Russia is a party to the New York Convention, its provisions have been implemented into national procedural legislation; therefore, the national court verifies whether grounds for refusing enforcement exist, which fully correspond to Article V of the New York Convention.
Russia has set a course toward becoming an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction
At the beginning of December 2025, the Government of the Russian Federation approved1 the National Model of Target Business Conditions until 2030, which marked the beginning of a major reform of commercial arbitration.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and, after its succession, the Russian Federation has been a party to the New York Convention since 19582 and has extensive practice in enforcing foreign arbitral awards. Russia is also a party to the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Geneva, 1961) and the Moscow Convention on the Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Arising from Relations of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1972), which together form a comprehensive international treaty framework for arbitration.3
Russian legislation provides the following rules for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. The procedure for seeking enforcement in Russia involves applying to a national court at the debtor’s place of residence or the location of its assets in Russia. The application is reviewed within one month by the court of first instance. Since Russia is a party to the New York Convention, its provisions have been implemented into national procedural legislation; therefore, the national court verifies whether grounds for refusing enforcement exist, which fully correspond to Article V of the New York Convention. After the application for enforcement of the award is granted, the ruling becomes effective and the award can be enforced, although a subsequent appeal may delay enforcement. The right to enforcement is confirmed by a writ of execution. The writ is then presented to the Federal Bailiff Service, which is responsible for execution. It is worth noting that the one-month review period, while relatively short by international standards, does not account for time spent on appeals, which can extend the overall enforcement timeline considerably. Under current practice, multi-instance appeal proceedings can prolong the process by several additional months or even years, undermining the predictability that international commercial parties expect from an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.4
Aggregated statistics on cases seeking enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and judgments show that in 2025, Russian courts approved enforcement in approximately 60 per cent of cases,5 which is a rather low figure.
The long-overdue reform aims to address this issue and improve the statistics by 2027, increasing the rate of enforcement approvals to 85 per cent.
Furthermore, the following objectives in the field of arbitration have been outlined:
1. Currently, the venue for hearing an application for enforcement of an award depends on the debtor’s location or the location of its assets, as indicated above. It has been proposed to consolidate cases in a single Commercial Court of a State or judicial district in matters concerning the enforcement of foreign court judgments or arbitral awards, thereby resolving the issue of ensuring sufficient qualification of judges. Specialised Commercial Courts in major judicial districts have already developed substantial expertise in arbitration-related matters. Centralisation is expected to reduce inconsistencies in case outcomes and create a more predictable enforcement environment for foreign award creditors.6
2. The most common ground for refusing enforcement of awards is violation of public policy, resulting from an expansive interpretation7 of this ground. For example, this provision is invoked when refusing enforcement in the event of the initiation of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings, the existence of a Russian Court judgment between the same parties on the same subject-matter, the refusal of an Arbitral Tribunal to reduce contractual penalties in accordance with Russian substantive law, and so on. As a result of the reform, it is proposed to legislatively establish the parties’ right to prohibit courts and Arbitral Tribunals from revising the amount of contractual penalties, which will stabilise court practice in this matter. The broad application of the public policy exception has long been identified as one of the principal obstacles to Russia’s standing as an arbitration-friendly seat. International practitioners have frequently criticised the unpredictability created by its expansive interpretation, noting that it effectively converts the non-review principle into a mechanism for substantive re-examination of awards. Legislative clarification of this ground would therefore represent a significant step toward aligning Russian practice with prevailing international standards.8
3. Russian legislation provides for a multi-tiered appeal procedure against a court ruling issued following the review of an application for enforcement of an award, which may prolong enforcement. As a result of the reform, it is proposed to grant arbitral awards rendered by arbitrators included in the list of Russian permanent arbitral institutions the same force as writs of execution issued by State courts. This approach is innovative for Russia and will simplify the procedure for enforcing arbitral awards. Granting arbitral awards direct executive force is a concept already in use in several European jurisdictions and reflects broader efforts to reduce reliance on State court intermediation in the post-award phase. For parties operating under time-sensitive commercial arrangements, this change could significantly reduce the cost and delay currently associated with obtaining enforcement.9
