Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT): The Division Bench of Justice Devi Prasad Singh (Chairperson) and Air Marshal BBP Sinha, Member (A) heard the instant application wherein the allegation was levelled against the authority concerned of non-observance of Tribunal’s order.

The applicant was enrolled in the Army as Sepoy on 23-01-1980. On account of certain family dispute, coupled with the fact applicant was charged with bigamy, his services were dispensed after serving a show-cause notice on 25-01-1996 i.e. after rendering service for the period of 14 years and 6 months.

The applicant had requested the authorities that the six months’ period required to complete 15 years of service for payment of pensionary benefits be condoned. In the application, the Tribunal had directed the respondents to decide the statutory appeal of the applicant by passing a speaking and reasoned order with regard to condonation of six months’ period so that the applicant may be paid pensionary benefits. However, the same had been decided by a non-speaking order.

The Bench observed that the authorities concerned had the right to condone a period of one year for the purpose of payment of pensionary benefits yet they had not applied mind while complying with the direction Tribunal. The Bench stated,

In case he (the applicant) was entitled to pensionary benefits after the order of discharge, which was not punitive one, it was incumbent upon the respondents to consider the impugned order of discharge without going back to the cause for passing the order of discharge.

If the applicant’s conduct had been bad then it would be open to the respondents to pass an order of dismissal, so that the applicant might not get any retiral benefits even if he had completed the qualifying minimum period of service. Considering that the respondents themselves had taken a lenient view, it was not open for them to look into the backgrounds or reason.

“The order of discharge might have been passed for bigamy but in any case right to avail pensionary benefits and law over the point is one and same and it may not be correct to discriminate any person in the matter in the Armed Forces.”

The Bench opined that once a person is entitled to payment of pensionary benefits after discharge then provision must be considered judiciously for payment of pensionary benefits, more so when no punitive order had been passed. Hence, the respondents were directed to reconsider the application of the applicant expeditiously, keeping in view the prayer made by him for condonation of the period of six months to complete 15 years of service for payment of pensionary benefits. Further, the cost of Rs.50,000 was imposed upon the respondents which were ordered to be released in favour of the applicant.[Ram Bahadur Singh, v. Union of India,  2018 SCC OnLine AFT 9435, decided on 18-01-2018]

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Appearance before the Tribunal:

For the applicant: Adv.  Parijaat Belaura

For the respondents: Adv. Shailendra Sharma Atal, and Adv. A.K. Sahu

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Sudhir Agarwal, J., found a government servant to be guilty of the offence of bigamy.

The instant petition was filed against the decision passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Agra dismissing the petitioner from the post of Fireman and therefore mandamus was sought to direct respondent not to interfere in working of the petitioner as a fireman and to pay his full salary for the period of suspension.

Another challenged placed by the petitioner was with regard to the validity of Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, claiming the same to be unconstitutional.

Factual matrix

Petitioners wife i.e. respondent 5 had alleged him of bigamy since he had married another woman.

Petitioner submitted that respondent 5 was married to his maternal uncle and after his death, she started living with an elder maternal uncle from whom she conceived a child also. She has also been receiving the pension of his maternal uncle. Further, he added that there is no relationship between husband and wife with respondent 5 and on the other hand he married Anita Yadav in the presence of all relatives and friends.

Further, the petitioner added that respondent 5’s motive and the intent was only to extract some monetary benefits from him.

In view of respondent 5’s complaint, petitioner was suspended.

Chief Fire Officer, Agra in his report submitted that there was no evidence of respondent 5’s marriage with the petitioner. However, both were living together and their relationship resulted in the birth of a child.

S.P. City Agra in his report submitted that respondent 5 and the petitioner were married. In 1994, petitioner without respondent 5’s knowledge solemnised the second marriage. Respondent 5 on knowing the said fact took various legal steps and also filed maintenance applications, wherein she was awarded the same by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.

