Kerala High Court: In an appeal challenging a common order granting regular bail to several accused in a mob-lynching case, the issue was whether the Special Judge could grant bail without issuing the mandatory notice to the victim’s dependent under Section 15-A(3), Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). A Single Judge Bench of A. Badharudeen, J. allowed the appeal and set aside the bail granted in mob lynching case as it did not comply with the mandatory notice required under Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act to the victim’s dependent which rendered it non est in the eye of the law. The Court cancelled the bail bonds and directed the accused persons to surrender within three days, giving them the liberty to file fresh bail applications in strict compliance with Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act.
Background
A police outpost attached to the District Hospital received information of an alleged offence. The investigation revealed that on 17 December 2025 at about 7.40 p.m., the accused persons, acting with common intention, brutally attacked a 40-year-old man, a native of Jharkhand, as part of mob lynching, thereby attracting Section 103(2), Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 3(2)(v), SC/ST Act. The Special Court granted regular bail to accused persons after varying periods of custody, holding that further detention was not warranted, that the petitioners had cooperated, and that statements under Section 183, Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) were already recorded.
The Public Prosecutor contended that the bail was granted at an extremely premature stage, which adversely affected the investigation in a serious mob lynching case. It was further urged that mandatory notice under Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act was not issued to the dependent of the victim, and the criminal antecedents of the accused persons were also reported. On the other hand, Respondents 1 to 8 opposed the cancellation of bail, asserting that it is a harsh step and that the order granting bail contained justifiable reasons. They submitted that many criminal antecedents were old, and some accused persons had none. The counsel for the victim’s brother strongly supported the prosecution, particularly highlighting the non-compliance of Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act, asserting that no notice had been issued before deciding the bail applications.
Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that the Special Judge had taken the view that Section 3(2)(v), SC/ST Act would not prima facie apply as the accused persons had no previous acquaintance with the victim and could not have known his caste identity, and therefore concluded that hearing the victim’s dependent was unnecessary. The Court observed that this approach amounted to giving a go-by to the mandatory statutory requirement under Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act which provides that a victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any court proceeding including bail.
The Court noted that no notice was given to the victim’s dependent which was in violation of Section 15-A(3), SC/ST Act, that was introduced by an amendment to avoid delivery of judgments and passing of orders without hearing the grievance of the victim or his dependent.
The Court opined that even to decide whether offences under the SC/ST Act are attracted, the courts cannot proceed unilaterally without issuing notice under Section 15-A(3). The Court observed that the Special Judge inattentively and thoughtlessly granted bail in a serious case of mob lynching without ensuring a mandatory hearing to the victim’s dependent, which amounted to a serious lapse.
The Court highlighted that Section 103(2) BNS is a special provision intended to address murder committed by a group of five or more persons acting in concert on grounds such as race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief, or similar grounds. The Court opined that the legislature intended to treat the offence under Section 103(2) BNS as more serious and to avoid the peril of murder by mob lynching.
The Court referred to Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501, which described lynching as an affront to the rule of law, emphasising that mob vigilantism cannot become the order of the day, and opined that “unless such extra-judicial attempts are nipped in the bud, they will lead to anarchy and lawlessness which would plague and corrode the nation like an epidemic”. It was observed that:
“The State has a sacrosanct duty to protect its citizens from unruly elements and perpetrators of orchestrated lynching and vigilantism with utmost sincerity and true commitment to address and curb such incidents which must reflect in its actions and schemes.”
The Court noted that the present case was clearly mob lynching on the ground of discrimination based on the place of birth, as the victim was a native of Jharkhand, and that the investigation remained at a primitive stage and premature grant of bail could adversely affect the investigation, particularly since some accused were habitual offenders.
The Court observed that the Special Judge mechanically concluded that interrogation was not required, ignoring Section 187 BNSS which allows police custody during the initial 60 days of detention. The Court also observed that the Special Judge failed to consider the impact of Section 8(c), SC/ST Act which provides a statutory presumption relating to knowledge of the victim’s caste identity.
Accordingly, the Court, while allowing the appeal, held that the bail order was passed in violation of mandatory statutory provisions and was non est. The Court set aside the impugned order, cancelled the bail, directed surrender within three days, and allowed liberty to file fresh bail applications which must be decided strictly in accordance with Section 15-A(3) and other statutory requirements.
Also read: ‘Compliance with Ss. 15-A(3), 15-A(5) of SC & ST Act mandatory’; Delhi HC sets aside bail order granted without hearing the victim
[State of Kerala v. Anu, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3693, decided on 19-3-2026]
Editorial Note: Although the judgment refers to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018, it is pertinent to clarify that the 2018 Amendment was made to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, to insert Section 18-A to the Act. The present case, however, deals with Sections 3(2)(v), 8(c) and 15-A(3), all of which form part of the SC/ST Act, 1989 itself and not the Amending Act of 2018.
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Vipin Narayan, Sr. Public Prosecutor
For the Respondents: Sooraj Krishnan K.V., C. Dheeraj Rajan, Mahesh V. Menon, A.V. Ravi, E.A. Haris, Anand Kalyanakrishnan, Libin Varghese, M.A. Ahammad Saheer, Muhammed Yasil, Aagi Johny, Ifra Iqbal, Advocates.
