decisive or determinative factor while interpreting a statute.
Section 61 IBC empowered this Appellate Tribunal to admit an appeal even after the prescribed period of 30 days, only up to a further 15 days, provided the appellant showed sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the 30-day period. The Appellate Tribunal was not vested with any discretionary powers after the expiry of the extended 15 days to admit an appeal. Any condonation of delay beyond 30+15 days would be in violation of legislative intent and statutorily impermissible.
Accordingly, the Appellate Tribunal rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently rejected the memo of appeal.
[EPFO v. Rolta India Ltd. (Resolution Professional), Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No. 503 of 2026, decided on 21-5-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Appellant: Sanjay Agarwal, Prachi and Shikha Saloni, Advocates
For Respondents: Ananya Pratap Singh, Ms. Gyanika Kochar and Anurag Sahay, Advocates for R2.
