Hot Off The PressNews

The National Human Rights Commission, India has issued a notice to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, DMRC, after taking cognizance of a complaint requesting removal of misleading signages on its 347 new toilets for Transgender Persons.

Allegedly, the name ‘Ubhayalingi’ with a symbolic photo of ‘half-male and half-female’ outside the new 347 Transgender friendly toilets, constructed by the DMRC at metro stations, is not the acceptable term for Transgender persons.

The signage fails to provide a safe space and prevent gender discrimination that the DMRC intended.

The Commission has called for an action taken report from the Director (Works) and the Director (Projects), DRMC, on the grievances raised by the complainant within six weeks.

The complainant has requested the Commission for directions to the DMRC to remove all bilingual signage that mention ‘Ubhayalingi’ immediately and make the following changes:

1. The transliteration of the term ‘Transgender Person’ in Hindi should be used in all signages;

2. The symbol for transgender persons should be ‘T’ instead of the ‘half male-half female symbol;

3. A fresh press release be issued after the change wherein the signage and the statement use ‘Transgender Persons’ instead of Transgender;

4. hat the above changes be followed in all future actions of the DMRC including separate public toilet facilities for Transgender Persons at its upcoming stations in Phase-IV;

5. DMRC should notify a complaint officer for notifying violations of provisions of the Transgender Persons Act.

National Human Rights Commission

[Press Release dt. 17-09-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: P. Velmurugan, J., addressed a matter revolving around the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

A complaint was filed for an alleged offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Judicial Magistrate found the respondent guilty of offence under Section 138 NI Act.

The appellate Judge while allowing the respondent’s appeal set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 NI Act, for which he was prosecuted before the trial court.

Appellant’s case was that the respondent had borrowed a sum of Rs 90,000 from the appellant and in order to discharge the debt issued a cheque which returned when presented to the bank with endorsement “drawers signatures differs”.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Bench noted that on statutory notice sent by appellant, respondent responded stating that he had denied the execution of the cheque.

Another significant fact was that the appellant did not prove that there was a transaction between the appellant and the respondent.

High Court remarked that,

When the cheque was returned for the reason that the signature differs, and the respondent/accused has taken a stand that the complainant is a stranger to the accused, it is for the appellant/complainant to establish the case and the appellant has not proved the same, and if once, execution of cheque is proved, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be drawn and the accused has to rebut the presumption that there is no legally enforceable debt and cheque has not been issued for legally enforceable debt.

 Hence, in the present matter, complainant could not establish the execution of the cheque and borrowal of money by the respondent.

Therefore, in Court’s opinion the appellate Court’s decision had no perversity and Bench found no compelled circumstances or reason to interfere with the Judgment of acquittal.

In view of the above-stated facts and circumstances, criminal appeal was dismissed. [S. Ashok Kumar v. S. Boopal,  2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2325, decided on 22-04-2021]

Advocates before the Court:

For Appellant : Mr. M. Marudhachalam

For Respondent: Mr. L.Mouli

Case BriefsCOVID 19Tribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Human Rights Commission, India, after taking cognizance of a complaint about the brutal assault on a doctor by the relatives of a Covid patient at Udali Model Hospital in Hojai district of Assam 01-06-2021 has called for the action taken report from the Chief Secretary and the Director-General of Police, Government of Assam into the alleged incident within four weeks. Besides an enquiry into the allegations, the report is expected to include the needful preventive and punitive action taken in the matter.

The Commission has also sent a copy of the complaint to the Secretary, Union Health & Family Welfare Ministry to initiate necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of the frontline health workers in the country.

According to the complaint, having attached media reports,

the incident happened after the Covid patient had died. Allegedly, some of the frontline medical workers, Doctors, Nurses and Ward boys managed to escape but also got hurt and are deeply traumatized due to this horrific incident.

National Human Rights Commission

[Press Release dt. 4-06-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Vivek Chaudhary, J., held that while giving notice under Section 5 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, it shall be optional for the parties to the intended marriage to make a request in writing to the Marriage Officer to publish or NOT to publish a notice under Section 6 and follow the procedure of objections as prescribed under the Act.

Backdrop – Story of many Safias and Abhisheks

A Habeas Corpus petition was filed by one Safia Sultana through her husband Abhishek Kumar Pandey claiming that they got married as per Hindu rituals after Safia converted to Hindu religion and got a new name Simran. It was alleged that Safia’s father was not permitting them to live together. They claimed that both of them were adults, married of their free will, and desired to live together. They alleged that Safia’s custody by her father was illegal. However, before the Court, Safia’s father fairly accepted that since Safia married Abhishek with her choice and wants to live with him, he accepted her decision and wished both of them best for their future.

The issue of the petition concluded there. But the views expressed by the young couple, compelled the Court to look into the deeper issue. Safia and Abhishek expressed that they could have solemnized their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but the Act requires a 30 days notice to be published and objections to be invited from the public at large. They expressed that any such notice would be an invasion in their privacy and would have definitely caused unnecessary social pressure/interference in their free choice with regard to their marriage. The personal laws do not impose any such condition of publication of notice, inviting and deciding objections before solemnizing any marriage. They further state that such a challenge is being faced by a large number of similarly situated persons who desire to build a life with a partner of their own choice.

