This article is a roundup of all the landmark constitutional law judgments delivered and reported in the second half of 2025, inclusive of all the judgments that showcased consideration, interpretation, and evolution of important constitutional law principles. The judgments in Part IV out of the total 75 significant ones of the four-part series are as follows:
Abbreviations for various common terminologies in the judgments
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AIIMS — All India Institute of Medical Sciences |
Army Act — Army Act, 1950 |
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Art. — Article |
Assn. — Association |
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BRS — Bharat Rashtra Samithi party |
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CAD — Constitutional Assembly Debate |
CBI — Central Bureau of Investigation |
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CDR — Call Detail Records |
COI — Constitution of India |
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CSR — Corporate Social Responsibility |
DABs — Disability Assessment Boards |
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DEPwD — Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities |
DoPT — Department of Personnel and Training |
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DPSP — Directive Principles of State Policy |
Election Rules — Election Rules, 1961 |
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ESZ — Eco-Sensitive Zone |
FR — Fundamental Right |
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FYs — Financial Years |
GOI — Government of India |
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Inquiry Act — Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 |
ITRs — Income tax Returns |
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MoEF — Ministry of Environment and Forests |
NEERI — National Environmental Engineering Research Institute |
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NIA — National Investigation Agency |
NIEPVD — National Institute for the Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities |
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NMC — National Medical Commission |
PNJ — Principles of Natural Justice |
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Protection Act — Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 |
PwD — Persons with disabilities |
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RO — Returning Officer |
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RTI — Right to Information |
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r/w — read with |
Sec. — Section |
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SHRC — State Human Rights Commission |
UNCRPD — United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities |
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UOI — Union of India |
UPSC — Union Public Service Commission |
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UTs — Union Territories |
WP — Writ Petition |
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GOI Act — Government of India Act, 1935 |
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The judgments are as follows:
(Delivered on 21-2-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice K.V. Viswanathan
The appeal arose out of judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which rejected the claim of the appellant, a person with disabilities (for short, “PwD”), upholding the denial of his admission to the MBBS course in the respondent institution. A Medical Board was constituted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), in which one of the members of the Board Dr Satendra Singh, dissented. The majority opinion of the Medical Board opined that petitioner is unfit to be given admission in the MBBS course, whereas a separate opinion of Dr Satendra Singh recommended for his admission in the Government Medical College, Sirohi, Rajasthan, against the seat reserved for PwDs.
Factual matrix of the case
The appellant being a PwD had a locomotor disability above 50 per cent, with the disabilities of speech and language to the extent of 20 per cent. Merely on the basis of the quantified disability (of 58 per cent), the petitioner was denied admission, by being treated as ineligible to pursue the medical course. The petitioner being so aggrieved filed writ petition before the High Court, which referred the matter to the Medical Board. The majority opinion declared the petitioner unfit to join the MBBS course falling back upon the guidelines framed by the Department of Empowerment of PwDs as published in the Gazette of India of March 2024. The majority however, also observed that current guidelines of National Medical Commission (for short, “NMC”) needed revision. However, the dissenting opinion of Mr Satendra Singh concluded that appellant can successfully navigate the MBBS course with clinical accommodations and assistive technologies.
The guidelines framed by the NMC, which were the subject-matter of consideration contained a “Note”, which stipulated the minimum eligibility of both hands being intact, sensations with sufficient strength with range of motion as essential for pursuing the medical course. Relying on this note only appended at the end of the guidelines with the “triple asterisks”, the petitioner was treated as ineligible.
Consideration and analysis by the court
The court then proceeded to analyse the guidelines, observing that their mechanical and literal interpretation has created difficulty for the petitioners. Referring to its three earlier judgments in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India2, Bambhaniya Sagar Vasharambhai v. Union of India3, and Vikash Kumar v. UPSC4, the court, referring to Article 14 of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), observed that the Parliament has enacted Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Since the same was not found to be effective and efficacious in protecting the rights of PwDs, it was replaced with Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act). It further observed that merely based on the quantification of disability, a candidate should not be treated as having forfeited his right to stake a claim for admission to the course of his choice. The Supreme Court in the Omkar Ramchandra Gond case critically examined the NMC guidelines and held that merely on the basis of quantification of disability, a person cannot automatically become ineligible for the medical course. Constitutional Courts are obliged to probe as to whether beneath the veneer of equality, there is an invidious breach of Article 14. NMC was directed to work out functional classifications and physical requirements consistent with the requirements of the medical profession and also review its regulations. In the Vikash Kumar case, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the principle of reasonable accommodation as enshrined under Section 2(y), RPwD Act, which was interpreted as not to be understood narrowly to imply only the provision of assisting devices and other tangible substances for providing assistance to PwDs. Rather the concept of reasonable accommodation will encapsulate measures by the State for excluding conditions that prevent their full and effective participation as equal members of the society. It captures the positive obligation of the State for providing additional support to PwDs for facilitating their full and effective participation in the society. The approach and attitude of the executive must be liberal and relief-oriented and never obstructive or lethargic.
The Disability Assessment Boards (for short, “DABs”) are not expected to look at just quantified benchmark disabilities, since such an approach is antithetical to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Rather, DABs must and are obliged to examine as to whether the candidate in the opinion of the experts in the field is eligible to pursue the course and whether such disability will actually come in the way of the candidate completing the said course. The court thus observed that flexibility in answering individual needs and requirements is an essential component of reasonable accommodation, and there cannot be a “one-size-fits-all approach”. The note with the triple asterisks in the Guidelines/Regulations dated 13 May 2019 mentioning “both hands intact with intact, with intact sensation, sufficient strength and range of motion are essential to be considered eligible for medical course” was thus held to be completely antithetical to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It indicated a classification which is overbroad and glorifies ableism.
Referring to the majority opinion of the Medical Board, the court concluded that the majority opinion failed to indicate how functional assessment of the appellant was carried out, but went by the literal interpretation of the note with triple asterisks in the guidelines. Eventually, the court held that the note with triple asterisks of “both hands intact…” has no sanctity in law, as it does not admit of a functional assessment of the individual candidate, which is at the core of protecting the rights of PwDs. Referring to the report of Dr Satendra Singh, the court reiterated that medical model of disability apparent in the guidelines of NMC must give way to the social model of disability, which takes into account the variety of experiences and outcomes which PwDs have when they interact with different kinds of societies and accommodations. Assessment of functional competence of any medical aspirant with higher disabilities must be done on a case-to-case basis. The principle of reasonable accommodation is not only statutorily prescribed, but also rooted in the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right, being a facet of substantive equality and its failure constitutes discrimination. Therefore, a Medical Board cannot be allowed to override the statutory mandate of providing reservation to PwDs, since no committee can have primacy over any law. The opinions of DABs, Medical Boards and Committees must always embody core principles of the Rule of Law within their processes, and must assess on a case to case basis as to whether it is infeasible for the candidate to pursue a medical career with their disability. It was thus held that the report of five members of the Medical Board of AIIMS cannot be treated as a valid basis to deny the appellant’s admission to the MBBS course. This was discarded by the court for the following reasons:
(a) firstly, the report does not satisfy the test laid down in the Omkar Ramchandra Gond case and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services5. The reason in the Omkar Ramchandra Gond case and Om Rathod case is not functional assessment as contemplated in the said two judgments;
(b) secondly, as mandated or required by the Board in the Omkar Ramchandra Gond case and Om Rathod case, reasons have not been assigned by the majority members of the Board for denying the appellant his right to pursue the MBBS course; and
(c) thirdly, the need to assess beyond the quantified disability and the need to opine whether the individual with a disability aided by modern scientific tools and devices can enter the MBBS program has not been fulfilled by the majority members of the Board. This is apart from the fact they have recorded statements in the nature of disclaimers as set out hereinabove.
Accordingly, the court discarded the report of the Medical Board of AIIMS and also held the note with triple asterisks — “both hands intact…” to be making a mockery of the principles of reasonable accommodation. The court also criticised the manner in which NMC continued to implement the guidelines, despite earlier judgments of the court finding faults in the wording of the said guidelines. Accordingly, the NMC was directed to revise its guidelines in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court as directed in the Omkar Ramchandra Gond case and Om Rathod case.
The appeal filed by the petitioner was allowed by the Supreme Court by setting aside the judgment of the High Court and the interim order granting admission to the petitioner in the medical college concerned was confirmed.
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(2) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corpn. v. Tahsildar6
(Delivered on 27-2-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice J.B. Pardiwala
The Supreme Court, in the present appeals, examined the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short, “Repeal Act”) on proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, “ULC Act”), particularly where the State claimed to have taken possession of surplus land before the repeal of the principal enactment. The central controversy concerned whether the mere vesting of excess vacant land in the State under Section 10(3), ULC Act was sufficient to defeat the benefit of the Repeal Act, or whether the State was required to establish that actual physical or de facto possession had been taken in accordance with Section 10(5) and (6), ULC Act. The court also examined the extent to which the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 could adjudicate disputed questions of fact concerning possession and whether an intra court Appellate Bench was justified in overturning the detailed factual findings of the learned Single Bench.
Factual matrix of the case
A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation, now known as ECE Industries Limited had acquired land at Fatehnagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Rangareddy District, for establishing its manufacturing unit. Following the enactment of the ULC Act, the appellant filed a declaration under Section 6(1). Certain portions of the land were exempted by the Government under Section 20(1)(a), while another portion was exempted under Section 21 for a housing scheme for weaker sections. Subsequently, the exemption granted in respect of a portion of the land was withdrawn on account of the alleged failure of the appellant to fulfil the conditions attached to the exemption.
After a series of proceedings under Sections 8(4) and 9, ULC Act, the competent authority ultimately determined 46,538.43 sq m as surplus land. A notification under Section 10(3) was published on 3 October 2007 declaring the land to have vested in the State Government with effect from 12 July 2007. Thereafter, the authorities purportedly issued a notice under Section 10(5) dated 5 January 2008 requiring the appellant to surrender possession within thirty days. According to the State, the notice was affixed to the main gate of the factory on 8 January 2008 because the factory was allegedly under lockout. The State subsequently claimed that an order under Section 10(6) was issued on 5 February 2008 and that actual possession was taken on 8 February 2008 through a panchnama.
The appellant disputed the alleged taking of possession and contended that the Section 10(5) notice, Section 10(6) order and panchnama were fabricated and prepared subsequently. It maintained that actual physical possession had always remained with the appellant, as demonstrated by the continuing existence of the factory, residential structures, compound wall and security arrangements. The appellant further asserted that it became aware of the purported Section 10 notices and panchnama only on 14 September 2010. The State of Andhra Pradesh adopted the Repeal Act with effect from 27 March 2008. The appellant thereafter approached the High Court, challenging the State’s attempts to dispossess it and specifically assailing the alleged panchnama recording the taking over of possession.
The learned Single Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petitions, finding serious discrepancies, including the unexplained dates appearing in the Section 10(6) order and the absence of convincing evidence demonstrating actual physical possession. It held that the mandatory procedure under Section 10(5) and (6) had not been followed and that possession remained with the appellant. The State preferred intra court appeals. The Division Bench reversed the learned Single Bench’s judgment, principally holding that there was no statutory requirement for a fresh notice under Section 10(6), that a panchnama was a legally recognised mode of taking possession of a large tract of land and that the disputed factual questions could not appropriately be determined in writ jurisdiction. The appellant consequently approached the Supreme Court.
Issue before the court
Before the Supreme Court the principal question for consideration was “whether the Division Bench of the High Court had committed an error in interfering with the findings recorded by the learned Single Bench”.
Consideration by the court
Effect of the Repeal Act and the requirement of actual possession
The court first examined Section 3, Repeal Act. Section 3(1)(a) preserves the vesting of vacant land under Section 10(3), ULC Act, only where possession of such land had already been taken over by the State Government or an authorised person. Conversely, where land had vested under Section 10(3), but possession had not been taken, the saving provision did not protect the State’s claim. Section 4 further provides for abatement of proceedings relating to orders under the principal Act, subject to the statutory exception concerning land of which possession had already been taken.
The court therefore held that the crucial question after the Repeal Act came into force was not merely whether the land had vested in the State under Section 10(3), but whether the State had actually obtained possession before the repeal. If actual possession had not been taken, the proceedings would stand abated and the landholder would be entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act.
Interpretation of Section 10(5) and (6): Peaceful and forceful dispossession
The court closely analysed Section 10(5) and (6). Section 10(5) requires the competent authority to issue a written notice to the person in possession directing surrender or delivery of possession within thirty days of service of the notice. Only where the person refuses or fails to comply within that period can the competent authority proceed under Section 10(6) and take possession, including by use of force if necessary.
The court stressed that these provisions were not merely procedural formalities. Since the ULC Act is an expropriatory legislation, it must be construed strictly. The State being a creature of statute must act strictly within the four corners of the statutory scheme. Consequently, mere issuance of a Section 10(5) notice without its proper service cannot constitute compliance with the statute, without which the State cannot validly invoke Section 10(6).
The court relied upon State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria7 and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.8, for the principle that an expropriatory statute must be strictly construed and that where the law requires an act to be performed in a particular manner, it must be performed in that manner alone.
Meaning of “Vesting” under Section 10(3)
A significant part of the judgment concerns the distinction between vesting of title and taking of physical possession. Relying extensively upon State of U.P. v. Hari Ram9, the court held that the deeming fiction contained in Section 10(3) results in vesting of the land in the State in the sense of vesting of title and legal interest, but does not by itself result in the State acquiring de facto physical possession. The words “acquired” and “vested” must be understood in the context and purpose of the ULC Act. The Act was intended to impose a ceiling on urban vacant land, regulate construction and prevent concentration of urban land in the hands of a few. The vesting contemplated by Section 10(3) therefore operates primarily upon the title and legal interest in the property. Actual possession remains with the landholder until surrendered voluntarily or taken over through the procedure prescribed by Section 10(5) and (6).
The court thus reaffirmed that “vesting” does not necessarily mean “vesting in possession”. In the context of Section 10(3), the State obtains de jure possession/title, whereas de facto possession must be separately obtained in accordance with the subsequent statutory mechanism.
Hari Ram continues to hold the field
The Supreme Court considered the apparent tension between Hari Ram case and State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma10, whilst categorically rejecting the suggestion that Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma had diluted or overruled Hari Ram. According to the court, Hari Ram case remains a good law. The two judgments operate in different factual situations. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma case dealt with a situation where actual possession had allegedly been taken long before and the landholder had approached the court after considerable delay. In such circumstances, the landholder could be deemed to have waived procedural objections concerning Section 10(5).
The court emphasised that when two judgments appear inconsistent, courts should not mechanically follow one and disregard the other. Instead, the decisions must be harmonised by examining the particular facts and applying the judgment whose factual context is more closely aligned with the case before the court. It relied upon the principle stated in Quinn v. Leathem11 and reiterated by the Privy Council in Punjab Coop. Bank Ltd. v. CIT12.
Actual physical possession and “paper possession”
The court unequivocally held that the possession contemplated by Section 3, Repeal Act is de facto possession and not merely de jure or paper possession. Mere vesting of surplus land under Section 10(3), without actual resumption of possession is insufficient to save the proceedings from abatement. The burden lies upon the State to establish through cogent evidence that actual physical possession was taken before the Repeal Act came into force. A mere assertion in official records or preparation of a paper panchnama cannot by itself establish actual possession. Referring to Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana13 and Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi v. State of Gujarat14, the court reiterated that paper possession is not equivalent to actual possession. The fact that the land had been declared surplus or that revenue records had been altered in favour of the State did not by itself divest the landholder of his rights where actual possession remained with him. Even receipt of compensation would not necessarily defeat the landholder’s claim under the Repeal Act where the landholder continued to remain in actual physical possession, subject to refund of compensation where required.
Panchnama as a mode of taking possession
The court recognised that particularly in cases involving large tracts of land, preparation of a properly executed panchnama in the presence of witnesses can constitute an accepted mode of recording possession. However, the existence of a panchnama does not automatically conclude the question of actual possession. Its authenticity and evidentiary value must be examined in the circumstances of the case. In the present matter, the court found substantial material undermining the State’s version including the continuing existence of the factory and residential structures demonstrating that the State had actually entered into possession.
Power of the writ court to determine disputed questions of fact
One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the court’s discussion of the power of a High Court under Article 226 to examine disputed questions of fact. The court acknowledged the general principle that writ courts ordinarily avoid adjudicating seriously disputed questions of fact, particularly where resolution would require extensive oral evidence. However, it rejected the proposition that the mere assertion by the State that a dispute involves a “question of fact” automatically deprives the High Court of jurisdiction.
The court held that where the material on record itself enables the court to ascertain the factual position and where the alleged factual dispute is merely being raised to prevent judicial scrutiny, the writ court not only possesses jurisdiction but may be required in the interests of justice to examine the disputed facts.
Relying upon State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei15, the court reiterated that Article 226 does not preclude the High Court from determining questions of fact; the decision whether to undertake such an inquiry is one of judicial discretion and not jurisdiction. Similarly, Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda16 establishes that the High Court may determine questions of fact and law in a writ petition, although it may decline to do so where the dispute is so complex that oral evidence would be necessary.
The court also relied upon the State of U.P. v. Ehsan17, which holds that where a writ petition has already been entertained, pleadings have been exchanged and the matter has remained pending for a considerable period, the court should ordinarily decide the matter on merits unless compelling reasons exist to relegate the parties to an alternative remedy.
Importantly, the court characterised the question of whether actual possession had been taken in accordance with Section 10(5) and (6) as a mixed question of law and fact, rather than merely a question of fact. The court explained that determination requires both an examination of the historical facts and application of the statutory requirements governing lawful possession. If every claim of “disputed facts” were accepted at face value the State could defeat judicial review merely by denying the landholder’s version. Such an approach could result in a serious miscarriage of justice and render Article 226 ineffective, particularly in cases where statutory safeguards under Section 10(5) and (6) are themselves in issue.
Intra-court appeal: Limited scope of interference
The Supreme Court also strongly disapproved of the manner in which the Division Bench interfered with the judgment of the learned Single Bench.
It explained that an intra court appeal is not equivalent to an ordinary statutory appeal in which the entire evidence is reconsidered afresh. It is an appeal from one coordinate Bench of the High Court to another. Interference is ordinarily warranted only where there is a patent error apparent on the face of the record or where the judgment under challenge is contrary to settled legal principles. The Supreme Court found that the learned Single Bench had undertaken a meticulous examination of the record and identified numerous deficiencies in the State’s case. In contrast, the Division Bench had effectively attempted to cure those deficiencies by repeatedly giving the benefit of doubt to the State.
The court was particularly critical of the State’s Explanation regarding the alleged closure of the factory and affixation of the Section 10(5) notice on the gate. Given the enormous size of the land and the continuing existence of the factory and residential structures, the court found it difficult to accept that no person could be found at the premises and that the authorities were left with no option except to affix the notice and found the present case to be an instance of paper possession.
Constitutional protection of property under Article 300-A
The court also placed the controversy within the broader constitutional framework governing deprivation of property. Referring to Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah18, the court reiterated that Article 300-A continues to provide meaningful constitutional protection against arbitrary deprivation of property.
Although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right under Part III, Article 300-A mandates that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. The court emphasised that constitutional protection cannot be reduced merely to the question of compensation; State action resulting in deprivation of property must comply with the broader constitutional safeguards inherent in Article 300-A.
Ratio decidendi/principles laid down
The court ultimately summarised the governing principles relating to possession under the ULC Act and the Repeal Act as follows:
1. The Repeal Act recognises possession taken under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6), ULC Act.
2. The competent authority or State Government is under a statutory obligation to take possession strictly in accordance with law.