Thereafter, a regular disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner under the U.P. Subordinate Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1991, after the enquiry was completed, petitioner was held guilty of bigamy and, therefore, guilty of misconduct under Rule 29 of Conduct Rules, 1956.

Disciplinary Authority in light of the above-stated passed the impugned order of dismissal.

Analysis and Decision

Judicial Review

Bench observed that in the cases pertaining to the disciplinary enquiry, the scope of judicial review is very limited and is confined to the extent of decision-making process and not to appreciate the decision itself unless it is found to be vitiated in law on account of malafide, bias or in violation of natural justice, or in case it can be shown that the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings are based on no evidence at all.

With regard to the contention that the charge of bigamy is false and there is no proof or evidence showing the valid marriage of the petitioner with respondent 5 i.e. Munni Devi, counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no evidence of solemnization of marriage between the petitioner and Munni Devi who claimed to be his legally wedded first wife. It is also submitted that assuming that the petitioner and Munni Devi were living together and maintaining a relationship of husband and wife, yet in the absence of any proof of solemnization of marriage it cannot be held that the petitioner was guilty of bigamy and therefore violated Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules.

A very significant observation made by the Court was that,

Admittedly there was no evidence showing solemnization of marriage with Hindu rituals but there was evidence that petitioner and Munni Devi married in Court, blessed with a daughter out of their relationship of living together as husband and wife and in various documents Munni Devi was shown as the wife of the petitioner.

In these circumstances, Bench stated that it cannot be stated that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the Disciplinary enquiry that the petitioner was guilty of bigamy are based on no evidence at all. The evidence of a marriage between the petitioner and Munni Devi does exist and the sufficiency or adequacy thereof is not within the realm of judicial review of this Court.

Court cited the decision of Supreme Court, R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90, wherein it was held that the standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings is that of the preponderance of probability and where there is some relevant material which the competent authority has accepted and such material if can reasonably support the conclusion drawn by the disciplinary authority regarding the guilt of the employee, the court will not reappreciate such evidence to arrive at a different conclusion since the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence can not be canvassed before the court.

In Bombay High Court’s decision of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, it was held that the disciplinary authority, is the sole judge of the facts if the enquiry has been properly conducted. If there is some evidence on which the findings can be based then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter to be canvassed before the Court

Hence, in view of the above discussion, petitioners contention that he was not guilty of bigamy was not accepted.

The validity of Rule 29 of the Conduct Rules

Petitioner contended that Rule 29 is arbitrary, unjust and illegal, no guidelines have been given as to when the permission will be granted for the purpose of second marriage under the proviso to the said rule and therefore, it is ultra vires.

Bench found the above-stated submission to be wholly baseless and misconceived.

No law, custom or practice has been brought to the notice of the Court showing that solemnizing more than one marriage is necessary religious or otherwise activity.

Decades ago people used to marry more than once inspite of having spouse living. It is said that in Muslim Personal Law, marriage with four women is permissible.

However, to the knowledge of the court, no personal law maintains or dictates it as a duty to perform more than one marriage.

No religious or other authority has been brought to Court’s notice providing that marrying more than one woman is a necessary religious sanction and any law providing otherwise or prohibiting bigamy or polygamy would be irreligious or offence the dictates of the religion.

Polygamy cannot be said to be an integral part of any religious activity, may be Hindu, Muslim or any other religion.

A distinction has to be drawn between religious faith, belief and religious practices. Even Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees only the religious faith and belief and not the religious practices which if run counter to public order or health or policy of social welfare which the state has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good of the people of the state as a whole.

Bench also observed that various statutes have prohibited both bigamy and polygamy.

A Division Bench of this Court also considered the validity of Rule 27 of the U.P. Government Servant (Conduct) Rules (old) prohibiting bigamy in the case of Ram Prasad Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1960 SCC OnLine All 128 and the  Court observed that there is no law, making it necessary to solemnize a second marriage. It was held that even under the Hindu religious belief marrying a second wife in order to obtain a son when the first wife can not provide one was only a practice followed by the people and not a sanction or mandate of law.