It is further submitted that such young couples are not in a position to raise these issues before solemnizing their marriages as any litigation further attracts unnecessary attention which invades into their privacy and also causes unnecessary social pressure upon them with regard to their choice of a life partner.

Discussion & analysis


For the purpose of the present discussion, the Court referred to Section 4 (Conditions relating to solemnization of special marriages); Section 5 (Notice of intended marriage); Section 6 (Marriage notice book and publication); Section 7 (Objection to marriage); Section 8 (Procedure on receipt of objection); and Section 46 (Penalty for wrongful action of Marriage Officer).


After briefly visiting the history and development of law with regard to civil marriages in India, it was considered that the question before the Court was:

“Whether the social conditions and the law, as has progressed since passing of the Special Marriage Act, 1872 and thereafter the Special Marriage Act, 1954 till now, would in any manner impact the interpretation of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the 1954 Act and whether with the change the said sections no more remain mandatory in nature.”


The Court noted that the Golden Rule of Interpretation is that so far as possible plain reading of the provisions should be accepted. However, at the same time, there is another Principle of Interpretation, that, an ongoing statute should be interpreted on the basis of present day’s changed conditions and not on old obsolete conditions. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287; and Kashmir Singh v. Union of India, (2008) 7 SCC 729. Reliance was also placed on Githa Hariharan v. RBI, (1999) 2 SCC 228; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose, (2009) 7 SCC 1; and K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

Thus, said the Court, it was required to consider the changes in the social and legal aspects, if any, that may impact the interpretation of the provisions of the 1954 Act.


While discussing the changes in Socio-legal aspects, the Court referred to the 59th Law Commission Report; the 212th Law Commission Report; and the 242nd Law Commission Report and recommendation made by the Law Commission in these reports.


While walking through the Development of Law on the present aspects, the Court relied on a number of Supreme Court decisions and concluded that since the case of Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, till the case of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, the law has travelled a long distance defining fundamental rights of personal liberty and of privacy:

  • Once a person becomes a major he or she can marry whosoever he/she likes.” [Lata Singh Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 475]
  • An inherent aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution would be the freedom of choice in marriage.” [Indian Woman Says Gang-Raped on Orders of Village Court, In re, (2014) 4 SCC 786]
  • Choice of woman in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitutional right. It is founded on individual choice that is recognized in the Constitution under Article 19.” [Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 786]
  • The consent of the family or the community or the clan is not necessary once the two adult individuals agree to enter into a wedlock… is a manifestation of their choice which is recognized under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.” [Shakti Vahini Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192]
  • “Neither the State nor the law can dictate a choice of partners or limit the free ability of every person to decide on these matters…. Social approval for intimate personal decisions is not the basis for recognising them.” [Shafin Jahan Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368]
  • Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination……. privacy is one of the most important rights to be protected both against State and non-State actors and be recognized as a fundamental right.” [S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1]


In view of the changed social circumstances and progress in laws noted and proposed by the Law Commission as well as law declared by the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, the High Court held that:

“It would be cruel and unethical to force the present generation living with its current needs and expectations to follow the customs and traditions adopted by a generation living nearly 150 years back for its social needs and circumstances, which violates fundamental rights recognized by the courts of the day.”

In view of the Court, the interpretation of Sections 6 and 7 read with Section 46 containing the procedure of publication of notice and inviting objections to the intended marriage in 1954 Act thus has to be such that would uphold the fundamental rights and not violate the same. It was held:

“In case the same on their simplistic reading are held mandatory, as per the law declared today, they would invade in the fundamental rights of liberty and privacy, including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.”

It was further noted that even today, majority of marriages in India are performed under personal laws which do not require publication of any notice or calling for objections with regard to such a marriage. However, under Sections 6 and 7 of the 1954 Act, the persons intending to solemnize a marriage are required to give a notice and the Marriage Officer thereafter is made duty-bound to publish the notice for a period of 30 days and invite objections with regard to the same. Any person can object to the marriage on the ground that it violates any of the condition of Section 4 of the 1954 Act. None of the conditions under Section 4 is such, violation of which would impact rights of any person in any manner different than the same would in case of marriage under any personal law. Even if a marriage takes place in violation of any of the conditions of Section 4, legal consequences would follow and the courts can decide upon the same, including declare such a marriage to be void, as they do under the personal laws.

The Court was of the view that:

“There is no apparent reasonable purpose achieved by making the procedure to be more protective or obstructive under the 1954 Act, under which much less numbers of marriages are taking place, than procedure under the other personal laws, more particularly when this discrimination violates the fundamental rights of the class of persons adopting the 1954 Act for their marriage.”

