Bengaluru City District Court: In a suit seeking ₹1 crore in damages for alleged defamation following the whistleblowing, along with permanent and mandatory injunctions, the Court of Shirin Javeed Ansari, Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, held that the claims for compensation for libel and slander were barred by limitation under Articles 75 and 76, Limitation Act, 1963.
The Court clarified that the finding on limitation did not determine whether the alleged statements were true or false, or whether the defendants had made them. It further observed that the limitation period applicable to claims for compensation could not automatically be extended to independent claims for injunctions or employment-related relief.
Background
The plaintiff, Naveen Kumar Midha, who had been employed with Willis Towers Watson India Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant 4) since 2011, alleged that he was targeted after raising concerns about financial irregularities and other alleged wrongdoing within the company. He claimed that, despite his professional record and contributions to the business, he was suspended on 17 July 2018. His suspension was revoked on 27 September 2018, and his employment was terminated on 28 September 2018.
The dispute extended beyond the termination. Plaintiff alleged that certain defendants made defamatory statements about him to individuals in the insurance industry, accusing him of unethical conduct, financial irregularities and improper dealings involving IT vendors and wellness companies. According to him, these statements damaged his professional reputation and were connected with the action taken against him after he raised concerns about the company.
The plaintiff sought ₹1 crore as punitive damages for the alleged defamation, a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from publishing, sharing, circulating or disseminating the alleged defamatory statements, and a mandatory injunction directing them to issue a public apology. The suit also raised separate claims arising from his termination, alleged violations of the company’s Whistleblower Code and employment-related damages.
Issues discussed
Issue 1: Whether the plaintiff proves he is entitled to seek a permanent injunction concerning publishing, sharing, and circulating malicious, defamatory statements as pleaded?
Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff proves he is entitled to seek a mandatory injunction against the defendants as prayed?
Issue 3: Whether the plaintiff proves he is entitled to seek punitive damages of ₹1 crore as prayed?
Issue 9: Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation?
Issue 10: Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable?
Also Read: Corporate Whistleblowing: Are We There Yet? | SCC Times
Analysis and Findings
Limitation Act, 1963, Articles 75 and 76, compensation for libel and slander, period of limitation
The defendants contended that the claims founded on the alleged defamatory statements were barred by limitation because the statements were alleged to have been made in July, August and October 2018, whereas the suit was instituted in January 2021. The plaintiff relied on the alleged communications to different persons on different occasions, his subsequent knowledge of certain statements, their continued circulation and the earlier suit and subsequent mediation.
The Court held that limitation had to be examined with reference to the nature of each cause of action and the statutory period applicable to the relief claimed. Since the plaint contained distinct claims founded on different legal rights and alleged acts, the suit could not be treated as a single and indivisible proceeding for determining limitation.
Article 75 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, prescribes a period of 1 year for a suit for compensation for libel, commencing from the date on which the libel is published. Article 76 prescribes a period of 1 year for compensation for slander, commencing from the date on which the actionable words are spoken or, where the words are not actionable in themselves, from the date on which the special damage complained of results. The applicable period therefore had to be determined with reference to the nature of the alleged statement and the relevant date of publication or speaking of the words.
The Court considered the specific dates pleaded by the plaintiff: the alleged communications to Kanchan Mitra on 18 July 2018, Pramod Kumar Pandey on 24 July 2018, and Vinoth Kumar and Vidya Ramachandran on 23 August 2018, as well as further statements allegedly made during the first week of October 2018. The suit was instituted on 18 January 2021. Even accepting the dates pleaded by the plaintiff for computing limitation, the ordinary 1-year period applicable to compensation arising from those publications had expired before institution of the suit.
The Court then considered the plaintiff’s contention that he acquired knowledge of certain statements only subsequently. It held that subsequent knowledge did not, by itself, postpone the commencement of limitation. Under Articles 75 and 76, the statutory starting point was ordinarily the date of publication or the speaking of the actionable words, as applicable. The Court found no legally sufficient basis, on the material considered for these issues, to postpone the commencement of limitation or exclude a period sufficient to render the specifically identified claims timely.
The Court also rejected the contention that the alleged defamatory statements constituted a continuing wrong merely because their consequences continued to affect the plaintiff’s reputation. It distinguished the continuing effect of an earlier statement from a fresh and independent publication that might give rise to an actionable claim. Each subsequent publication specifically pleaded and proved would have to be examined on its own facts and limitation period. A general allegation that statements continued to circulate did not automatically render every earlier publication actionable within limitation.
