Supreme Court: While considering the appeals arising out of six FIRs filed under various provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (“the U.P. Conversion Act”), the Division Bench of J.B Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ., took note of the scheme of the UP Conversion Act and observed that the provisions of the U.P. Conversion Act pertaining to the pre and post-conversion declaration seems to introduce a very onerous procedure to be followed by an individual seeking to adopt a faith other than the one he professes. The involvement and interference of the State authorities in the conversion procedure is also conspicuous, with the District Magistrate having been legally obliged to direct a police enquiry in each case of intended religious conversion. Further, the Court observed that statutory requirement of making public the personal details of each person who has converted to a different religion may require a deeper examination to ascertain if such a requirement fits well with the privacy regime pervading the constitution.
However, since the validity of the provisions of the U.P. Conversion Act were not challenged, hence the Court limited its observations to the afore-stated extent.
Background:
In April 2022, FIR 224/2022 (1st FIR) was filed on the basis of a written complaint filed by the Vice President of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, pertaining to an alleged event of mass religious conversion which, according to the complaint, allegedly took place at the Evangelical Church of India, Hariharganj, Fatehpur.
While the investigation of the aforesaid FIR was in progress, FIR 47/2023 (2nd FIR) was filed wherein the complainant alleged that having been allured by the offer made by the accused persons, he converted himself and embraced Christianity. Then FIR 54/2023 (3rd FIR) was lodged with allegations similar to the 2nd FIR along with allegations related to mass conversions and taking away of Aadhar Cards. Within seven minutes of the 3rd FIR, FIR 55/2023 (4th FIR) was lodged alleging conversion by allurement. Then FIR 60/2023 (5th FIR) was lodged with similar allegations like 3rd and 4th FIR. FIRs 1-5 were lodged in Fatehpur. Then FIR 538/2023 (6th FIR) was filed in Prayagraj containing several allegations including performing illegal conversion of Hindus to Christianity by giving them the allurement of curing diseases like cancer, etc.
Aggrieved by the registration of the FIRs, writ petitions were filed before the Allahabad High Court, however the proceedings were not quashed.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter, the Court firstly referred to the scheme of the U.P. Conversion Act and raised concerns over certain points such as onerous procedure regarding religious conversion and privacy concerns. The Court stated that Article 25 of the Constitution carries with it the facets of privacy rights, whereby the person has the intrinsic right to freedom of conscience and also the choice to express it to the world at large. However, since the validity of the U.P. Conversions Act was not challenged before the Court therefore, the Court limited itself to making the observations on the Act.
Thus, deciding the issues of validity of the FIRs, the Court analysed and answered the following questions:
A. Principles governing the quashing of criminal proceedings
The power to quash criminal proceedings is guided by the principle of preventing the abuse of the process of law or miscarriage of justice, and of securing the ends of justice. It can be done by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or by exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC1 and even by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, if the circumstances so require. Section 482 of the CrPC stipulates that nothing in the CrPC limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders to give effect to any order under the CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The powers vested can even be exercised suo motu to secure the ends of justice. Where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. However, Section 482 jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly, with due regard to balancing the rights of the genuine complainants vis a vis the innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings have been initiated by abusing the process of law.
B. Whether an FIR can be quashed after the filing of chargesheet?
The Court pointed out that this question is no longer res integra. The High Court, while dealing with a petition seeking quashing of an FIR, even after the chargesheet had been filed, is well within its powers to do so if, upon a collective reading of the FIR and the chargesheet, it is satisfied that they do not disclose commission of any offence or that the continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. An accused person may approach the High Court for quashing of the FIR and chargesheet under Article 226 of the Constitution till the time cognizance on the chargesheet has not been taken by the jurisdictional Trial Court. Once cognizance is taken, thereafter the accused person may approach the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (Section 482 of the CrPC) at any stage of the proceedings for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings on the ground of abuse of the process of law.
C. Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 32?