However, held that Court, that in case, such individuals applying to solemnize their marriage under the 1954 Act themselves by their free choice desire that they would like to have more information about their counterparts, they can definitely opt for publication of notice under Section 6 and further procedure with regard to objections to be followed. Such publication of notice and further procedure would not be violative of their fundamental rights as they adopt the same of their free will. Therefore, the requirement of publication of notice under Section 6 and inviting/entertaining objections under Section 7 can only be read as directory in nature, to be given effect only on request of parties to the intended marriage and not otherwise.

Operative Portion of the Order

“Thus, this Court mandates that while giving notice under Section 5 of the Act of 1954 it shall be optional for the parties to the intended marriage to make a request in writing to the Marriage Officer to publish or not to publish a notice under Section 6 and follow the procedure of objections as prescribed under the Act of 1954. In case they do not make such a request for publication of notice in writing, while giving notice under Section 5 of the Act, the Marriage Officer shall not publish any such notice or entertain objections to the intended marriage and proceed with the solemnization of the marriage. It goes without saying that it shall be open for the Marriage Officer, while solemnizing any marriage under the Act of 1954, to verify the identification, age and valid consent of the parties or otherwise their competence to marry under the said Act. In case he has any doubt, it shall be open for him to ask for appropriate details/proof as per the facts of the case.”[Safiya Sultana v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 19, decided on 12-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: B. M Shyam Prasad J dismissed the appeal being devoid of merits.

The facts of the case are such that the first respondent – the Karnataka State Financial Corporation filed a petition under Section 31 (1)(aa) and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 before VI Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru City, against the appellant and the second and third respondents invoking Bank Guarantee executed by them. Hence the petition was filed under Section 31 (1) (aa) and 32 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 which was allowed, assailing this order another petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed which was dismissed ex parte as inspite of giving repeated reminders no one appeared before the Court. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition instant appeal was filed before XXXVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the first respondent had shown his address at Wilson Garden, Bengaluru for service of notice but he had sold the property way back in 1992 and shifted his residence and been a resident of this new place ever since. He further submitted that this is the reason why the appellant did not know about the petition and came to know only in the month of September 2008 when he visited Sub Registrars Office for verification of documents.

The Court observed that the question of the appellant being served at the address other than the address mentioned in the petition viz., address of the principal borrower and there was a complete cessation of all association with the principal borrower. It was further observed that when it is admitted that he was one of the directors of the principal borrower and he continued to be a director of the principal borrower as of the relevant date, the service of notice at the first instance at the principal borrower’s address could be reasonably inferred as due service of notice. Also, it would not be reasonable to infer that the appellant has no knowledge of the petition merely because the appellant contends that he shifted his residential address.

The court thus held that based on documents placed on record it is amply clear that there is no information available that the appellant informed the first respondent about his shifting of residence and his new address. Thus, there stands no reason for interference.

In view of the above, appeal was dismissed.[N. Nagaraja Reddy v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 1413 of 2013 (CPC), decided on 03-01-2021]

Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

OP. ED.Practical Lawyer Archives


Meetings have a very important role to play in the functioning of company where decisions are taken and recorded. In case of companies, whether Board meetings or shareholders’ meetings, there is an exchange of idea, proposal, problems and decision on the further of action. In case of companies, a meeting of members, directors, debenture holders, class shareholders, creditors can be called and conducted. This article is a checklist for preparation and sending of the notice of shareholders’ meeting by a private company or unlisted public company under Sections 101 and 102 of the Act read with the Rules.

