Supreme Court: In a batch of appeals arising out of dismissal from service of an Indian Air Force Officer in connection with a 1987 desert incident involving the alleged death of a General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) driver, a Division Bench of Dipankar Datta and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ., allowed the appeal and set aside the order of dismissal. The Court held that once the competent authority had elected to proceed before a criminal court instead of a court martial and the accused had been discharged, initiation of subsequent administrative action on the same set of facts was legally impermissible and non est in law.
While setting aside the dismissal, the Court directed grant of consequential service benefits with 50 per cent back wages, notional promotion, pensionary benefits, and restoration of honour, emphasising that dignity of a defence personnel forms an integral part of justice.
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Background
The appellant was commissioned as a Pilot Officer in the Indian Air Force in 1972 and, at the relevant time in 1987, was serving as a Senior Operations Officer with 147 Squadron stationed in a remote area of the Thar Desert in premises belonging to the GREF. The case arose out of an incident dated 29 March 1987 involving a GREF driver who, while in an inebriated state, allegedly caused damage to a radar installation and engaged in misconduct. Acting on the directions of his superior, a Wing Commander, the appellant, along with others, removed the said driver from the camp and abandoned him at a secluded location approximately 30 km from the Air Force Station. A missing report was lodged on 31 March 1987, and the driver’s body was recovered from the same location on 2 April 1987.
An FIR was thereafter registered, and a court of inquiry was instituted. Nearly two years later, in January 1989, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant; however, the Air Force, exercising powers under Section 124, Air Force Act, 1950 opted to have the matter tried by a criminal court instead of a court martial. On 12 January 1990, the Sessions Court discharged all accused, holding that no prima facie case was made out and noting the absence of sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The said discharge order attained finality as it was not challenged.
The statutory period of limitation of three years for initiating court martial proceedings expired on 28 March 1990 under Section 121, Air Force Act, 1950. Despite having sufficient time after the appellant’s discharge, no court martial was initiated. Subsequently, on 30 October 1990, the appellant was issued a show-cause notice under Section 19, Air Force Act, 1950 read with Rule 16, Air Force Rules, 1969 proposing administrative action on the ground that trial by court martial was inexpedient or impracticable. The appellant, in his reply contested the proceedings on multiple grounds, including the finality of the criminal court’s discharge, lack of evidence, procedural irregularities in the court of inquiry, and non-application of mind in invoking administrative action.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s reply, he was dismissed from service on 22 September 1993. Notably, the superior officer (Wing Commander), on whose directions the appellant had acted, was awarded only “severe displeasure” for a period of three years. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition, which was allowed by the Single Judge on the ground that the action was time-barred in view of Section 121, Air Force Act, 1950. Although the Division Bench initially dismissed the appeal filed by the respondents, the matter was remitted by the Supreme Court on 15 February 2002. Upon reconsideration, the Division Bench upheld the dismissal, setting aside the Single Judge’s order.
The record further reveals that, during 1992─1993, multiple internal communications took place between the Air Force and the Central Government concerning the quantum of punishment, including queries regarding the disparity in treatment between the appellant and his superior officer. Ultimately, relying on the recommendation of the Air Force and subsequent deliberations, the Central Government proceeded to dismiss the appellant from service.
Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the initiation of administrative/disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, after his discharge by a criminal court on the same set of facts, was legally impermissible and non est. The Court found the reasoning in the proceeding note dated 5 June 1992 to be clearly fallacious, observing that discharge, being a pre-trial termination for want of evidence, places the accused on a better footing than acquittal. Once discharged, the accused cannot be subjected to continued stigma or further action on the same allegations. Relying on the principle in Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, (2001) 5 SCC 593, the Court reiterated that where the competent authority elects to proceed before a criminal court instead of convening a court martial, such election attains finality; upon discharge or acquittal, the matter must end. The authority cannot thereafter revert to disciplinary action “once the road is chosen, the traveller must walk it to the end”.
Even otherwise, the Court found the disciplinary action unsustainable on merits. The proceeding note dated 5 June 1992 was bereft of any discussion on merits and merely relied on the existence of “morally convincing evidence”, which was held to be vague and insufficient for sustaining disciplinary findings. The Court noted a complete failure to consider the appellant’s detailed reply to the show-cause notice, terming the rejection as cryptic and mechanical, in violation of principles of natural justice and indicative of non-application of mind. It was further observed that in the absence of a regular inquiry and denial of opportunity to test evidence, judicial review assumes a broader scope, making a reasoned decision indispensable.
On the issue of punishment, the Court held the dismissal to be manifestly arbitrary and disproportionate. The appellant had acted pursuant to the directions of his superior officer and was placed in a position where disobedience would have invited disciplinary consequences. There was no material to suggest any intention to cause harm. The Court found a glaring disparity in treatment, while the superior officer was visited with the minor penalty of “severe displeasure”, the appellant was dismissed from service. In the absence of distinguishing features, such differential treatment was held to be violative of the principle of equality, attracting the ratio in Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 4 SCC 225.
The Court held that justice demands that the ignominy with which the appellant had to survive the past more than three decades is obliterated, the wrongful termination of his service be revoked and his honour restored. The order of dismissal from service dated 22 September 1993 was accordingly set aside. Since the appellant had crossed the age of superannuation, reinstatement was not possible; however, it was held that he is entitled to claim all consequential service benefits which would have accrued to him, had he not been fastened with such illegal order of dismissal, as the appellant could not work beyond 22 September 1993 not owing to any fault on his part but because of the illegal order of termination.
On the question of “no work, no pay”, the Court, relying on Ramesh Chand v. DTC, (2023) 19 SCC 97, and Maharashtra SRTC v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, (2025) 4 SCC 321, held that entitlement to 100 per cent back wages requires a statement on affidavit that the employee has not been re-employed, and in the absence of any material to show that the appellant was not employed after 22 September 1993, the claim was reduced to 50 per cent.
Decision
Accordingly, the Court directed that the appellant shall be entitled to
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arrears of salary and allowances to the extent of 50 per cent from 23 September 1993 till the date of retirement;
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notional promotion with consideration by Review Departmental Promotion Committee ; and
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pensionary benefits as admissible in law, with financial benefits including increased pay to be paid with interest @ 9 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the writ petition till payment.
The Court further directed that, irrespective of service benefits, restoration of honour remains the foremost concern of a defence personnel, and the appellant shall be signed off in the normal manner by the Chief of Air Staff. The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed.
[Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 590, decided on 15-4-2026]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Dipankar Datta
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