The Court stated that once the Constitution has cast such a responsibility upon it, the Supreme Court need not direct a petitioner to pursue an alternative remedy, when the grievance stems from the alleged violation of a fundamental right. At the same time, although, an aggrieved party is expected, in the ordinary course, to first approach the High Court, yet where facts disclose a palpable violation of the fundamental rights necessitating urgent intervention, it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to step in and secure justice. “In such circumstances, the existence of an alternative remedy cannot dilute the constitutional mandate entrusted to this Court. That is why it is said that “Let justice be done, though the Heavens may fall””.
D. Whether multiple FIRs pertaining to the same alleged offence are maintainable?
The Court stated that a plain reading of Section 154 of the CrPC makes it clear that a police officer is not obliged to record every subsequent piece of information in the station diary as the first information. “The expression “second FIR” is a misnomer, for the law does not recognize the registration of more than one First Information Report in respect of the same offence”. The existence of another FIR stamps an abuse of investigative powers, undermines the fairness of the investigative process, and exposes the accused to unwarranted harassment through repeated investigations into the same offence. Thus, the law disregards the practice of registering a “second FIR”, except in situations where the test of sameness is inapplicable or a counter-case is being investigated into. In such cases, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 and/or its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may quash the subsequent FIR to prevent abuse of the process of law.
E. Whether the 1st FIR, having been lodged at the instance of a complainant other than a person prescribed under the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, is liable to be quashed on that ground alone?
The 1st FIR was lodged by the Vice President of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, an unrelated party, while Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act mandates that only an ‘aggrieved person’ or their relative by blood, marriage or adoption, can lodge an FIR with respect to the acts of unlawful conversion. Perusing the unamended and amended version of Section of the U.P. Conversions Act and Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 2024, the Court noted that it is the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act which is applicable to FIRs sought to be quashed in the batch of matters under consideration, all of them having been lodged prior in time to the 2024 Amendment.
A plain reading of the unamended provision indicates that the intention of the legislature in prescribing a list of persons competent to lodge an FIR for contravention of the Act was to restrict the manner in which the prosecution under the U.P. Conversion Act could be initiated, the reason for the same being that the religious belief being an inherently personal and private aspect of an individual’s identity, it is only such a person or persons closely associated to him, who would be competent to report any incident of forceful, fraudulent, deceitful or otherwise illegal conversion which is in contravention of Section 3.
The Court noted that the U.P. Conversion Act is a piece of special legislation which introduces a somewhat different regime than the one prescribed under the CrPC. The Court explained that words employed by the legislature in the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act are abundantly indicative of the intent of the legislature to only allow a certain specified category of persons to make a complaint for the violation of Section 3. Thus, there is no good reason to take the view that despite being a special legislation, Section 154 of the CrPC should be given primacy over Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act. The legislature, in its wisdom, has consciously circumscribed the locus standi for instituting proceedings, recognising that only the person whose faith is directly in question, or those standing in proximate familial relation, are in a position to determine whether the act of conversion is the result of free volition or whether it bears the taint of coercion, fraud, or allurement. An unrelated third party, having no direct nexus with the individual concerned, is neither competent nor legitimately placed to assess the voluntariness of such a decision.
The Court further found glaring errors in the affidavits submitted by the complainant. The Court also took note of indistinguishable statements of victim/witnesses, which have possibly been reproduced from a pre-decided prototype with change in the personal particulars depending upon the witness making the statement.
The Court thus found the 1st FIR suffering from incurable legal defect, having been lodged by a person not competent to do the same as per the then prevailing statutory scheme, but also the materials collected during the course of investigation lack credibility and fall hopelessly short of the standard necessary for permitting criminal prosecution to proceed on the strength of such materials.
F. Whether 2nd FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are liable to be quashed?
Where the credentials of the investigation are already lacking in genuineness and credibility in relation to the other FIRs registered at the same police station for similar offences, the Court opined that it wouldn’t be prudent to allow the continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the present FIR as well.