In view of the above discussion, the Court held that Rule 29 cannot be said to be non-arbitrary or illegal and ultra vires.

Concluding with its decision, Bench held that

In any country where bigamy is an offence, a government servant guilty of committing an offence cannot ask to continue in service after award of the minor or lesser punishment.

In view of the above, petition was dismissed. [Veerpal Singh v. SSP, Agra, 2006 SCC OnLine All 1628, decided on 18-05-2006]

Read more:

Bigamy [S. 494 IPC, S. 17 Hindu Marriage Act]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gujarat High Court: The Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and Vireshkumar B. Mayani, JJ., while addressing the issue of grant of permanent alimony to a Muslim Woman noted the significant difference between permanent alimony and periodical maintenance.

An instant appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was filed at the instance of the original defendant (husband) and was directed against the judgment and decree passed by Principal Judge, Ahemdabad for a decree of divorce under the provisions of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Question for consideration:

Whether the Family Court committed any error in passing the order of permanent alimony in favour of the wife while granting the decree of divorce to the wife?

There are two types of alimony:

1. Given at the time of court proceedings- This is usually the maintenance amount.

2. Given at the time of legal separation- This can be given either in a lump sum or as a fixed monthly or quarterly payment or as per the requirements of the spouse.

Supreme Court on a creative and meaningful interpretation of the MWPRDA, 1986, upheld its constitutionality. It held that a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife extending beyond the Iddat period.

In the Supreme Court decision of Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 SCC 666, the question that fell for consideration was whether a Muslim Divorced wife would be entitled to receive the amount of maintenance from her divorced husband under Section 125 CrPC, and if yes, then through which forum.

In the above decision of the Supreme Court, it was held that petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the family court as long as the wife does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be restricted for the Iddat period only.

Main Argument

The most significant submission on behalf of the appellant was that no provision exists in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 for the maintenance or permanent alimony. Further, it was stated that Family Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order with respect to maintenance or permanent alimony once the suit is allowed and the marriage is dissolved at the instance of the wife.

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

The Muslim Women Act is “to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by or have obtained a divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Hence the Muslim Women Act professes to deal with Muslim divorced women and their rights against their former husbands.

Family Court

Bench observed that, where a Family Court has been established, the power and the jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to entertain an application for maintenance, even by a divorced Muslim wife, under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been taken away, either expressly or even by implication by the Muslim Women Act of 1986.

And once such an application is made to a Family Court under Section 7(2) of the Family Courts Act, and not to a Magistrate, the same has got to be disposed of by the Family Court in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Muslim Women Act of 1986, including its Section 5, would have no manner of application.

Matrimonial Property

Further, it was stated that the right to maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution. Those reliefs are incidental to the main relief of ‘dissolution of marriage’ and therefore, these reliefs are very much an integral part of the decree of ‘dissolution of marriage’.

Section 4 of the Act, 1986

It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of Section 4 of the Act, 1986, the former husband had no liability to make any provision for the Post-Iddat period.

Bench observed that the right of maintenance given to the wife and the minor children under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is in addition to the right, which the minor children are having under Muslim Law to get maintenance from the father. The law expects that the parties should not be driven to approach the different forums but in one forum itself, they should be granted whatever reliefs to which they are entitled.

Supreme Court in the decision of K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida, (2003) 4 SCC 166 was concerned with the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 as to whether the Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any question relating to the properties of the parties not only of the subsisting marriage but also divorced parties and the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the reason for the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, was to set up a Court to deal with all the disputes concerning with the Family and it is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a Court created specifically for the resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally.

Wife has remarried

Counsel submitted that the wife was remarried and in view of there was no question of any lump sum permanent alimony.

Bench observed that

A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to receive, from her husband, inter alia, “maintenance”, “reasonable and fair provision”, “Mahr” etc. under Section 3 of the Act, 1986.

