Case BriefsDistrict Court

South-West, Dwarka, Delhi: Mridul Gupta, Metropolitan Magistrate –09, on noting a very weak case of the complainant and not being able to produce sufficient evidence, dismissed his complaint filed for the dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Complainant alleged that the accused who had been purchasing iron plates/ sheets/ other forms of irons from the complainant was supplied the said material to the tune of Rs 8,00,000.

In the discharge of said liability, accused issued the cheques in question i.e. two postdated cheques. Complainant presented the said cheques but they were both returned with the remarks “Drawers Signature Differs”.

In view of the above, legal notice was issued but no response was received from the accused, hence the present complaint was filed.

Following issues for consideration arose:

  1. Whether the accused had any legal debt or liability towards complainant?
  2. Whether cheques in question were issued by accused?
  3. Whether the legal demand notice was duly served upon the accused?

Bench noted that the complainant could not produce any reliable document regarding the alleged business transactions with the accused. Not even a single date of the transaction with the accused was mentioned by the complainant.

In Vijay v. Laxman, (2013) 3 SCC 86, the Supreme Court observed that:

“the absence of any details of the date on which the loan was advanced as also the absence of any documentary or other evidence to show that any such loan transaction had indeed taken place between the parties is a significant circumstance.” 

As per the complainant his whole trading business was being carried out without any paper trail whatsoever, which appeared implausible. The said testimony of the complainant raised serious doubts on the credibility of the witness and suspicion was cast on the existence of any such business of complainant and supply of goods to accused.

Trite Position of Law

Dishonor of cheque due to signature of accused not matching with specimen signature could also constitute dishonour under Section 138 of the Act, and said fact, in itself, is not sufficient to escape prosecution under the said provision.

In the instant matter, it is pertinent to note that the accused denied his signatures on the cheques in question right from the stage of framing of notice and throughout the trial. Secondly, the said defence of accused was duly corroborated by the bank memos as per which both the cheques in question were each dishonored twice for the same reason i.e. ‘Drawers Signature Differs’.

Complainant could not explain the occasion for issuance of cheques in question in his favour by the accused.

Legal notice was sent to the correct address of the accused. Once the legal notice is proved to be sent by post to correct address of accused then the presumption under Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897 arose and it shall be presumed unless proved contrary, that legal notice sent to the address of accused was delivered to him.

Court held that,

The case of the complainant is inherently very weak as he has not been able to sufficiently prove in his evidence, the existence of any business of iron trading and the supply of such goods to accused. The lack of any business document whatsoever casts grave suspicion on case of complainant.

Concluding the matter, the bench stated that the complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the fundamental requirements of the offence that the cheque in question was issued by the accused and in discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability. [Rishi Pal v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, CC No. 32700 of 2019, decided on 23-11-2021]

Case BriefsDistrict Court

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru: Vani A. Shetty, XVII Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes & ACMM, addressed a matter with respect to the liability of the accused in a case of dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

In the present case, the accused was tried for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Factual Background

Complainant with an intention to have a South Africa trip paid Rs 24 lakhs to the accused to book the tickets. But the accused failed to book the tickets and repaid a sum of Rs 14.5 lakhs to the complainant and sought time for the payment of balance amount of Rs 9.5 lakhs. Towards the discharge of the said liability, the accused issued a cheque for Rs 4,50,000 assuring that the cheque would be honoured if presented for payment.

But the cheque came to be dishonoured on the grounds of ‘payment stopped by drawer’. Thereafter the complainant got issued a legal notice demanding repayment of the cheque amount within 15 days. Due to no response from the accused, an instant complaint was filed.

In view of sufficient ground to proceed further, a criminal case was registered against the accused, and she was summoned.

Question for Consideration:

Whether the complainant proved that the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881?

Analysis, Law and Decision

While analyzing the matter, Bench stated that in order to constitute an offence under Section 138 NI Act, the cheque shall be presented to the bank within a period of 3 months from its date. On dishonour of cheque, the drawer or holder of the cheque may cause demand notice within 30 days from the date of dishonour, demanding to repay within 15 days from the date of service of the notice.

“If the drawer of the cheque fails to repay the amount within 15 days from the date of service of notice, the cause of action arises for filing the complaint.”

In the present matter, the complainant had complied with all the mandatory requirements of Section 138 and 142 of the NI Act.

