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Retro Application of Interim Moratorium Amendment: Legislature Avenging to Go Back in Time

by Akaant K. Mittal* and Bhavana Garg**

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Retro Application of Interim Moratorium Amendment: Legislature Avenging to Go Back in Time

Introduction

Hard enough to live with the reality post Thanos’ infamous snap, the Avengers went back in time to change the reality. Now, our Insolvency and Bankruptcy regime, coupled with the judicial interpretation, may be doing the same. Except it is an easier task in the latter’s case.

For six and a half years, a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor could buy time simply by filing. An application under Section 94 or Section 95, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) triggered an interim moratorium under Section 96 on the date of the application. Pending legal actions “in respect of any debt” were deemed stayed, and creditors could not start new ones, until the application was decided.1 No judicial order was needed, as the shield held for many years.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Amendment Act) has taken that shield away by stipulating:

96(4). The provisions of this section shall not apply where an application is filed for initiating an insolvency resolution process in respect of a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor.2

The question that followed was a familiar one: Does the new Section 96(4) reach applications that were already pending when it came into force?

Within four months, three High Court Benches said it does, and on 28 October 2026 the Supreme Court declined to interfere. This piece traces that journey, while pointing out one key scenario3 that the discussion of retroactivity and retrospectivity may still allow the debtors to invoke.

The amendment and why it was made

Section 51, Amendment Act inserted the following sub-section in Section 96:

(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply where an application is filed for initiating an insolvency resolution process in respect of a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor.

Section 55 made a matching insertion in Section 124, which governs the interim moratorium on a bankruptcy application.4 The Amendment Act received assent on 6 April 2026, and both provisions came into force on 26 May 2026.5

The reasons appear in the Report of the Select Committee on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs told the Committee that guarantors rushed to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) as soon as recovery proceedings began, and that the amendment would “remove any perverse incentives” to do so. The Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Borad of India (IBBI) added that NCLT members cite this as “the number one mechanism through which thousands of crores are being siphoned off”. The Committee recommended the clause, observing that removing “this unnecessary pre-admission shield is essential”.6 A suggestion that the shield be replaced by a bar on the guarantor alienating his assets was not taken up.7

Two features of the amendment matter for what follows. Firstly, it leaves the moratorium under Section 101 untouched, and that moratorium still begins on admission.8 Only the filing-triggered, pre-admission standstill has gone. Secondly, Section 51 contains no saving or transitional clause for applications already on file.

The question

On 26 May 2026, a large number of applications against personal guarantors were pending at the pre-admission stage. Guarantors argued that the words “where an application is filed” look only forward, that the moratorium had accrued to them on filing, and that an accrued protection cannot be taken away without express retrospective language. Creditors answered that the moratorium was a procedural standstill rather than a vested right, and that a forward-only reading would leave the mischief alive in every pending case.

How the High Courts answered

Bombay High Court: Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP9 (24 July 2026)

The first ruling came in a Section 9 arbitration petition that had been frozen since 2022, because the lender had itself filed Section 95 applications against the guarantors.10 The court held that “where an application is filed” takes in applications filed earlier and still pending before the Adjudicating Authority; had Parliament meant only future filings, it would have said so.11 Relying on SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal12, the court explained that a “retroactive” application is in truth a prospective application of a new rule to facts existing on the date the rule takes effect. The moratorium that operated until 25 May 2026, therefore, ceased from 26 May 2026.13 The court referred to the Supreme Court rulings, wherein the difference in retroactivity, retrospectivity was explained, in the following terms:

102. Many decisions of this Court define “retroactivity” to mean laws which destroy or impair vested rights. In real terms, this is the definition of “retrospectivity” or “true retroactivity”. “Quasi-retroactivity” or simply “retroactivity” on the other hand is a law which is applicable to an act or transaction that is still underway. Such an act or transaction has not been completed and is in the process of completion.

