UK High Court of Justice: The present case concerned a challenge to the legality of Metropolitan Police Service’s policy, entitled “MPS Overt LFR Policy Document” (the Policy), in relation to the deployment in London of live facial recognition technology (LFR). The Bench of Holgate and Farbey, JJ., stated that the purpose of LFR deployment is to locate persons on police watchlists, and any deployment not aimed at locating such persons would fail under the Policy. Further, the inclusion of additional persons on watchlists, even without a direct connection to the deployment location, did not create any greater intrusion on innocent individuals’ rights, and therefore did not undermine the foreseeability or legality of the Policy. Thus, the Court held that the Policy was both “in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” and therefore did not violate the claimants’ rights under Articles 8, 10, or 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
Background
LFR is used by the police for crime prevention and detection, locating missing persons, and protecting the public. The technology uses movable cameras to capture facial images in public places, converts those images into biometric data, and compares them against police watchlists to identify possible matches. If no match is found, the biometric data is automatically deleted and unmatched faces are blurred from officers’ view. Where a match is detected, an alert is generated for officers to review and determine whether any further action is required. The system is capable of scanning a substantial number of faces within seconds during a deployment.
The claimants did not contend that the use of LFR was unlawful in principle or in all circumstances. However, they argued that its increased deployment in recent years had given rise to significant civil liberty concerns. They contended that LFR involves the extraction of biometric data, can be deployed without the knowledge or consent of individuals, and is often used on a large scale in crowded public places where most persons scanned are not suspected of any wrongdoing. The claimants also highlighted the risk of false identification, which may lead to intrusive questioning to establish a person’s identity.
Issues
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Whether the Policy violated Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy).
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Whether the Policy violated Articles 10 and 11 ECHR (freedom of expression and assembly).
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Whether the Policy allowed arbitrary police decision-making due to excessive discretion in the deployment of LFR.
Key Features of the Policy
The policy allowed LFR deployment only in three defined use cases:
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Crime Hotspots: Small geographical areas with elevated crime rates or rising crime trends.
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Protective Security Operations: Use during public safety events or around critical national infrastructure.
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Specific Intelligence Operations: Deployment at locations where police intelligence indicated that a sought person was likely to appear.
The policy also:
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imposed watchlist restrictions,
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required written authorisation,
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mandated proportionality assessments,
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required equality and community impact assessments, and
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established oversight structures and officer training obligations.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
A. The “who” and “where” questions
The claimants argued that the Policy allowed the police to deploy LFR at arbitrary locations without sufficient connection between the individuals on watchlists and deployment sites. However, the Court rejected this contention and held that the Policy interconnected, the purpose of deployment (why), the categories of persons on watchlists (who), and permitted deployment zones (where).
The Court stated that the purpose of LFR deployment is to locate persons on police watchlists, and any deployment not aimed at locating such persons would fail under the Policy. Thus, this means that an application for resources for the deployment of LFR that is not designed to locate people will fail. Further, the inclusion of additional persons on watchlists, even without a direct connection to the deployment location, did not create any greater intrusion on innocent individuals’ rights, and therefore did not undermine the foreseeability or legality of the Policy.
B. Proportionality standards
The Court rejected the claimants’ argument that the Policy merely restated general legal principles without imposing real constraints on police discretion. The Court observed that Section 6 of the Policy lays down a clear, practical, and structured framework to guide officers when deciding whether deployment of LFR is justified in a particular situation.
The Court further noted that the Policy specifically addresses potential interference with Article 8 ECHR rights by recognising that expectations of privacy vary depending on the location of deployment. It expressly identifies sensitive places such as schools, clinics, hospitals, and private venues as areas where privacy concerns may be engaged more intensely, thereby requiring greater scrutiny before deployment is authorised.
In relation to Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, the Court emphasised that the Policy expressly requires decision-makers to consider whether the use of LFR may have a “chilling effect” on lawful protest, assembly, and free expression. The Policy also incorporates detailed guidance and a structured three-stage proportionality assessment to ensure that any interference with fundamental rights is properly justified. Importantly, the Policy recognises that the more serious the interference with rights and the greater the number of persons affected, the less likely it is that the deployment of LFR would be proportionate.
Accordingly, the Court held that the proportionality framework meaningfully constrained police discretion, adequately addressed risks to democratic freedoms and privacy rights, and operated as an effective safeguard against arbitrary deployment of LFR technology.
Thus, the Court held that the Policy was both “in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” and therefore did not violate the claimants’ rights under Articles 8, 10, or 11 ECHR.
[The King (On the Application of Shaun Thompson and Silkie Carlo) v. Commissioner of Police, Case No. AC-2024-LON-001764, decided on 21-4-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Claimants: Dan Squires KC, Aidan Wills and Rosalind Comyn (instructed by Bindmans LLP)
For the Defendant: Anya Proops KC, Robert Talalay and Raphael Hogarth (instructed by Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services)
For the Intervener: Dee Masters and Joshua Jackson.
