Orissa High Court: While hearing a criminal appeal against conviction under Section 450 Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), a Single Judge Bench of Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J., observed that the trial court had acquitted the accused under Section 376 IPC, holding that the sexual relationship was consensual. Perusing the trial court’s verdict, the Court held that mere entry into property is not sufficient, as the entry must be accompanied by the requisite criminal intent as defined under Section 441 IPC, and in the case of Section 450 IPC, such intent must be to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the essential ingredients of Section 450 IPC had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the present case and therefore set aside the conviction and sentence.
Background
The prosecution alleged that on 7 August 2021, at about 11:00 PM, the accused entered the informant’s house during his absence and committed rape upon his wife. A written report was lodged the following day, leading to registration of a police case. The trial court, while acquitting the accused under Section 376 IPC on the ground that the sexual relationship between the parties was consensual, nevertheless convicted him under Section 450 IPC.
In appeal, the accused contended that the conviction was illegal and contrary to law, pointing to inconsistencies in witness testimony, absence of corroborative medical evidence, and delay in lodging the FIR. It was emphasised that the relationship was consensual, a fact supported by the statements of the victim and medical officers.
The State, however, argued that even if the sexual relationship was consensual, the offence of house-trespass under Section 450 IPC was made out, since the accused had entered the house without authority during night hours.
Analysis and Decision
The Court emphasised that Section 450 IPC contemplates house-trespass committed in order to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life, and therefore the intention at the time of entry is determinative.
The Court observed that the trial court itself had recorded a finding that the sexual relationship was consensual in nature, with no evidence of physical violence, resistance, or forcible entry, since the victim had opened the door for the appellant. It was further noted that the parties were in a prior intimate relationship.
The Court highlighted that once the charge of rape has not been sustained and the relationship has been held to be consensual in nature, the foundation for invoking Section 450 IPC must be independently examined. The Court also observed that if the entry was not with the intention of committing rape or any other offence punishable with imprisonment for life, the essential ingredient of Section 450 IPC cannot be said to have been established.
The Court emphasised that though the trial court proceeded on the reasoning that the victim, being the wife of the informant, had no right to permit the appellant to enter the house during the absence of her husband, and that even if the relationship was consensual, such entry was illegal, the Court opined that criminal liability must be founded strictly upon statutory ingredients and not upon considerations of moral or social impropriety.
The Court further noted that consensual sexual relationships between adults fall within the ambit of personal autonomy and privacy protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, as recognised in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39. The Court observed that in the present case, once the trial court had already established that the relationship between the appellant and the victim was consensual in nature, the mere fact that the victim was a married woman cannot render the entry ipso facto criminal so as to attract Section 450 IPC.
The Court emphasised that the foundational requirement of criminal trespass as defined under Section 441 IPC remains unestablished. The Court noted that once the allegation of rape has been rejected on merits, the inference that the appellant entered the house with intent to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life cannot be sustained in the absence of independent evidence establishing such intent.
The Court concluded that the essential ingredients of Section 450 IPC have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the conviction was unsustainable. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence under Section 450 IPC were set aside.
[Ajit Kishan v. State of Odisha, 2026 SCC OnLine Ori 595, decided on 13-2-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: A. Ray, Adv.
For the State: Udit Ranjan Jena, AGA
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