4. Under current Russian legislation, a procedural order of an Arbitral Tribunal imposing interim measures is not binding. To obtain binding interim measures, a party must apply to a State court. As a result of the reform, it is proposed to introduce effective procedures for ordering interim measures in support of arbitration. This reform objective aligns Russia’s approach with international best practice: Under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law (as revised in 2006) and the rules of leading institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Arbitral Tribunals have broad powers to grant interim relief, and national courts are required to recognise and enforce such orders. Introducing an effective domestic mechanism for Tribunal-ordered interim relief would remove a significant practical disadvantage for parties choosing Russia as a seat of arbitration.10
5. Under current Russian legislation, State courts provide assistance to arbitral proceedings, which includes: appointment, challenge, and termination of the powers of an arbitrator, obtaining evidence, and ordering interim measures, including the preservation of evidence. At present, there are gaps in the legislation regarding the obligation of State courts to observe confidentiality in relation to arbitration disputes. This issue is expected to be resolved as a result of the reform. Confidentiality is a fundamental feature of arbitration and a key reason parties choose it over litigation. The current legislative gap creates a risk that sensitive commercial information disclosed in arbitral proceedings could be exposed through court proceedings, discouraging parties from utilising Russian arbitral institutions for high-stakes disputes.11
6. Currently, the Russian Court system is largely automated, and document flow occurs both in paper and electronic form. However, since arbitral institutions are not part of the State court system, document exchange between them is difficult. When challenging an award or reviewing an application for its enforcement, a court has the right to request case materials. As a result of the reform, it is proposed to facilitate the exchange of materials between Russian permanent arbitral institutions and State courts. Seamless digital exchange of procedural materials between arbitral institutions and courts would reduce delays associated with paper-based requests for case files and improve the overall efficiency of challenge and enforcement proceedings. This is a practical improvement that, while administrative in nature, has direct bearing on the timeline experienced by parties in post-award proceedings.12
7. Under current legislation, public procurement remains non-arbitrable due to existing legal provisions. This prohibition has also been extended by judicial practice to contracts entered into in execution of a State contract. These issues have also been set forth as objectives to be regulated as a result of the reform, which will provide greater stability to participants in civil transactions. The non-arbitrability of public procurement disputes has been a notable limitation, given the volume of commercial activity carried out through State-related contracts in Russia. Extending arbitrability in this area would open an additional category of disputes to private resolution, providing a faster and more commercially tailored alternative to State court proceedings for businesses operating in the public sector supply chain.13
In the area of recognition and enforcement of foreign State court judgments, steps are also being considered to regulate the possibility of enforcing foreign court judgments. Previously, legislation provided for the possibility of enforcement only where an international agreement existed, and such judgments are usually successfully enforced. Later, the concept emerged in judicial practice of enforcing a foreign judgment in Russia in the absence of an international agreement on the basis of the reciprocity principle, provided that the interested party proves that Russian judgments are enforced in the jurisdiction where the judgment sought to be enforced was rendered. This evidentiary burden has proven difficult to satisfy in practice, particularly with respect to jurisdictions that do not maintain publicly accessible records of foreign judgment enforcement. The proposed reforms seek to reduce this obstacle by placing the reciprocity principle on a statutory footing and allowing courts to presume reciprocity in appropriate circumstances.14 Nevertheless, courts could refuse enforcement on the ground that the party had not proven that judgments of Russian Courts are enforced in that State. In furtherance of addressing the issue of enforcing judgments, the following actions are contemplated:
1. Ratification of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (The Hague, 2019), previously signed by Russia15;16
2. Statutory recognition of the possibility of recognising and enforcing foreign court judgments on the basis of the reciprocity principle and/or international comity without the need to sign a corresponding international treaty.
Other objectives for the development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms include:
1. enhancing the role of adjudicators in certain legal relations and making their decisions legally binding;
2. further developing professional mediation; and
3. signing and ratifying by the Russian Federation of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (New York, 2018)17.18
Time will show whether Russia will become a sufficiently pro-arbitration jurisdiction. However, one can draw a clear conclusion that Russia has chosen a path toward improving its investment climate and conditions for cooperation with foreign partners. The breadth of the proposed reforms — spanning enforcement efficiency, judicial specialisation, interim relief, confidentiality, digitalisation, and expanded arbitrability — reflects a systemic rather than piecemeal approach to improving the arbitration landscape. Whether these ambitions are translated into effective legislative and judicial change will determine the extent to which Russia can re-establish itself as a credible venue for international dispute resolution.19
More discussions and experiences are planned at the largest international arbitration conference in Russia, the Russian International Arbitration Congress (RIAC), which is scheduled to take place in Moscow from 21 September 2026 to 27 September 2026. SCC Times is a media partner to the event.
*Arbitrator, LLM, Head of Dispute Resolution Practice at NK Legal, RIAC ambassador. Author can be reached at: contact@nklegal.ru.
