Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports, to give an accurate report to our readers.
Delhi High Court: In a petition seeking leave to appeal against an acquittal under Section 279, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) arising from a fatal road accident, the Single Judge Bench of Amit Mahajan, J., held that the trial court had failed to properly appreciate evidence relating to rash and negligent driving. Observing that the absence of excessive speed does not negate criminal negligence, the Court granted leave to appeal and directed transfer of the accused’s pending appeal against conviction under Section 304-A IPC so that both matters could be heard together.
Background
The prosecution alleged that on 20 November 2016, the respondent was driving a truck on a public road in a rash and negligent manner when he struck a motorcycle from behind, resulting in the death of the rider. FIR No. 497/2016 was registered at Police S tation Sunlight Colony.
By judgment dated 12 February 2018, the Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the respondent of the offence under Section 279 IPC (rash driving on a public way) but convicted him under Section 304-A IPC for causing death by negligence.
The State sought leave to appeal, contending that the acquittal under Section 279 IPC was legally inconsistent with the finding of guilt under Section 304-A IPC and resulted from an erroneous appreciation of evidence.
Issues
1. Whether the High Court should grant leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 279 IPC?
2. Whether the absence of excessive speed alone can negate rash or negligent driving?
3. Whether a conviction under Section 304-A IPC could coexist with an acquittal under Section 279 IPC on the same factual matrix?
Analysis
At the outset, the Court reiterated the settled principles governing the grant of leave to appeal against acquittal under Section 378, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The Court relied upon State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475, wherein it observed that at the stage of considering leave, the High Court is not required to determine whether acquittal would ultimately be reversed but must examine whether a prima facie case or arguable issue warranting appellate scrutiny exists.
The Court noted that the trial court had acquitted the respondent under Section 279 IPC primarily on the ground that the speed of the vehicle, stated by eyewitnesses to be approximately 40-60 kmph, could not be considered excessive. However, the same court simultaneously concluded that the respondent had caused death by rash and negligent driving, thereby convicting him under Section 304-A IPC.
The Court held that both provisions share a common element, that is, the commission of a rash or negligent act. The Court referred to State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas (2019) 10 SCC 75, and reiterated that Section 279 IPC criminalises rash or negligent driving that endangers human life, while Section 304-A IPC applies where such negligence results in death without intention or knowledge amounting to culpable homicide. The Court referred to Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, and noted that essential ingredients of Section 304-A IPC, includes the death of a human being caused by a rash or negligent act.
The Court further relied upon Braham Dass v. State of H.P., (2009) 7 SCC 353, to emphasise that both Sections 279 and 304-A IPC are premised on proof of rashness or negligence, and the determining factor is endangerment of life rather than mere speed of the vehicle.
Applying these precedents and principles, the Court observed that the Magistrate had placed disproportionate emphasis on the speed of the truck while disregarding other material evidence. Testimonies of eyewitnesses indicating that the truck was being driven in a zig-zag manner were not adequately evaluated.
The Court clarified that high speed is not a sine qua non for establishing rash driving; negligent operation of a heavy vehicle, particularly when allegedly overloaded and driven erratically on a public way, may itself constitute endangerment within the meaning of Section 279 IPC.
The Court held that once the trial court accepted that the respondent’s driving resulted in death through negligence, it was sufficient to attract Section 304-A IPC and as the result the acquittal under Section 279 IPC would have required closer appellate scrutiny. The Court observed that, prima facie, rashness and negligence could not be negated merely because the vehicle was not travelling at excessive speed.
The Court also took note that the respondent’s appeal challenging the conviction under Section 304-A IPC was pending before the Sessions Court. The Court observed that both matters arose from the same judgment and involved overlapping questions of rashness and negligence. Therefore, it invoked its transfer jurisdiction under Section 447, Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (corresponding to Section 407 CrPC) and directed transfer of the pending appeal to the High Court so that both appeals could be heard together in the interests of justice.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that substantial and arguable grounds existed warranting appellate examination and that the State had successfully established a case for the grant of leave.
[State v. Sabu, CRL.L.P. No. 286 of 2018, decided on 20-2-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP for the State with Divya Yadav, Advocate
For the Respondent: Vrinda Bhandari, Advocate (DHCLSC) with Nitya Jain, Advocate
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