3. Even where possession is purportedly taken under Section 10(6), the court can examine whether such possession was legally and validly taken.
4. The possession contemplated under Section 3, Repeal Act is de facto possession and not merely de jure possession.
5. Mere vesting of surplus land without actual resumption of possession is insufficient; the landholder remains entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act.
6. The requirement of notice under Section 10(5) and (6) is mandatory; although the statute uses the word “may”, it must be understood as “shall” where necessary to give effect to the legislative intent.
7. Mere vesting under Section 10(3) does not confer de facto possession upon the State unless there has been voluntary surrender or lawful dispossession.
8. The State bears the burden of establishing through cogent evidence that there was voluntary surrender, peaceful delivery of possession under Section 10(5), or forceful dispossession under Section 10(6).
Conclusion
The court accordingly set aside the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and restored the judgment of the learned Single Bench. The decision therefore firmly establishes that “paper possession” cannot be substituted for actual possession, that the statutory procedure governing dispossession must be strictly followed and that a writ court is not powerless to examine questions of possession merely because the State labels them as disputed questions of fact.
***
(3) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar19
(Delivered on 9-6-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Sanjay Karol
The case arose from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in the appellant’s application for regular bail. The High Court accepted an assurance given by the investigating officer that a narco-analysis test would be conducted on all the accused persons and if considered necessary on other witnesses to assist the investigation into the disappearance of the appellant’s wife.
Necessary facts
An FIR was registered against the appellant, Amlesh Kumar and his family members under several provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), including Sections 341, 342, 323, 363, 364, 498-A, 504, 506, and 34. The complainant alleged that her sister had married Amlesh Kumar in December 2020 and that thereafter she had allegedly been subjected to dowry demands and physical assault by the accused persons. On 22 August 2022, the complainant was informed by the appellant that her sister had disappeared from the matrimonial home. As attempts to locate her were unsuccessful, the complainant suspected that the accused persons had played a role in her disappearance.
The appellant presented a different account. According to him, he and his wife were travelling towards Ayodhya. During the journey, his wife got down from the bus at Babli Chowk to attend nature’s call, but did not return. The appellant subsequently lodged a complaint at Police Station Jahangirganj. Significantly the missing woman had not been traced even by the time the Supreme Court considered the appeal. The appellant’s parents and brother had, however, been granted bail by the High Court.
The appellant sought regular bail, but the Sessions Judge rejected his application. Apart from the allegations contained in the FIR, the court considered the confessional statements of co-accused persons, who had allegedly stated that the missing woman had been thrown into the River Saryu during the intervening night of 21 August 2022 and 22 August 2022.
The appellant thereafter approached the Patna High Court seeking regular bail. During the proceedings, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahua assured the High Court that further investigative steps would be taken to discover the whereabouts of the missing woman and that narco-analysis tests would be conducted on all accused persons and other witnesses, if necessary. The High Court accepted this submission and adjourned the matter for consideration at a later stage.
Issues before the court
The court framed the following issues for its consideration:
1. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Patna High Court could accept the investigating officer’s submission that narco-analysis tests would be conducted on the accused persons?
2. Whether the report of a voluntary narco-analysis test could constitute the sole basis for convicting an accused, when there was no other supporting evidence?
3. Whether an accused possesses an indefeasible right to voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test?
Meaning and nature of narco-analysis
The court explained that narco-analysis is an interrogation technique in which a suspect is administered a psychoactive substance under controlled conditions. The purpose is to suppress, to a degree, the person’s reasoning and decision-making abilities. The court noted that sodium pentothal is used for the procedure and that the same substance can be administered in higher doses to induce general anaesthesia during surgery. Because the technique affects the individual’s ability to exercise conscious control over responses, its use against an accused raises significant constitutional concerns. In particular, it engages the protection against being compelled to give evidence against oneself under Article 20(3) and the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The court while referring to the three-Judge Bench judgment in Selvi v. State of Karnataka20, reiterated the three principles. Firstly, the guarantees under Articles 20 and 21 are fundamental protections and cannot be diluted by creating judicial exceptions. Secondly, compulsory administration of narco-analysis violates the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). Thirdly, the results of an involuntary test cannot themselves be treated as substantive material evidence. The court also stressed that compulsory testing violates the requirement of substantive due process, because subjecting a person to such a procedure without consent represents a serious interference with personal liberty. It additionally intrudes upon the individual’s sphere of privacy. Thus, investigative convenience cannot justify crossing these constitutional limitations. At the same time, the Selvi case had recognised a limited space for voluntary testing, provided adequate safeguards were observed. Even where consent exists, the test report itself cannot be directly treated as evidence. However, information or material subsequently discovered because of information obtained through the test may become admissible through Section 27, Evidence Act, 1872, subject to the requirements of that provision.
In re: Issue 1: Narco-analysis cannot be permitted as an investigative condition during bail procedure
On the first issue, the court categorically held that the High Court had erred in accepting the investigating officer’s proposal to conduct narco-analysis tests on all the accused. The court found the order to be directly inconsistent with Selvi case. An involuntary or forced narco-analysis test cannot be permitted merely because the investigating agency believes that it may assist in solving a criminal case. The court further found a procedural problem in the High Court’s approach. The proceedings before it concerned an application for regular bail under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), and relying on the judgment of Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat21 it observed that a bail court is required to consider factors such as the allegations against the accused, the period of custody, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the alleged offence, the possibility of influencing witnesses and other relevant considerations. A bail proceeding is not intended to become an investigation into the truth of the allegations through investigative techniques. The High Court should not undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the investigating agency or order particular investigative tests. Doing so risks converting a bail hearing into a mini-trial, which is outside the proper scope of such proceedings.
The State attempted to justify the proposed testing by arguing that modern investigative techniques are necessary in contemporary criminal investigations. The Supreme Court accepted that scientific methods may have an investigative role, but clarified that modern investigative needs cannot override constitutional guarantees. Investigative advancement must operate within the boundaries imposed by Articles 20(3) and 21.
Accordingly, the first issue was answered in the negative.
In re: Issue 2: Voluntary narco-analysis report cannot alone establish guilt
The second issue concerned the evidentiary value of a voluntarily conducted narco-analysis test.
The court reiterated the distinction drawn in the Selvi case, that although voluntary testing may be permitted under appropriate circumstances and safeguards, the test results themselves cannot be directly admitted as evidence. Only information or material consequentially discovered with the assistance of such information may potentially be brought within the evidentiary rule contained in Section 27, Evidence Act.
The court, relying on the judgments of Vinobhai v. State of Kerela22 and Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.23 considered whether even such Section 27 material could independently sustain a conviction. These authorities establish that information leading to a recovery under Section 27 cannot without supporting evidence, ordinarily constitute sufficient material to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A disclosure or discovery may contribute to the prosecution case, but it cannot automatically become the sole foundation for conviction. Applying this principle, the Supreme Court held that even a voluntary narco-analysis report obtained with adequate safeguards, or information discovered because of that report, cannot by itself constitute the sole basis for conviction. Other legally admissible evidence must support the prosecution case.
The second issue was, therefore, answered in the negative.
In re: Issue 3: Does an accused have an indefeasible right to seek narco-analysis?
The third question arose because the court was informed that different High Courts had adopted different approaches concerning whether an accused could demand a narco-analysis test as a matter of right.
The Amicus Curiae pointed out this divergence. Several High Courts, including the Allahabad, Bombay, Delhi, Kerala, Gujarat, and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, have dealt with requests for narco-analysis by accused persons by considering the surrounding circumstances rather than recognising an unrestricted entitlement to the test. The Supreme Court held that undergoing narco-analysis cannot automatically be treated as an aspect of the accused’s indefeasible right to lead evidence. The inherently uncertain and suspect nature of the technique, together with the principles laid down in the Selvi case, prevent the accused from claiming an absolute entitlement to undergo such testing.
The court, relying on Selvi case, emphasised that consent to narco-analysis must be genuine, voluntary and informed and cannot be assumed merely because a person formally agrees to the test. Consent may be influenced by threats, deception, promise or pressure from investigating authorities and therefore, the surrounding circumstances must be examined. The court held that an accused may seek narco-analysis voluntarily at an appropriate stage, particularly while exercising the statutory right to lead evidence during trial, but such a request does not create an indefeasible right. The court must independently assess the circumstances, and determine whether the request can be permitted. Further, even voluntarily obtained responses do not become ordinarily admissible evidence merely because the person consented, since the subject does not retain conscious control over the responses generated during the procedure.
The court reiterated the safeguards laid down in the Selvi case, drawing from the National Human Rights Commission’s 2000 Guidelines. The accused must freely consent, have access to a lawyer and be informed of the physical, emotional and legal consequences of the procedure. Consent must be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate with legal representation and the Magistrate must clarify the nature and evidentiary character of the statement. The circumstances of detention and interrogation must also be considered. The procedure should be conducted by an independent agency such as a hospital in the presence of a lawyer and a complete medical and factual record of the process must be maintained. These safeguards are intended to ensure that voluntary testing remains genuinely consensual and does not become a means of bypassing constitutional protections.
Conclusion
After considering the various constitutional and evidentiary questions, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s view could not be sustained. The court thus set aside the impugned order and also directed that the appellant’s pending bail application, if any, be decided independently and in accordance with law. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
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(4) Shubha v. State of Karnataka24
(Delivered on 14-7-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar, JJ.
Authored by: Justice M.M. Sundresh
The Supreme Court’s decision concerned the conviction of four accused persons for the murder of one deceased, Girish, who was engaged to Accused 4 (for short, “A4”), Shubha. The prosecution case was that A4 was unwilling to marry the deceased and, with the assistance of A1, A3, and A2, a conspiracy was formed to eliminate him. The court in the present judgment did not rely upon the alleged eyewitnesses to sustain the convictions. After closely examining their conduct and testimony, the court found their presence at the scene doubtful. The court, therefore, reassessed the matter substantially as a case based on circumstantial evidence. It examined the motive, extensive call detail records (for short, “CDRs”), the recovery of a weapon and scooter, the admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65-B, Evidence Act and the conduct of the accused.
Factual background of the case
In December 2003, A4, Shubha Shankar, was a 20-year-old student pursuing an integrated BA LLB course at BMS Law College, Bangalore. The deceased, Girish, was the person with whom her marriage had been arranged. A1 was also a student at the same college. A3 was related to A1, while A2 was a friend of A3. The prosecution alleged that A4 was unhappy about her proposed marriage and had confided in A1 about her unwillingness to marry Girish. According to the prosecution, A1 approached A3, who subsequently involved A2 in a plan to eliminate Girish and thereby prevent the marriage.
The marriage proposal between the families had been finalised and the engagement ceremony was held on 30 November 2003. The prosecution relied upon the evidence of persons acquainted with A4 to establish that she was unhappy with the proposed marriage. PW 8, a beautician who had applied mehendi to A4 before the engagement, claimed that A4 had expressed her unwillingness to marry Girish and had indicated that she wanted to be with A1. PW 11, a friend of A4, also spoke about her unhappiness regarding the marriage. More significantly, PW 23, a close friend of A4, testified that she had told him that she did not want to marry Girish because of differences in their lifestyles and because she did not wish to marry at such a young age. The court ultimately considered PW 23’s evidence more reliable than that of PWs 8 and 11. On 3 December 2003, A4 went out with Girish after dinner and allegedly attacked Girish with a steel rod, while A1 waited nearby on the scooter. After the assault, A1 and A2 fled from the spot and A4 arranged for Girish to be taken to the hospital. He died from his injuries the following morning.
Following the incident, an FIR was registered against unknown persons under Section 302 IPC. The accused were arrested on 25 January 2004, a charge-sheet was filed on 17 April 2004, followed by a supplementary charge-sheet on 10 January 2005. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 r/w Section 120-B IPC and imposed life imprisonment. A2 was additionally convicted under Section 302 IPC, while A4 was convicted under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to 3 year’s rigorous imprisonment. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused and partly allowed the State’s appeal by modifying the conviction to Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, maintaining the life sentences. The accused then approached the Supreme Court.
Issues before the Supreme Court
The court framed the following issues for its consideration:
1. Whether the eyewitness testimony of PWs 15 and 16 could be relied upon?
2. If the eyewitness evidence was discarded, whether the remaining circumstantial evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
3. Whether the prosecution had established a sufficient motive?
4. Whether the Call Detail Records (CDRs) were legally admissible and what evidentiary value could be assigned to them?
5. Whether the recovery of a weapon and other material objects was legally proved?
6. Whether the circumstances formed a complete chain consistent only with the guilt of the accused?
7. Whether, despite affirming the convictions, the court should take into account the passage of time, age, and subsequent conduct of the accused while considering relief under Article 161?
In re: Issue 1: Eyewitness evidence found unreliable
The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of both the eyewitnesses. The court also found inconsistencies in the testimonies of both eyewitnesses concerning their presence at the scene. After examining these circumstances, the court concluded that their presence at the place of occurrence was sufficiently doubtful that their evidence could not be safely relied upon.
In re: Issue 2: Case was therefore examined as one based on circumstantial evidence
After discarding the eyewitness testimony, the court treated the case as one resting upon circumstantial evidence. For this purpose, it applied the well-established principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra25, under which the circumstances relied upon must be firmly established; the established circumstances must point towards the guilt of the accused; the circumstances must be conclusive; they must exclude reasonable alternative Explanations; and the entire chain must be sufficiently complete to exclude a reasonable possibility consistent with innocence.
The court, therefore, proceeded to assess each important circumstance independently and then considered whether collectively they formed a complete chain.
In re: Issue 3: Motive was established through reliable evidence
The prosecution alleged that A4 did not want to marry the deceased and that this provided the motive for the conspiracy. The Supreme Court did not accept all the evidence relied upon by the prosecution to establish motive. It found serious problems with the testimony of PWs 8 and 11, including inconsistencies and delays in recording their statements. However, the court found the testimony of PW 23 (close friend of A4) substantially reliable and had no apparent reason to falsely implicate her. He testified that A4 had expressed her reluctance to marry the deceased because she considered their lifestyle incompatible and did not want to marry at such a young age. His evidence also indicated that A1 and A4 were closely connected. An email written by PW 23 to A4’s father supposed this aspect, while A4’s father himself acknowledged that A1 used to visit his house for moot court rehearsals with A4. The court therefore accepted that A4 was unwilling to marry Girish and that A1 was a close confidant of hers.
In re: Issue 4: CDR’s became a central part of the case
After rejecting the eyewitness evidence, the Supreme Court examined CDRs in considerable detail. The record demonstrated extensive communications among the accused during the period preceding the murder. The court analysed the communications from October 2003 until the days following the incident and identified a progressively increasing pattern of interaction among the accused. The court first satisfied itself that the mobile numbers were being used by the respective accused. It then considered whether the electronic records had been properly provided under Section 65-B, Evidence Act.
In re: Issue 5: Section 65-B compliance and the admissibility of electronic evidence
The appellants argued that the CDRs were inadmissible because the requirement of Section 65-B had not been fulfilled. The Supreme Court referred extensively to the judgment of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal26, and Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer27. The court reaffirmed that where electronic records are produced as secondary evidence, the requirement of Section 65-B(4), including the necessary certificate, is mandatory. At the same time, the court clarified that there is no rigid formula by which compliance must be established in every CDR case. The court must examine the certificate along with the testimony of the competent officer from the telecom service provider.
In the present case, Reliance and Airtel had supplied the requisite certificates. PWs 24 and 25, who occupied responsible positions within the respective telecom companies, testified regarding those certificates and the CDRs. The court found statutory requirements sufficiently satisfied. It held that the fact that the certificates were not in a particular prescribed format did not make them invalid where their authenticity was otherwise established.
The Supreme Court thus reinforced two propositions: Firstly, compliance with Section 65-B certificate is mandatory, where statutory provisions apply to the electronic evidence being produced. Secondly, the court must examine actual compliance rather than mechanically reject an electronic record merely because the certificate does not follow a particular format, especially where the relevant telecom officials have properly established its authenticity and the opposing party does not dispute the underlying entries.
In re: Issue 6: The pattern of communications supported the conspiracy
The court then undertook a detailed analysis of the CDRs and found the communications between A1 and A4 increased substantially as the proposed marriage approached. At the same time, communications between A4 and the deceased Girish were comparatively trimmed. The court considered this pattern relevant because the marriage had already been finalised, yet A4’s communications with A1 were significantly more frequent than those with her prospective husband. The CDRs also helped the court to trace the alleged involvement of A3 and A2.
The court also noted that immediately after the last communication between A1 and A4 at approximately 9.39 p.m., there was a period of silence among the accused until A4 contacted her father at approximately 9.56 p.m. The court treated this sudden break in communication, occurring during the narrow period in which the assault must have taken place, as another circumstance supporting the prosecution’s conspiracy theory. After the incident, communications among the accused reduced substantially. A4 nevertheless communicated with A1 during the night and early morning while the deceased remained in critical condition, while A3 continued contacting A1 and A2.
Evidentiary value of the call details
The Supreme Court made an important observation concerning the use of CDRs. It stated that CDRs ordinarily function as corroborative material rather than automatically constituting substantive evidence of the crime. Their value must be assessed in the context of the surrounding evidence. However, where the communications form a strong and unexplained pattern and the accused fail to provide a satisfactory Explanation for that conduct, the court may attach substantial weight to the CDRs. In the present case, the accused were confronted with the extensive communications during their Section 313 CrPC examination, but did not provide an acceptable Explanation for them. The court therefore placed considerable reliance upon the available records.
Recovery of weapon was properly established
The prosecution also relied upon the recovery of a steel rod/pipe used in the assault. The Supreme Court upheld the recovery of the steel rod/pipe pursuant to the information furnished by A2, which was witnessed by an independent witness, PW 30. The appellant’s objection that a panch witness was not examined and that both accused were present during the recovery were rejected. Relying on the judgment of Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra28, the court held that disclosures by more than one accused are not inherently inadmissible, provided the information leads to the discovery of the relevant fact. It also clarified that the presence of a witness to the disclosure statement is a matter of prudence and not an absolute statutory requirement.
The court further rejected the challenge based on the absence of visible bloodstains on the weapon and the delay in sending it for forensic examination. It observed that the doctor’s role was to assess whether the weapon could have caused the injuries, whereas the FSL report was relevant to its forensic characteristics. Since the weapon was properly sealed and the seal remained intact, the court found the forensic evidence reliable. Relying on the judgment of State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal29, It held that mere delay in forwarding a recovered weapon to the FSL does not by itself invalidate an otherwise credible recovery.
The complete chain of circumstances established guilt
After assessing the evidence as a whole, the Supreme Court found that the following circumstances formed a coherent chain, A4’s reluctance to marry Girish; her close relationship with A1; the involvement of A3 and subsequently A2; the unusually extensive communication among the accused before the incident; the sharp increase in communications immediately before the murder; the coordinated communications during the period when A4 was with Girish; the communications between A3 and A2 shortly before the incident; the sudden cessation of communication around the time of assault; the subsequent communications after the deceased was hospitalised; the proximity of the accused indicated by tower locations and the recovery of the weapon at the instance of A2.
Although the court rejected eyewitness evidence, it concluded that the remaining circumstances were sufficient to establish conspiracy and involvement of the accused. The court accordingly upheld the convictions under Section 302 r/w Section 120-B IPC with A4’s conviction under Section 201 IPC also being maintained.