The Court next examined the plaintiff’s reliance on the earlier suit, instituted on 25 June 2020 and subsequently withdrawn by an order dated 12 August 2020, and the pre-litigation mediation proceedings declared a non-starter on 28 September 2020.
The Court held that the mere institution of an earlier suit or commencement of mediation did not automatically revive a cause of action that had already become barred by limitation. Section 14, Limitation Act permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting an earlier civil proceeding only where the statutory conditions are satisfied. These include due diligence and good faith, and the inability of the earlier court to entertain the proceeding because of a defect of jurisdiction or another cause of a like nature. The mere fact that an earlier suit was instituted and subsequently withdrawn did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to exclusion of the period spent therein. The order passed in the earlier suit, and the circumstances of its withdrawal had to be examined before exclusion could be allowed.
In the present case, the ordinary 1-year limitation period for the specifically identified publications had already expired before the earlier suit was instituted. Its institution and subsequent withdrawal therefore did not, by themselves, revive the time-barred claims. Nor could the subsequent mediation proceedings operate as a general mechanism for reviving an expired cause of action. Any available exclusion of time had to be established and computed in accordance with the applicable statutory provision.
On this basis, the Court held that the claims for compensation arising from the specifically identified defamatory publications of July, August and October 2018 were instituted beyond the period prescribed under Articles 75 and 76 and were consequently barred by limitation.
Defamation, compensation, limitation, effect of finding on merits of alleged statements
While deciding the monetary claim, the Court clarified that the finding on limitation was distinct from a determination of the merits of the alleged defamatory statements.
It observed:
“The conclusion that the claims for compensation are time-barred does not, by itself, establish that the statements were true or false, nor does it amount to a finding that the defendants necessarily did or did not make them.”
The Court held that, since the claim was barred by limitation, it was unnecessary to determine every disputed question concerning the truth or falsity of the identified publications, or their precise defamatory meaning, solely for deciding the monetary claim.
The Court had also explained that the claim for ₹1 crore had to be examined according to its substantive nature as a claim for monetary compensation arising from the alleged defamatory publications, notwithstanding the wording of Issue 3 as a claim for punitive damages. To establish the claim, the plaintiff was required to establish the actionable statements, their publication, the liability of the defendants concerned and the legal basis for the compensation claimed. The claim also had to satisfy the applicable limitation requirements.
Having found that the ordinary 1-year limitation period had expired, the Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover ₹1 crore as compensation for the specifically identified defamatory publications. Issue 3 was answered in the negative.
Permanent injunction, alleged defamatory publications, absence of sufficient factual basis
The Court considered the prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from publishing, sharing, circulating or disseminating the alleged defamatory statements.
The Court distinguished the limitation applicable to compensation for libel and slander from the legal requirements governing preventive relief. The 1-year period prescribed under Articles 75 and 76 did not, by itself, determine the limitation applicable to every suit for injunction. However, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction had to establish a legally maintainable cause of action and a sufficient factual basis for the relief sought. An apprehension of future dissemination, without establishing the requisite legal entitlement and the conduct warranting relief, was insufficient.
On examining the pleaded publications and the material referred to in the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff had not established a distinct and timely publication or other sufficient factual foundation warranting a permanent injunction in respect of the alleged defamatory statements. It also found no independent and sufficient basis, on the material considered for this issue, for granting the broad preventive relief sought.
The Court accordingly held that the plaintiff had failed to establish his entitlement to the permanent injunction. It clarified that this finding was confined to the relief sought in respect of the pleaded defamation claim and did not determine any independent cause of action arising from a distinct publication, if otherwise legally maintainable and established. Issue 1 was answered in the negative.
Mandatory injunction, public apology, legal entitlement and limitation
The plaintiff also sought a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to issue a public apology in respect of the alleged defamatory statements and the injury to reputation said to have been caused thereby. The defendants disputed his entitlement to this relief and relied on the dates of the alleged publications to contend that the claims arising from them were barred by limitation.
The Court held that a mandatory injunction is an equitable remedy and cannot be granted merely because a party alleges that his reputation has been adversely affected. The plaintiff had to establish the legal right sought to be enforced, the corresponding obligation of the defendants and the circumstances justifying the particular relief. The relief also had to be legally sustainable and supported by the pleadings and evidence.