  1. Applicability of Provisions.—The said provisions are applicable to annual general meeting or extraordinary general meeting of the members of private company or unlisted public company. A listed company shall also comply with the provisions of the Act and Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.
  2. Contents of the Notice of Meeting.—Every notice of a general meeting shall specify the place, date, day and the hour of the meeting and shall contain a statement of the business to be transacted at such meeting. The statement of business includes the resolutions that are proposed for the voting of the shareholders of the company. Ordinary business (as referred to in Section 102 of the Act) means: (i) consideration of financial statements and the reports of the Board of Directors and auditors; (ii) declaration of any dividend; (iii) appointment of Directors in place of those retiring; and (iv) appointment of, and the fixing of the remuneration of, the auditors. Any other business shall be considered as “special business”. Necessary reference of type of business (ordinary or special) and type of resolution (ordinary or special) shall be given in the notice of the general meeting.
  3. Contents of the Notice of General Meeting through Videoconferencing (VC).—Ministry of Corporate Affairs has allowed companies to hold the general meeting through VC or other audio-visual means (OAVM). In addition to any other requirement provided in the Act or the Rules, the notice for the general meeting shall make disclosures with regard to the manner in which framework provided in the MCA Circular (i.e. General Circular No. 14/2020 [F. No. 2/1/2020-CL-V] dated 8-4-2020) shall be available for use by the members and also contain clear instructions on how to access and participate in the meeting. The company shall also provide a helpline number through the registrar and transfer agent, technology provider, or otherwise, for those shareholders who need assistance with using the technology before or during the meeting. A copy of the meeting notice shall also be prominently displayed on the website of the company and due intimation may be made to the exchanges in case of a listed company.
  4. Explanatory Statement.—A statement setting out the material facts concerning each item of “special business” to be transacted at a general meeting, shall be annexed to the notice calling such meeting. The statement shall set out the nature of concern or interest, financial or otherwise, if any, in respect of each item of every director, key managerial personnel, manager and their relatives. The explanatory statement shall also include information and facts that may enable members to understand the meaning, scope and implications of the items of business and to take decision thereon.
  5. Length of Notice of Meeting.—A general meeting of a company may be called by giving not less than clear 21 days’ notice. In case of private company, the articles of association may provide for a shorter period for the length of notice of general meeting. In case of companies incorporated under Section 8 of the Act, a general meeting of a company may be called by giving not less than clear 14 days’ notice.
  6. Mode of Sending Notice of General Meeting.—The notice of general meeting can be given either in writing or through electronic mode in such manner as may be prescribed.
  7. Sending of Notice through Electronic Mode.—Rule 18 of the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014 prescribes detailed procedure for sending notice in electronic mode[1]. A notice may be sent through e-mail as a text or as an attachment to e-mail or as a notification providing electronic link or uniform resource locator (URL) for accessing such notice. The e-mail shall be addressed to the person entitled to receive such e-mail as per the records of the company or as provided by the depository. The subject line in e-mail shall state the name of the company, notice of the type of meeting, place and the date on which the meeting is scheduled. If notice is sent in the form of a non-editable attachment to e-mail, such attachment shall be in. PDF or in a non-editable format together with a “link or instructions” for recipient for downloading relevant version of the software. The company should ensure that it uses a system which produces confirmation of the total number of recipients e-mailed and a record of each recipient to whom the notice has been sent and copy of such record and any notices of any failed transmissions and subsequent resending shall be retained by or on behalf of the company as “proof of sending”. The company’s obligation shall be satisfied when it transmits the e-mail and the company shall not be held responsible for a failure in transmission beyond its control. The company may send e-mail through in-house facility or its registrar and transfer agent or authorise any third-party agency providing bulk e-mail facility. The notice of the general meeting of the company shall be simultaneously placed on the website of the company, if any, and on the website as may be notified by the Central Government.
  8. Opportunity for E-mail Address Registration.—The company shall provide an advance opportunity at least once in a financial year, to the member to register his e-mail address and changes therein. Such request may be made by only those members who have not got their e-mail id recorded or to update a fresh e-mail id and not from the members whose e-mail ids are already registered. If a member entitled to receive notice fails to provide or update relevant e-mail address to the company, or to the depository participant as the case may be, the company shall not be in default for not delivering notice via e-mail.
  9. Shorter Notice Consent for Shareholders Meeting.—A general meeting may be called after giving shorter notice than clear 21 days’ notice (or any other period as mentioned in the articles of association of the company), if consent, in writing or by electronic mode, is accorded thereto:

(i) In Case of an Annual General Meeting (Company with Share Capital or without Share Capital).—By not less than 95% of the members entitled to vote thereat.

(ii) In the Case of Extraordinary General Meeting (for Company with Share Capital).—By members of the company holding majority in number of members entitled to vote and who represent not less than 95% of such part of the paid-up share capital of the company as gives a right to vote at the meeting.

(iii) In the Case of Extraordinary General Meeting (for Company without Share Capital).—By members of the company having, if the company has no share capital, not less than 95% of the total voting power exercisable at that meeting.

  1. Recipients of Notice of Shareholders’ Meeting.—The notice of every meeting of the company shall be given to: (a) every member of the company, legal representative of any deceased member or the assignee of an insolvent member; (b) auditor(s) of the company; and (c) every director of the company.
  2. Accidental Omission to Give Notice of General Meeting.—Any accidental omission to give notice to, or the non-receipt of such notice by, any member or other person who is entitled to such notice for any meeting shall not invalidate the proceedings of the meeting.

*Gaurav N Pingle, Practising Company Secretary, Pune. He can be reached at

[1] Here, “electronic mode” means any communication sent by a company through its authorised and secured computer program which is capable of producing confirmation and keeping record of such communication addressed to the person entitled to receive such communication at the last electronic mail address provided by the member.

Op EdsOP. ED.

This article concerns with a recurrent issue that arises from an ever-widening relationship of landlord-tenant. There can be no hesitation mentioning that almost all the societies have witnessed conflicts when it comes to determination of tenancy and thus, regulate the same. In India, Part V of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” or “TPA”) governs such a relationship entered into through a lease. A perplexing question that needs discussion here pertains to procedural requirement of “giving a notice” under Sections 106 and 111(g) of the Act, by the landlord, of his intention to determine the jural relationship of tenancy before filing a suit for eviction under the various State Rent Acts. The issue within this is not regarding what amounts to “giving of a notice” or whether a notice given in a certain way fulfils all requirements to be a valid notice. The controversy centres on whether such a notice is at all necessary to be given. The major takeaway for the readers would be knowledge of confined situations where notice is required to be served by the landlord and consequently, would reduce the confusion regarding the same. Before moving on to the question on hand it becomes pertinent to shed some light on the concept and scope of the aforesaid provisions.