Article 161 and court’s consideration of passage of time
Although the court upheld the convictions and sentences, it took note of the fact that the offences had occurred in 2003 and more than two decades had since elapsed. It also considered the appellant’s ages at the time of the offence, their subsequent conduct and the absence of any adverse prison record or subsequent criminal conduct brought to the court’s notice. Referring to the constitutional nature of the Governor’s power under Article 161 and decisions such as Kehar Singh v. Union of India30 and Epuru Sudhakar v. State of A.P.31, the court clarified that it was not itself granting any pardon or reducing the sentence, but considered it appropriate to enable the appellants to seek constitutional clemency from the competent authority.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the convictions under Section 302 r/w Section 120-B IPC along with A4’s conviction under Section 201 IPC and maintained the life sentences, however appellants were granted eight weeks to approach the Governor of Karnataka under Article 161.
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(5) L. Muruganantham v. State of T.N.32
(Delivered on 15-7-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice R. Mahadevan
The present petition arose from the illegal arrest and incarceration of an advocate suffering from a progressive degenerative disability, who alleged that the prison authorities failed to provide him with appropriate medical care, nutrition and reasonable accommodation during his custody.
Necessary facts of the case
The appellant is an advocate suffering from Becker Muscular Dystrophy, a progressive degenerative locomotive disability. His disability was assessed at 70 per cent in 2013 which increased to 80 per cent by 2020. He also stated that he suffered from autism and mental health-related conditions.
According to the appellant, a civil dispute with his paternal uncle resulted in a criminal complaint being lodged against him and his aged mother. The complaint was allegedly initiated through one Selvakumar, described by the appellant as acting at the instance of his paternal uncle. An FIR was registered under Sections 294(b), 323 and 506(ii) IPC. The appellant was arrested and subsequently remanded to judicial custody.
The appellant alleged that his arrest was illegal and that he was subjected to harassment and torture. He further alleged that the criminal proceedings were motivated by an attempt to exert pressure upon him in relation to his property. The criminal proceedings ultimately resulted in the charge-sheet being quashed by the High Court. The period of incarceration lasted around eleven days, when the appellant was released on bail.
Alleged violation of rights during incarceration
The appellant alleged that during his incarceration the prison authorities failed to provide reasonable accommodations required due to his disabilities, including adequate psychotherapy and physiotherapy, protein-rich nutrition, accessible sanitation, ramps and other accessibility measures, suitable sensory measures, warm water, and other necessary assistance. He contended that these deficiencies aggravated his physical and psychological condition, pointing to the progression of his disability from 70 per cent to 80 per cent.
After his release, he approached the State Human Rights Commission (for short, “SHRC”), seeking substantial compensation and action against the officials concerned. While the SHRC found that his arrest had violated safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court and recommended Rs 1 lakh compensation, disciplinary action and improved prison accessibility, it did not find a specific human-rights violation by the prison authorities, nothing that he had remained in the prison hospital and had received medical treatment. On challenge, the Madras High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs 5 lakhs with Rs 4 lakhs payable by the State and Rs 1 lakh recoverable from the police officer concerned, along with Rs 25 thousand as cost. The High Court additionally directed a disability-sensitisation programme for police personnel and appropriate guidelines for dealing with persons with disabilities who come into conflict with the law.
The appellant then approached the Supreme Court seeking further enhancement of compensation and broader systemic directions concerning the treatment of prisoners with disabilities.
Issues framed by the court
1. Whether the High Court was correct in enhancing the compensation to Rs 5 lakhs, while declining to hold the prison authorities responsible for a separate human-rights violation.
2. Whether adequate and appropriate facilities were being provided to persons with disabilities in Tamil Nadu in accordance with the RPwD Act and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (for short, “UNCRPD”).
Findings regarding the illegal arrest
The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the concurrent conclusion of the SHRC and the High Court concerning the appellant’s arrest. Both the authorities had found that the FIR, arrest and subsequent incarceration had occurred at the instance of the appellant’s paternal uncle and that the arrest did not comply with the safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court. The court also noted that the authorities had failed to adequately take into account the appellant’s disability. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the findings concerning the illegality of the arrest and the consequent liability of the police officer concerned and upheld the High Court’s direction concerning disciplinary proceedings against the police officer concerned.
In re: Issue 1 — The High Court was correct in enhancing the compensation to Rs 5 lakhs while declining to hold the prison authorities responsible for a separate human-rights violation
The appellant argued that the compensation of Rs 5 lakhs did not adequately compensate him because the effect of his physical and mental condition had deteriorated during incarceration. He also argued that the consequences of the prison conditions had implications for his future treatment, including his alleged reduced eligibility for advanced gene therapy. The Supreme Court however declined to enhance the compensation further. The court noted that the appellant had indeed not received certain medical and dietary facilities that would have been appropriate to his condition. At the same time, the records demonstrated that he had remained in the prison hospital throughout his custody and had received certain special amenities in recognition of his disability. The court considered that the absence of certain specialised facilities appeared to be attributable to institutional limitations in the prison system, rather than deliberate neglect or malicious conduct by the prison authorities. The compensation of Rs 5 lakhs was therefore regarded as appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case.
In re: Issue 2 — Adequate and appropriate facilities were being provided to persons with disabilities in Tamil Nadu in accordance with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The court held that prisoners with disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation and the protection of Article 21 including adequate nutritious and medically appropriate food. However, it distinguished between dietary requirements supported by genuine medical necessity and preferences for particular or costly food items, clarifying that reasonable accommodation does not create an unrestricted right to every preferred facility. The court further emphasised that incarceration does not extinguish a prisoner’s constitutional right to dignity, healthcare or humane treatment. Accordingly, reasonable accommodation for prisoners with disabilities must be treated as an essential constitutional requirement linked to equality, health and dignity, rather than as a discretionary benefit.
The Supreme Court held that prisoners with disabilities must receive healthcare comparable to that available to persons with disabilities outside prison, including psychiatric and speech therapy, assistive devices and other disability-specific treatment. It also highlighted the structural inaccessibility of prisons, noting that inadequate access to toilets, common dining areas, libraries and healthcare facilities can undermine dignity and equality.
The court noted these systemic deficiencies as potential violations of Articles 14 and 21 and provisions of the RPwD Act. It further stressed the importance of reliable disability-related data, updating outdated prison manuals and adherence to the Constitution, the RPwD Act, the UNCRPD and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1955 (Nelson Mandela Rules).
In the larger public interest, the court issued 21 directions aimed at creating an institutional framework for disability-sensitive prison administration. These included identifying disabilities at admission, providing accessibility, accessible information and infrastructure, establishing therapeutic facilities, conducting accessibility audits, ensuring community-equivalent healthcare and medically appropriate diets and training medical and prison personnel in disability rights. The State was also directed to revise its prison manual, incorporate provisions on discrimination and reasonable accommodation, consult disability-sector organisations, establish monitoring mechanisms, conduct periodic inspections, maintain and publish disaggregated disability data subject to privacy safeguards and submit regular compliance reports. Together these directions sought to shift prison administration from ad hoc assistance towards systematic accessibility, reasonable accommodation and accountability.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court ultimately disposed of the appeal without further enhancing the compensation. The court upheld the High Court’s decision and accepted the findings concerning the illegal arrest and the disciplinary action against the concerned police officer. At the same time, the court declined to impose liability upon the prison authorities because the material before it did not establish wilful negligence or deliberate omission by them. The shortcomings identified in the prison facilities were considered to arise principally from systemic limitations rather than intentional misconduct attributable to the particular officers.
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(6) Sukdeb Saha v. State of A.P.33
(Delivered on 25-7-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta
The appeal arose out of the judgment of the High Court, which rejected the appellant’s prayer of transfer of investigation to CBI, pertaining to the tragic, unnatural death of his 17-year old daughter, who was undergoing coaching for entrance examinations in Visakhapatnam. The untimely death of the appellant’s daughter took place in July 2023, which was labelled as a suicide.
Prefatory and opening remarks by the court
The court in its prefatory and opening remarks referred to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his prominent treatise “Emile, or on Education” to reiterate that education must be adapted to the developmental needs of the child and should cultivate reason, autonomy and emotional well-being. Referring further to Jiddu Krishnamurti, it mentioned that the function of education is to create human beings who are integrated and therefore intelligent and it cannot be converted into a system of conformity and performance. Education is meant to liberate, not burden the learner and that its true success lies not in grades or rankings, but in the holistic growth of a human being capable of living with dignity, confidence, and purpose. Referring further to the statistics published by the National Crime Records Bureau in its 2022 report titled “Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India”, the court highlighted the dismal figures reflecting emerging patterns of distress in educational institutions, coaching centers and residential educational institutions leading to systemic failure in addressing students” emotional and mental health needs. Referring to the judgment of Amit Kumar v. Union of India34, the court reiterated that the country is grappling with a “suicide epidemic”, with an alarming rise in cases of student suicides in educational institutions. Therefore, the judgment was structured in two parts, viz. Part A pertaining to “adjudication on the merits of the case”, Part B setting out “immediate interim Guidelines, laying down a preventive, remedial, and supportive framework for the prevention of student suicides”.
Part A: Adjudication on merits of the dispute
Examining the peculiar facts of the whole case, the Court referred to the judgment of State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights35, laying down circumstances when Constitutional Courts may direct a CBI investigation. Such a direction is issued not as a matter of routine, but when the investigation is tainted by delay, irregularity or suppression of material facts or where the complexity and inter-State ramifications of the matter necessitate the involvement of a central agency. Accordingly highlighting the various factors, which led to inference of a collective failure of the local investigation authorities, the court spelled out the reasons as to why an impartial investigation by the CBI is necessary. These reasons were broadly as follows:
1. The attempt of the accused persons and the State to paint the unfortunate incident as one of suicide, which narrative was so developed in hindsight by treating the deceased as mentally perturbed. However, no suicide note was ever recovered; no psychological history was documented and no other evidence was collected, which pointed towards any suicidal tendencies.
2. Glaring contradictions pointed out in the CCTV footage collected by the Advocate Commissioner, which shows no abnormal activity on the part of the deceased prior to her death. No forensic/DNA analysis or witness identification has been attempted, which severely undermines the credibility of the claim that the deceased herself went upstairs and jumped off the terrace.
3. The same medical officer functioned simultaneously in 3 roles, viz. as the autopsy surgeon whilst conducting post-mortem examination; chemical analyst for the DNA examination and a member of the post-incident internal committee. Thus, “institutional independence, objectivity and professional detachment” was severely compromised.
4. The chemical analysis report of the viscera and final opinion on the cause of death were not placed before the court. Thus, it was not clear as to whether the deceased was administered poison, sedatives or any narcotic agent that would have contributed to her fall from the terrace or deterioration of her vitals.
In view of the above key discrepancies, the court observed that there were serious unexplained lapses in the seizure and preservation of material evidence making the whole case, one of exceptional complexity and concern. Accordingly, the court found the matter worthy and fit for being transferred to CBI for investigation with the consequential directions.
Part B: Guidelines and directions for dealing with the suicide epidemic
The court then dealt with the broader issue of increasing number of student suicides in educational institutions. The court referred to draft guidelines for prevention of student suicides as released by the Ministry of Education in 2023 titled as “UMMEED” (Understand, Motivate, Manage, Empathise, Empower, and Develop). These guidelines provide for sensitising schools, identifying students at risk, providing institutional responses and community-based interventions. Referring to the judgment of Amit Kumar case, the court mentioned that National Task Force on mental health concerns of students has been constituted under the chairmanship of a former Supreme Court Judge along with various experts.
The court then discussed the right to mental health being an integral component and facet of Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the judgments of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India36 and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India37, the Supreme Court mentioned that mental integrity, psychological autonomy and freedom from degrading treatment are the essential facets of human dignity under Article 21. It is further reinforced by a rights-based legislation the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, guaranteeing mental health services to all and explicitly decriminalising attempted suicide, acknowledging the need for care and support rather than punishment. Referring further to international treaties, covenants and action plans, the court observed that evolving international norms reinforce the view that suicide prevention is not merely a policy objective, but a binding obligation on India flowing from the right to life, health, and human dignity. Thus, there remains a legislative and regulatory vacuum in the country with respect to a unified, enforceable framework for suicide prevention of students in educational institutions, especially coaching centers and student-centric environments. Referring to the judgment of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan38, the court held that whenever it experiences a vacuum in matters concerning the necessity of any legislation, the court can lay down guidelines and norms under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
The court accordingly framed and issued guidelines on the subject until such time as appropriate legislation or regulatory frameworks are enacted by the competent authority. The guidelines issued by the court broadly stipulated as follows:
1. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy drawing cues from UMMEED draft guidelines and other policies framed by the Central Government. Appointments of necessary counsellors, psychologists and social workers shall be effected by all educational institutions having 100 or more enrolled students.
2. All institutions shall have written protocols for immediate referral of suspect cases to mental health services, local hospitals and suicide prevention helplines, with teaching and non-teaching staff undergoing mandatory training from medical health professionals.
3. Educational institutions shall establish robust, confidential and accessible mechanisms for reporting, redressal and prevention of incidents involving sexual assault, harassment, ragging and bullying on the basis of caste, class, gender or sexual orientation and internal committees for the said purpose be constituted.
4. Extracurricular activities be prioritised by educational institutions, including sports, arts and personality development initiatives.
The court framed detailed guidelines and directions to be complied with by educational institutions, applicable across the board to all categories of institutions. Simultaneously, the court also issued directions to all the States and UTs for mandatorily introducing a mechanism of registration, student protection norms and grievance redressal mechanism for all private coaching centers, to be complied with by all the institutions. District-level monitoring committees were directed to be set up and the Union of India was directed to file a compliance affidavit before the court within a period of 90 days.
With the aforesaid guidelines and directions, the appeal was accordingly disposed of.
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(7) In re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India39
(Delivered on 6-8-2025)
Coram: three-Judge Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai, K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.
Authored by: Justice B.R. Gavai
The interlocutory applications pertained to various issues with respect to Matheran Hill Station situated in District Raigad, Maharashtra amidst the Western Ghats and recognised as an eco-sensitive region. Rich in wildlife, flora, and fauna it becomes a popular tourism destination during the monsoons with the uniqueness that it is the only pedestrian hill station.
In view of the final notification issued by the MoEF (for short, “Ministry of Environment and Forests”) in February 2003, declaring Matheran as an Eco-Sensitive Zone (for short, “ESZ”), the movement of vehicular traffic within the municipal limits except for ambulances and fire engines got restricted. The Government of Maharashtra proposed to lay paver blocks on the road between Dasturi Naka to Shivaji Maharaj statue to avoid the possibility of soil erosion. The Court also dealt with the issue of permission to battery-operated e-rickshaws to replace the practice of hand-pulled carts/rickshaws. The application was moved by the Municipal Council to allow battery operated e-rickshaws in Matheran for the benefit of the local population of Matheran by amending the ESZ notification. The persons who were dependent on horses for their livelihood constituting the local population contended that if e-rickshaws are permitted, then there should be a restriction on the number of e-rickshaws and the allotments should be made to persons who are genuine hand-cart/rickshaw pullers whose activities were restricted by the government order.
The court accordingly framed the following issues for its consideration:
1. As to whether the paver blocks should be permitted to be laid on the road between the Dasturi Naka to Shivaji Maharaj Statue, which is the main road that connects Matheran from Dasturi Railway Station to the last point inasmuch as most of the habitations are situated on this road. The internal roads are also accessible from the said main road.
2. If the answer to Issue (i) is in the affirmative, then which type of paver blocks should be permitted to be laid down.
3. As to whether e-rickshaws should be permitted on the said road between Dasturi Naka to Shivaji Maharaj Statue or not.
4. If the answer to Issue (iii) is in the affirmative, then we would have to consider as to what should be the number of e-rickshaws that should be permitted to be played on the said road.
5. The last issue that would, accordingly, be required to be considered is as to who should be the persons to whom the said e-rickshaws be allotted to.
Insofar as the issue of laying of the paver blocks is concerned, reports were called from IIT Bombay and the National Environmental and Engineering Research Institute (for short, “NEERI”), who were directed to examine and submit their expert report about the necessity to install the paver blocks; possibility of any other alternative to avoid soil erosion; and whether such paver blocks would actually arrest the problem of soil erosion.
Referring to both the expert reports, the court held that clay paver blocks can be considered as the best solution for arresting soil erosion on mud roads of Matheran and other surrounding ESZ areas.
The court then dealt with the next issue as to whether the practice of towing hand-carts/rickshaws by hand should be permitted or not. Referring to the judgment in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India40 on the interpretation of Article 23, the court observed that Article 23 is not limited in its application only against the State, but it prohibits “trafficking in human beings”, begar and other similar forms of forced labour generally being practiced by anyone else. Its sweep is wide and unlimited, and it strikes at “trafficking in human beings” wherever they are found. Thus, it strikes at the existence of bonded or forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself since the same is violative of human dignity and contrary to basic human values. Every form of forced labour, begar or otherwise is within the inhibition of Article 23 and even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by the article if it is forced labour. There should be no serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic India, as it is against the basic worth of the human person. Thus, the persons towing hand-carts/rickshaws in Matheran do not do so not of their own choice, but since they have no other source of livelihood. Permitting such an inhuman practice, which hits the concept of human dignity in a country like India, belittles the constitutional promise of social and economic justice. Referring further to the judgment in Azad Rickshaw Pullers’ Union (Regd.) v. State of Punjab41, the court observed that even the practice of cycle-rickshaw pulling was not consistent with the Preamble’s promise of social justice as contained under Article 38. Short of scooters, there are mechanised cycle-rickshaws which are fairly inexpensive. The quality of life led by the weakest in any society is the true measure of social justice. Long hours of duty spent on pedalling rickshaws lead to musculoskeletal pain problems amongst 91.7 per cent of the persons who were subjected to the study. Thus, the inhuman practice of human beings towing other human beings prevalent in the town of Maharashtra should be shunned if the constitutional promise of social and economic equality, social and economic justice is to be met. The court directed that the practice of permitting hand-pulled carts/rickshaws needs to be stopped forthwith with immediate effect. They hit at an individual’s dignity. The State which has a duty under the DPSP, should form a scheme for the rehabilitation of these hand-cart/rickshaw pullers so that they are not deprived of their livelihood.
Quoting the example of the rehabilitation of rickshaw pullers in the town of Kevadia (Sardar Patel Sarovar) in the State of Gujarat, the court directed the State of Maharashtra to study the same scheme and implement a similar model in the town of Matheran so that not only genuine hand-cart/rickshaw pullers are rehabilitated, but other underprivileged persons in and around Matheran including Adivasi women, benefit therefrom.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court disposed of the batch of interlocutory applications by issuing the following directions:
1. The State Government was permitted to lay the clay paver blocks on the road between Dasturi Naka to Shivaji Maharaj statue with various safeguards as directed therein.
2. The State of Maharashtra was further directed to stop the practice of plying hand-pulled carts/rickshaws in the town of Matheran in a phased manner, within a period of six months.
3. The State Government was directed to evolve a scheme on the lines of the one implemented in Kevadia, Gujarat for providing a source of income through e-rickshaws to various underprivileged persons and those working earlier as hand-cart/rickshaw pullers.
The aforesaid scheme was directed to be implemented through Corporate Social Responsibility (for short, “CSR”) funds, but the court also held that non-availability of funds would not be treated as an excuse for not implementing the scheme. The essential character of Matheran as a pedestrian hill station unique to the town, was directed to be maintained to the extent possible.
Accordingly, the applications were disposed of by the Supreme Court.
***
(Delivered on 7-8-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Dipankar Datta
The petitioner, a Judge of the Allahabad High Court petitioned the court challenging the “In-house Procedure” dated 15 December 1999, enabling the In-house Committee in inquiring and commenting on the existence of serious misconduct warranting removal and further authorising the Chief Justice of India to intimate the same to the President and Prime Minister for initiating proceedings for removal of the High Court Judge concerned as unconstitutional being violative of the petitioner’s Part III rights. The said Paras 5(b) and 7 were also challenged as being ultra vires Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution of India and consequential prayer was made for quashing the same. An incidental relief was also sought in the Article 32 petition for setting aside the final report dated 3 May 2025 submitted by the Committee and all consequential actions taken pursuant to the same.