Permanent Alimony

Bench stated that what is significant to note is that the relief of permanent alimony is a relief incidental to the granting of the substantive relief by the Court in the main proceeding. It is an incidental relief claimed in the main proceeding, though an application is necessary for claiming it.

The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the question whether a Muslim woman obtaining a divorce under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, and it was held in Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim, (1981) 2 SCC 509 that there are three distinct modes in which a dissolution of marriage can be brought about and Clause(b) of the Explanation to Section 125(1) envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or where she obtains divorce under the other two modes, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code.

The Supreme Court held that divorce resulting from the dissolution of marriage under the provision of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 is also a legal divorce under the Mohammedan law by virtue of the Statute (1939 Act).


Bench observed that when the Court would make an award of permanent alimony or for one-time payment, it is not founded on any stipulation that any part of the sum would be either actually refunded in whole or in part. Such sum is not granted on the condition against remarriage for all times to or for any particular period.

The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in a lump sum to discharge the judgment debtor from his future liabilities unconditionally.

The grant of periodical payment by way of maintenance to a divorced wife is in recognition/obligation to the spouse to maintain her so long as she enjoys the continued status of a divorcee.

On remarriage status of divorcee comes to an end and she acquires another marital status as someone’s spouse. Under the Act, 1986 as under Section 125 CrPC, the wife includes a divorcee.

In view of the above discussion, it can be said that:

when the wife remarries, her claim of maintenance primarily comes to stand against her new husband coming into existence in a new relationship.

The proposition of law laid down by the Court should be looked into keeping in mind Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986.

A divorced woman is entitled to ‘a reasonable and fair provision” and “maintenance” to be made and paid to her within and post the Iddat period by her former husband.

Point-wise Conclusion of the decision:

  • After the Act of 1939, a wife had a statutory right to obtain a divorce from her husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.
  • The ex-wife, having obtained a divorce from her erstwhile husband under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is entitled to the reasonable and fair provision under Section 3 of the Act, 1986.
  • The Family Courts Act has in its comprehension all community including the Muslims. All disputes between the Muslim community within the purview of the Family Courts Act are to be settled by the Family Courts.
  • Dispute contemplated by Section 3 of the Act, 1986 is within the purview and four corners of the Family Courts Act as the dispute under Section 3 of the Act, 1986 also relates to matrimonial relations between the parties.
  • Right of maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution.
  • The Law contemplates that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations; (I) to make “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorcee wife and (ii) to provide “maintenance” for her. The obligation to make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife is not restricted until the divorced wife remarries. It is within the jurisdiction of the Family Court to pass an order for a lump sum amount to be paid to the wife in the discharge of the obligation of the husband under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986 and such order cannot be modified upon remarriage of the divorced Muslim wife.
  • Provision for permanent alimony is incidental to the granting of a decree or judicial separation, divorce or annulment of marriage.
  • The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in a lump sum to discharge the husband from her future liabilities unconditionally.
  • If the wife gets remarried, her status of divorcee comes to an end and the liability of the husband to pay periodical maintenance would also come to an end.

Another significant observation of the High Court was which was placed by the counsel for the parties was that the appellant had remarried way back in the year 2014. Before the respondent herein instituted the proceedings in the Family Court for divorce, the husband had already remarried and raised a family. The appellant could do so because polygamy is permissible amongst the Muslim Community. It does not constitute an offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 of the Penal Code.

The materials on record indicated that the husband hardly paid anything towards maintenance. The respondent had to leave her matrimonial home soon after the marriage, i.e., sometime in 2010. Ultimately, she was constrained to institute the proceedings of divorce in the Family Court. Even during the pendency of such proceedings, nothing was paid to the wife. The wife, ultimately, succeeded before the Family Court in getting the marriage dissolved and was also successful in getting an order of permanent alimony. The husband now cannot turn around and say that he is not liable to pay the lump sum amount because the respondent is remarried.