Ordinarily, a contract between the parties would regulate all the relevant terms including the duration of the subsistence of tenancy, however, there might be a case where the contract mentions no date of termination of such relation. On a plain reading of Section 106, it is clear that the legislature has classified the leases into two categories and according to their purposes this provision would be attracted to construe the duration of the lease and accordingly duration of notice to be served in absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary[1]. This implies that this section is applicable only in the absence of contract as to the duration of lease. Also, it is open to the parties to contract themselves out of the provision and to make a valid contract between themselves as regards duration of their lease and the manner of termination of the same. It is obvious that the lease of tenancy, mostly, if not always, would be covered by the mandate of giving 15 days’ notice to the tenant. Even the length of the notice or the calendar for computation of the period can be subject to contract between the parties[2].

The other indispensable requirement of giving notice is rooted under Section 111(g) of the Act. The sub-section deals with the subject known as forfeiture of leases. Forfeiture ordinarily implies a penalty for an offence or unlawful act or for some wilful omission of a tenant of property whereby he loses it, together with his title, which devolves upon others[3]. To constitute forfeiture in a matter, there must be a breach of an express condition of the lease which provides for the landlord’s re-entry to the premises.

The question that stares us at this stage is whether both the notices under the impugned sections technically are identical to each other. To start with, a bare reading of Section 111(g) shows that it is nowhere mentioned as to the nature and time period of the notice that needs to be given is identical to that of Section 106. Clearly, Section 106 of the Act was incorporated as an equitable provision so that a tenant may not be taken by surprise. The rationale behind such a mandate could be intimating the intention of landlord so that the tenant could arrange for himself another roof. It seems to be in the interests of hapless tenants who are without just cause thrown out of the premises at the mercy of the landlord. On the other hand, the latter’s purpose apparently is not the one as of the former and is not based on the principles of justice, equity or good conscience[4]. It cannot be said to be guided by reason and equity as the tenant after liability has been incurred cannot be given benefit of his own wrong. Therefore, notice under the latter sub-section is not the one to be given under Section 106 of the Act. However, at most, it can be said that the similarities that can be drawn in both the notices are with respect to the procedural formalities but not the technical ones.

This brings us to the real question of this article as to whether the “giving of notice” as contemplated by the Act is a prerequisite condition that needs to be adhered to prior to filing of a suit of eviction against tenant under the State Rent Acts.

Here, it becomes imperative to appreciate the fact that the State List[5] of the Constitution of India prescribes the State Governments to regulate rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents. Resultantly, almost all the States have enacted their law governing determination of tenancy. The controversy now is limited to whether the provisions of the relevant State Rent Act was in addition to the provision of the TPA or was in derogation thereof. In other words, whether it would supplement or supplant the same. The Rent Acts  passed in different States were intended to prevent indiscriminate eviction of tenants and were intended to be a protective statute to safeguard the security of possession of the tenants and therefore, should be construed in the light of it being a social legislation[6].

As far as the answer to the present question is concerned it can be said that there were mixed and inconsistent views iterated by the Supreme Court and various High Courts in catena of judgments. A few of the judgments deserves to be highlighted herein. The Supreme Court in Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Prosad Roy Chowdhury[7], while deciding requirement of notice in both the sections to be sine qua non before filing suit for eviction under the State rent provisions, has remarked that:

5. … Rent Acts are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling, conferring no new rights of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general law.

In addition to the above case, the Supreme Court while referring to its judgment in Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai[8], has held that giving notice under Section 106 is a principle of equity and hence mandatory but laid down contrary with respect to Section 111(g). It observed that:

26. … The irrelevance of the English Law as such to notions of good conscience in India notwithstanding, we agree that a written notice is no part of equity. The essential principles, not the technical rules, of the TP Act form part of justice, equity and good conscience. The conclusion emerges that the landlord’s termination of the tenancy in this case is good even without a written notice.[9]

Either of the above view was adopted by the Supreme Court of India in many more pronouncements until the landmark judgment[10] by a seven-Judge Bench of the Court. The ruling marked the end of all the chaos and confusing and thus overruled all the previous conflicting views. Moreover, it emphasised the need to have a uniform law in all the States despite having some difference in phraseology of relevant provisions in the State laws.

The Court pointed out with no hesitation that notice under both the sections is different kind of intimation. As far as Section 106 is concerned it brushed aside the previous position of law and stated that when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief, such a notice will have to be given. It further observed that:

11. … It is true that the Rent Act is intended to restrict the rights which the landlord possessed either for charging excessive rents or for evicting tenants. But if within the ambit of those restricted rights he makes out his case it is a mere empty formality to ask him to determine the contractual tenancy before institution of a suit for eviction[11].