Factual matrix of the case
The matter related to recovery of huge quantities of burnt currency notes being discovered in the bungalow premises of the petitioner, who was serving as a Judge of the Delhi High Court at the relevant point of time. The discovery of such currency notes gave rise to suspicion that petitioner deviated from the universally accepted values of judicial life, setting into motion the in-house procedure as devised by the Supreme Court on administrative side on 15 December 1999 (for short, “the Procedure”). An Explanation was sought from the petitioner, whereafter a three-member committee was constituted by the Chief Justice of India for inquiring into the allegations of impropriety and misconduct against the Judge. The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court (for short, “CJDHC”) was asked not to assign any judicial work to the petitioner and at the same time the photographs of the currency notes recovered in the petitioner’s bungalow were also put in the public domain on the website of the Supreme Court of India. The three-member committee in May 2025 furnished the inquiry report, finding sufficient substance in the allegations raised in the letter of March 2025 of the Chief Justice of India, returning a finding that misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the petitioner from his office. Thereafter, in terms of the procedure, the Chief Justice of India wrote to the President and the Prime Minister forwarding the report of the three-member committee. In this backdrop, the petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the various clauses of the In-house Procedure framed in December 1999, as also the recommendation-cum-report of the Chief Justice of India to the President and the Prime Minister.
Contentions of the petitioner
On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended broadly as follows:
1. The provisions of the Procedure, insofar as it permits the committee to opine as to whether misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal or not and permits the Chief Justice of India to intimate the President and the Prime Minister about the proposed misconduct warranting removal of the Judge concerned, is de hors the constitutional provisions, violating Articles 124 and 218 thereof.
2. Specifically, Paras 5-B and 7(2) are ultra vires the Constitution of India, since the only provisions under which a Judge of a High Court may be removed are Articles 124 and 218. Constitutional provisions read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (for short, “Inquiry Act”) constitute a complete and comprehensive code, occupying the field of the process of removal, and there is no scope for a new procedure being evolved through an alien mechanism. Thus, the removal process set into motion by the procedure lacks constitutional sanction or contemplation, more so by permitting the Committee constituted under it to adopt such procedure as felt necessary by it. The report of the Committee constituted under the Procedure cannot interfere with the process envisaged under Article 124 or Article 218.
Issues under consideration
The court accordingly framed the following substantial questions of law for its consideration:
1. Should the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to the conduct of the petitioner?
2. Does the procedure have legal sanction?
3. Is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the procedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism?
4. Does Para 5(b) of the Procedure foul Articles 124 and 125 read with Articles 217 and 218 of the Constitution or abrogate any fundamental right of a Judge of a High Court?
5. Did the Chief Justice of India/the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice of India act in terms of the procedure or in deviation thereof?
6. Is the requirement of Para 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the Chief Justice of India to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister unconstitutional?
Consideration of submissions and analysis by the court
The court, referring to Articles 217, 218, and 124, specifically Article 124(5) stated that the Constitution of India leaves upon Parliament to regulate the procedure for removal of any Judge by way of a duly enacted law. The Parliament accordingly enacted the Inquiry Act, under which a committee is to be constituted for investigation/inquiry into the allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity levelled against the Judge. The process for impeachment of a Judge, however, under the provisions of the Inquiry Act is very rigorous, whereunder a Judge can be removed only by way of an impeachment. However, the framers of the Constitution at the time of its enactment never conceived of the requirement of removal of a Judge through impeachment.
Referring to the various provisions of the Procedure, the court stated that it starts with a written complaint addressed to the Chief Justice of India or Chief Justice of a High Court. The Committee is constituted by the Chief Justice of India consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts and one High Court Judge, which committee has the liberty to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice (PNJ). On the receipt of the inquiry report from the three-member committee, the Chief Justice of India has three options of proceeding, one of which empowers the Chief Justice of India to intimate the President and the Prime Minister that the allegations are serious enough to warrant initiation of proceedings for removal and hence judicial work is withdrawn. In cases where misconduct is established, but not so serious as to warrant removal, the Chief Justice of India may call the Judge concerned and advise him accordingly.
The detailed process under the procedure has already been delineated in the judgment of Judge ‘X’ v. High Court of M.P.43 Referring to the judgment in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. A.M. Bhattacharjee44, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Chief Justice of India as the head of the institution may take any action as “deemed necessary or warranted”. Some other means other than impeachment are required to ensure that Judges do not abuse the trust the society has reposed in them.
The judgment of C. Ravichandran Iyer case was followed by Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India45, which considered whether the report of the 3-member committee constituted by the Chief Justice of India ought or should be placed in the public domain. The said question was answered in the negative, stating that the report made to the Chief Justice of India by the said committee is wholly confidential and only meant for the purpose of his satisfaction as to whether the matter needs to be proceeded further or be dropped altogether. The only source of authority by which the Chief Justice of India exercises this power of inquiry is moral or ethical and not drawn from under any law. The same therefore, cannot be made the subject-matter of a writ petition seeking disclosure of the report made to him. The seeds of the “In-house Procedure” therefore came to be sown in the judgment of C. Ravichandran Iyer case, whereafter the said procedure has been firmly put in place for dealing with matters expressed by the court. At the same time it is not toothless as it may lead to impeachment of the Judge concerned under the constitutional provisions. The investigative process under the procedure takes into consideration sufficiently the rights of the Judge concerned through a fair process for determining the veracity of allegations levelled against him, whilst balancing the same with the integrity of the judicial institution.
Explicating the role of Chief Justice of India as the foremost judicial officer, the court emphasised that Chief Justice of India is to ensure that the judiciary of the country functions in a transparent, efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner. He is the most important person in the larger scheme of maintaining institutional interest and credibility to ascertain whether a Judge has indulged in misconduct. The Chief Justice of India is vested with the responsibility to decide about constitution of a three-member committee for an in-house inquiry if he feels that allegations against any Judge require a deeper probe. If the three-member committee finds the allegations to be serious against the Judge concerned, the Chief Justice of India is under an obligation to forward the report to the President and the Prime Minister along with his views in the matter. He is therefore not merely a post office between the Committee and the President/Prime Minister. Referring to the judgment of K. Veeraswami v. Union of India46, the court observed that the President is not an outsider so far as the judiciary is concerned, nor is he an outsider to the procedure itself. Complaints are received also from the office of the President by the Chief Justice of India and therefore the Chief Justice of India is obligated to apply his mind and respond to the same wherever necessary. In a fit and proper case, the Chief Justice of India may endorse such findings while forwarding the report of the inquiry to the Prime Minister and the President with his own recommendations. However, at the same time, utmost care and caution must be undertaken to ensure that any action of the Chief Justice of India is not in deviation of the procedure which permits the in-house inquiry to be undertaken.
Thereafter referring to Section 3(2), Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (for short, “Protection Act”), the court observed that the Protection Act itself empowers the Supreme Court or “any other authority” to take any such action (civil, criminal or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge. Thus, Section 3(2) itself permits initiation of any other action by the Supreme Court. The procedure therefore fits in the mould of the word “otherwise” employed under Section 3(2). The Supreme Court is therefore not denuded of the power to initiate any other action as is deemed fit. On the contention of the petitioner that there is no parliamentary law empowering the Supreme Court to initiate proceedings against a Judge of the High Court, the court fell back upon Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The “In-house Procedure” was held to be filling the gap in the constitutional mechanism and the ground realities present. The law declared by the court in the judgment of C. Ravichandran Iyer case fills the vacuum where it is needed the most by devising the mechanism of “In-house Procedure”. The Full Court resolution of 1999 has also been framed on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the C. Ravichandran Iyer case and there is therefore full legal sanction to the procedure. The Protection Act therefore does not offend the constitutional scheme, rather it supplements its provisions. The designing of procedure is towards the growing concern of incidents of misconduct, for disciplining the Judges internally, for the misconduct sufficient to tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution to which he belongs. Therefore, once the ball is set rolling by the Chief Justice of India under the provisions of the procedure, it has to end with the recommendation/advice to the President and the Prime Minister along with his findings. The contention therefore cannot be accepted that the procedure interferes with provisions of the Inquiry Act or the Protection Act. The judiciary in India is characterised by judicial independence, which signifies flexibility of judicial thought and the freedom to adjudicate without external and internal pressure. Judicial independence does not imply unfettered liberty to act as one might wish. If judicial independence is fundamental, so too is judicial accountability and compromising one compromises the other. The procedure answers the constitutional silence on cases which do not rise to the level of proven misbehaviour and acts as a check on Judge’s unbridled freedom of action, thereby seeking to prevent outcomes that could be harmful or unjust.
The court then discussed “the nature of inquiry under the procedure”. It was held that the inquiry is a fact-finding inquiry, akin to preliminary inquiry against a delinquent employee. The findings in the said inquiry report are preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final. It is not necessary therefore for the three-member committee to extend the opportunity of cross-examination of the persons who come before it for giving their versions to the Judge under inquiry or to be represented through a lawyer. The three-member committee thus just effectively assists the Chief Justice of India in arriving at a conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given case based thereupon. Referring to the judgments of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India47, Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra48, and Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat49, the court stated that the concept of preliminary inquiry is just to determine whether a full-fledged inquiry is at all needed or not, based on the material collected in the course thereof. The “In-house Procedure” is therefore not toothless and may very well trigger initiation of proceedings in Parliament for removal, as has also been held in the judgment of Judge ‘X’ case. The Judge under probe always gets an effective opportunity of defending himself by presenting the evidence of his side during the course of inquiry under the Inquiry Act. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that principles of natural justice were violated hold no ground.
Issue-wise answers and conclusions
Answer to question (I)
On question (I) of maintainability of the writ petition, the court held that petitioner had participated in the inquiry proceedings before the three-member committee without any demur and submitted to its jurisdiction. Thus he can well be held disentitled to relief based on his tardy conduct if not on the ground of waiver. The challenge at the behest of the petitioner was also belated, after the inquiry report came to be filed before the Chief Justice of India and recommendation to the President and the Prime Minister was made for initiation of the process of his removal. There was no reason for the petitioner to have waited for completion of the fact-finding inquiry so set in motion by the Chief Justice of India. Thus, the writ petition was worthy of not being entertained for the aforesaid reasons. However, even then the court chose to answer all the issues instead of dismissing it at the threshold.
Answer to questions (II) and (III)
Answering questions (II) and (III), the court held that the law declared by the Supreme Court in the C. Ravichandran Iyer case is binding as a precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is in the form of a judicial legislation that emerged because of a vacuum in the field of disciplining a Judge, who shows signs of delinquency. Even though it might have originated as a moral and ethical authority, the procedure has gradually transformed into legal authority of the Chief Justice of India in view of the aforesaid judgment. Even otherwise, the procedure has a legal sanction by virtue of Section 3(2), Protection Act as aforestated. Once the three-member committee recommends to the Chief Justice of India for initiating the action of removal of the Judge under probe, invariably the process under Articles 124(4) and (5) or Articles 217 and 218 gets triggered. It is thereafter for the Parliament to decide what is in the best interest of the nation, which is left untrammelled and undisturbed by the procedure. Therefore, it cannot be argued that procedure is a parallel or extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge, as it does not lead to removal of a Judge, but only leads to the same.
Answer to question (IV)
Answering question (IV), the court stated that if complaints of misconduct against a Judge are received followed by an inquiry conducted under the procedure with the inquiry report containing sufficient substance in the allegations, immunity cannot be claimed by the delinquent Judge either by citing abrogation of the fundamental rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment. Thus, Para 5(b) or Para 7 of the Procedure is not in conflict with any constitutional provision.
Answer to question (V)
Answering question (V), the court held that if there is no ground or averment in the writ petition that there has been a deviation from the procedure by the Chief Justice of India or the three-membered committee. Uploading of the photos and making the report public however is not part of the procedure, since the said exercise was completely confidential. The demands of being fair and transparent in such cases have to yield to the confidentiality and uploading on the website is not approved. However, since the petitioner did not have any grievance in relation thereto, which is obvious from his failure to question such uploading at an appropriate time leads to a situation where court is faced with a fait accompli. No relief is claimed in respect of such uploading and resultantly nothing can come out thereof in relation to such contention.
Answer to question (VI)
Answering question (VI), the Supreme Court observed that CJI owes also a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted. Any adverse impact on the credibility of the institution could prove dear and Para 7(ii) of the PROCEDURE requiring the CJI to write to the President and the Prime Minister along with the report of the 3 member committee is, therefore quite in order, legal and valid. The said recommendation of the CJI to the President and the Prime Minister is to be acted upon by the latter constitutional functionaries and none else. Therefore Para 7(ii) does not infringe or is ultra vires any constitutional provision or the concept of separation of powers. There is no requirement of giving a hearing to the Judge under probe, more so when he expressed his inability to resign or voluntarily retire himself. Desirability of any requirement is different from it being a mandatory prescription and in the absence of any such express obligation in the PROCEDURE a right to hearing cannot be read in the provisions.
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
***
(9) Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India50
(Delivered on 11-8-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Manmohan
The challenge before the Supreme Court was to a notification issued under Section 12, Army Act, 1950 (for short, “Army Act”), through which separate merit lists for male and female candidates and only three vacancies for female candidates, as against six vacancies for male candidates were provided. The petitioners filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India when they were denied admission and induction in the Judge Advocate General branch, against induction of the respondent male candidate, who was much lower in marks in the merit list of male candidates, being a lesser scorer than the female counterparts. The sheet anchor of the petitioner’s submission was that while the Central Government professes to be adopting and implementing a “gender neutral policy” of recruitment in the Judge Advocate General branch, however the impugned notification by making provisions of the above nature, coupled with fixing a ratio of 50:50 for male and female officers, respectively, cannot be treated as “gender neutral“.
The petitioners further contended that the selection process to Judge Advocate General if treated as “gender neutral“ must be based purely on merit and based on a common merit list and common cut-off marks.
The respondents on the other hand justified the issuance of such notification and the resultant delimitation of seats and vacancies for female candidates on the ground that operational and functional requirements compel the department to adopt such division of seats and compartmentalisation of male and female merit lists. Since there is a likelihood of Judge Advocate General officers being deployed in combat and all of them being combatants, therefore considering the wartime requirement to maintain optimal functional and operational needs, gender specific decisions are required to be made for services in the Indian Army, which cannot be compared with other civilian services. The respondents further contended that it is a conscious decision of the Government of India for restricting the employment of women officers from being posted in frontline combat deployment where contact with the enemy/hostiles is likely. Women cannot be posted in isolated posts or be engaged in conduct of field active operations, including counter insurgency operations.
Referring to the judgment of Babita Puniya v. Secretary51, the Government of India contended that the decision of non-posting of women officers in infantry battalions has not been interfered with by the courts of law, being held essentially to be a matter of policy by the courts. It is in this light that intake policies are capped at 50:50 for male and female officers, respectively, in the Indian Army.
Consideration and analysis by the court
The court then considered the contentions of both the parties. Referring to Article 33 of the Constitution of India, the court observed that the said provision insofar as it excludes the applicability of Part III rights to defence forces is an exception and therefore to be construed strictly. The extent to which permissible restrictions or abrogation of fundamental rights can take place insofar as their application to defence forces are concerned can be done only by a law duly passed by Parliament and not otherwise. Referring to the judgment of R. Viswan v. Union of India52, the court stated that Army Act is an enactment under Article 33 of the Constitution of India defining the extent to which Central Government can restrict the fundamental rights of any person, especially a person who is a member of the armed forces. However, such restriction can only be to the extent of the rights set out therein. Referring thereafter to Section 12, Army Act, the court stated that restrictions to be imposed on Articles 14, 15, and 16 have been clearly spelled out thereunder, authorising the Union of India to impose restrictions. However, the same is to be done by way of notification in the Official Gazette specified in this behalf. In pursuance thereof, the Union of India has issued notifications in January, February and December 1992 making women eligible for appointment as Short Service Commission (SSC) officers in the 10 specified streams delineated thereunder. However, the appointment for women in the above 10 streams is authorised to be effected only in “combat support arms” and not to “combat arms”. The dispute in the present case relates to “combat support arms” at the highest and not “combat arms”. Therefore, once the Government of India in exercise of notification issued under Section 12 permitted women officers to join any corps, department or branch forming a part of the regular Army, thereafter additional restrictions with regard to “extent of induction of women officers” in the said corps, department, or branch under Section 12 could not be done. This is more so when no notification had been published as mandated under Section 12 in the Official Gazette laying down the “extent of induction”. Therefore, once the Government of India decided to induct women officers by way of a notification issued under Section 12, their numbers could not have been restricted or reservation for male officers introduced through a backdoor by way of a policy or administrative instruction. The same would amount to “setting at naught” a duly issued notification under Section 12, Army Act. The circulars under challenge of November 2011 and March 2012 are therefore untenable in law, being contrary to the statutory notification issued under Section 12, Army Act, possessing no legal backing for the same under the Constitution.
This is more so when the Supreme Court earlier in the judgment of Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya53, has already taken a view that right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory consideration under Article 14 mandates permanent commission for women irrespective of gender. All such clauses of such administratively issued instructions and policies, being contrary to Section 12 and the notification issued thereunder are therefore redundant and inapplicable.
The court then repelled the contention of the Government of India that Judge Advocate General Branch consists of primarily combatants, holding that field parity amongst the male and female officers has already been institutionalised. The court held that acceptance of such a contention would lead to exclusion of women officers from all streams of the Army, allowing 100 per cent reservation for men on the ground and presumption that all posts in the Army are combatant posts. The services in the Army are classified under three broad categories, viz. (i) combat arms; (ii) combat support arms; and (iii) services. Therefore, insofar as combat support arms or the services category are concerned, the same cannot be treated as part of the first category, and the contention of Government of India that Judge Advocate General officers are essentially combatants being a reserve for mobilisation on the field is not entirely correct. It also observed that over the passage of time female officers are also trained akin to their male counterparts for operational field conditions, being trained to be posted in the terrain and regimental structures. Therefore, field parity between male and female officers has already been institutionalised. Women in Air Force have in fact been appointed to combat posts. Therefore, the argument does not hold water that women officers in times of emergency cannot be deployed for counter-insurgency or counter-terror operations attached to infantry/artillery units. Thus, there is no legal or operational bar express or implied which restricts deployment based on gender at peace locations. The court referred to the celebrated quote of Bill Gates, Microsoft co-founder — “people feared electricity when it was invented. Didn’t they?”.
The court further held that there can be no waiver of fundamental rights by any person, merely because he has joined the duties of Government of India. It is always open to an aggrieved person to challenge any policy, notification, policy-cum-notification or statutory provision by filing a writ petition under Article 226 or Article 32, if the same violates his fundamental rights. Referring to K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India54, the court reiterated that fundamental rights are geared towards a wider notion of securing the vision of justice of the Founding Fathers, which, so guaranteed, are not capable of being waived. Referring further to the judgment of Basheshar Nath v. CIT55, the court reiterated that when the State itself is prohibited from making any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India, then there is no question of prejudice to the State by non-application of the doctrine of waiver, when its own action is contrary to the constitutional prohibitions so imposed.
Interpreting Article 15(3), which allows the State to make special provisions for women, and relying on the judgment of Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay56, the court observed that a compensatory approach must be adopted in its interpretation wherein gender differences must be considered in order to produce substantive equality for women. The Parliament has also enacted the Women’s Reservation Act, 2023, which reflects its commitment to tangible action in creating a more inclusive society. The impugned notification therefore insofar as it provides only three vacancies for female candidates while six vacancies for male candidates is violative of Articles 14, 15, and 16, as also Section 12, Army Act.