Delhi High Court: IDBI Trusteeship (19 August 2026)14

The court herein reached the same result on a guarantor’s application to reject a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A Section 95 application against him had been pending since 10 August 2024.15 The court drew the mischief from the Select Committee’s Report and held Section 96(4) to be “retroactive”, though the Amendment Act did not say so; its effect, the court said, was “quasi-retroactivity”, applicable to pending applications.16 The court also rejected the argument that this left Section 96 otiose, since Section 96 could still be made applicable to other personal guarantors in future, Part III having been brought into force in stages.17

Bombay High Court, Division Bench: Indian Bank (18 September 2026)

The court herein decided eight writ petitions by lenders, most of them arising from the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) enforcement that had stalled on the strength of interim moratoria.18 The Bench held that the stage between filing and the order under Section 100 is “purely procedural”, that the interim moratorium is not an absolute or indefeasible right, and that its beneficiaries “cannot claim any vested right”.19 It found support in BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (P) Ltd.20, where the removal of the automatic stay on an arbitral award was applied to challenges already pending. Its answer was that Section 96(4) “applies retroactively and hence, even to pending proceedings”. The provision operates “in futuro” from 26 May 2026, but its effect is equally on applications pending on that date. The Bench expressly agreed with Tata Capital21 and IDBI Trusteeship,22 and set aside the restraint orders in the individual petitions.

Calcutta High Court: The other side of the coin

Two judgments of a Division Bench delivered shortly before Tata Capital, are often cited for a “prospective” view. In Ambootia Tea Exports23, a money suit had been filed on 12 December 2022, while a revived Section 95 application against two of the defendants was pending. The court held that the suit was barred at inception by Section 96(1)(b)(ii), so that it could neither have been filed nor received. It declined to apply Section 96(4), which had come into force after the suit was filed, and set the decree aside.24 The point here showed that one right stood crystallised at the time section 96 was operative. Therefore, it may be hard to find that this ruling digresses from the position taken by Bombay and Delhi High Courts above.

However, in Vineet Mohan Gupta v. Canara Bank25, by contrast, a suit filed before the Section 95 application was held to be merely stayed, and not liable to rejection.

Read carefully, neither judgment holds that Section 96(4) cannot reach pending applications. What they establish is that the legality of an action is judged by the law in force when the action was taken. That, as discussed below, is the real limit of the retroactivity finding.

Elsewhere, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, issuing notice in a challenge to SARFAESI action against a guarantor, allowed the auction to proceed but not to be confirmed.26 NCLT New Delhi applied Tata Capital to hold that proceedings pending against the same guarantors before another Bench no longer barred fresh Section 95 applications.27 And the IBBI, by a circular of 21 September 2026, told insolvency professionals that the interim moratorium under Sections 96 and 124 had ceased from 26 May 2026 in all applications then pending.28

The Supreme Court’s order

The Division Bench’s judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court in a batch of special leave petitions. On 28 October 2026, the court framed the question as whether Section 96(4) “would operate retroactively or not”, extracted the High Court’s answer in paras 64 and 65, and held that “no error, not to speak of any error of law” had been committed. The petitions were dismissed and the interim order was vacated. The proceedings before the NCLT and the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) were directed to go on in accordance with law, with liberty to the parties to raise all submissions available to them.29

An order dismissing a special leave petition does not attract the doctrine of merger, whether or not it gives reasons. Where it does give reasons, however, the statement of law in it is a declaration of law under Article 141, and its findings bind the parties.30 The order of 28 October 2026 is short, but it is not a bare dismissal: It states the question, sets out the High Court’s answer and records that the answer contains no error of law. There is a respectable argument that the proposition that Section 96(4) reaches pending applications now carries the force of Article 141. At the very least, no High Court or Tribunal is likely to take a different view.

What this means in practice

  1. From 26 May 2026, a pending application under Section 94 or Section 95 against a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor neither stays suits, arbitrations, DRT or SARFAESI proceedings, nor bars new ones. Insolvency professionals have been told the same, for Sections 96 and 124 alike.

  2. Protection now begins only on admission, under Section 101. Before admission the guarantor also remains free to deal with his assets, so creditors should consider interim relief, such as the disclosure and non-alienation orders granted under Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in Tata Capital.31

  3. Steps taken in breach of the moratorium before 26 May 2026 are not automatically validated, and challenges to them should be expected.

  4. Part III is in force only for personal guarantors to corporate debtors.32 For now, therefore, Section 96 has no field of operation; it will matter again only when Part III is extended to other individuals and partnership firms.

