Kerala High Court: In a writ appeal filed under Section 5(i), Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 6 January 2026 passed by the Single Judge in that writ petition, the Division Bench of Anil K. Narendran and Muralee Krishna S.*, JJ. upheld the jurisdiction of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to inquire into a sexual harassment complaint filed against the Director of the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC), holding that the Director would fall within the definition of an “employee” under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (PoSH Act), and not that of an “employer”.
The Court observed that under the scheme of the PoSH Act, the Local Committee acquires jurisdiction only in cases where no ICC has been constituted or where the complaint is against the employer himself. Since IRTC had a duly constituted ICC and the appellant, despite being the Director, functioned under the control and supervision of the Executive Committee and General Body, he could not claim the status of “employer” under Section 2(g) of the Act.
The Court further held that the overall management of powers exercised by the Director were subject to the authority of the Executive Committee and General Body, which retained ultimate control over the administration and affairs of the institution. Consequently, the complaint against the appellant was maintainable before the ICC, and the Local Committee had no jurisdiction to interfere with or take over the proceedings.
Facts
The appellant, a retired Senior Principal Scientist of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), New Delhi, was serving as the Director of IRTC. A woman employee of IRTC filed a complaint of sexual harassment against the appellant on 27 November 2024. Pursuant to the complaint, the ICC of IRTC issued notice dated 3 February 2025 directing the appellant to appear before it. The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the ICC by contending that he was the “employer” within the meaning of Section 2(g), PoSH Act. According to him, if the complaint is against the employer, only the Local Committee constituted under Section 6, PoSH Act could enquire into the matter.
The appellant therefore approached the District Collector seeking intervention. However, the ICC continued proceedings, leading the appellant to file a writ petition seeking:
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quashing of the ICC notice,
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direction to authorities to ensure an impartial enquiry, and
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declaration that the actions of ICC and IRTC Authorities were illegal and unconstitutional.
The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred the present writ appeal.
Issues
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Whether the Single Judge erred in holding that ICC cannot be found to be without jurisdiction to enquire about the allegation of sexual harassment raised against the appellant by a woman employee of IRTC?
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Whether it is the Local Committee that has the authority to receive complaints regarding sexual harassment in the present case, since the appellant is the Director of IRTC?
Analysis
The Court examined the provisions of the PoSH Act and the Memorandum of Association and Rules of IRTC. It noted that the control, administration and management of IRTC vested with the General Body and Executive Committee, and that the Director functioned subject to their supervision and control. The Court also noted that the Director was appointed by the Executive Committee.
The Division Bench examined Sections 2(f), 2(g), 4, 6 and 9, PoSH Act along with Clauses 7, 18 and 23.2 of the Memorandum of Association and Rules of IRTC.
The Court observed that under the PoSH Act, complaints of sexual harassment against employees are to be inquired into by the ICC, whereas complaints against the employer are to be dealt with by the Local Committee.
“The combined reading of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the PoSH Act would make it clear that if a complaint of sexual harassment is raised by an employee in the workplace from the hands of another employee, then the matter has to be enquired into by the ICC.”
To determine whether the appellant was an “employee” or “employer”, the Court analysed the governance structure of IRTC. It noted that:
1. the control, administration and management of IRTC vested in the General Body and Executive Committee;
2. the Director functioned subject to the supervision and control of the Executive Committee and General Body;
3. the Director was appointed by the Executive Committee; and
4. the Executive Committee exercised disciplinary and administrative control over employees and affairs of the institution.
Although Clause 23.2.2 stated that the Director was responsible for the overall management of IRTC, the Court held that such authority was expressly made subject to the control and supervision of the Executive Committee and General Body.
On this basis, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be treated as the “employer” under Section 2(g), PoSH Act and instead fell within the definition of “employee” under Section 2(f). Consequently, the ICC had jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint.
Decision
The Court held that a Director of an institution cannot automatically be treated as an “employer” under Section 2(g), PoSH Act merely because he exercises managerial or administrative functions. Where the institution’s Memorandum of Association and governing rules show that the ultimate control, administration and supervision of the organisation vest with the General Body and Executive Committee, and the Director functions subject to their authority and is appointed by them, the Director would fall within the definition of an “employee” under Section 2(f) of the Act.
Accordingly, a complaint of sexual harassment against such Director is maintainable before the ICC and not exclusively before the Local Committee under Section 6(1), PoSH Act.
Finding no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment, the Court dismissed the writ appeal and upheld the jurisdiction of the ICC to proceed with the inquiry.
[Prof. J. Sundaresan Pillai v. KK. Seethalakshmi, Writ Appeal No. 534 of 2026, decided on 19-05-2026]
*Judgment Authored by: Justice Muralee Krishna S.
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Appellant: C.V.Manuvilsan,.O.A.Anju, Alana Mohammed Ali Cholassery
For Respondent: Thomas Abraham, Merciamma Mathew, Aswin.P.John, R.Ananthapadmanaban, Paul Baby, Swathy A.P., Thara Elizabeth Thomas, Fousiya R, Nisha Bose, Senior Government Pleader