Hence, in Court opinion, the Family Court’s line of reasoning ad the ultimate conclusion that was drawn by the family court was just and proper.

Therefore the appeal was dismissed.[Tarif Rashidbhai Qureshi v. Asmabanu, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 711, decided on 19-03-2020]

Advocates who appeared for the parties:

Nishant Lalakita for Appellant 1

Javed S Qureshi for Appellant 1

SP Majmudar for Defendant 1

Shashvata U Shukla for Defendant 1

Op EdsOP. ED.

India is truly a strange country of diversity. A popular cliché remains in our society that only among the Muslim community polygamous marriage exists. One ignores the fact that before enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955[1]; there used to exist polygamy among the Hindu community. Section 17 of the said Act provides that Sections 494 and 495[2] of the Penal Code, 1860 shall be attracted if any Hindu commits bigamy.

Muslims are allowed by their personal law to marry four times provided that the husband loves the four wives equally. One can assume that it is possible for a Muslim wife to petition for divorce if this condition is not strictly followed. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act[3] provides for a similar penal provision in Section 5 of the Act. Section 44 of the Special Marriage Act[4] mentions that bigamous marriage shall attract penalty under Sections 494 and 495 of the Penal Code. However, one cannot find a similar penal provision in the  Christian Marriage Act[5].

Further Section 18 of the  Divorce Act, 1869[6] provides that “Any husband or wife may present a petition in the District Court or the High Court, praying that, his or her marriage may be declared null and void”. Section 19(4) of the said Act provides that such decree of nullity may be made on the ground that former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of marriage and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Thus it is amply clear that if neither party (husband or wife) sues for decree of nullity of marriage there is a chance of continuing a number of polygamous marriages.

One can argue that law allows absolute liberty to a subject if there is no express prohibition in it. One can cite Article 21 of the Indian Constitution for the justification.


From practical experience one can gather that marrying more than once even if permissible in personal laws, attracts a disability in Government jobs or for standing as a candidate in election of legislative bodies[7]. Even a  modern Muslim country like Turkey discourages polygamous marriage. In Bai Fatima v. Ali Mahomed[8], the defendant wanted to have a second wife, executed a document in favour of the plaintiff, that is, his first wife, contemplating future separation and also payment of maintenance allowance to the plaintiff. After the execution of the document they lived together for some time. And then they separated. The plaintiff brought an action to recover the arrears of maintenance as mentioned in the document. It was held that such an agreement between Mohammadan husband and wife to live separately in future because the husband wanted to marry again was opposed to public policy as mentioned in Section 23 of the Contract Act and thus, void.

The bane of polygamous marriage is having constant discord among the spouses, hindrance of the welfare of the children and further; stretching the economic resources of the family. There is a threat of population explosion due to polygamous marriage. Further, the earlier social backdrop for polygamous marriages in different religions does not exist anymore. Marriage is, one presumes a “secular institution” and thus law can provide reasonable restrictions.

Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005[9] provides protection to women who are having a relationship in the nature of marriage with the partner. In Indra Sarma v. N.K.V. Sarma [10] the Court laid down that the women in defacto[11]marriage are protected from the abuse of the partner.

Although the Constitution directs for a Uniform Civil Code,  however, it remains as a far cry and distant reality.

* Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, Pune

[1] The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

[2] Section 494  IPC punishes the offence of marrying again during the lifetime of husband and wife. Section 495  IPC punishes for the same offence with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted.

[3] The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

[4] Special Marriage Act, 1954

[5] Christian Marriage Act, 1872

[6] Divorce Act, 1869

[7] See Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution which provides; Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,  practice and propagate religion.

