Supreme Court: In an appeal raising an important question concerning the scope of compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act) as to whether appellant, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), could be saddled with liability, for grievous injuries suffered by the claimant when a branch of a roadside tree fell upon an autorickshaw in which he was travelling, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., held that falling of a tree branch during heavy rain may constitute an unforeseen natural occurrence beyond the contemplation of authorities, however, it does not by itself, constitute an accident “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” within the meaning of Sections 165 and 166 of the Act, specially when the vehicle plays no active or proximate role in causing the injury and its presence is merely incidental. Therefore, the Court held that, in such circumstances, fastening liability upon the appellant under the Act would be unfair.
Nevertheless, taking note of the claimant’s life-altering injuries, including permanent paraplegia, and invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court enhanced the compensation to ₹ 25 lakhs and directed its payment in the interest of complete and humane justice.
Factual Matrix
On 23 June 2007, Respondent 1 was travelling in an autorickshaw from Queens Road to Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru. Owing to heavy rainfall, he requested the driver to stop the vehicle on the roadside until the rain subsided. The road was lined with old trees, some stated to be nearly a century old. While the autorickshaw was stationary beneath one such tree, a branch detached and fell upon the vehicle, causing serious injuries to the claimant. He was immediately admitted to Mallya Hospital and underwent treatment.
Claiming that the accident had rendered him permanently disabled, he instituted a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bengaluru (Tribunal), seeking compensation of ₹ 50 lakhs. The Tribunal dismissed the claim on 10 April 2013, holding that the incident was the result of a natural calamity.
The Karnataka High Court, in the first round of litigation, dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay. The claimant approached the Supreme Court, which remanded the matter for reconsideration on the issue of non-condonation of delay. Thereafter, in the second round of proceedings, the High Court allowed the appeal and awarded compensation of ₹ 17,10,500 and apportioned the liability as 25 per cent upon BBMP, 50 per cent upon the insurer of the autorickshaw; and 25 per cent upon the Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka.
Aggrieved, the BBMP challenged only the fastening of liability upon it before the Supreme Court.
Issue for Determination
Can BBMP be held liable under the Act for the injuries sustained by Respondent 1 that were caused due to the falling of a roadside tree branch on the vehicle by which the Respondent 1 was travelling, but had stopped under the tree waiting for the rain to subside and then proceed further?
Analysis
At the outset, the Court undertook an extensive review of jurisprudence relating to act of God. It referred to Nichols v. Marsland, (1876) 2 Ex D 1, where exceptionally heavy rainfall caused artificial ponds to overflow, damaging neighbouring property. Although liability was sought to be imposed under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868 LR 3 HL 330, the Court accepted ‘Act of God’ as a valid defence because the flooding was not reasonably foreseeable. In The Majestic, 1897 SCC OnLine US SC 84, the US Court described an act of God as an inevitable accident occurring without human intervention and incapable of prevention by human prudence. It was emphasised that such events arise exclusively from natural forces and are independent of human agency.
The Court further referred to S. Vedantacharya v. Highways Department of South Arcot, (1987) 3 SCC 400, wherein it was observed that heavy rains and floods are not beyond the contemplation of authorities responsible for public infrastructure. Since preventive measures had not been shown to have been taken, the High Court’s dismissal of the claim was reversed and compensation awarded. In Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 12 SCC 1, extensive flooding and damage to agricultural lands occurred due to release of water from an overfilled dam following extraordinary rainfall. The Supreme Court discussed the exception of vis major to strict liability and observed that an act of God is a direct, violent, sudden and irresistible act of nature which could neither reasonably be anticipated nor resisted by human care and skill. The Court reiterated that such events need not be unique but must be extraordinary and beyond reasonable anticipation.
The Court acknowledged that trees located along city roads are under the supervision of municipal authorities. Consequently, the Corporation bears a responsibility to maintain them and ensure that periodic upkeep is undertaken so as to avoid accidents. Municipal authorities are expected to keep trees healthy and to undertake maintenance in the interests of public safety.
However, the Court simultaneously recognised practical realities. Urban boundaries continue to expand and municipal bodies serve ever-increasing populations. It would be unrealistic to expect a constant vigil over every tree and shrub within city limits. Likewise, although it may be conceivable that an old branch might eventually give way, public authorities cannot be expected to cut every branch merely because such a possibility exists.
The Court clarified that it was not trivialising the claimant’s injuries nor excusing the Corporation from its maintenance duties. Nevertheless, on the facts of the case, neither the claimant’s act of taking shelter beneath the tree nor the falling of the branch could be regarded as events within the contemplation of the authorities or the driver. The occurrence was an unfortunate and unforeseen incident. In such circumstances, fastening liability upon the Corporation under the Act would be unfair.
The Court noted that Section 166 of the Act permits claims arising from accidents described in Section 165(1), namely, accidents involving death, bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of motor vehicles. The Court referred to Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530, which gave a broad interpretation to the expression “use of a motor vehicle” and stated that the expression “use” includes situations where a vehicle is stationary and not in motion. Likewise, the expression “arising out of” has a wider meaning than “caused by” and includes situations connected with the use of a vehicle even where the causal link is less immediate.
Applying these principles, the Court held that although the respondent happened to be inside the autorickshaw when the branch fell, the vehicle itself played no active role in the occurrence. The accident was not caused by the operation, movement or condition of the vehicle. The presence of the autorickshaw was merely incidental. The vehicle was not part of the proximate cause of the accident. Consequently, a claim specifically under Section 166 of the Act was not an appropriate remedy. Therefore, it was held that such an incident does not properly fall within the ambit of compensation claims under Section 166 of the Act.
Further, the Court noted that compelling the claimant to initiate another round of litigation for compensation would delay relief to a person who had suffered life-altering injuries. Referring to the medical evidence recorded by the High Court, which showed total paraplegia of both lower limbs; bladder and bowel incontinence; and healing fracture with implants in good position, the Court opined that justice required a humane approach.
The Court further observed that even the compensation awarded by the High Court was inadequate and reflected an overly technical approach inconsistent with settled principles governing assessment of damages.
Decision
Accordingly, invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹ 25,00,000 together with interest as directed by the High Court from the date of filing of the claim petition.
Significantly, while deciding that liability could not legally be imposed under the Act in the manner contemplated, the Court chose not to disturb the High Court’s apportionment of liability among BBMP, the insurer and the Horticulture Department in order to ensure immediate and effective relief to the injured claimant. It directed that the compensation amount and interest were to be deposited directly into the claimant’s bank account payment within 4 weeks.
[Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1111, decided on 11-6-2026]
*Judgment by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case:
M/S. Nuli & Nuli, AOR with Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv., Mr. Suraj Kaushik, Mr. Nanda Kumar K. B., Mr. Dharm Singh, Ms. Akhila Wali, Mr. Abhishek Kanyalur, Ms. Divya Sinha, Mr. Ashritsai Torgal, and Ms. Tanya Chillar, Advs., Counsel for the Appellants
Ms. Shweta Garg, AOR, Ms. Patil Rekha Chandra Gouda, AOR, Ms. Manjeet Chawla, AOR with Mr. Ashish Gopal Garg, D.A.G., Mr. Rakesh Garg, Mr. Pankaj Seth, Ms. Jyoti, Adv. Ms. Shruti Jain and Mr. Jadhav Vishal, Advs., Counsel for the Respondents