Section 118 of the NI Act lays down that until the contrary Is proved, it shall be presumed that every Negotiable Instrument was made or drawn for consideration.

Section 139 NI Act contemplated that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole of any debt or liability.

In a catena of decisions, it has been repeatedly observed that in the proceeding under Section 138 of NI Act, the complainant is not required to establish either the legality or the enforceability of the debt or liability since he can avail the benefit of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act in his favour.

Further, it was observed that by virtue of the presumptions, accused had to establish that the cheque in question was not issued towards any legally enforceable debt or liability.

Later in the year 2006, the Supreme Court in the decision of M.S. Narayan Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006 SAR Crl. 616), has held that the presumption available under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act can be rebutted by raising a probable defence and the onus cast upon the accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution.

Further, in the Supreme Court decision of Krishna Janarshana Bhat v. Dattatreya G. Hegde, (2008 Vo.II SCC Crl.166), the Supreme Court held that the existence of legally recoverable debt was not a presumption under Section 138 NI Act and the accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence and therefore, the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section 139 of the NI Act should be delicately balanced.

Bench, in conclusion, observed that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of NI Act does indeed include the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, it is a rebuttable presumption, open to the accused to raise defence wherein the existence of the legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.

If the accused is able to raise a probable defence, which creates doubt about the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, the onus shifts back to the complainant.

Court stated that if the accused was able to probabalise that the disputed cheque was issued due to the intervention and pressure of the police, it may not be justified to draw the presumption contemplated under Section 139 NI Act.

It was added that if the police would have really interfered, the accused could have produced some evidence to show the intervention of the police. But there was absolutely no evidence on record to show that cheque was issued either due to pressure of police or due to some other compulsion.

In Court’s opinion, the Court was required to draw the presumption under Section 139 NI Act in favour of the complainant.

Court noted that in the present matter, accused at no point in time asked the complainant to pay the balance amount. Instead, she had kept quiet by enjoying the huge amount of Rs 24 lakhs which clearly indicated that the non-purchase of the ticket was not on account of the non-payment of the remaining amount. Further, there was no forfeiture clause.

For the above, Bench stated that in the absence of the forfeiture clause, the accused could not have retained the amount of the complainant with her, the said was barred by the doctrine of unlawful enrichment under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Hence, even if it was held that the complainant was a defaulter in respect of the payment of the remaining amount, the accused was legally liable to repay the amount received by her from the complainant.

In view of the above reasons, guilt of the accused was proved under Section 138 NI Act. [Srinivas Builders and Developers v. Shyalaja, CC No. 57792 of 2018, decided on 13-10-201]


Advocates before the Court:

For the Complainant: V.N.R., Advocate

For the Accused: J.R., Advocate

Tis-hazari
Case BriefsDistrict Court

Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi: Devanshu Sajlan, MM NI Act-05, while noting the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 acquitted a person charged for offence punishable under Section 138 NI Act.

Factual Matrix

Present complaint was filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Complainant had granted a friendly loan of Rs 21,00,000 to the accused for two months for some urgent need of the accused.

To discharge the legal liability, the accused issued two cheques in favour of the complainant firm, but the same were returned by the bank as no balance was available in the account. Thereafter, Complainant sent a legal notice but the accused allegedly failed to pay the cheque amount and hence, the complainant filed the present complaint.

Accused denied having taken a loan of Rs 21,00,000 from the complainant and instead stated that he took a loan of Rs 5,00,000 and had already paid the same. He added that he had given three blank signed cheques as security cheques which were misused by the complainant.

Discussion

In the present matter, the complainant proved the original cheques that the accused had not disputed as being drawn on the account of the accused.

Court stated that giving a blank signed cheque does not erase the liability under the NI Act. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may subsequently fill up the amount and other particulars (Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, ¶ 34).). The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability.

Legal Notice

It is settled law that an accused who claims that she/he did not receive the legal notice, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court, make payment of the cheque amount, and an accused who does not make such payment cannot contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act [C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555).

Maintainability | Complainant is an unregistered partnership firm

It was contended that the present complaint was barred under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. The firm was unregistered and hence the complaint was barred under the stated section.

A simpliciter reading of Section 69(2) would show that it is intended to apply to only suits, and that it would have no application to a criminal complaint.

Hence, the bar imposed on unregistered firms under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act does not apply to a criminal complaint under Section 138 NI Act.

