Supreme Court: An appeal was filed against the order of a Single Judge of the High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States Union finding appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to a fine of Rs 25 and in default of payment of the fine he shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month and cost of the proceedings at Rs 20. The 4-Judges Bench of B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das*, Ghulam Hasan, and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ., opined that a charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal charge and that the charges must be established beyond all reasonable doubt Thus, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact of giving written notice to respondent of the proposed suit which appellants wife was entitled to file against respondent could not be said to amount to an attempt to interfere with the court of justice. Thus, the Supreme Court held that appellant’s wife was not guilty of contempt of court.
Background
Appellant was a licensed petition-writer attached to the Court at Dhuri in the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union and his wife was the owner of a plot of land measuring 5¾ biswas situated in Dhuri. On the other hand, respondent was the owner of another plot of land measuring about 2½ biswas which was adjacent to the plot of appellant’s wife. It was alleged by appellant that respondent had encroached on the land of his wife to the extent of 2 biswas. Appellant’s wife submitted a plan for the construction of a house on her, but the Small-Town Committee and the Government intimated her that her plan could not be sanctioned and passed unless she got possession of the encroached land from the Court.
It was further alleged that before appellant’s wife could take any action in the Court, respondent forestalled her by filing a suit against her in the Court of Subordinate Judge II Class, Dhuri claiming an easement over a portion of her plot of land and praying for a permanent injunction restraining her from closing certain doors and obstructing a certain drain. After the filing of the suit, respondent obtained an interlocutory injunction against appellant’s wife. While that suit was pending, a notice was issued in the name of appellant’s wife to respondent. The notice was written by appellant in his own handwriting, and it contained the thumb impression of his wife. Although at the foot of the notice, it was stated that copies had been sent to the persons named therein it was alleged that the same had not been sent.
Thereafter, respondent filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge praying that action should be taken against appellant and his wife under the Patiala Contempt of Courts Act. This application was dismissed for default. However, a petition was presented before the High Court on respondent’s behalf through her husband praying that proceedings in contempt be taken against appellant and his wife. The High Court sent the notice to the Subordinate Judge, who after going through the notice reported that he did not think the contents provided any ground for proceeding in contempt. The report concluded stating that appellant had done nothing very serious which could interfere with justice or prejudice the mind of the Court and that the application for contempt did not, therefore, deserve the notice of the High Court.
The matter was referred to the Advocate General, who opined that appellant and his wife had by the notice clearly interfered in the administration of justice and that contempt of court proceedings might be started against them. The High Court accordingly issued notice to appellant and his wife to show cause why they should not be proceeded against in contempt. Both filed statements disclaiming all intention of putting extraneous pressure on the opposite party or of getting the suit withdrawn or insulting any court. Further, an unqualified apology was tendered by both. The High Court accepted the apology of appellant’s wife but did not accept appellant’s apology and sentenced appellant to a fine of Rs 25.
As appellant’s conviction had also resulted or was likely to result in the cancellation of his licence as a petition-writer, he prayed for leave to appeal to this Court which was refused by the High Court. Appellant, thereafter, applied for and obtained the special leave of this Court to prefer this appeal.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Supreme Court noted that the Small-Town Committee refused the building plan submitted by appellant’s wife and referred her to court. The Supreme Court opined that respondent’s suit was filed by way of forestalling the suit which appellant’s wife had been advised by the Small-Town Committee to file could not be said to be wholly unfounded, however, it was clear that the decision of that suit in appellant’s wife favour would not have entitled her to obtain a decree for possession of the disputed land in that suit. Therefore, appellant’s wife had to file a suit for possession, and she was entitled to take steps to file her suit, there was nothing improper in her giving notice to respondent of the proposed suit. Therefore, the mere fact of giving notice could not be said to amount to an attempt to interfere with the course of justice.
The Supreme Court, after reading the text of the notice, opined that it was clear that appellant’s wife was asserting, as she was entitled to do, that respondent possessed no right against the land which appertained to her. She complained of being harassed and burdened with costs by reason of respondent having filed that suit for injunction. She called upon her to remove the structures from her land and that she should not interfere with it in future. Appellant’s wife informed respondent that if she closed the door and the drain it would be all right but otherwise proceedings would be taken according to the law against her, and she would be made liable for all damages and costs.
The Supreme Court opined that it was familiar with the usual protestation at the end of written statements in the notice which meant nothing and which no court takes notice of. The Supreme Court opined that it was futile to say that the characterization of the opponent’s case as false and frivolous and the warning that the opponent would be liable to pay damages and costs had in all cases the effect of putting such pressure on the opponent as to induce him or her to withdraw his or her cases or defence and thereby or otherwise of interfering with the course of administration of justice.
The Supreme Court distinguished the case of Rajender Singh v. Uma Prasad, 1934 SCC OnLine All 228 on facts, by stating that the language used in that notice was entirely different from the language used in the notice in the present case. The Supreme Court opined that the allegations in the notice were nothing more than what had already been stated in the written statement and if the written statement did not prejudice the Subordinate Judge this notice was not likely to do so. Also, a copy was forwarded to the President, Small-Town Committee and not to the incumbent of that office in his capacity as the Subordinate Judge.
The Supreme Court noted that the Small-Town Committee had referred appellant’s wife to court before her plan could be sanctioned and thus, appellant might have thought that it was right to keep the Small-Town Committee informed of the steps appellant’s wife was taking for recovery of possession of the disputed land in order to entitle her to secure the sanction of the Small-Town Committee. The Supreme Court opined that there was no doubt that appellant’s previous conduct was reprehensible but it should be remembered that a charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal charge and that the charges must be established beyond all reasonable doubt and that the alleged contemnor must be given the fullest benefit of the presumption of innocence which an accused person was entitled to in our law.
Thus, the Supreme Court opined that the language of the notice read by itself was susceptible of an innocent meaning and there could be no doubt whatever that the previous conduct of appellant influenced the mind of the Court and induced the Court to read into the notice expressions of contempt which were not there. The Supreme Court thus allowed the appeal stating that these petty matters should not have been magnified into contempt of court.
[Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati, (1953) 1 SCC 726, decided on 17-04-1953]
*Judgment authored by: Justice S.R. Das
Note: Contempt of Court
Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution empower the Supreme Court and the High Court respectively, to punish for contempt of themselves. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 specifically deals with the issues related to contempt, wherein Section 2(b) and Section 2(c) defines ‘civil contempt’ and ‘criminal contempt’, respectively.
In Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204, the Supreme Court held that the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt.