The Government of India has throughout been taking a stand that the Indian Army carries out a completely gender-neutral selection process, wherein all steps are fair and gender neutral. The court drew a distinction between the two expressions “gender neutral“ and “gender equal”. “Gender neutral” in ordinary parlance means that no discrimination shall be made between candidates on the basis of gender or sex of an individual, but however cannot be treated as synonymous with the expression “gender equality”. “Gender neutrality” does not just prohibit sex-based classification, but also ensures that the most meritorious candidate is selected for the job. It also does not preclude or limit deployment in any operational area or role. The recruitment policy under challenge in the garb of being “gender neutral” therefore fails to achieve the said purpose. The court also observed that the current recruitment policy leads to indirect discrimination, when it recommends an intake ratio and compartmentalisation of 50 per cent for men and 50 per cent for women for the Judge Advocate General Branch. Relying on the empirical data produced before the court in the form of marks scored by female candidates, the court held that it has an adverse impact on women who are more meritorious than their male counterparts. Relying on the judgment in Nitisha v. Indian Army57, the court observed that it must always look beyond the formal level of evaluation of any policy and take additional factors such as “impact” or “effect” into account. The courts have shifted their emphasis in testing the constitutionality of any policy to examine whether such a rule or a policy substantively “contributes to the subordination of a disadvantaged group of individuals”. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Co.58, the court reiterated that if indirect discrimination is the consequence of any State policy, then it is violative of equality clauses. Therefore, the practice of fixing a ceiling limit on the recruitment of female candidates runs counter to the very concepts of “gender neutrality” and “merit”.
The court accordingly held the 50:50 criteria/ratio as discriminatory in nature. Thereafter, the court also discussed the preparation of two separate Service Selection Boards (SSBs) and separate merit lists for males and females. The said practice also runs counter to the equality guarantees, since Judge Advocate General officers do not have distinct cadres with different conditions of service. It was thus held that a similar combined merit list ought to be prepared. The court further held that merit-based selection will always improve the efficiency of Judge Advocate General, since Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor to the Chief of Army Staff in matters of military, martial and international law. He also assists the Adjutant General in matters relating to discipline involving the application of military law. Thus, it is necessary that merit must play the predominant role in the selection of Judge Advocate General officers.
Referring to the practice followed in other branches of the Armed Forces like the Air Force, Navy, Border Security Force (BSF) and others, the court observed that in none of the aforesaid branches is the enrolment of women candidates is restricted on the ground of operational efficiency, rather females have been outperforming their male counterparts in entrance examinations for various other disciplines. Therefore, a merit-based “gender neutral” selection process cannot be accepted to be negatively impacting functionality, manpower planning or operational efficiency of the Judge Advocate General Branch.
Conclusions and directions
Accordingly, the court directed the Union of India to henceforth conduct recruitment in terms of the observations and directions made in the judgment by doing away with the 50:50 criteria and without implementation of the vacancy demarcation or following the extent of induction principle in the armed forces. A combined merit list to be prepared for both the male and female Judge Advocate General officers by following the concept of gender neutrality. It was held that R3 despite having obtained less marks than the female candidates was selected, such a selection cannot be given effect to, since females possessing higher marks than him like the petitioners were denied the appointment. Reiterating the celebrated quote that “no nation can be secure, when half of its population (i.e. its women force) is held back”, the court accordingly directed the Union of India to conduct recruitment in the aforesaid manner, make the merit list as well as marks obtained by all the candidates participating in the selection process public. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.
***
(10) Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi59
(Delivered on 14-8-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Surya Kant and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
Authored by: Justice N. Kotiswar Singh
The appeal came to be preferred under Section 116-A, Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, “RP Act”) against the judgment of the Telangana High Court which dismissed the election petition preferred by the election petitioner against the returning successful candidate. The primary issue that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether non-disclosure of the income as shown in the income tax returns (for short, “ITRs”) of the four financial years (for short, “FYs”) out of the last five FYs in the Form 26 affidavit accompanying the nomination papers by the respondent, accepted by the Returning Officer (for short, “RO”), would amount to improper acceptance; whether such non-disclosure of ITRs out of the preceding four FYs would amount to a corrupt practice by the returned candidate, being non-compliance of the provisions of the RP Act and other associated provisions.
Facts in brief
The respondent contested the elections to Zila Parishad Territorial Constituency (for short, “ZPTC”), and was successfully elected as a ZPTC member, followed by her election as the MLA, which became the subject-matter of challenge. At the time of filing her nominations as a nominee of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi party (for short, “BRS”), while submitting the Form 26 affidavit, she failed to disclose her income shown in the ITRs of the last four completed FYs. Rather, she mentioned her income as “NIL”, not even disclosing the monthly honorarium of Rs 1,00,000 being earned from her other nominations to government posts.
The election of the respondent was challenged by the appellant on the ground that non-disclosure of such income to such material extent amounted to her engagement in “corrupt practices” proscribed under Section 123(2), RP Act, rendering her election void. Since there was concealment of relevant information required to be mentioned under the Form 26 affidavit, it also amounted to non-compliance of provisions of the RP Act, rendering her election liable to be declared as void.
The High Court dismissed the election petition holding that omission to disclose the ITRs is not of a significant nature as to declare null and void the election of respondent under Section 100, RP Act. Much less, the same would not constitute a corrupt practice which would materially affect the outcome of the elections. Against the same the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issues for consideration before the court
On the basis of contentions of both the parties, the Supreme Court framed the following issues for its consideration as follows:
1. firstly, whether the non-mentioning of the income in the Form 26 affidavit, with its portrayal as “NIL” would render the acceptance of nomination of respondent’s candidature as improper, making her election liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i), RP Act;
2. secondly, whether such non-disclosure constitutes a “corrupt practice” under Section 100(1)(b), RP Act; and
3. thirdly, whether such non-disclosure amounts to violation of Rule 4-A, Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 (for short, “Election Rules”) , which materially affected her elections.
Consideration and analysis by the court
The court started its discussion on the Right to Information (for short, “RTI”) of the citizen of India and a foundation of free and fair elections as the base root of a functional democracy. Referring to Articles 324 and 327 of the Constitution of India, the court stated that subject of “elections” finds a special place under Indian Constitution vide Part XV, which lays down the constitutional mechanism under a constitutional body viz., Election Commission of India. Article 327 empowers Parliament to make laws covering all aspects related to elections for both the Parliament as well as the States, by virtue of which the RP Act has been enacted and the Election Rules thereunder. One of the major concerns of the lawmakers was how to prevent criminal elements from taking part in the electoral process and subvert the electoral mandate. This could have been ensured only when complete disclosure of the antecedents and assets of the candidates to the electorate was made to enable it to have an informed exercise of franchise, as also recommended by the Law Commission of India in its 170th Report. Accordingly, the Delhi High Court in the matter of Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India60 issued sweeping directions to the Union of India for ensuring that antecedents and assets of the candidates are made available to the public. The aforesaid directions of the Delhi High Court were challenged unsuccessfully before the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms61, in which the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the right of the citizen to know about the candidates as a facet of Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Directions were issued to the Election Commission of India to seek information on affidavit from all the contesting candidates seeking election to Parliament or the State legislature about their criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications. In light thereof, provisions of the RP Act were amended to insert Sections 33-A and 33-B. Section 33-A mandated the candidate concerned to furnish additional information about his criminal antecedents, whereas Section 33-B provided explicitly that no disclosure shall be required of any information, which is not prescribed under the RP Act or the Election Rules made thereunder. This led to the subsequent verdict of PUCL v. Union of India62 by the Supreme Court of India challenging the constitutionality of Section 33-B insofar as it whittled down its directions pertaining to the extent and heads of disclosure by the candidate concerned. Expounding again on the amplitude and width of Article 19(1)(a), the Supreme Court reiterated that the ordinary citizen/voter is entitled to know about the assets and liabilities of the contesting candidates. Accordingly, Section 33-B which protected the candidates from disclosure of any other details other than the criminal antecedent was struck down after being declared as null and void, being contrary to the directions of the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment of Assn. for Democratic Reforms case. The necessity of disclosure of assets and liabilities by the contesting candidate was held to be necessary to ascertain whether unaccounted money is used for electoral gain and whether the elected representative gets enriched after assuming public office. Such disclosure acts as a check against misuse of power for making quick money and disclosure about liabilities enables the voter to know whether the candidate has outstanding dues payable to public financial institutions or the government. Accordingly, Rule 4-A came to be inserted in September 2002 with the amendment of the Election Rules, requiring furnishing of affidavit under Form 26 by the contesting candidate to the Returning Officer. Thereafter, in Resurgence India v. Election Commission of India63, the Supreme Court held that filing of an affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory and the nomination paper is fit to be rejected. Such a blank affidavit will be directly hit by the provisions of Section 125-A, RP Act. Comparing the provisions of Section 33-A, Rule 4-A and Form 26 affidavit, the court observed that requirement of disclosure of the assets and educational qualifications is not prescribed anywhere under any section or the provision of the Act, but only under Form 26 affidavit.
The Supreme Court then discussed various provisions of the RP Act, including Section 100, the vital provision for declaring election to be void. Referring to Section 100(1)(a), the court observed that the existence of facts applicable to this ground of disqualification must pre-date the election process. Therefore, a candidate who was not eligible either because he was not qualified or disqualified, must be a circumstance existing prior to the election process. There is no question of judicial consideration or debate or scope of debate with respect to grounds mentioned hereunder, nor is there any subjective element involved in the process for determination. With respect to grounds specified under Section 100(1)(b), the said grounds are relatable to conduct of the candidate during the election process and the acts so committed during thereof. It is not connected at all to the candidate’s attributes or qualifications, but is relatable to the acts which are prohibited to ensure the integrity of the election process. Insofar as other grounds are concerned, there is an element of subjectivity vested with the Returning Officer to decide whether to accept or reject the nomination paper. Unless and until it is not of a substantial character, and merely technical, the nomination form cannot be rejected. It is in this category that disclosure concerning the criminal antecedents of the candidate is concerned, which is linked to the existing provisions under Sections 8 and 9, RP Act, whereunder a candidate would be disqualified if found convicted of any of the offences specified thereunder vide Sections 8 and 9, RP Act. The RP Act nowhere mentions or contains any explicit provisions pertaining to voidness of an election if the returned candidate fails to disclose his/her assets. The said requirement of disclosure has become part of election law through judicial intervention and mentioned only as part of Form 26 Affidavit. For this reason, therefore these considerations cannot be placed at the same pedestal as the conditions specified under Section 100(1)(a) and (b).
Though requirement of disclosure of criminal antecedents has to be examined more scrupulously and dealt with more strictly, on the other hand disclosure of assets and educational qualification is not referable to any specific statutory provision under the RP Act. There can be no disqualification under the law based on a candidate’s wealth or financial status unlike in the case of candidates with criminal antecedents, who stand disqualified if convicted of certain offences mentioned under Section 8 of the Act. No restriction on candidates from contesting in election due to immense wealth or being impoverished exists, as people elect their representatives regardless of the candidate’s financial health, financial condition, judging instead primarily on whether the candidate can genuinely represent their interest. Furthermore, the exercise of examining the validity of acceptance of nomination can be scrutinised by the court after the election is over in an election petition and the result is known to the voters as in the present case. The post-election judicial inquiry serves as a safeguard against arbitrary actions by the Returning Officer or any injustice caused to a candidate. But at the same time, people’s mandate cannot be overlooked by the court in case of a successfully elected candidate, when examining the legality of acceptance of the nomination. Elections are hugely expensive and time-consuming process, involving coordinated efforts of various agencies. Therefore, any interference or tinkering with the election result has the potential to undermine the voice of the people and their participation in shaping the government. Referring to the Latin maxim, “vox populi, vox dei”, the court observed that collective wisdom should always be respected, to be placed on the highest pedestal of divine authority. The test of substantiality therefore must be applied by the court whilst testing the validity of any declaration or nomination or disclosures made by the candidate at the time of filing his nomination. Minor or technical irregularities that do not substantially impinge on the law should not be the basis of invalidation of the election results. Courtroom interventions after all should only happen where there are clear and blatant violations of the law that threaten fairness, legality, and constitutional principles, not otherwise. Referring to the judgments of Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh64 and Madhukar G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani65, the court reiterated that success of a candidate who has won at the election should not be lightly interfered with, and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirement of the law. Applying the aforesaid principles and precedents to the facts of the case at hand, the court observed that the respondent did not leave the relevant column blank but filled it as “NIL” insofar as the disclosure of ITRs of the previous four years were concerned. Whether such disclosure amounted to a material defect that would make the acceptance of R-1’s nomination improper attracting penal provisions of Section 100 is to be examined. However, her nomination form was not rejected by the Returning Officer, but was rather accepted resulting into ultimate success of R-1 during the elections by a huge margin. Such non-disclosure of ITRs will not amount to a corrupt practice, and resultantly election cannot be declared void under Section 100 of the Act. Referring to the judgment of Lok Prahari v. Union of India66 and S. Rukmini Madegowda v. Karnataka State Election Commission67, the court observed that mere failure to disclose assets in the affidavit if it does not constitute a material defect and not of a substantial character will not make the acceptance of the nomination paper improper thus invalidating the election. Non-disclosure irrespective of its gravity and impact would not automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature thereby materially affecting the result of the election or amounting to undue influence so as to qualify as a corrupt practice. “Right to know of the voter” about the candidate is absolute, but non-disclosure of each and every aspect of life cannot amount to corrupt practice.
The court also observed that petitioner admittedly had not raised any other issue regarding the accuracy or insufficiency of information related to assets, sources of income except the allegation that ITRs of the last four years and income from honorarium and pension were not disclosed. Observing that R-1 is a well-known political figure in her constituency; having a long political lineage, the people could be presumed to be aware of her work, reputation and her success shows that she was quite popular in the area otherwise. Therefore, merely because honorarium amount was not explicitly mentioned by the R-1 in her Form 26 affidavit it would not constitute material concealment. Likewise, an ITR merely provides a reference framework of the assets and sources of the income from the perspective of Income Tax Authorities for the purposes of levying income tax. It is a declaration in fiscal terms for assessment of the income tax authority intended for taxation on the assets and income received by a person, but not as a statement of fact of the existence of assets or source of income. As long as the assets, income and sources of income are otherwise disclosed and there is no dispute regarding the same, non-disclosure of ITRs for a certain number of financial years is just a technical defect and cannot be considered a defect of such a significant importance/nature that it will void the election. The court thus observed that R-1 did not make a false statement or attempt to mislead the voters by providing erroneous information about the net income or assets as required under Para 4 of the Form 26 affidavit. The present case admittedly was not concealment or misrepresentation of criminal antecedents, but just a lack of information concerning ITRs which is of inconsequential import.
The court further observed that it is not desirable to reject a nomination at the stage of scrutiny considering the fact that disputes relating to the correctness or non-disclosure of information may require a full-scale inquiry during the election trial. However, failure to raise any objection at the time of scrutiny before the nomination paper raises a question mark on the bona fides of the election petitioner, which prompts the court to minutely examine such a claim by the election petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no objection at the time of scrutiny before the Returning Officer, nor any material produced regarding the non-disclosure of any other material information by the returned candidate which would significantly affect the information regarding the disclosed assets and income of the returned candidate.
Accordingly, by not adopting a highly pedantic and fastidious approach, since the non-disclosure was not of a substantial character, it could not have influenced the election result or materially affected them. The disclosure requirement as far as assets and educational qualifications are concerned even though ordained through various judicial pronouncements should not be unreasonably stretched to invalidate an otherwise validly declared election over minor technical non-compliances, which are not of substantial character and should not be the basis for nullification of the people’s mandate. Accordingly, the civil appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
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(11) Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, In re68
(Delivered on 28-8-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar, JJ.
Authored by: Justice J.K. Maheshwari
The matter related to a reference made by the President of India under Article 317 of the Constitution of India, pertaining to allegations and accusations of misbehaviour. The President referred the matter for an inquiry and report to the Supreme Court as to whether the respondent, Ms Mepung Tadar Bage, member of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (for short, “APPSC”) ought to be removed on the grounds of misbehaviour. The tipping point of the whole set of allegations that led to the reference to the Supreme Court was the leakage of question papers for the Assistant Engineer Mains Examination conducted by the APPSC in August 2022. The reference was made with a proposal for the removal of Ms Bage.
The opening paras of the judgment emphasise upon the indispensable role of civil servants in the governance of the country. The court stated that to ensure that Public Service Commissions (for short, “PSCs”) and selection bodies remain completely impartial, free from any influence or outside pressure, Article 317 prescribes a stringent procedure for the removal of their members.
Facts of the case
The respondent was appointed as a member of the APPSC in August 2021 under Article 316 with the APPSC consisted of five members including the Chairman. When the Mains Examinations for the post of Assistant Engineer were convened in August 2022, one of the candidates appearing for the examination submitted a formal complaint to the Police Station, Itanagar that certain question papers were leaked in advance by the APPSC in conspiracy with certain coaching institutes. This led to the registration of an FIR against certain accused persons, whereafter the whole case was transferred to the CBI. In the midst of this criminal investigation, complaints were filed with the SIC (Vigilance), alleging the involvement of APPSC members, which led to the constitution of a three-member High-Level Inquiry Committee (for short, “Committee”) by the State Government. This “Committee” was to probe into irregularities in the Mains Examination on the various terms of reference (for short, “TOR”) made to the Committee. Bare reference to the TOR for which the Committee was constituted would show that no specific term/issue of reference was formulated in respect of the individualised actions of the Chairman or members of the APPSC. This committee submitted its report in October 2022, pointing out lapses in the Standard Operating Procedure (for short, “SOP”) with regard to maintaining the secrecy of question papers and other such lacunae. Various stipulations in the SOP were not followed by the APPSC. At this juncture, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh requested the Governor to place the matter before the President of India for making a reference to the Supreme Court for the removal of four members of the APPSC. Out of these four members three of them tendered their resignations with immediate effect and the sole member who remained was the respondent.
Meanwhile, the CBI also filed the charge-sheet in pursuance of the FIR earlier registered by the State and investigation transferred to it, wherein respondent was not named as an accused. The Deputy Secretary-cum-Deputy Controller of Examinations was found to be primarily responsible for leakage of the mains examination paper.
In the reference made by the President under Article 317(1) for the removal of the respondent, the questions for reference were also relating to “collective responsibility” of the respondent Ms Bage along with the Chairman and other members of the Commission to ensure confidentiality in Commission’s working as also the examinations conducted by it.
Issues framed by the court
After the reference was made by the President and the exchange of pleadings took place, the court formulated various issues for its consideration, which were as follows:
1. Whether the conduct of Ms Mepung Tadar Bage can be considered as “misbehaviour” within the meaning of Article 317 of the Constitution by reason of her failure towards ensuring complete integrity in all matters relating to the Assistant Engineer (AE) mains examination conducted by the APPSC in August 2022, and as such is liable to be removed as a member?
2. Whether the alleged vagueness of charges raised on behalf of the respondent-member can be an issue in the enquiry under Article 317 of the Constitution?
3. Whether there is any scope or room for raising the question of non-application of mind by any authority preceding the request for Reference made by the President of India under Article 317 of the Constitution?
4. Whether all the charges are duly proved against the respondent?
consideration and analysis by the court
Referring to Article 317 of the Constitution of India, the court observed that removal of any member of PSC shall be on the grounds of misbehaviour. Article 317 is enacted to afford greater protection and immunity to the members of the PSCs, who are otherwise susceptible to political pressure. It is only after adopting the rigors of Article 317 that the members can be removed and not otherwise through any other mode.