Non-Existence of Debt

Complainant is required to prove that the cheque in question was drawn by the drawer for discharging a legally enforceable debt.

Court stated that as per the NI Act, once the accused admits signature in the cheque in question, certain presumptions are drawn, which result in shifting of onus on the accused and in the present matter, the issuance of cheques was not denied.

The combined effect of Section 118(a) NI Act and Section 139 of the NI Act is that a presumption exists that the cheque was drawn for consideration and given by the accused of the discharge of debt or other liability.

Rebuttal

  • Misuse of the security cheque

Bench stated that it is immaterial whether the cheque had been filled by the complainant once the cheque has been admitted being duly signed by the drawer-accused.

  • Complainant did not have the financial capacity to grant the alleged loan

It is a settled position of law that in case of cash transaction, showcasing that complainant did not have the adequate financial capacity to lend money to the accused amounts to a probable defense and can help in rebutting the presumption that is accrued to the benefit of the complainant in cheque dishonor cases.

In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

During his cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.

(emphasis added)

Hence, the Court stated that in cases in which the underlying debt transaction is a cash transaction, the accused can raise a probable defense by questioning the financial capacity of the complainant, and once the said question is raised, the onus shifts on the complainant to prove his financial capacity.

Bench on perusal of the record of the present case, agreed with the submission of the counsel of the accused, since the record created adequate doubts over the financial capacity of the complainant to advance the loan in question.

Conclusion

Hence, Court opined that the complainant failed to establish that it had the financial capacity to advance a loan of Rs 21,00,000 to the accused.

Therefore, accused successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 NI Act and the complainant failed to discharge the shifted onus.

“…even if the cheque presented by the complainant was returned unpaid by the bank, the complainant cannot prosecute the accused, as the requirement of the existence of legal liability has not been satisfied in the present case, since the accused has been able to establish a probable defence by creating a credible doubt over the existence of the alleged loan transaction.”

Concluding the matter, Bench held that complainant failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, hence the accused was acquitted from the charge of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. [S.S. Auto Gallery v. Vaneet Singh, 21636 of 2016, decided on 9-10-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

Manjeet Singh, counsel for the complainant.

D.K Ahuja, for the accused.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Ravi Nath Tilhari, J., addressed a matter wherein a person being the director of the company signed a cheque on behalf of the company and since the said cheque got dishonoured, he was made liable, without the company being made liable under the offence of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The instant petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of summoning order passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Facts as stated by the applicant

Applicant has been stated to be the Director of a Company and complainant/OP 2, an employee in the railways, by giving assurance of contract of road construction from his superior officers in favour of applicant’s company obtained post-dated cheque of 5 lakh rupees in terms of security money.

Complainant had assured the applicant that once he starts earning profits from the said contract work he would return the post-dated cheques.

However, applicant without any prior notice to the company, complainant presented the cheque in the bank which was dishonoured due to non-availability of funds. One of the legal notice, though was not received by the applicant, but the second notice was served.

Points that arose for consideration:

High Court formulated the following points of consideration:

  • Whether criminal prosecution against the person in charge of, and responsible for conduct of the business of the company under Section 138 NI Act, can be maintained, in the absence of any prosecution of the Company for such offence and without making the company an accused, in view of Section 141 of the NI Act?
  • Whether the cheque in question was issued by the applicant in his personal capacity or in the capacity of director of the company?
  • Whether the orders under challenge and the criminal proceedings against the applicant deserve to be quashed in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC?

Analysis of the above points:

In order to consider the first point, Court referred to Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

On perusal of the said provisions, the essential ingredients of offence under Section 138 NI Act as laid down by the Bench were:

  • The person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker
  • When such a cheque is presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid
  • such cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
  • the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to the payee
  • Such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding return of the cheque, as unpaid and
  • Inspite of the demand notice the drawer of the cheque failed to make the payment within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the demand notice

For the offence to be constituted under Section 138 NI Act, all the above ingredients need to co-exist.

Supreme Court decision in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, held that Section 141 of NI Act is concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the other persons, vicariously liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company.

The vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 NI Act stands satisfied. There can be no vicarious liability unless there is a prosecution against the company. For maintaining a prosecution under Section 141 NI Act, arraying of the company as an accused is imperative.

 In Supreme Court’s decision of Standard Chartered Bank v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 6 SCC 62, it was held that there cannot be any vicarious liability unless there was a prosecution against the Company.