1. Government of the Russian Federation (29-11-2025) available at <https://disk.yandex.ru/i/ns_Ss_24VlDcfw>.
2. The USSR ratified the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards on 22-11-1960. The Russian Federation continues as a contracting State as the successor to the USSR. See, “The Statistical Analysis of the Application of the New York Convention in Russia”, Russian Arbitration Association/Kluwer Arbitration Blog (2019), available at <https://arbitration.ru/en/press-centr/news/application-of-the-new-york-convention-in-russia/>.
3. Russia is a party to the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Geneva, 1961), which supplements the New York Convention by narrowing the grounds on which an annulled award may be refused enforcement. Russia is also a party to the Moscow Convention on the Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Arising from Relations of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1972). See, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>.
4. Enforcement of an arbitral award confirmed by a Russian Court is carried out by the Federal Bailiff Service pursuant to Federal Law No. 229-FZ “On Enforcement Proceedings” (2007). On appeal timelines: The Russian Arbitration Association NYC Study found that the average duration of recognition and enforcement proceedings in Russian Courts was approximately six months at first instance (2008—2017 data) with appeals extending this considerably. See, “Application of the New York Convention in Russia”, Russian Arbitration Association, available at <https://arbitration.ru/en/press-centr/news/application-of-the-new-york-convention-in-russia/>; Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>.
5. Russian Arbitration Association Working Group, NYC Study (2018—2019): of approximately 472 recognition and enforcement cases decided in Russian Courts from 2008—2017, about 89 per cent of applications were granted at first instance, but only 60 per cent at the supreme (cassation) instance, with overall enforcement of roughly 58 per cent of claimed amounts (EUR 4.77B of EUR 8.22B total). See arbitration.ru and Kluwer Arbitration Blog (February 2019). The 60 per cent figure cited in the article reflects the outcome rate at the highest instance level and the broader post-2022 enforcement environment. See also, Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>.
6. The proposal to consolidate enforcement applications in specialised Commercial Courts mirrors reforms adopted in other jurisdictions to improve judicial expertise in arbitration matters. On the role of specialised arbitration courts and chambers, see, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>; see also, Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>, noting that inconsistency in Russian Court outcomes across different regions has been a contributing factor in enforcement unpredictability since 2022.
7. Russian courts have consistently applied a broad interpretation of public policy as grounds for refusing enforcement. See, for example, Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court Information Letter No. 156 (2013) on application of the public policy concept in recognition and enforcement proceedings; see also, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>; Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>, noting that since February 2022 courts have also invoked sanctions-related considerations as an independent public policy ground. The refusal to reduce contractual penalties imposed by State courts under Russian Civil Code, Art. 333 has been addressed in recent case law: See, Arbitrazh Court of the Ural Region, Case A50-2810/2024 (Feb. 2025), reversing lower courts that had reduced tribunal-awarded penalty interest.
8. The principle that courts may not review the merits of an arbitral award is a cornerstone of the New York Convention framework: Article V provides an exhaustive and narrow list of grounds for refusal. The UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention confirms that contracting states have overwhelmingly interpreted Article V restrictively in line with its pro-enforcement purpose. Russian Courts’ broad application of the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) has been criticised as inconsistent with this standard. See, Global Arbitration Review, “Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards: Russia” (2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/report/russia>; see also, Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Information Letter No. 156 (2013); Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>.
9. Several European jurisdictions, including France and Sweden, allow arbitral awards to be directly enforced without an intermediate court ruling once the exequatur or enforcement order is obtained, thereby streamlining the post-award phase. The proposed Russian reform — granting awards of accredited permanent arbitral institutions the force of writs of execution — would achieve a functionally similar result. On the existing Russian appeal structure and its effect on enforcement, see, Global Arbitration Review, “Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards: Russia” (2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/report/russia>; Jessica Foley and David Bridge, “CMS Expert Guide to International Arbitration”, CMS Expert Guides, CMS Law (25-1-2019) available at <https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert-guide-to-international-arbitration/russia>.
10. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as revised in 2006, introduced a comprehensive regime for interim measures in Chapter IV-A (Articles 17—17J), including a mechanism for recognition and enforcement of tribunal-ordered interim measures by national courts. ICC Rules, 2021, Art. 28, and LCIA Arbitration Rules, 2020, Art. 25, similarly, grant Arbitral Tribunals broad powers to grant interim relief. Russia’s Law on International Commercial Arbitration (No. 5338-1, 1993) is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 and has not incorporated the 2006 Amendments on interim measures. See, Jessica Foley and David Bridge, “CMS Expert Guide to International Arbitration”, CMS Expert Guides, CMS Law (25-1-2019) available at <https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert-guide-to-international-arbitration/russia>; Norton Rose Fulbright, Russian Arbitration Law Reform, available at <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/ea1dbc62/russian-arbitration-law-reform>.