The court then proceeded to discuss the meaning and interpretation of the word “misbehaviour” as employed under Article 317 as interpreted by the Supreme Court earlier in various judgments and precedents. Referring to the CAD, especially the discussions that took place amongst the Constituent Assembly members, the court observed that the primary goal of enacting Article 317 was to ensure autonomy and independence of PSCs. Likewise, in Reference under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India, In re69, the Supreme Court reiterated that indulging in physical violence by a member of the PSC, he failed to maintain the standards of conduct and the same amounted to “misbehaviour” under Article 317. Referring further to the judgments of Ram Ashray Yadav, Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, In R/o70, it was stated that mere signing of a final selection list as the Chairman in discharge of official duties will not imply that the selection committee was influenced in favour of a candidate till and until specific material against such member was forthcoming to connect the lapse with extraneous considerations. Lapses per se cannot amount to misbehaviour. Though the Supreme Court held the respondent in the said case to be guilty of misbehaviour by indulging in non-disclosure of the participation of his daughter in the selection and examination process.
In the matter of Reference No. 1 of 200371 against the Chairman of Orissa Public Service Commission, it was held that Article 317 leaves it on to the Supreme Court to determine whether any particular act or conduct is of such a nature as to warrant removal of the Chairman on the grounds of “misbehaviour”. The expression generally refers to conduct which might erode the faith and confidence of the public at large in such high constitutional office and cannot be given a restricted meaning. It may include behaviour that was not expected of the holder, but would not definitely include “grave misconduct” or “proved misbehaviour”. Referring to the judgment of Krishna Swami v. Union of India72, the court reiterated that every act or conduct, error of judgment or negligent act by the higher judiciary per se does not amount to misbehaviour. Wilful abuse of judicial office, wilful misconduct in the office, corruption, lack of integrity or any other offence involving moral turpitude would be misbehaviour. It is different from the term “proved misbehaviour” under Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India. The difference between Articles 124 and 317 is that in the case of the latter, misbehaviour by a member of PSC has to be established in an inquiry conducted by the Supreme Court itself, whereafter only he can be removed. However, under Article 124(4), “proved misbehaviour” is a condition precedent for Parliament to move an address before the President for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court from the office, which has to be proved before a separate committee constituted under the appropriate legislation.
The court also referred to various law dictionaries and lexicons, to infer that the language employed under Article 317 makes it clear that removal and suspension of a member of PSC is in personam and not of the entire PSC or its members as a collective entity. It is specific to the conduct of the particular office bearer with respect to any act or omission constituting misbehaviour done in their official capacity. Misbehaviour cannot be adjudicated in vacuum, as Commissions were established as independent constitutional bodies to ensure that the process of recruitment in public services became insulated from political pressure, conducted with utmost fairness and transparency. Articles 315—320 of the Constitution of India are a complete code on PSCs, providing them independence for fair discharge of their functions, as well as ensuring their security and protection from any external interferences.
The court then proceeded to answer the charges framed and referred to it for being answered by the President of India after undertaking the aforesaid conceptual discussion. Charge 1 related to leakage of question papers for the Assistant Engineers alleging connivance with the functionaries of the Commission. However, the court observed that nothing has been brought on record to substantiate the respondent’s direct alleged connivance in leakage of the question papers and how far she was to be held responsible for not preventing it. The entire report prepared by the “committee” does not personally indict the respondent with any act or omissions which would have pointed towards her negligence in fulfilling her duties. In the criminal proceedings also, she was neither made accused nor anything was indicated regarding her involvement in paper setting, moderating or leakage of any question paper. Therefore, Charge 1 was not proved.
Answering Charge 2, which related to lapses in the previous examinations conducted by the APPSC since 2017, the court recorded that respondent was appointed as a member in August 2021 and there is no specific allegation that after her joining she was given any particular duty which required her to carry out such changes in the guidelines which she failed to carry out. The charge was therefore found to be completely vague and material brought on record before the court failed to evince any misbehaviour on the part of the respondent.
Answering Charges 3 and 5, relating to failure on the part of APPSC to take remedial action by bringing relevant changes in the examination guidelines to avoid leakage of the examination papers, the court found that the 2022 Guidelines which were in the process of being finalised for tackling the menace of leakage were put in abeyance with the common consensus of the Chairman and all the members of APPSC. Thus, the introduction of guidelines for the conduct of examinations cannot be presumed as a sole responsibility of the respondent, nor the failure can be attributed to her singularly. Furthermore, the respondent was not assigned the duties or responsibilities related to the recruitment of Assistant Engineers, which were assigned to some other members, rather she was assigned the work relating to law and judicial and legal matters pertaining to APPSC. There was no office order or any document which clarified the specific nature of duties to be discharged by members of the Commission, and no member was exclusively or solely assigned the task of revising the 2017 Guidelines. Since removal under Article 317 is individual and not collective in nature, therefore for the collective failure of the whole body, the respondent could not have been selectively targeted.
Discussing about the concept of “collective responsibility”, the court held that Article 317 does not envisage the principle of collective responsibility, unlike some other provisions of the Constitution. Referring to the judgments of Common Cause v. Union of India73 and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India74, the court reiterated that “collective responsibility” has two meanings; the first being that all members of a government are unanimous in support of its policies and would exhibit that unanimity on public occasions, even though they might have internally expressed their reservations or dissent during the formulation of such policies in the course of deliberations. The second being is that the ministers who had an opportunity to speak for or against the policies in the cabinet are thereby personally and morally responsible for its success and failure. It is a cornerstone of the Westminster model, which has its roots in Britain. However, in a parliamentary democracy the nuances of the doctrine are political, whereby to maintain “collegiality and coherence”, the ministers of the government work as a team. Since the Indian Constitution borrowed the cabinet form of government from the British constitutional theory, “collective responsibility” of the cabinet was specifically incorporated into India’s constitutional framework.
Referring to Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) Vol. 7, pp. 1159—60, the address of Dr B.R. Ambedkar on “collective responsibility”, the court observed that the same is enforced by keeping the Prime Minister at the center of the cabinet. He is the keystone of the arch of the cabinet and unless and until he advises for the nomination of any person to the cabinet, no person can take the position of the minister and likewise on his advice be dismissed from the said post.
The said principle of collective responsibility however cannot be incorporated and applied to PSCs as unless and until the member concerned of the PSC is directly responsible for the irregularities alleged in the charges framed against him, the question of he being guilty of misbehaviour would not arise. In the present case. admittedly when the facts nowhere showed that the respondent was solely responsible for preventing the leakage of papers or specific acts or omissions attributed to him for the said lapses, responsibilities cannot be imputed on him. She cannot be held liable in her individual capacity by carrying the weight of the entire Commission’s responsibilities exclusively, when the Chairman and other members have not been proceeded against for their removal.
The court accordingly held that the State requesting the President of India to initiate removal of the respondent is arbitrary, unfair and discriminatory. The allegations of misbehaviour against the respondent were not at all proved, rather they even failed to meet the threshold of “lapse”, to have triggered the process of removal. If the respondent is being proceeded against, it would in fact erode the roots of the constitutional intent behind Article 317. The court accordingly answered the reference by holding that none of the allegations or charges were found to have been proved, nor did they constitute any act of misbehaviour. Accordingly, the Supreme Court recommended for revocation of her suspension and, with the consequential entitlement of all the monetary benefits.
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(12) Reena Banerjee v. State (NCT of Delhi)75
(Delivered on 12-9-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta
The matter related to two different cases, relating to comprehensive implementation of statutory framework by the Central and the State Governments as provided under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short, “PWD Act”). In March 2014, the Supreme Court issued a slew of directions to States and UTs for protection of persons with cognitive disability in State-run institutions all over the country and various guidelines were issued to ensure compliance with accessibility standards for PWDs as provided under the PWD Act. The said directions were issued through the judgment of Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India76.
Background facts of the litigation
The writ petition under Article 32 was preferred for effective implementation of the PWD Act. The special leave petition which arose out of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court sought various reliefs including inquiries into deaths at observation homes, accountability of authorities, and improvements in conditions for children with disabilities. Through its judgment passed initially in the matter of Reena Banerjee v. State (NCT of Delhi)77, the Supreme Court directed all the States and UTs for appointment of competent administrators with a medical and administrative background to oversee all such institutions where children with disabilities were residing and directions were issued also for upgrading the manpower, staff, and infrastructure to national and international standards. A Central Advisory Board was constituted to receive responses and compliance reports from all the States and UTs. The advisory group accordingly prepared a comprehensive report, as also its recommendations for strengthening the institutional and legal framework governing the rights of PWDs.
Recommendations and institutional framework
The advisory group gave host of recommendations, ranging from blending medication with therapeutic, psychological, and psychosocial support system for handling of children with disabilities in care and rehabilitation houses and their compulsory enrolment in nearby government, private or special schools wherever possible, enrolled with the nodal agency, department or university of the government. The recommendations therefore were part of an ongoing shift towards an inclusive, rights-based framework enabling PWDs to live with dignity, autonomy and support within the community. On the basis of the said recommendations, the present proceedings were instituted before the Supreme Court seeking effective implementation and realisation of all the directions.
International and Indian framework on disability rights and accessibility
The court then proceeded to refer to various international and Indian frameworks concerning the PWDs. Referring to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (for short, “UDHR”), specifically Articles 1, 2 and 25, it reiterated that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (for short, “ICESCR”) further enforces the rights of PWDs through its Articles 6, 12, and 13 by obligating the State to remove physical, informational, and attitudinal barriers that impede the full enjoyment of such rights by persons with disabilities. Referring to the UNCRPD adopted and ratified by India in 2007 marks a paradigm shift from the “medical or charitable model” of disability to the “human rights and social model”. It mandates that PWDs are entitled to enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with others along with accompanying obligations on the State. Thus, the aforementioned international treaties and conventions impose a clear and affirmative obligation upon State parties to progressively realise the rights of PWDs including children, to live with dignity, autonomy and inclusion in society while ensuring that institutional settings are not converted into spaces of neglect, exclusion, or denial of rights.
Likewise, in India, in pursuance of its obligations under the UNCRPD, the RPwD Act came to be enacted. Various provisions of the RPwD Act affirm the principles of equality and dignity for PwDs, with Section 34 stipulating provisions concerning reservation for PwDs. The Indian judiciary also has played a pivotal role in reframing disability not merely as a medical condition, but as a type of structural disadvantage requiring active redressal, protection and inclusion within the constitutional framework. Referring to the judgments of Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India78 and Rajive Raturi v. Union of India79, the court held that discrimination against PwDs violates Articles 14 and 21 and their right to dignity is intrinsic to the right to life. The Union and State Governments were directed to make buildings, transport systems and websites accessible in conformity with Sections 44 and 45, RPwD Act. Likewise, in the judgment of Vikas Kumar v. UPSC80, the Supreme Court held that principle of reasonable accommodation must be responsive to the individualised needs of PwDs, rather than being confined to fixed or standardised benchmarks. Equal opportunity in employment processes cannot be achieved by applying uniform rules without having regard to the structural disadvantages that PwDs may face and emphasised that reasonable accommodation is intrinsic to substantive equality under Article 14. PwDs are to be treated as assets, not liabilities. A truly inclusive constitutional vision must move beyond the binaries of exception or achievement and recognise the right to equality being anchored in dignity, autonomy in every domain of life. Thus, inclusive education requires administrative flexibility, empathetic assessment and legal sensitivity to the evolving concept of equality for PwDs. Reasonable accommodation and the removal of barriers is a necessary facet of substantive equality, anchored also in the right to life under Article 21. State-run care institutions/homes must therefore be viewed through this expansive constitutional lens.
The Supreme Court accordingly directed that monitoring of the implementation of recommendations made by the Central Advisory Committee must be undertaken under the name and style of “Project Ability Empowerment” to be undertaken by eight National Law Universities (for short, “NLUs”) of the country. The eight NLUs in conjunction with the Advisory Group Expert Panel shall undertake extensive monitoring of all care institutions, whether State-run or private, including the efficacious implementation of the RPwD Act. The court also directed the said team members of “Project Ability Empowerment” to examine institutional policies and grievance redressal mechanisms as to whether PwDs are aware of and able to exercise their rights properly and ensure a robust enforcement framework. They must examine the feasibility and steps required to ensure that all PwDs residing in State-run care institutions are duly enrolled under the Aadhaar scheme. The court thus issued a slew of directions to the said committee.
In conclusion, it recorded that reservation arrangements for PwDs be also streamlined considering the grave discrimination being faced by them. The principle of upward movement as discussed and elaborated in the judgment of M. Nagaraj v. Union of India81, must be extended to PwDs also. The extent of reservation must extend to promotions also and the Union of India was directed to offer its suggestions in the said regard. The interlocutory applications on which the Supreme Court passed the aforementioned directions were accordingly disposed of.
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(13) M.S. Patter v. State (NCT of Delhi)82
(Delivered on 12-9-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice R. Mahadevan
The special leave petition (SLP) came to be preferred against the order of the Delhi High Court, which without passing a speaking order disposed of the application preferred by the petitioner seeking guidelines and directions for proper upkeep and maintenance of various beggar’s homes in the NCT of Delhi. Before the Delhi High Court, the public interest litigation (PIL) was filed on the basis of a news item, published in May 2000, which disclosed that a large number of beggars suffering from gastroenteritis were admitted in the hostels. Out of such hospitalised beggars, some of them even succumbed to the said ailment, which also got highlighted by the media. When the petitioner knocked on the doors of the Delhi High Court, a status report along with facts and figures was called for by the High Court, whereafter the PIL was disposed of through a non-speaking order permitting the petitioner to agitate their grievance before the competent authority. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred an SLP before the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner contended primarily that authorities misled the public and concealed real facts and figures, suppressing the reasons and issues behind the loss of valuable lives, especially that of beggars. The petitioner contended that even beggars are entitled to lead a dignified life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that the State is duty-bound and obligated to ensure safe, hygienic and good living conditions for beggars in the beggar’s home constructed and maintained by it for this purpose.
Challenging the aforesaid order passed by the Delhi High Court, the petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that the Delhi High Court disposed of the PIL without actually ascertaining the compliance of its earlier orders of October 2001 and without obtaining the final report of the Committee. The beggar’s homes continue to suffer from serious shortcomings, bottlenecks and problems across the NCT of Delhi.
Consideration and analysis by the court
The court discussed the legal position with respect to treatment of beggars and indigent persons. The same has oscillated between two diametrically opposite paradigms — criminalisation on one hand and compassion on the other; deserving poor on the one hand and undeserving poor, typically the able-bodied, unemployed, vagrants on the other. The latter were subjected to harsh punitive measures including confinement in workhouses, corporal punishment, or forced labour as a deterrent. The same attitude travelled to India under the British rule with the enactment of Maharashtra Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (for short, “MPB Act”), which design mirrored the Victorian and Edwardian suspicion of poverty as a moral failing, rather than a socioeconomic condition. Resultantly anti-begging statutes, even after independence, permitted arrest, detention and forced confinement of persons found begging without commission of any substantive offence. However, the Constitution of India provided for normative shift from a penal centric to a welfare centric approach for beggars by incorporating Articles 38, 39(e), 41 and 47 under DPSP. Referring to the judgment of Francis Coralie Mullin v. State (UT of Delhi)83, the court reiterated that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and that goes along with it the bare necessities of life, such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter. The State’s responsibility towards indigent persons is therefore affirmative and non-derogable. A beggar’s home maintained by the State is thus a constitutional trust, not a discretionary charity.
Referring to the judgment of Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, In re84, the court observed that when prisoners even are entitled to basic human rights, the same principle shall extend to beggars also. Beggar’s homes must be viewed not as an instrument of social control, but must be recognised as spaces of social justice. The Delhi High Court in Harsh Mander v. Union of India85 struck down certain provisions of MPB Act which criminalised begging holding them to be violative of fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. The State therefore has a duty to identify, care for and rehabilitate persons who have to resort to begging, due to poverty, disability or social exclusion.
The court then discussed the facts of the case at hand, where due to contamination of drinking and cooking water, cholera and gastroenteritis spread amongst the inmates of the beggar’s home, leading eventually to multiple deaths. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court appointed an Expert Committee and called for a report, in which it was informed to the High Court that action had been taken against the responsible officers, and steps are being taken to ensure that such incidents are not repeated subsequently.
In appeal, the Supreme Court called for a status report from the Government of NCT of Delhi about the status of quality of food and other amenities, services, hygiene being maintained at beggar homes. The report called by the Supreme Court disclosed that living conditions of inmates, including cleanliness and hygiene, were in a miserable state and staff working in beggar’s homes need to be increased considerably and upgraded. From time to time, the Supreme Court thereafter issued various directions for upgradation and improvement of living conditions for inmates in such beggar homes. Thereafter, after monitoring the same for a substantial period of time, the Supreme Court recorded its satisfaction that directions have been substantially complied with. The cumulative effect of these directions and compliance measures has been tangible improvement in infrastructure, health facilities, diet, sanitation and overall living conditions of inmates. Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed that the progress so achieved should not remain confined to the homes that were subject to scrutiny in the present case but must extend to all homes under the Government of NCT of Delhi.
The Supreme Court accordingly issued directions and guidelines with respect to beggar’s homes across the country to ensure that the institutions housing them have improved conditions that are being continuously maintained. These directions and guidelines related to the following heads:
1. Preventive healthcare and sanitation.
2. Infrastructure and capacity.
3. Nutrition and food safety.
4. Vocational training and rehabilitation.
5. Legal aid and awareness.
6. Child and gender sensitivity.
7. Accountability and oversight.
The State Governments and UTs were directed to maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates and to implement the aforesaid directions within six months from the date of the judgment. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of by the Supreme Court after recording satisfaction about the compliance of its various directions issued from time to time.
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(14) Mission Accessibility v. Union of India86
(Delivered on 3-12-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta
The Supreme Court in the present petition examined the accessibility of public examinations for candidates with disabilities (for short, “PwD”), particularly in the context of the Civil Services Examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (for short, “UPSC”). The case concerned two principal difficulties faced by PwDs: the timing and procedure for changing a scribe and the availability of laptops equipped with screen reader software along with accessible digital question papers. The petition was instituted by Mission Accessibility, an organisation working for the rights of persons with disabilities. The petitioner invoked the constitutional guarantees of equality, non-discrimination and dignity together with the statutory protections available under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (for short, “RPwD Act”). The court’s approach was directed towards ensuring that accessibility measures do not remain merely formal commitments, but are translated into practical arrangements enabling persons with disabilities to participate meaningfully in public examinations.
The petitioner through the present petition challenged the requirement under the Civil Services Examination process that candidates requiring a scribe furnish the relevant scribe details at the time of submitting their application. It was contended that candidates, particularly visually impaired candidates should instead be allowed to provide or modify such details closer to the examination, when the need for a particular scribe could be more accurately determined. The petition also sought permission for eligible visually impaired candidates to use laptops containing screen reader software at all stages of the Civil Services Examination. Alongside this the petitioner sought accessible digital versions of question papers for candidates opting for that facility. The reliefs were framed principally around Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as well as the RPwD Act with the petitioner asserting that the existing requirements created an unnecessary barrier to equal participation in the examination process.