The Court noted that the alleged obligation to issue a public apology arose principally from the statements said to have been made during July, August and October 2018. As already discussed, the claims for compensation arising from those identified publications had been instituted beyond the 1-year period under Articles 75 and 76, and the plaintiff had not established a legally sufficient basis for excluding the relevant period or otherwise bringing those claims within limitation.
The Court nevertheless distinguished the limitation governing compensation for libel or slander from that governing a suit for mandatory injunction. Expiry of the 1-year period under Articles 75 and 76 did not, by itself, establish that every possible claim for mandatory injunction was barred. However, seeking a different form of relief founded on the same alleged publications could not, by itself, overcome the consequences of limitation applicable to the pleaded defamation claims. The plaintiff still had to establish an enforceable right and a legal basis for the relief claimed.
On the material referred to in the pleadings and evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff had not established a sufficient independent legal basis for directing the defendants to issue a public apology. The alleged communications, their attribution to the respective defendants and the circumstances warranting the mandatory relief had to be established in accordance with law. The relief could not be granted solely on the plaintiff’s assertion that the statements were defamatory or that an apology would restore his reputation.
The Court further held that a mandatory direction could not be issued merely as a consequential measure to revive or indirectly enforce a claim for compensation barred by limitation. In the absence of a sufficiently established and legally maintainable basis for the particular relief, the plaintiff was not entitled to the mandatory injunction sought in relation to the pleaded defamation claim. Issue 2 was answered in the negative.
Limitation and maintainability, scope of the findings
The Court took up Issues 9 and 10 together because they were interlinked. It examined the defendants’ objection with reference to the nature of each cause of action and the statutory period applicable to the particular relief, rather than treating the suit as a single and indivisible proceeding.
Having considered Articles 75 and 76, the dates of the identified publications, the plaintiff’s subsequent knowledge, the allegation of continuing circulation, and the earlier suit and mediation, the Court concluded that the claims for compensation arising from the specifically identified defamatory publications were time-barred.
The Court then expressly limited the reach of that conclusion. Articles 75 and 76 governed claims for compensation for libel and slander. The limitation applicable to the prayers for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction, declaration and damages founded on an independent contractual or other cause of action had to be determined according to the legal character of the particular relief, the applicable provisions of the Limitation Act and the facts pleaded and established. Such reliefs could not be held barred merely by applying Articles 75 and 76 without examining their independent legal basis.
In particular, the claims concerning wrongful termination, alleged violation of the Whistleblower Code and employment-related damages arose from distinct asserted rights and obligations. Their limitation and maintainability had to be determined independently in accordance with the applicable law and the findings on those issues. The limitation finding on the specifically identified defamatory publications did not, by itself, determine those claims or establish that every independent claim and relief sought in the suit was barred.
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendants had established the bar of limitation only in respect of the claims for compensation arising from the specifically identified defamatory publications under Articles 75 and 76, Limitation Act. Issues 9 and 10 were answered partly in the affirmative, confined to those claims.
Decision
The Court held that the claims for compensation arising from the specifically identified defamatory publications were barred by limitation under Articles 75 and 76, Limitation Act, and declined to award the claimed ₹1 crore. It answered Issue 3 in the negative.
The Court also refused the permanent injunction because the plaintiff had not established a distinct and timely publication or another sufficient factual basis for the preventive relief sought. The mandatory injunction for a public apology was refused because the plaintiff had not established a sufficient independent legal basis for that relief, and it could not be used merely to revive or indirectly enforce a claim for compensation barred by limitation. Issues 1 and 2 were answered in the negative.
Issues 9 and 10 were answered partly in the affirmative, but only insofar as they compensation concerned arising from the specifically identified defamatory publications. The Court clarified that its findings did not establish whether the alleged statements were true or false, or whether the defendants necessarily made them. Nor did the limitation finding, by itself, determine the limitation or maintainability of the plaintiff’s separate claims concerning wrongful termination, alleged violation of the Whistleblower Code and employment-related damages.
[Naveen Kumar Midha v. Rohit Jain, OS No. 7134 of 2021, decided on 16-10-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the plaintiff: Arjuna Rao and Madhav Misra, Advocates
For the defendants: Syed Shujath Mehdi, Advocate for Defendants 1, 2 and 4; Perikal K. Arjun, Advocate for Defendants 3, 6, 7 and 8; A.J., Advocate for Defendant 5