Thus, the action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in any State Rent Act will tantamount to an expression of his intention that he does not want the tenant to continue as his lessee and the legal relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order or a decree for eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of the word “tenant” under the various State Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been determined by giving of a valid notice under Section 106 of the TPA.

On the other hand, the Court while considering the requirement under Section 111(g) obliterated the difference between “contractual tenantandstatutory tenant. It observed that where any tenant has violated any term of the contract and the landlord having served the notice determines the contractual lease under Section 111(g) of the Act, nevertheless, he would be provided with the protection under various State Acts as statutory tenant and can only be evicted after obtaining an order or decree to that effect. Stating it in words of the Bench:

16. … Why this dual requirement? Even if the lease is determined by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of the law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise. In many State statutes different provisions have been made as to the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted and in relation to his incurring the liability to be so evicted. Some provisions overlap those of the Transfer of Property Act. Some are new which are mostly in favour of the tenants but some are in favour of the landlord also.[12]

Therefore, it can be aptly concluded that determination of a lease in accordance with the TPA is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter.

Thereafter, this position of law has been followed in a plethora of judgments by the Supreme Court. In Shakuntala S. Tiwari v. Hem Chand M. Singhania[13], the Court held that it is an act in law and not an act of law because under the scheme a determination of tenancy which takes place under the TPA, according to the appellant, is wholly irrelevant for founding a cause of action in ejectment because the provisions of the TPA are superseded by the provisions of the Rent Act. Interestingly, the Court has broadened its sweep to the extent saying that Section 111(g) in such situations be treated as inoperative and deemed to be repealed[14].


On a careful consideration of all the material referred to, it can be aptly remarked that requirement of giving a notice to the tenant under Sections 106 and 111(g) in a case of filing an eviction petition under the respective State rent legislations is not based on rule of equity and reason. Hence, it is an additional technical formality, absence of which ensue no legal consequences and cannot be insisted upon the landlord. But does that mean that the impugned provisions have no role to play in shaping the rent control jurisprudence? The answer cannot be in affirmative. The two provisions would still operate in a larger field of regulating other leases of immovable property other than tenancy. Also, it cannot be said that both of them are in nullity when we talk about regulation of landlord-tenant relationship. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF)[15] can be interpreted to the extent that giving a notice under Section 106 of the Act is not a requirement even when filing a suit in general law. However this does not seem to be the correct proposition of law laid down in Yesodai Ammal case[16] as these provisions of the Act would apply in absence of Rent Act in the State concerned and where the landlord presses a ground which does not find mention in the State Act but in general law[17]. In furtherance to this, there can be another situation which is a necessary corollary to the intent of State Legislatures i.e. where the State rent law itself expressly or by necessary implication entails to give a notice in accordance with the terms of Section 106.

Ergo, the requirement of giving a notice can be summed up in the following categories as noted hereinbelow:

  1. Where the rent agreement speaks for giving notice in a manner which is not inconsistent with the statute in force of that State or the general law (in case no State Act exists) as the case maybe, then that specific clause of the agreement shall prevail.
  2. Where no clause for giving notice is provided in the agreement or if provided is inconsistent with the State law or Central law (in case of absence of State law), then:

(a) Where that particular State has not enacted its rent statute, then the terms provided under TPA shall apply and would become a mandate.

(b) Where a particular State has enacted its rent statute but does not provide any provision regarding giving of notice, then no notice need to be served before filing a petition for eviction and tenancy shall only be terminated once a decree is granted by the proper rent court.

(c) Where the State rent statute itself expressly or by necessary implication entails to give a notice in accordance with the terms of Section 106 of TPA.

(d) Where the landlord presses a ground which does not find mention in the relevant State Rent Act in a particular State of India but in TPA, then terms of TPA shall be complied with.

*Final Year Student of BA LLB (Hons.), University School of Law & Legal Studies, GGSIPU.

[1] Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder K. Bajaj, (2001) 5 SCC 259 

[2] Harbhajan Singh v. P.N. Chopra, 1976 SCC OnLine Del 174

[3] Wharton’s Law Lexicon, see also Sunil Kumar Modi v. Munna Lal Gupta, 2007 SCC OnLine All 899

[4] Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, (1976) 2 SCC 103; see also, Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai,  1953 SCR 1009

[5] Sch. VII, List II, Entry 18,  Constitution of India

[6] Manujendra Dutt v. Purendu Prosad Roy Chowdhury, (1967) 1 SCR 475

[7] Ibid

[8] 1953 SCR 1009

[9] Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander, (1976) 2 SCC 103, 117

[10] V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214

[11] Id. at p. 22

[12] V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, (1979) 4 SCC 214, at p. 227

[13] (1987) 3 SCC 211

[14] Palani Ammal v. Viswanatha Chettiar, (1998) 3 SCC 654

[15] (2008) 2 SCC 728

[16] (1979) 4 SCC 214

[17] Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera, (2009) 15 SCC 693

COVID 19Hot Off The PressNews

The National Human Rights Commission has taken suo motu cognizance of media reports that fifty-seven minor girls have tested positive for the novel coronavirus at a state-run children’s Shelter Home in Kanpur district of Uttar Pradesh. Five of them have been found pregnant and one HIV positive. Reportedly, the girls were exhibiting symptoms of COVID 19 for some time but there was delay in taking them to the hospital for tests.