Proceedings before the court
The Supreme Court allowed the Department of Personnel and Training (for short, “DoPT”) to be impleaded and directed the UPSC to consult it on the concerns of candidates with disabilities, particularly regarding the change of scribes. UPSC informed the court that around 27 requests had been received and stated that each would be considered individually, while inviting further requests. The court directed UPSC to entertain eligible candidate’s requests for a change of scribe until that date and decide each application objectively through a reasoned order within three working days. The court also sought clarification on providing screen reader software to visually impaired candidates in the upcoming preliminary examination. While concerns were raised about the absence of clear criteria and documentary requirements for changing scribes, UPSC assured the court that applications would be dealt within the prescribed period and explained that providing screen reader software would require the facility to be extended to all eligible candidates, for which it lacked the necessary logistical infrastructure before the examination.
A significant development occurred during the subsequent proceedings, when the court was informed about an additional affidavit filed by UPSC, stating that it had undertaken a comprehensive review and had in principle decided to introduce screen reader software for visually impaired candidates appearing in examinations conducted by the Commission. The Commission acknowledged the importance of the measure, but explained that immediate implementation was constrained by the absence of the necessary infrastructure.
The UPSC did not maintain its own examination infrastructure and depended substantially upon the infrastructure, logistical arrangements and personnel of State Governments, district authorities, schools and colleges where its examinations were conducted. It therefore stated that the screen reader facility would be introduced after the necessary infrastructure and software had been tested and found adequate, with due regard to examination security and integrity.
The petitioner accepted the principle behind UPSC’s decision, but argued that merely pronouncing the policy was insufficient. According to the petitioner, UPSC had not yet provided a definite implementation plan, operational framework or timeline for establishing the technological infrastructure necessary to make screen reader software genuinely available to candidates. UPSC subsequently informed the court that it was coordinating with the National Institute for the Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities (for short, “NIEPVD”), the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (for short, “DEPwD”) and State authorities. It stated that the facility would be made operational from the next examination cycle, following testing and standardisation.
Resolution by the court
Accessibility must be converted into practical implementation
The Supreme Court observed that a substantial portion of the grievances raised in the petition had been addressed by the UPSC’s decision to introduce screen reader software. The court recognised this decision as an important step towards improving accessibility and equal opportunity for candidates with disabilities. At the same time, the court found that the decision remained incomplete because the practical mechanism for implementing it had not yet been fully established. UPSC’s dependence on external examination infrastructure, together with the absence of a definite implementation roadmap and timeline, meant that further institutional coordination was necessary.
The court therefore emphasised that accessibility cannot remain confined to a policy document or an administrative declaration. Concrete planning, coordination between institutions and uniform technical standards were required to ensure that the proposed objective actually became available to candidates in examinations.
Directions regarding change of scribe
The Supreme Court directed UPSC to incorporate, in every examination notification issued by it, a clear provision enabling candidates entitled to a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days before the examination. Such a request must be objectively examined and UPSC must communicate its decision through a reasoned order within three working days of receiving the request.
Directions regarding screen reader software
The court required UPSC to submit a comprehensive compliance affidavit within two months with a proposed plan of action for introducing screen reader software; the timeline for implementation; the modalities governing its use; the proposed testing, standardisation and validation of the software and associated infrastructure; and the feasibility of making the facility available to all eligible candidates from the next examination cycle. The court also directed UPSC in coordination with the DEPwD and NIEPVD to formulate uniform guidelines and protocols governing screen reader software and other assistive technologies. These protocols were intended to maintain consistency in accessibility, while also protecting the security and integrity of examinations across the relevant examination centres.
The court did not place the entire burden upon UPSC. It directed the Union Government, through the DoPT and the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, to provide necessary administrative and technical assistance for implementation. The Union Government was also directed to facilitate coordination with State Governments and examination authorities whenever necessary, recognising that UPSC relies upon external institutions and infrastructure for conducting its examinations.
While directing greater accessibility the Supreme Court expressly required that implementations should preserve the sanctity, confidentiality and fairness of the examination process. Thus, the court’s directions were not framed as requiring accessibility at the expense of examination security; instead, the objective was to develop appropriate technological and procedural safeguards so that assistive technology could be incorporated without compromising the integrity of the competitive examinations.
The court ultimately connected the directions with the constitutional guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and dignity, particularly under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India read with the RPwD Act. The court stressed that the measures contemplated for candidates with disabilities were intended to give meaningful effect to these guarantees rather than operate merely as formal concessions. The rights of persons with disabilities should not be understood as matters of charity or benevolence. They form part of the constitutional commitment to equality, dignity and non-discrimination reflected in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition in terms of the observations and directions contained in the judgment. The court directed UPSC to implement the measures concerning the change of scribes and screen reader software and required the Commission to submit a compliance affidavit. The matter was accordingly disposed of.
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(15) Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India87
(Delivered on 19-12-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Augustine George Masih, JJ.
Authored by: Justice Vikram Nath
In the present appeal, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between the statutory restrictions governing passports and an individual’s constitutional right to personal liberty and travel abroad. The principal question was whether the pendency of criminal proceedings against a person automatically prevents the re-issuance of an ordinary passport for the normal period of 10 years, even where the criminal courts concerned have permitted renewal while retaining control over the person’s foreign travel.
Factual background of the case
The appellant was an Indian citizen holding an ordinary passport issued on 29 August 2013, which was valid till 28 August 2023. He was an accused in a case investigated by the National Investigation Agency (for short, “NIA”). The NIA subsequently registered the matter, and the allegations of extortion concerned, collection of levies, and related activities in coal mining areas, including alleged funding of a proscribed organisation. The appellant was arrayed as Accused 18 and was charge-sheeted for offences including those under the Penal Code, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908.
The appellant had earlier challenged the cognizance taken by the NIA Court before the Jharkhand High Court. In February 2020, the High Court directed him not to leave India without prior permission and required him to deposit his passport before the trial court. His challenge was subsequently dismissed and the SLP filed against the dismissal was also rejected by the Supreme Court.
The appellant was later arrested in the NIA case. In April 2022, the Jharkhand High Court directed his release on bail, subject to conditions to be imposed by the NIA Court. The NIA Court required him to deposit his original passport, which was already in its custody. Apart from the NIA proceedings, the appellant had also been convicted in a CBI coal block case by the Special Court, New Delhi. He challenged the conviction before the Delhi High Court, subsequently the High Court suspended the sentence, but retained the condition that he could not leave India without the court’s permission.
As the appellant’s passport was nearing expiry, the NIA Court permitted its release for the limited purpose of renewal, subject to an indemnity bond, surety and an undertaking not to obtain a visa or travel abroad without prior permission, with the renewed passport to be deposited immediately. The Delhi High Court also found no reason to deny renewal for the regular 10-year period. After his passport expired, the appellant applied to the Regional Passport Office, Kolkata, disclosing all pending proceedings and restrictions and produced the relevant court orders.
The Passport Authority however, refused to issue a regular 10-year passport, relying on Section 6(2)(f), Passports Act, 1967, G.S.R. 570(E) notification88 and the 2019 Ministry of External Affairs Office Memorandum, on the ground that the NIA Court had permitted renewal, but had not expressly authorised foreign travel. The Calcutta High Court’s Single Judge Bench dismissed the petition, holding that statutory restrictions applied to renewal/reissuance and that no permission to travel abroad had been granted. The Division Bench affirmed this decision, holding that Section 6(2)(f) operated as a statutory embargo in view of the pending criminal proceedings and conviction, and that a regular 10-year passport could not be issued without an appropriate order permitting departure from India.
Issues before the court
The main issue before the court was:
1. Whether the passport authority was justified in refusing to reissue the appellant’s ordinary passport for the normal period of 10 years, merely because criminal proceedings were pending against him and there was a subsisting conviction, despite orders of the Delhi High Court and NIA Court permitting passport renewal subject to restrictions on foreign travel.
Resolution by the court
The Supreme Court held that Section 6(2)(f), Passports Act is not an absolute bar to passport renewal merely because criminal proceedings are pending. The provision must be read with Section 22, G.S.R. 570(E), and the 2019 Office Memorandum, which together provide a mechanism for issuing or renewing passports subject to judicial supervision. The Supreme Court found that the NIA Court and the Delhi High Court had already imposed safeguards by requiring the appellant to obtain prior permission before traveling abroad and, in the NIA proceedings, to redeposit the passport. These conditions sufficiently protected the criminal courts’ jurisdiction, making a blanket refusal of renewal unnecessary.
The court further clarified that permission to renew a passport is distinct from permission to travel abroad. G.S.R. 570(E) did not require an applicant to identify and obtain approval for a specific future foreign journey before a passport could be renewed. Possession of a passport merely enables a person to seek a visa and potentially travel; it does not itself confer an unrestricted right to leave India. Accordingly, the passport authority could not insist upon details of a future journey over which the criminal courts retained control for every proposed departure. The NIA Court and the Delhi High Court orders, when read together, were sufficient to establish the required judicial permission, including the appellant’s entitlement to a regular 10-year passport.
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the appellant’s pending CBI criminal appeal independently attracted Section 6(2)(f). Relying on Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu v. CBI89, the court distinguished between pending criminal proceedings and an appeal against an already recorded conviction, holding that the mere pendency of a criminal appeal could not be treated as a Section 6(2)(f) bar. The court further clarified that the expiry of the previous passport did not create any additional disability. The relevant question remained whether any statutory ground for refusal continued to operate after applying the exemption under Section 22 and G.S.R. 570(E).
Placing the issue in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the court reiterated that the right to travel abroad and the right to possess a passport formed part of personal liberty, referencing decisions including Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam90, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India91, and Union of India v. Naveen Jindal92. Restrictions on these rights must therefore be fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the legitimate objective sought to be achieved. Since the criminal courts had already ensured that the appellant could not travel without their permission, completely denying passport renewal imposed a restriction greater than what was necessary to secure the administration of criminal justice. The court accordingly found no justification for denying the normal 10-year validity period.
Finally, the court clarified that its ruling did not affect the powers of the criminal courts or the passport authority in the future. The criminal courts remained free to modify or impose conditions concerning foreign travel, while the passport authority retained its statutory power under Section 10 to impound or revoke the passport if requisite circumstances arose. The judgment was confined to the interaction between the relevant provisions of the Passports Act, the G.S.R. 570(E) notification, the 2019 Office Memorandum, and the facts of the case without expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal proceedings.
Conclusion
The court allowed the appeal and set aside both the judgments of the Division Bench as well as the Single Judge. The court directed the respondents to reissue the appellant’s ordinary passport for a normal period of 10 years, subject to completion of the usual procedural requirements within four weeks.
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(16) State of T.N. v. Governor of T.N.93
(Delivered on 8-4-2025)
Coram: two-Judge Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Authored by: Justice J.B. Pardiwala
The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India came to be filed by the State of Tamil Nadu being aggrieved by the action of Governor with respect to various bills forwarded to him by the legislature of the State of Tamil Nadu (for short, “LSTN”) for approval; inaction on the files relating to prosecution of public servants and investigation against various eminent political personalities; pendency of proposals relating to appointment of members to TNPSC under Article 316 of the Constitution of India. The questions arose with respect to powers of the Governor in withholding his assent for the bills forwarded by the LSTN or reserving them for consideration for the assent of the President.
Factual matrix of the case
The LSTN between January 2020 and April 2023 enacted and forwarded 12 Bills to the Governor of Tamil Nadu (for short, “GoTN”) for grant of assent as per Article 200 of the Constitution of India, which were however kept pending and became a subject-matter of inaction on the part of the Governor. When a writ petition was filed earlier against the said inaction, the GoTN eventually took a decision in November 2023 of withholding of consent to 10 Bills, without conveying any message to the latter for their reconsideration. The LSTN convened a special session and repassed the 10 Bills returned by the Governor after withholding of assent and again forwarded them to GoTN for his approval. In November 2023, on the ground that the 10 Bills suffered from repugnancy for being contrary to Union List of Schedule VII, the Governor without the aid and advice of Council of Ministers (for short, “CoM”) reserved the said repassed Bills for the consideration of the President for grant of presidential assent. It is this conduct on the part of the Governor which became a subject-matter of challenge eventually in the writ petition pending before the Supreme Court. The President in turn withheld assent to 7 Bills out of the 10 Bills, granted assent to only 1 Bill and kept others pending to consider the remaining 2 Bills. Providing a tabular chart, the court referred to the factual conditions, viz. that the Bills which were withheld at the presidential level on the ground that the subject-matter of the Bills pertains to and overlaps with the legislative sphere of the Union under List I Schedule VII to the Constitution of India.
Issues for consideration
On the basis of contentions of the parties, the Supreme Court framed following issues for its consideration:
1. What are the courses of action available to the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 200 of the Constitution of India? Whether the first Proviso provides an independent course of action in addition to the three options provided under substantive part of Article 200 and how should the expression “the Bill falls through unless the procedure under the first Proviso is followed”, be construed? Whether Article 200 envisages an “absolute veto” or “pocket veto” of any Bill by the Governor?
2. Whether the Governor can reserve a Bill for consideration of the President when it is presented to him for assent after being reconsidered and repassed by the State Legislature in accordance with first Proviso to Article 200, especially when in the earlier round of consideration, he never reserved it for the President’s consideration and declared withholding his assent simpliciter?
3. Whether there is an express constitutionally prescribed time-limit within which the Governor is required to act under Article 200 and the import of expression “as soon as possible” under first Proviso?
4. Whether the Governor under Article 200 is expected only to act in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the CoM and that there is no discretion available to him in the scheme of Article 200?
5. Whether exercise of discretion by the Governor under Article 200 is amenable to judicial review and what are the parameters thereof? Likewise, whether withholding of assent by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India can also be treated as amenable to judicial review?
6. What is the manner in which the President under Article 201 is expected to act, once the Bill is reserved for his consideration under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?
Historical background of assent to Bills
The court then started consideration of the issues posed before it, discussing the historical background of assent to Bills, culminating in enactment of Article 200 under Chapter III, Part VI of the Constitution of India. Contrasting it with Section 75, Government of India Act, 1935, the court found that the visible difference between both the provisions is that the expression “in his discretion” had been omitted from both the substantive part of Article 200, as well as the first Proviso thereto. The first Proviso never had the mandatory requirement of Governor’s assent if the Bill was passed again by the House. The second Proviso to Article 200 is a new addition, which was not existing earlier. The court then observed that under Article 200, the Governor has three options, viz.:
(a) that he assents to the Bill;
(b) that he withholds assent to the Bill;
(c) that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President.
The use of expression “shall” obligates the Governor to exercise any one of the three options available to him, all of which are mutually exclusive of each other and the Governor can choose only one of them at a time. In other words, therefore, the Governor cannot assent to a Bill and also reserve it for consideration of the President at the same time when the Bill comes back after reconsideration/repassing by the State Legislature. Referring to the judgment of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh94, the court observed that the Governor cannot do both, viz. withholding assent to a Bill and also reserving it for the consideration of the President at the same time.
The requirement of Governor’s assent was introduced for the first time in 1916, when any Bill passed by the Imperial Legislative Council had to receive the assent of the Governor-General before it became the law. The Government of India Act, 1919 also introduced Section 12, wherein the Governor had various options when a Bill was presented to him for assent. However, under this provision there was no mandatory requirement of assenting to a Bill upon its presentation after reconsideration, a requirement which is there under first Proviso to Article 200. Thus, at the time of drafting of the Constitution, the framers not only had before them Section 75, Government of India Act, 1935, but also Section 12, Government of India Act, 1919 despite which they chose to go for Article 200 without the expression “in his discretion” for the Governor.
The court also referred to debates of the Constituent Assembly (for short, “CAD”) which took place during the drafting of Article 200. The court referred to the address of Dr B.R. Ambedkar on 30 July 1949, wherein he stated that in a responsible government, there cannot be any room for the Governor acting “in his discretion”. The majority of members also agreed with the view of Dr B.R. Ambedkar itself.
Referring to developments post the commencement of the Constitution qua Article 200, court referred to reports of various Commissions which undertook exhaustive analysis of working of constitutional machinery pertaining to Centre-State relations, the focal point of which was interrelation between Articles 200 and 201. Referring to the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966, Rajamannar Commission, 1971, it was mentioned that the Constitution does not provide for the issue of any instructions to the Governor, nor does it vest any discretionary powers in express terms upon him. The Sarkaria Commission constituted in June 1983 also stated that powers of reservation of any Bill under Article 200 by the Governor by withholding his assent should be exercised only in rare cases where the Bill is patently unconstitutional. However, the Governor cannot act contrary to the aid and advice of the CoM merely because in his personal capacity he does not favour the policy embodied in the Bill. On the ground that Union is likely to pass a comprehensive legislation on the same subject-matter, consent cannot be withheld by the Governor of any Bill passed by the State Legislature. This is because the Parliament retains its power always to amend, vary or repeal any State legislation even after its enactment, under Article 254 of the Constitution of India and therefore Presidential or the Governor’s assent should not be withheld on the ground that the Union is contemplating a comprehensive law on the same subject- matter in future. The Sarkaria Commission further sounded a note of caution stating that policy considerations should not ordinarily be treated as a valid ground for withholding Presidential assent and the Union Executive is required to exercise at most caution, circumspection and restraint in exercise of supervisory powers under Article 201. This is more so especially in respect of subject-matters falling squarely within the State’s competence, wherein the President should not withhold assent only on consideration of policy differences except on the grounds of patent unconstitutionality.
The Sarkaria Commission also recommended against inordinate delay in disposal of State Bills by the Governor or the President when it is reserved for his assent. Strict timelines were proposed by the Commission to be treated as salutary conventions within which the Governor or the President must take their decisions, timelines ranging from an immediate decision to a maximum of four months applicable to the President, where the Bill is reserved for his assent. The Commission accordingly recommended strongly that needless withholding must be avoided by the Governor as well as the President.
The Punchhi Commission constituted in 2007 on Centre-State relations also delved into the role of Governor. Interpreting Article 163(2), the Commission took a view that language of Article 163(2) cannot be taken to mean that the Governor has a general discretionary power to act against the aid and advice of the CoM and such an area of exercise of discretion is limited and even in this limited area the Governor’s choice of action should neither be arbitrary nor fanciful. This Commission also recommended for fixed time-limits/timelines within which the Bills must be assented to.
The Supreme Court as part of its discussion also referred to the international jurisprudence on assent to Bills, specifically the United Kingdom, where the Royal Assent Act was enacted in 1967 by the British Parliament. The long-established convention was followed that the monarch will not withhold any Bill which has received approval from both the Houses. The only ground on which assent may be withheld, that too solely on ministerial advice, is that the Bill has failed to comply with mandatory procedural requirements or there has been a change in government between the Bill’s approval and its presentation for assent. The legal position in other countries was also referred to by the Supreme Court.
Issue-wise analysis and consideration by the Supreme Court
The court answering this issue observed that the first Proviso to Article 200 is in the form of an Explanation, which is clear from the use of the expression “may” therein. The Governor is precluded from withholding assent, once the contingency under the first Proviso materialises. The ultimate decision whether to accept the advice of the Governor or not when the same is being returned back to the legislature belongs to the legislature alone. This is clear from the expression “if the Bill is passed again … with or without amendment”. If the first Proviso is not read in juxtaposition to the power to withhold assent conferred by the substantive part of Article 200 the Governor would otherwise be in a position to virtually veto the functioning of the legislative domain by a duly elected legislature by simply declaring that assent is withheld without any further recourse. This course of action would be contrary to the fundamental principles of constitutional democracy based on a parliamentary pattern where the Governor under Article 168 is bound by the constitutional regime. The first Proviso comes into play only when the Governor decides to return the withheld Bill along with a message containing his reasons for not granting assent thereto. The only obligation upon the State Legislature on return of the Bill by the Governor is to mandatorily take into consideration the suggestions contained in the message sent by the Governor along with the Bill. The State Legislature however is not under an obligation to mandatorily introduce any amendment suggested by the Governor and it may even proceed to repass the Bill without any amendments. The expression “falls through” refers to those situations only where the State Legislature elects not to pass the Bill for reconsideration again and in such circumstances causing the Bill to lapse. The use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first Proviso makes it clear that the Constitution has imposed a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. It does not confer a discretion upon him to decide whether to act in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the first Proviso. The use of the word “shall” along with the word “accordingly” is only for the limited purpose that if the State Legislature in its discretion does decide not to allow the Bill to “fall through” by taking it up for reconsideration, then the scope of such reconsideration must at the very least encompass the suggestions of the Governor and it cannot be construed as a substantive obligation on the part of the State Legislature to necessarily incorporate the suggestions/amendments suggested by the Governor. The Bill will fall through only if it is not passed again by the State Legislature, after being returned by the Governor. Thus, the substantive part of Article 200 must be read in conjunction with the first Proviso, whereunder the constitutional object of ensuring that law-making machinery (State Legislature) keeps on running unhindered is duly achieved. The Governor therefore under Article 200 does not possess any “absolute veto”, but is envisaged merely as an intermediary stop in the journey of the Bill towards becoming an Act. Thus, in none of the circumstances can the Governor permanently keep a Bill with him without according assent to it, nor can he declare a simpliciter withholding of assent thereby killing the Bill with the due passage of time.
