Kerala High Court: In a writ petition centred on the legality of an Internal Complaints Committee (‘ICC’) constituted by Kollam Bar Association (‘KBA’) under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (‘POSH Act’), a Single Judge Bench of P.M. Manoj, J., held that only an ‘employer’ of a ‘workplace’ could constitute an ICC as per Section 4 of the POSH Act. Since bar association is not an ‘employer’ within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the POSH Act, the ICC constituted by KBA was contrary to the POSH Act. Accordingly, the Court set aside the ICC’s report on the alleged sexual harassment.
Background
The petitioner and Respondent 3 (‘victim’) were members of the KBA, which was registered as a Company in 1937 under Section 26 of the Travancore Companies Regulation 1 of 1092. The victim preferred a complaint before KBA alleging misconduct on the part of the petitioner when she had visited him to discuss a document’s notarisation. A police complaint was also filed which led to the registration of an FIR alleging offences under Sections 354, 354A(1)(i), 354(1)(ii), and 354(1)(iv) of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’). Subsequently, based on the complaint preferred by the victim on 15-6-2024, the President of KBA constituted an ICC as provided under Section 4 of the POSH Act. The ICC submitted a report after enquiry, which was challenged in the present petition. The petitioner also sought relief against KBA’s suspension order.
The petitioner argued that the incident admittedly took place in his private residence and not at a ‘workplace’. It was contended that KBA was not an employer of either party, that no employer-employee relationship existed, and that KBA functioned more like a club than an establishment covered under the POSH Act. The petitioner further argued that KBA employed only one woman employee and therefore had no obligation to constitute an ICC, and in such a case the statute contemplated recourse to a Local Committee where establishments had fewer than ten employees. He also emphasised that disciplinary jurisdiction over advocates lay with the Bar Council of Kerala and not with an ICC created by KBA.
On the other hand, KBA stressed that it acted bona fide, particularly because the matter involved allegations by a junior member against a senior member, and because the issue had attracted widespread media attention. It stated that the petitioner never objected to the ICC’s jurisdiction at the initial stages, participated in the enquiry, and raised the challenge only after realising that the ICC’s report was unfavourable.
The ICC argued that the writ petition was defective due to non-joinder of necessary parties, because Rule 7 of the POSH Rules do not provide representative capacity to the Chairperson in legal proceedings. It was argued that POSH Act does not require a strict employer—employee relationship, and an ‘aggrieved woman’ may be anyone who alleges harassment, and therefore, it was not necessary that the victim should be an employee of either the petitioner or KBA. It was submitted that the petitioner’s residence was also being used for professional purposes, and therefore, it could not be treated as a purely private place or residential dwelling.
Similarly, the victim argued that the writ petition itself was not maintainable, since KBA was not a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. She further contended that she was subjected to sexual harassment at the petitioner’s office, an advocate who operated his office from his residence. Since her visit was not for any personal purposes, the incident could be treated as sexual harassment which occurred during an official visit to the petitioner’s office. She submitted that KBA was empowered to proceed against dishonourable or unprofessional conduct.
Analysis and Decision
The Court observed that the Bar Council of Kerala is the responsible body for the Advocates within the territory of the State to enrol a person, maintain that person in the rolls, take disciplinary action against them, and is also responsible for their welfare. The Court opined that although the Advocates Act, 1961, does not specifically mention anything about Bar Associations, the Kerala Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 1980, provides for their registration and recognition and prescribes its duties which include maintaining a register of Advocates and intimating the Bar Council of any professional fraud.
The Court relied on Abdul Azeez v. Alappuzha Bar Association, 1992 SCC OnLine Ker 401, and Jose Kuttiyani v. High Court Advocates Association, 2003 SCC OnLine Ker 328, and held that the Bar Associations are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court considered Section 2(g) of the POSH Act and observed that as far as an advocate is concerned, the petitioner’s role does not qualify under any of the authorities mentioned in the said provision. The Court opined that ‘employer’ meant someone who exercised control over a workplace in the context of an employment relationship and discharged contractual obligations towards employees.
The Court observed that the Bar Association could not be treated as an ‘employer’ and therefore, the formation of the ICC did not qualify under the mandate of Section 4 of the POSH Act. The Court held that the constitution of the ICC by KBA was itself against the objective and specific requirements of Section 4 of the POSH Act, and consequently, the report submitted by the ICC had no legal basis to stand upon.
Accordingly, the Court set aside ICC’s report without addressing the other contentions.
[X v. Kollam Bar Assn., 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 1199, decided on 27-1-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: S. Sreekumar (Kollam), S. Navas, K. Vijayan, Namitha Rajesh, Nithya V.D., S. Sreekumar (SR.), Advocates.
For the Respondents: K. Siju, T.S. Maya (Thiyadil), C.M. Mohammed Iquabal, S. Abhilash, Anjana Kannath, Mariya Jose, Istinaf Abdullah, Shehsad A.S., P. Abdul Nishad, Dhilna Dileep, Thasneem A.P., K.A. Sunitha, Advocates.