The Commission has observed that the contents of the media report, if true, are enough to prima facie believe that the public servants have failed to provide safeguard to the victim girls and, apparently, were negligent in protecting their right to life, liberty and dignity in the custody of the State .

Accordingly, it has issued a notice to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh calling for a detailed report in the matter including health status of all the girls, their medical treatment and counselling provided to the girls by the authorities. The State Government is expected to order an inquiry into the matter from an independent agency. It is also expected to review health status of the female inmates lodged in shelter homes, across the State and issue suitable directives that such incidents do not recur in future.

A notice has also been issued to the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh calling for a report regarding registration of FIR in this matter and status of investigation. The response is expected within 4 weeks from both the authorities.

According to the media reports, the girls at the shelter home had been exhibiting Covid-19 symptoms for a few days, and the local administration had informed the State health department about it only last Friday on 19th June,2020.

Reportedly, the Kanpur District Magistrate has said that there were seven pregnant girls living in the home, and five of them tested positive for Covid-19. He has said that these girls were already pregnant when they were brought to the shelter home on the recommendation of the Child Welfare committees in different districts, and investigation under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act is going on in all these cases.

The Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur has reportedly stated that two of the girls had come from Agra and Kannauj in December 2019. The SSP said all the girls found Covid-positive are being treated at the Kanpur Medical College. The shelter home has been sealed, and its staff quarantined.


[Press Release dt. 22-06-2020]

Case BriefsCOVID 19High Courts

Madras High Court: A Division Bench of R. Subbiah and R. Pongiappan, JJ. issued notice to T.N. Government to reply on the plea for declaring special holidays for certain industrial establishments.

Present petition was filed with the aim to seek direction to respondents 1 and 2 to pass orders notifying the period of lockdown from 24-03-2020 to 14-04-2020 as special holidays for industrial establishments, excluding establishments which were allowed to function, in terms of powers vested under Section 3(2) of Tamil Nadu (National, Festival and Special Holidays) Act.

Notice for respondents with regard to the above was taken by Additional Advocate General, S.R. Rajagopal assisted by Government Pleader V. Jayaprakash Narayanan and Special Government Pleader, E. Balamurugan.

Affidavit for the said to  be filed on 20-04-2020. [S. Ravindran v. Chief Secretary, Government of T.N.,  2020 SCC OnLine Mad 936, decided on 16-04-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Y.K. Srivastava, J. while dismissing the petition observed that the assertion made by the petitioner that the proceedings were without notice or opportunity to him is contrary to the material on record.

In the instant petition, it was sought to challenge an order of the Additional Collector (Land Revenue) in proceedings under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and challenge the order of the Additional Commissioner (1st) whereby the revision was also rejected for the same.

Counsel for the petitioner, Rajesh Kushwaha submitted that powers under Section 28 of the 1901 Act are to be exercised by the Collector and that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.

Counsel for the fourth respondent, R.N. Yadav and Standing Counsel, Prakash Singh pointed out that in terms of the provisions under the above-mentioned Act, the expression “Collector” would include “Additional Collector” also. It was further submitted that there was no violation of principles of natural justice as an enquiry report was sought from the Naib Tehsildar and thereafter notice was issued to the petitioner whereupon the petitioner duly filed his objections but did not appear later on.

In view of the above and to analyse the primary submission made by the petitioner, the Court observed that the provision with regard to appointment of Additional Collector was brought in by insertion of Section 14-A whereunder the State Government is empowered to appoint an Additional Collector in a district or in two or more districts combined who shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties of a Collector in such case or classes of cases as the Collector concerned may direct.

The Court also cited the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Brahm Singh v. Board of Revenue, 2008 SCC OnLine All 490, where it was held that the Additional Collector when he acts and discharges the duties and functions or exercises such powers of a Collector either under the 1901 Act or under any other Act for the time being in force, the powers would be deemed to have been exercised by him as Collector of the district under that Act. [Seetla v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 4784, decided on 05-12-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: Alok Singh, J. dismissed a writ petition filed by Sahak Nagar Adhikari, who was Public Information Officer under Right to Information Act, 2005.

The petitioner contended that, a show cause notice was issued upon him which sought an explanation as to why a penalty should not be imposed upon him for providing delayed information. He gave a brief reply of the said notice and administered information to the said officer. Thereafter, State Information Commissioner adjudged the matter and imposed a penalty of Rs 25,000 for delayed reply to the notice. He was aggrieved by the said order of the officer and therefore sought justice from the Court.