[8] ILR (1912) Bom 280

[9] The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

[10] (2013) 15 SCC 755

[11] (i) A reference in a written law to a defacto relationship shall be construed as a reference to a relationship(other than legal marriage) between two persons who live together in marriage-like relationship

(ii)The following factors are indicators of whether or not  a de facto relationship exists between two persons but are not essential,

(a) The length of relationship between them,

(b) Whether two persons have resided together,

(c) The nature and extent of common residence,

(d) Whether there is or has been a sexual relationship between them,

(e) The degree of financial dependence and interdependence and arrangements for financial support between them,

(f) The ownership, use and acquisition of their property (including property they own individually),

(g) The degree of mutual commitment by them to a shared life,

(h) Whether they care for and support children,

(i) The reputation and public aspects, of the relation between them.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: RMT. Teeka Raman, J., while addressing a petition observed that,

“A plea of customary divorce is a valid defence in departmental proceedings initiated for the misconduct of bigamy under Service Rules/Conduct Rules.”

The instant petition was sought to set aside the punishment order imposed in proceedings under Rule 3(b) Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955.

Petitioner, during his service, married a staff nurse and has two children. Later, in 2007, the petitioner during his service married a Woman Sub Inspector of Police and had two children with her as well.

Grave Misconduct

Petitioner’s grave misconduct was having married Woman Sub Inspector of Police while his first wife was living with two children and thereby violating Rule 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Police Officer’s Conduct Rules, 1964.

Charge Memo

In view of the above-stated act, a charge memo was issued under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (D&A) Rules, 1955.

The Oral Enquiry Officer held the charge against the petitioner.

Deputy Inspector General of Police also arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner violated Rule 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Police Officers’ Conduct Rules, 1964 and awarded the petitioner a punishment of “Reduction in rank by the stage from the post of Head Constable to Gr.I PC for a period of two years to be spent on duty from the date of receipt of the order”.

Senior Counsel, Veera Kathiravan submitted that there was a customary divorce between the petitioner and his first wife and subsequently the petitioner married the widow Woman Sub-Inspector of Police and hence he did not violate any rules.

Analysis & Decision

Crux of the charge framed against the petitioner was that the delinquent was reprehensible conduct in having married the Woman Sub-Inspector of Police when his first wife was living and thereby violating the Rule 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Police Officers’ Conduct Rules 1964 and tarnished the image of Police Force.

Hindu Marriage Act

Bench stated that after the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, an end to marriage can be sought by either obtaining a declaration that the marriage between them was a nullity on the grounds specified in Section II or to dissolve the marriage between them on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. While, Section 29 of the Act saves the rights recognized by custom or conferred by special enactment to obtain the dissolution of marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of the Act.

Authorities have established that the prevalence of customary divorce in the community to which parties belong, contrary to the general law of divorce must be specifically pleaded and established by the person propounding such custom.

Core question to be decided in the present matter was whether the plea of customary divorce is a valid defence in the departmental proceedings initiated for action of bigamy as defined in Section 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Rules?

Bench noted the statement of the first wife that due to misunderstandings between the couple, as per the custom prevailing in the community, there was a customary divorce.

Customary Divorce

Hence, the plea raised by the delinquent about the prevalence of customary divorce in their community which was pleaded by the petitioner and the same was accepted by none other than the first wife herself only after the dissolution of the first marriage, he contracted the second marriage.

Court concluded its decision as follows:

  • Disciplinary Proceedings can be initiated even if the second marriage is contracted with the knowledge of the first wife so also even if the first wife does not prosecute the husband for the same and hence the complaint given by the third party alleging contract of the second marriage, departmental proceedings can still be maintainable.
  • A plea of customary divorce is a valid defence in departmental proceedings initiated for the misconduct of bigamy under Service Rules/Conduct Rules.
  • To substantiate plea of customary divorce a specific plea has to be raised in the statement of defence by the delinquent officer and has to be proved on up to the decree of the preponderance of probability and execution of the customary divorce as projected by the delinquent.

Hence, in view of the above, the petition was allowed and the punishment was set aside. [Sudalaimai v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, WP (MD) No. 17504 of 2014, decided on 09-09-2020]