The court further observed that withholding of assent by the Governor cannot be construed to be the same as denying assent or as conferring a power on the Governor to veto legislation passed by the State Legislature. Once the Governor returns the Bill with his suggestions, thereafter he is bound to signify his assent thereto when the Bill is reconsidered, repassed and forwarded again by the State legislature to him. He would be precluded from reserving the Bill for the consideration of the President. The Governor cannot simpliciter withhold assent to Bills without specifying the reasons for such withholding or without making recommendations as regard the desirability of introducing any amendments by the State Legislature while reconsidering the Bills.
Applying the aforesaid principle in the present case at hand, the court held that the Governor could not have reserved the Bills for consideration of the President, once they were reconsidered by the State Legislature and presented to him without any amendments, particularly when the Governor himself sent back the Bills to the legislature without any message on an earlier occasion.
The court then dealt with the question as to whether any express constitutionally prescribed time-limit can be read into Article 200, when it does not envisage either the exercise of a “pocket veto” or an “absolute veto” by the Governor. Referring to the CAD, especially the discussions between Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Shri P.S. Deshmukh and Shri H.V. Kamath, the court mentioned that all members conceived a sense of urgency on the part of the Governor in granting assent to Bills forwarded by the legislature. For this reason, the expression “as soon as possible” came to be incorporated under Article 200.
Referring to the judgment in Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of W.B.95, the court discussed the import of the expression “as soon as may be” appearing under Article 22(5). Drawing an analogy, the court mentioned that the expression denotes the required exercise to be undertaken with a sense of urgency, to be done with due promptitude and expedition. Referring further to the judgment of Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly96, the court reiterated that decisions by a constitutional authority must be arrived at within a fixed time- frame to ensure that the avowed constitutional objective is achieved. Referring further to the judgments in State of Telangana v. Governor of Telangana97 and Ram Chand v. Union of India98, the Supreme Court observed that where for the exercise of any power no time limit has been prescribed, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period of time and cannot be subjected to delay in a manner that violates or circumvents the object of the statute and the constitutional mandate. Though, there is a certain degree of immunity with respect to exercise of powers by the Governor under the Constitution, but at the same time courts have the power to judicially review the functioning of the Governor on certain grounds. One of the examples being non-exercise of these powers is as under Article 161, for the exercise of judicial review as the said provision pertains to the liberty of individuals and any inexplicable delay not on account of the prisoner’s is inexcusable. Therefore, despite there being no prescribed time-limit for the Governor to take a decision under Article 200, the said constitutional provision cannot be read in a manner allowing the Governor to inordinately delay the assent over the Bills presented to him and essentially roadblock the law-making machinery in the State. The inaction of the Governor would clearly be subject to judicial review and in the absence of any cogent reasons for the delay courts can issue directions for a time-bound decision on a case-to-case basis.
Referring to the judgment of Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala99, the court mentioned that absence of any provision as to the time-limit within which the Governor or the President should reach a decision suggests that constitution- makers were aware that the said Bill would not lapse on the dissolution of the assembly. That is why no time-limit was prescribed under Articles 200 and 201. The court applying the doctrine of “constitutional continuity of the State Legislature” as an institution mentioned that absence of any specific time-limit was not interpreted in the judgment of Purushothaman Nambudiri in the context of inaction on the part of the Governor in granting assent to Bills tabled before him. However, the settled law is that where no time-limit for the exercise of any power is prescribed, it should be exercised within a reasonable period. The prescription of time-limit by the judiciary leaves it open always to the Governor to justify the delay caused by providing reasonable grounds, which justification for the delay becomes justiciable and courts would be able to examine the same. The prescription of time-limit by the judiciary is with a view to ensure that the Governor is not conferred with the power of exercising a “pocket veto” under Article 200 or hinder the law-making process in the State without existence of any reasonable grounds. The State Governments are not remediless in such cases of malicious, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by the Governor.
The court referring to various judgments, Periyammal v. V. Rajamani100 and Keisham Meghachandra Singh case stated that prescription of time-limits for the discharge of constitutional functions or exercise of powers by the judiciary is not unusual. Accordingly, the Supreme Court fixed the following timelines for the Governor to exercise his powers under Article 200, failure to adherence of which would make the inaction of the Governor subject to judicial review by the courts:
(a) In case of either withholding of assent or reservation of the Bill for the consideration of the President upon the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor is expected to take such an action forthwith subject to a maximum period of one-month;
(b) In case of withholding of assent contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor must return the Bill together with a message within a maximum period of three-months;
(c) In case of reservation of Bills for the consideration of the President contrary to the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the Governor shall make such reservation within a maximum period of three months.
The court held that failure on the part of the Governor to comply with the timelines so prescribed would be amenable to judicial review.
The court then examined the issue as to whether the Governor in exercise of powers under Article 200 is bound to act only on the aid and advice tendered to him by the CoM. Discussing the role and office of the Governor under the Constitution of India, the court observed that with the introduction of Government of India Act, 1935 an era of provincial autonomy and accountability of the Ministers to the legislature was introduced. However, on declaration of independence of the country, until the Constitution came into effect, provisions of Government of India Act, 1935 with suitable modifications were adopted as India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 (for short, “The Adaptation Order”). In the said Adaptation Order, references to “acting in his discretion” and other such independent powers of the Governor were clearly omitted.
Referring to CADs, the Supreme Court observed that Governors were to be appointed through nomination and not through election. This was done to ensure that the Governor would be a person above party politics and would not attempt to override the State Government with his actions. He was supposed to be a close link between the Center and the provinces and avoid the clash between provinces and the Center. For this reason, to avoid separatist provincial tendency, the idea of elected Governor was done away with.
Referring to the CADs further on exercise of discretion by the Governor, the court observed that the Governor was normally expected to act on the advice of the CoM, except insofar as the exercise of his discretion is covered by those articles in the Constitution in which he is specifically empowered to act in his discretion. The retention of discretionary powers in the Governor was at the conclusion of CAD agreed to be contrary to responsible government in the States/Provinces and to the said extent therefore Government of India Act, 1935 was being undemocratic. After extensively referring to CADs, the Supreme Court thus concluded that the Governor plays a very crucial role in the political structure of the country, being a bridge between the governments at the Central and the State level, the proverbial buckle which ties the States with the Center. He is a representative of the Union and the other as a constitutional head of the State, being a “friend, philosopher and guide” of the State Government as well as the people. It referred to the celebrated quote of Sarkaria Commission that, “There is considerable truth in the saying that undue centralisation leads to blood pressure at the Center and anaemia at the periphery. The inevitable result is morbidity, and inefficiency. Indeed, centralisation does not solve but aggravates the problems of the people.”
Referring to the judgment of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab101, the Supreme Court observed that the limited area where express discretion has been conferred upon the Governor under Article 200 is vide the second Proviso, even against the advice of the CoM. The logical sequitur to this is that under Article 200, otherwise there is no scope for the Governor acting in his discretion other than the second Proviso. The Supreme Court in the Samsher Singh case thus allowed for a very limited scope of discretion for the Governor in certain exceptional situations in light of Article 163(2) of the Constitution of India. The discretion vested with the Governor has to be ascertained from Article 163(2), which is always within the scope of judicial review. Thus, any discretion exercised beyond the Governor’s jurisdictional authority can always be examined judicially. The Governor may in very limited cases reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, which cases are few and far between under the Constitution. Even such a decision has to be taken on the advice of the CoM, as it is the State Government which would advise the Governor to reserve the Bill for such a consideration. The reference to the President needs to be detailed and specific so as to enable him to undertake an effective consideration of the reserved Bill. It is the CoM only which is best equipped to assist and enable the Governor to make such a detailed reference to the President, with the Governor acting as a bridge between the two. In extremely limited and rare cases would the Governor be justified in reserving the Bill for consideration of the President without the aid and advice of the CoM. The deletion of the expression “in his discretion” both from the substantive part of Article 200 as well as from the first Proviso at the time of finalisation of the Constitution is also reflective of the intentions of the framers of the Constitution that ordinary exercise of the Governor’s functions must be in accordance with the aid and advice tendered to him by the CoM. The Governor under the constitutional scheme is no longer envisaged as the Governor under the Government of India Act, 1935, having the ultimate power to veto any legislation and subvert the collective will of the people. Rather, he has to mandatorily abide by what the CoM advises to him. The only exceptions to the aforesaid general rule as delineated by the Supreme Court were specified as follows:
(a) Where the Bill is of a description as provided under the second Proviso to Article 200;
(b) Where the Bill is of a nature covered by Articles 31-A, 31-C, 254(2), 288(2), 360(4)(a)(ii) etc. wherein assent of the President is a condition precedent before the Bill can take effect as law or is necessary for the purpose of securing immunity against the operation of some constitutional provision;
(c) Where the Bill is of a nature that, if allowed to take effect, then it would undermine the Constitution by placing the fundamental principles of a representative democracy in peril as described in M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P.102
Referring to the celebrated quote of Thomas Fuller stating: “Be you ever so high, the law is above you”, the court stated that the Rule of Law under our constitutional order transforms all public power into responsible, responsive, regulated exercise informed by high purposes and geared to people’s welfare. Referring to the Constitution Bench judgment of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India103 and B.P. Singhal v. Union of India104, the Supreme Court observed that the yardstick of subjecting any act or a decision to judicial review is not whether it is a legislative act or an executive decision on a policy matter, but whether it violates any constitutional guarantee or the rights under Part III of the Constitution. The “doctrine of political thicket” does not apply in the Indian constitutional framework. It cannot be argued that actions of the President or the Governor being essentially political in nature are immune from judicial review. Referring further to the judgment of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India105, the court reiterated that the jurisdiction of courts is not ousted merely because a question has a political colour. Every constitutional question irrespective of the political complexion or make thereof, falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. The court held that whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the limits of its authority or not is for the courts to decide. As long as it involves determination of a constitutional question the courts cannot decline to entertain it, when manifestly there is an unauthorised exercise of power under the Constitution of India. The concept of justiciability is not synonymous with judicial review. Thus, the contention cannot be accepted that the exercise of power to reserve a Bill is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, even when it is exercised by the Governor in his own discretion and against the aid and advice of the CoM. Referring to the judgment in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd.106, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is always authorised to examine the records of any proceedings to ascertain the extent to which assent was sought for from the President and the same would not amount to deciding whether assent was rightly or wrongly given.
Once the assent is granted by the President, the State law would prevail qua earlier other law enacted by Parliament only to the extent to which assent has been sought and with respect to that part for which no assent has been sought, nor reserved for the consideration of the President, it cannot be contended that the State law would prevail over all other laws which were not even the subject-matter of the assent. Whether procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law is followed or not can always be looked into by the court. The rationale laid down in the Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. case, in the context of Article 254(2) would apply squarely to bills reserved for consideration of the President by the Governor under Article 201 as well. The specific reference must contain details as regards the purpose why the consideration of the President is sought by the Governor. The reasons and the view of the CoM being the voice of the people must accompany such a reference which the Governor otherwise is not capable or reasonably and comprehensively positioned to do. The Governor is also bound to act as per the advice of the CoM regarding sending the reasons and purposes for consideration or assent by the President.
If the President or the Governor exercises the option of withholding of assent under Article 111 or Article 200 respectively, then they are obligated to communicate the reasons for such withholding in the form of a message to the House or Houses of the legislature. Likewise, if there is any reservation of Bills for the consideration of the President, then such reservation must also reflect detailed reasons for enabling the President to “consider” the desirability of according assent to the Bill so received. The reservation of Bills by the Governor for the consideration of the President is a part of the legislative procedure and thus courts can always examine such references for determining its legality and constitutional veracity. The President is expected to exercise the powers as conceived under Article 201 and if his exercise of powers does not align with this fundamental object, it would be susceptible to a greater degree of judicial scrutiny. It would not be open to the President to withhold assent without ascribing reasons as regard the doubt raised by the Governor to such a Bill. It is the Constitutional Courts which are conferred with the power of arriving at a final decision and the object of Article 201 is not to thwart the legislative procedure of the States by withholding of assent, even with respect to areas falling within the exclusive domain of States on grounds of legality.
If therefore the reservation made by the Governor is found to be irrelevant, mala fide, arbitrary, unnecessary or motivated by extraneous considerations, then it would be liable to be set aside. Inaction by the Governor to the Bills forwarded to him by the State Legislature beyond the time limit would warrants the issuance of writ of mandamus by the competent court against the Governor directing decision on the Bill concerned.
Where the Bill is reserved for assent of the President and the Bill appears to be patently unconstitutional for placing the principles of representative democracy in peril, the withholding of assent by the President would involve purely legal and constitutional questions and even the same would be justiciable. Therefore, it would be prudent for the President to obtain the advisory opinion of the court by way of reference under Article 143 and to dispel any apprehensions of bias, arbitrariness and mala fide. The President in such cases must obtain the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court under Article 143. The court accordingly summarised its findings on the judicial review of exercise of power by the President under Article 201 in withholding assent to a Bill as follows:
(a) Where the Bill which is under consideration is pertaining to a provision of the Constitution where primacy has been given to the Union Government in taking a decision keeping in consideration the desirability of having certain uniform standards of national policy, then the limited grounds of judicial review would be based on arbitrariness, mala fide, etc.
(b) Where the Bill which is under consideration pertains to a subject-matter or domain within which State Legislature has been accorded primacy, and the reservation of the Bill is by the Governor contrary to the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, then in exercise of judicial review the courts would be competent to look into the reasons for withholding of assent and whether they are legally tenable or not, besides the grounds of mala fide and arbitrariness, etc.
President’s role under Article 201 when the Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor
The court then considered the manner in which the President under Article 201 is required to act once a Bill has been reserved for his consideration by the Governor under Article 200. Comparing Article 201 with Articles 111 and 200, the Court observed that Proviso to Article 201 does not place any such obligation on the President to mandatorily accord assent to a Bill which is placed before him after reconsideration by the State Legislature. The expression “shall not withhold assent therefrom” present under Article 200 is missing under Article 201. Thus, the President is not bound to accord assent to a Bill even when it is presented to him for the second time. The special object behind the enactment of Article 201 and its importance in the quasi-federal structure of the country was also discussed and elaborated in the judgment of Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. case.
However, long and undue delays in the disposal of references pending before the President cannot be treated as acceptable. Such delay would have the effect of keeping the Bills, which are an expression of the popular will in an indefinite and uncertain state of abeyance. The implications of inaction on the part of the President being of a serious nature and detrimental to the federal fabric of the Constitution, there cannot be any scope therefore for delay even on the part of the President under Article 201. The court then referred to various Office Memorandums of the Central Government, which imposed timelines on various stakeholders surrounding the discharge of constitutional functions under Article 201. These Office Memorandums reveal the existence and acceptance of strict time-bound action consistent with the aims and object of Article 201. Accordingly, the Supreme Court adopted the timeline prescribed by the Ministry of Home Affairs and held that the President is also required to take a decision on the Bills reserved for his consideration by the Governor within a period of three months from the date on which such reference is received. The States are also expected to extend cooperation by furnishing answers to various queries which may be raised by the President. There can be no withholding of assent without furnishing of reasons and the Constitution does not contemplate any “absolute veto” by the President or the Governor. The reasons assigned by the President for withholding of assent must be communicated to the State Government concerned and after due consultation with the State Government the President may either declare assent to the Bill or may declare that he withholds assent thereto. However, at the same time, the procedure should not be reduced to an endless cycle of back and forth, without any chance for fruition of the aspirations of the polity of the State on mere technicalities. Therefore, ordinarily a Bill must be sent back for reconsideration by the President to the State Legislature only once. At the same time, any Bill appearing to be unconstitutional to the President must be assessed by a judicial mind. For this reason, only both Sarkaria Commission as well as the Punchhi Commission categorically recommended the President to seek the opinion of the Supreme Court under Article 143 in respect of Bills that may be apprehended to be patently unconstitutional. This will enable the President to judicially examine the constitutionality of any Bill and accordingly enable the President to take action in respect thereof under Article 201.
The court thereafter observed that “Constitution is not a maze, but a labyrinth.” Although both may semantically appear to be one and the same there is a very fine but discernible difference between the two. In a maze one may lose their way within the multiple overlapping paths, with each of them leading to a dead end, however in a labyrinth, one eventually finds the way and the process also comes out more enlightened. The Constitution expects the President to be a soothsayer, easing the sails for the Governor.
The Supreme Court on a reference made to it under Article 143 can always refuse to express its advisory opinion upon being satisfied that the questions presented to it are purely socioeconomic or political questions and have no relation to the Constitution, an approach in consonance with the “doctrine of political thicket”. Accordingly, the court held that withholding of Bills is against the very fundamentals of a representative democracy based on direct elections.
Conclusions and directions
After undertaking the discussion as aforementioned, the court returned the following conclusions and directions accordingly:
1. The reservation by the Governor of the 10 Bills for the consideration of the President in the second round was therefore illegal, erroneous in law and liable to be set aside. Any subsequent action taken upon the said Bills by the President also does not survive and is thus set aside. The 10 Bills are deemed to have been assented to by the Governor on the date when they were presented to him after being reconsidered/repassed by the State Legislature;
2. The President is required to take a decision within a time-bound period, even where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of any power under Article 201. Therefore, the President is required to take a decision within a period of three months from the date on which such reference is received from the Governor by him.
Snippets from the history
Before closing the judgment, the Supreme Court referred to a snippet of history from the days of infancy of the Constitution of India, as narrated in the “Eminent Parliamentarians Monograph Series on Dr Rajendra Prasad”. An issue arose during the deliberations on the Hindu Code Bill wherein the first President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad expressed reservations and sought to assert his independent authority to withhold assent to the new legislation. When a reference was made to the first Attorney General for India, Mr M.C. Setalvad, he clarified that the role of President under the Constitution of India was analogous to that of the British Monarch and he was expected to serve as a constitutional figurehead. The Attorney General reminded the President that he does not possess the authority to act contrary to the advice of the CoM and this opinion of the Attorney General was accepted with respect and magnanimity by the then President. The controversy, therefore, between the Prime Minister and the President was laid to rest. Quoting this historical snippet, the court observed that such was the commitment shown by stalwarts to upholding the spirit of the Constitution and the Governor and the State Government therefore should work in tandem and harmoniously keeping the interest and well-being of the people as their paramount consideration. The writ petitions were accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid directions.
*Practising Advocate, Supreme Court of India & an expert in Constitutional, Civil & Commercial Laws.
**Fourth Year Student, Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur.
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