11. Confidentiality is widely regarded as one of the primary advantages of arbitration over court litigation. The current Russian legislative framework provides for judicial assistance to arbitral proceedings — including evidence-gathering — but does not impose an express statutory obligation on State courts to maintain confidentiality in those proceedings. This creates a disclosure risk for commercially sensitive materials submitted to courts in the context of challenge or enforcement applications. See, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>; See Also, Federal Law No. 382-FZ “On Arbitration (Arbitration Proceedings) in the Russian Federation” (2015), as amended.
12. Russian State courts operate on a largely automated electronic case management system (“Kad Arbitr” for arbitrazh courts), but arbitral institutions are not integrated into this system. When a court requests case materials in the context of an award challenge or enforcement application, the exchange currently occurs through physical document transfer, which introduces additional procedural delays. See, Federal Law No. 382-FZ (2015); Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>.
13. Under Federal Law No. 44-FZ “On the Contract System in Procurement of Goods, Works and Services for State and Municipal Needs” (2013) and related judicial practice, disputes arising from public procurement contracts are considered non-arbitrable. Russian Courts have extended this prohibition to contracts concluded in performance of a State contract, even where the immediate parties are private entities. See, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>; “Russia’s New Commercial Arbitration Reform — Key Points”, Lexology (2016), available at <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a753eb6a-1e5f-4099-b94f-a3c5d85a29a6>.
14. The reciprocity-based enforcement of foreign judgments in the absence of an international treaty emerged in Russian judicial practice following a series of arbitrazh court decisions. Arbitrazh Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, Art. 241(1) conditions recognition of foreign court judgments on the existence of an international treaty or federal law; however, courts have in certain cases applied the reciprocity principle as an alternative basis. The evidentiary burden of proving that Russian judgments are enforced in the foreign jurisdiction has frequently led to refusals. See, Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>; Arbitrazh Procedural Code of the Russian Federation, Art. 241; “Russia Signs the 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, DLA Piper (November 2021) available at <https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2021/11/russia-signs-the-2019-convention-on-the-recognition-and-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments>.
15. Russia signed the Convention of 2-7-2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Judgments Convention) on 17-11-2021, becoming the fifth signatory. As of May 2026, Russia has not yet ratified the Convention. See, Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) “Russia signs the Judgments Convention” (17-11-2021) available at <https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=833>; “Russia Signs the 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, DLA Piper (November 2021) available at <https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2021/11/russia-signs-the-2019-convention-on-the-recognition-and-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments>.
16. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was adopted at the 22nd diplomatic session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on 2-7-2019. Russia signed the Convention on 17-11-2021, becoming the fifth signatory. The Convention entered into force on 1-9-2023 for the EU (excluding Denmark) and Ukraine. As of May 2026, Russia has signed but not ratified the Convention. See, Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) “Russia signs the Judgments Convention” (17-11-2021) available at <https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=833>; “Russia Signs the 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, DLA Piper (November 2021) available at <https://www.dlapiper.com/en-us/insights/publications/2021/11/russia-signs-the-2019-convention-on-the-recognition-and-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments>; “The Hague Judgments Convention has entered into force between EU Member States and Ukraine”, Bird & Bird (2023) available at <https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2023/global/the-hague-judgments-convention-has-entered-into-force-between-eu-member-states-and-ukraine>.
17. The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Convention on Mediation) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20-12-2018 and opened for signature on 7-8-2019 in Singapore. It entered into force on 12-9-2020. As of 2024, 57 States have signed the Convention and 12 States have ratified it. The Convention establishes a harmonised framework for the cross-border enforcement of international commercial mediated settlement agreements, analogous to the role the New York Convention plays for arbitral awards. See, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, available at <https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/international_settlement_agreements>.
18. Singapore Convention on Mediation, available at <https://www.singaporeconvention.org/convention/about>.
19. On the breadth of Russia’s 2025—2030 reform agenda, see the National Model of Target Business Conditions until 2030 (approved by the Russian Government, December 2025), which sets a target of raising the enforcement approval rate to 85 per cent by 2027. See also, Global Arbitration Review, Commercial Arbitration: Russia (EPAM Law, 2024) available at <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/know-how/commercial-arbitration/report/russia>; Yarik Kryvoi, “Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments in Russia After 2022”, CIS Arbitration Forum (23-2-2026) available at <https://cisarbitration.com/2026/02/23/enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards-and-judgments-in-russia-after-2022/>.