G. Whether 4th FIR and 5th FIR respectively are hit by the principle laid down in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, and are thus liable to be quashed?
In the light of the discussion on impermissibility of multiple FIRs in relation to the same incident, the Court held that these FIRs respectively cannot stand and ought to be quashed.
H. Whether the High Court committed any error in refusing to quash 3rd FIR?
The Court stated that the criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. Having noticed the glaring infirmities, in the registration of 1st FIR, it was not open to the police to overcome the difficulty by getting persons with vested interests to make complaints regarding the same alleged incident after a considerable delay and thereafter initiate a fresh round of investigation against largely the same set of accused persons via 3rd FIR. Therefore, the same should be quashed.
I. Whether 6th FIR is liable to be quashed?
The said FIR was also lodged at a time when the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act occupied the field. A plain reading of the contents of the FIR and the allegations made therein clearly indicated that it was not the case of the complainant therein that he was subjected to illegal conversion by the accused person, or there was any such attempt regarding the same. Instead, the allegation was that the accused persons were indulging in unlawful conversion of gullible persons by exercising illegal means. Thus, even if the allegations of the complainant are taken at their face value, an FIR for the offence under the U.P. Conversion Act could not have been lodged on the basis of the complaint made by the complainant in light of the embargo contained in the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act.
However, the Court found that entire chargesheet and case diary is not available on the record. The Court opined that the matter requires further consideration after the entire set of documents are placed on the record.
Decision:
With the afore-stated assessment, the FIRs 1 to 5 were quashed. With regard to the 6th FIR, Court held that High Court committed an error in declining to quash the FIR to the extent that no offence under the U.P. Conversion Act could be said to have been made out in view of the embargo contained in Section 4. However, it was clarified that insofar as FIR for the alleged offences under Sections 307, 386 and 504 of the IPC respectively is concerned, the matter requires further consideration once all the relevant documents are brought on record and is thus it was ordered to be de-tagged from the present batch. The interim protection granted to the Petitioner earlier by this Court shall continue till the matter is finally heard and decided.
[Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 123 OF 2023, decided on 17-10-2025]
*Judgment authored by Justice J.B. Pardiwala
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Ms. Payoshi Roy, Adv. Mr. Siddhartha, Adv. Mr. S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Adv. Mr. Bharathimohan M., Adv. Mr. Bharathimohan M, Adv. Mr. V. Swetha, Adv. Ms. V. Swetha, Adv. Mr. Vairawan A.s, AOR Mr. Vikash Chandra Shukla, AOR Mr. Aishvary Vikram, Adv. Mr. Lakshya Siddheshwar Pandey, Adv. Ms. Isha Barshiliya, Adv. Ms. Mukta Gupta, Sr. Adv. Mr. Manish Gandhi, Adv. Mr. Dhiraj Abraham Philip, AOR Mr. Febin Mathew Varghese, Adv. Ms. Nitya Gupta, Adv. Ms. Namrata Mohapatra, Adv. Ms. Achalika Ahuja, Adv. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv. Ms. Jemtiben A.o, Adv. Ms. Pallavi Sharma, AOR Ms. Rebecca M. John, Sr. Adv. Mr. Siddharth Agarwal, Sr. Adv. Mr. C.u. Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Sanbha Rumnong, Adv. Mr. M.f. Philip, Adv. Mr. M. F. Philip, Adv. Ms. Lija Merin John, Adv. Ms. Purnima Krishna, AOR Mr. Karamveer Singh Yadav, Adv. Mr. Togin M. Babichen, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay, AOR Mr. Divyanshu Sahay, Adv. Mr. Amit Singh, Adv. Mr. Aman Pathak, Adv. Mr. Ajay Prajapati, Adv. Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Adv. Ms. Oorjasvi Goswami, Adv. Mr. Kartikay Aggarwal, Adv. Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Adv. Mr. Shashank Pachauri, Adv. Ms. Nidhi, AOR.
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1. Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023