In Harihara Krishnan v. J Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663, Supreme Court held that Section 141 stipulates the liability for the offence punishable under Section 138 NI Act when the person committing such an offence happens to be a company.

In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, it was settled that for maintaining a prosecution against the person in charge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the company under Section 138 NI Act, arraigning of the Company as an accused is imperative in view of Section 141 of the Act, as such a person can only be held vicariously liable.

With regard to point 1, hence Court held that such a person, cannot be prosecuted unless there was prosecution of the company.

Second Point

 Whether the cheque in question was issued by the applicant in his personal capacity or in the capacity of the Director of the Company?

The above-stated question can be determined from perusal of the cheque itself. It is one of the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 138 NI Act, that the person drew a cheque on an account maintained with the Banker and the existence of this ingredient is to be proved from the document itself, i.e. the cheque, and for its proof no other evidence is required. Hence, Court could determine if the cheque was issued as authorized signatory or in personal capacity by the applicant by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

On perusal of the copy f the cheque it was found that the said was signed by Sanjay Singh, the applicant for Udit Infraheights Private Limited, as its authorized signatory.

Hence the cheque was not issued in the applicant’s personal capacity.

In the absence of the company, as accused, any offence was not made out, even prima facie, against the applicant for his summoning under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act.

While referring to the Supreme Court decision in Ashoke Bafna v. Upper India Steel Manufacturing and Engineering Company Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 202, it was held that before summoning an accused under Section 138 NI Act, the Magistrate is expected to examine the nature of the allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary, in support thereof, and then to proceed further with the proper application of mind to the legal principle of the issue.

Last Point

 With regard to the last point of consideration, Bench referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Rishipal Singh v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 215, Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Section 482 CrPC held that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the case.

In Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharshtra, (2015) 88 ACC 613, Supreme Court held that the Superior Court should maintain purity in the administration of justice and should not allow the abuse of process of the Court.

Therefore, Court opined that the complaint was not filed against the company, as the company was not made a party accused and no vicarious liability could be imposed upon the accused applicant.

Since, the cheque was not signed by the applicant in his personal capacity, the complaint could not have proceeded against him and no offence could be made out against the applicant.

Petition was allowed and the orders challenged were quashed. [Sanjay Singh v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 120, decided on 10-02-2021]

Case BriefsDistrict Court

State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Odisha (SCDRC): Dr D.P. Choudhury (President) modified the compensation amount awarded to a Law Student in light of being subjected to ‘Deficiency of Service’ and ‘Unfair Trade by ‘Amazon’.

The instant appeal was filed under Section 15 of the erstwhile Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Factual Matrix

While the appellant was in his first year of law school, the OP had floated an offer for sale of a Laptop without Laptop Bag for Rs 190 against the price of Rs 23,499.

OP had confirmed for placing of the order and two hours after receiving the confirmation, the appellant received a phone call from the OP’s Customer Care Service Department stating that the subject order stood cancelled due to the price recession issue.

Since the complainant was in need of a laptop to prepare his project, he raised an objection for such cancellation.

On not receiving any response from the OP, complainant issued a legal notice.

Deficiency in Service

Appellant had to purchase another laptop but suffered from mental agony for such cancellation, hence filed a complaint alleging the deficiency in service and unfair trade practice.

Complainant claimed compensation of Rs 50,000 and Rs. 10,000 towards litigation cost.

District Forum had allowed the complaint partly by directing the OP to pay compensation of Rs 10,000 for mental agony and to pay Rs 2,000 towards the cost of litigation.

Hence, the aforesaid impugned order was challenged by the complainant/appellant stating that the District Forum committed error in law by not deciding to direct to pay Rs 50,000 as compensation.

Analysis, Decision and Law

Bench observed that “When there is an advertisement made for offer placed by the OP and made the offer as per the material available on record and complainant placed the order and same got confirmed, the agreement is complete.”

Another aspect to be noted was that, when the OP had allowed Rockery Marketing at his platform as per written version, the responsibility of the OP could not be lost sight of.

Since there was a breach of contract by OP, OP is held to be liable to pay the damages.

Commission agreed with District Forum’s observation that OP not only negligent in providing service but was also involved in unfair trade practice.