Conclusion

Section 96(4) is a one-sentence amendment with large consequences. The courts have read it as acting on pending applications from 26 May 2026, without reaching behind that date, and the Supreme Court has declined to disturb that reading. That is the right answer, for the right reason: The interim moratorium was a procedural standstill, not a vested right. The open questions now lie at the edges, in the steps taken during a moratorium before 26 May 2026, and in how creditors secure a guarantor’s assets in the pre-admission window that the old shield used to occupy.


*Akaant Kumar Mittal, Founder, Blue Stone Chambers of Law. Advocate, Constitutional Courts and National Company Law Tribunals, Delhi and Chandigarh; Specialist Visiting Faculty, National Law University, Mumbai; Visiting Lecturer, National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. Author of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code — Law and Practice (2nd Edn., Eastern Book Company, 2023).

**Bhavana Garg, Independent Practitioner and Advocate, Constitutional Courts and National Company Law Tribunals, Delhi and Chandigarh.

1. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 96(1). See also, Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 435.

2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 by Act 6 of 2026, S. 51 (w.e.f. 26-5-2026).

3. See, the facts in Ambootia Tea Exports (P) Ltd. v. Sri Rani Sati Abasan (P) Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 10219. The same is discussed below.

4. Amendment Act, S. 55, inserting S. 124(4):

“The provisions of this section shall not apply where an application is filed for initiating a bankruptcy process in respect of a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor.”

5. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Notification S.O. 2625(E) dated 22-5-2026, issued under S. 1(2) of the Amendment Act, bringing Ss. 48 to 59 of the Amendment Act, among others, into force on 26-5-2026.

6. Baijayant Panda, Report of the Select Committee on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025 (17-12-2025) Cl. 47, paras 47.5.1, 47.5.2, 47.5.3 and 47.6, See also, IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6288, para 15.

7. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain2026 SCC , 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6288, para 47.4 (suggestions, including a reference to the Insolvency Law Committee’s recommendation of February 2020 for a stay on disposition of assets by the debtor) and para 47.5.1(iii) (the Ministry’s reply that restricting the interim moratorium creates “a level playing field”).

8. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 101(1):

The moratorium runs from the date of admission for 180 days, or until the order on the repayment plan under S. 114, whichever is earlier.

9. 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090.

10. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090, paras 4—5.

11. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090, para 11.

12. (2023) 8 SCC 274.

13. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090, paras 12—15.

14. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6288

15. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1241, paras 1—4 (CS (COMM) No. 800 of 2025, order dated 19-8-2026).

16. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1241, paras 15—20.

17. IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1241, paras 23—24.

18. Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel2026 SCC , 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12662.

19. Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel2026 SCC , 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12662, paras 31, 32 and 35.

20. (2018) 6 SCC 287Indian Bank ; relied on in Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12662, paras 33 and 35.

21. 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090.

22. Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12662, paras 64—65, as extracted in Chitrasen Nagnath Gulave v. Apna Sahakari Bank Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 2398, order dated 28-10-2026 (SC), para 3.

23. Ambootia Tea Exports (P) Ltd. v. Sri Rani Sati Abasan (P) Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 10219

24. Ambootia Tea Exports (P) Ltd. v. Sri Rani Sati Abasan (P) Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 10219.

25. 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 9222.

26. Seema Garg v. Pegasus Assets Reconstruction (P) Ltd., CWP No. 29014 of 2026, order dated 8-9-2026 (P&H).

27. Equentia Financial Services (P) Ltd. v. Saloni Ayush Aggarwal, CP (IB) No. 652/ND/2025, order dated 31-8-2026 (NCLT, New Delhi).

28. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, Circular No. IBBI/II/106/2026 dated 21-9-2026, para 4.

29. Chitrasen Nagnath Gulave v. Apna Sahakari Bank Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 2398, paras 2—7 [with SLP (C) Nos. 33889, 33921 and 36254 of 2026].

30. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, para 44; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376, para 26.

31. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11090, paras 19—21.

32. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Notification S.O. 4126(E) dated 15-11-2019, bringing Part III into force from 1-12-2019 only in so far as it relates to personal guarantors to corporate debtors; see also, IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6288, paras 23—24.

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