Taking all the factors discussed above for consideration, Bench concluded that compensation awarded should be of Rs 30,000 for unfair trade practice and punitive damages of Rs 10,000. Further, with regard to the cost of litigation Rs 5000 needs to be awarded.

On failing to make the above payments to the complainant within 30 days, the said amounts will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

In view of the above, the appeal was disposed of. [Supriyo Ranjan Mahapatra v. Amazon Development Centre India (P) Ltd., First Appeal No. 492 of 2018, decided on 11-01-2021]


Read More:

District Consumer Forum directs ‘Amazon’ to pay compensation for “deficiency in services”

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: Rajendra Kumar Srivastava, J., while addressing a matter with regard to dishonour of cheque held that, Director/Managing Director/Joint Director/other officers and employees of company can not be prosecuted under Section 138 of NI Act unless the company is impleaded as an accused

Petitioner is aggrieved with the Order passed against him by JMFC framing a charge under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Complaint was filed by respondent-trade firm against the petitioner wherein it was mentioned that on account of business relations between the parties petitioner had borrowed an amount of Rs 2,00,000 from respondent, which was to be returned by within a period of four months.

In November 2017, petitioner handed over a cheque amounting to Rs 2,00,000 which when the respondent submitted in January, 2018 was dishonoured due to “stop payment” by the petitioner.

On the above-event’s occurrence respondent had sent a legal notice to the petitioner which was ignored by the petitioner and thus a complaint before JMFC was filed.

Petitioners Contention

Respondent had given the amount in question for business purpose and the petitioner had given the said cheque under the capacity of chairman of company namely ‘Well Built Industry India Ltd.’ but the respondent did not implead the company as a party in the complaint case.

The respondent/complainant also failed to specify the role of present petitioner on behalf of the company. Hence, in view of the provision of Section 141 NI Act, the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act are bad in law and deserves to be quashed. With the aforesaid, he prayed to allow this petition.

Section 138 NI Act: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account.

Section 141 NI Act: Offences by Companies

“…if an offence is committed by a company under Section 138 of the Act, every person, at the time, the offence was committed, was in-charge and responsible to the company in the conduct of the business of the company, is liable along with the company to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89

“…Necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a person can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under Section 141 NI Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a company, principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable.”

Bench while referring to several decisions held that the person (Director/Managing Director/Joint Director/other officers and employees) of company can not be prosecuted under Section 138 of NI Act unless the company is impleaded as an accused.

Thus, in the present matter it is to be noted that a demand notice was served only on the petitioner/accused, there was no demand notice against company, therefore, without arraying the company as an accused in complaint case, the petitioner can not be prosecuted for the offence of Section 138 NI Act.

Hence the present petition was allowed.[Bhupendra Suryawanshi v. Sai Traders, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 1277 , decided on 09-06-2020]

Punjab and Haryana High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Ritu Bahri, J. partly allowed the petition with the directions that the petitioner was entitled to compensation when their plea for the compassionate appointment was rejected by the respondents.  

The husband of the petitioner was working with Haryana Police as Head Constable. He expired on 22.7.1998. His son was a minor at the time of his death. After attaining the age of majority in 2005, his son made an application for compassionate appointment and submitted all the relevant documents along with application. This claim was rejected on the ground that as per Instructions dated 28.2.2003 regarding Ex-gratia Appointment Rules, 2003 as per Clause 6(1) (b) the same had become time barred. 

The petitioner relied on the new policy dated 30.11.2005 “Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Govt. Employees Rules, 2005” and the notification dated 01.8.2006, whereby new rules known as Haryana Compassionate Appointment to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employee Rules 2006 was published by the State Government. The petitioner served a legal notice for grant of compassionate appointment as well as financial assistance. The Department in their reply to the said legal notice rejected the claim by saying that a compassionate appointment could not be given since any post could not be kept reserved for any minor child of a deceased employee. The petitioner also relied on Instructions dated 16.3.2011, whereby Chief Secretary to Government of Haryana as a one time measure had given relaxation for applying for ex gratia compensation in cases before 01.08.2006. As per these Instructions, a decision was taken that the Government was to reconsider all the old cases where the family of the deceased under Rule 4 (2) and 6(1)(c) of Rules 2003 and under Rule 4(2) and 6(4) of the Rules 2005 of the Ex-gratia Scheme could not exercise option within time due to lack of requisite knowledge and other reasons and because of which the family of the deceased could not avail the benefit under Ex-gratia Scheme as it became time barred.

The respondents stated that they had offered the petitioner some financial assistance, which the petitioner refused to accept and urged for the appointment of her son. While rejecting the case of the petitioner for ex-gratia appointment, reference was made to Clause 6 (1) (c) of Rules 2003. A perusal of these Rules showed that the Head of the concerned Department had to prepare the list of dependents which were valid for three years and appointments were to be given by the Department strictly in accordance with seniority so maintained. 

The only benefit that the petitioner could get was the payment of ex-gratia amount offered with regard to the Ex-gratia Appointment Rules 2003, as per Clause 6(1)(b) the same has become time-barred. Therefore, the question of grant of appointment on compassionate grounds did not arise. 

In view of the above-noted facts, the instant petition was partly allowed with the direction that it was the duty of the State Government after rejecting the case of compassionate appointment of petitioner, to give them Rs 2.5 lacs and that the petitioners were entitled for interest @ 6% interest per annum on the financial assistance from 01.12.2004 till the payment was made.[Asha Rani v. State of Haryana, CWP No. 2838 of 2017, decided on 14-12-2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Competition Commission of India (CCI): The Bench of Ashok Kumar Gupta, Chairperson and Augustine Peter and U.C. Nahta, Members closed a case under Section 26(6) of the Competition Act, 2002 by laying down analysis of the detailed investigation report by the DG.

The present case is pertaining to the information filed by Jasper Infotech (P) Ltd. against Kaff Appliances India (P) Ltd. for the alleged contravention of Section 3(4) of Competition Act. The Informant displayed OP-Kaff’s products on its online portal ‘Snapdeal’ at a discounted price, aggrieved by which the OP displayed a caution notice on its website alleging that the OP’s products sold by Informant through its website are without authorization and are counterfeit. The stated caution notice said that OP will not honour warranties on its products sold through the said website and any purchase made from it would be at customer’s own risk.

Further, a legal notice was served in order to withdraw the caution notice alleging a violation of certain provisions of the Competition Act.

According to the Informant, the main grievance of OP was regarding the discounted price at which such products were sold by the Informant through its website and to substantiate the said claim it revealed an e-mail which attempted to impose a price restriction in the form of Minimum Operating Price (MOP) on the website to make sales at a minimum price and threatened to ban online sales if such prices were not maintained, which resultantly is a contravention of Section 3(4)(e) of the Competition Act.

The other contravention attempted by OP was to cut off supplies to distributors who were aiming to sell through an online channel which amounted to a violation of Section 3(4)(d) of Competition Act. On perusal of the facts, Commission directed DG for an enquiry.

DG in conclusion to its report said that, firstly OP is not involved in maintaining a resale price and secondly, it does not possess sufficient market power to cause AAEC as provided under Section 18(3) and accordingly no contravention could be established under the provisions of Section 3(4)(e) of the Act. Further, on the establishment of the said report by DG, further investigation was directed under Section 26(7) of the Act. In the said investigation, DG concluded that alleged conduct of OP did not lead to any AAEC under Section 19(3) of the Act.

Analysis

Commission observed that, distributors/dealers were using the services of the informant while selling the products of OP, it ipso facto becomes a part of distribution/vertical chain and thus, it would be incorrect to state that an Informant is only a market place facilitating interaction of the buyers and sellers online. Further, while not agreeing with DG’s observation it was stated by the Commission that the agreements between manufacturers/distributors and e-commerce players can be looked into under Section 3(4) read with Section 3(1) of the Act.

To establish a contravention under Section 3(4) read with Section 3(1), two conditions need to be fulfilled- firstly, agreement/arrangement/understanding ought to exist and secondly, such agreement/ arrangement/understanding has caused or has the potential to cause AAEC.

A Right of the manufacturer to choose the most efficient distribution channel ought not to be interfered with, unless the said choice leads to anti-competitive effects.

Commission found merit in justifications offered by OP and observed that evidence on record does not demonstrate the conduct/practice of OP led to any AAEC and presence of a large number of dealers who were competing with each other suggests a fair degree of intra-brand competition.

Thus, evidence on record did not reveal the existence of any price restriction of minimum RPM and intra-brand competition negated the anti-competitive impact of OP’s alleged conduct. The case was thereby closed. [Jasper Infotech (P) Ltd. v. KAFF Appliances (India) (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine CCI 2, Order dated 15-01-2019]