Mr Parikshit Saini, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that impugned order of the Information Officer was arbitrary and patently illegal, hence, was not maintainable. He argued that impugned order was ‘unreasonable’ and ‘non-speaking’, the officer failed to justify the penalty as he gave a brief reply as to why the delay was caused by him for discharging his duties. He relied on the judgment of Supreme Court, in Narendra Kumar v. CIC, 2014 (2) UD 72 where it was observed, “State Public Information Officer has decided any complaint or appeal without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time etc., in that event penalty can be imposed. In the further opinion of this Court, if there was reasonable cause for furnishing the delayed information then Chief Information Commissioner should not impose penalty merely because there was some delay in supplying the information.”

The Court observed that judgment in case Narendra Kumar was not applicable in the aforementioned case, as in the referred case information was not supplied in time because of natural disaster but in the case of petitioner there was delay of one year in supply of the information whereas Act, 2005 mandates to provide information within thirty days. Cause shown by the petitioner for delay in supplying the information was the excessive workload. The Court stated that, petitioner has not explained his excessive work; this was no ground for the delay in providing the information. One year delay in providing information under the Right to Information Act was too high.

It further held that Commissioner has assigned the reason for the penalty. “Providing information after one year that too on filing of appeal in the State Information Commission amounts to denial of information.” Court found no illegality or perversity in the impugned order and directed the petitioner to pay the aforementioned penalty.[Chandrakant Bhatt v. Uttarakhand Information Commission, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 356, decided on 10-05-2019]

Hot Off The PressNews

The National Human Rights Commission, NHRC has taken suo motu cognizance of a media report supported with photograph that as many as 20 persons including the Civic Agency staff and the lawyers received head injuries in the alleged police action in Howrah, West Bengal on the 24th April, 2019. Reportedly, demanding action against the police personnel, the Bar Council of West Bengal observed black day throughout the State today and has resolved to cease the work till April 29th in solidarity with the lawyers of Howrah. According to media reports, the incident happened following the lawyers’ faceoff with the Howrah Municipal Corporation staff over parking.

The Commission has issued a notice to the Director General of Police, West Bengal calling for a detailed report in the matter, within four weeks including action taken against the delinquent police personnel and health status of the victims.

It has observed that the contents of the news report, if true, raise the serious issue of violation of human rights of the victims, who have sustained injuries in the incident. Apparently, the police personnel did not deal with the situation in a proper manner which resulted in humiliation and physical injuries to the victims.

According to the media report that the incident was triggered after and the elderly lawyer was turned away by the Guard of the civic headquarters on Mahatma Gandhi Road in Howrah when he tried to park his vehicle in the civic agency’s compound. Thereafter, the lawyers and the civic body staff fought for hours as many lawyers joined the protest against the guard. The civic staff, however, claimed that they were attacked first. Both sides, as mentioned in the news report, pelted stones and bricks at each other before the police intervened and chased away the lawyers.

[Dated: 26-04-2019] 


Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: The Bench of Dr A.K. Rath, J., allowed a petition filed against the order of the Trial Court which rejected an application of the petitioner filed under sub-section (2) of Section 80 CPC to waive notice on the ground of urgency.

Plaintiffs-petitioners had instituted the suit for a perpetual injunction against the defendants and also filed an application under sub-section (2) of Section 80 CPC to waive notice on the ground of urgency. However, the Trial Court rejected the application. The petition was filed against the order of the Trial Court. The petitioners had filed an application for injuncting the defendants from demolishing a portion of the house standing over the suit land. The suit had been instituted to obtain an urgent relief against the Government. Mr Sahu, Advocate for the petitioners submitted that the Trial Court had without assigning any reason rejected the petition.

The Court observed that Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 80 CPC postulates that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1). The Trial Court had rejected the petition without giving reasons. This amounted to the denial of justice. The petition was thus allowed. [Basantilata Swain v. State of Orissa, 2019 SCC OnLine Ori 133, decided on 18-03-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: The Bench of Vinod Kumar Sinha, J. allowed a criminal appeal granting anticipatory bail to persons who were apprehending their arrest under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Appellants herein were apprehending their arrest in connection with a police case registered for offences punishable under Sections 147, 341, 323, 354, 504, 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Allegation against them was that they arrived, heavily armed, at informant’s house, thrashed his wife, assaulted her and made her semi-naked.

Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr Ashok Kumar Jha, was that Appellant 1 had filed a title suit pertaining to a land which the defendant (in title suit) tried to sell to the informant. However, the Court granted an injunction in favour of the appellants. Holding the same grudge against appellants, a fabricated police case had been lodged against appellants.

In view of facts and circumstances, the Court allowed the appellants to be released on bail in the event of their arrest, on furnishing a bail bond of Rs 25,000 each with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Sitamarhi. [Bhikhari SK v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 257, Order dated 27-02-2019]

Legislation UpdatesNotifications

The National Human Rights Commission has taken suo motu cognizance of media reports about one of the deadliest fire tragedies in the capital in recent years resulting in the death of 17 people were killed at a five-storey hotel in central Delhi’s Karol Bagh on Tuesday,12th February,2018. Many of them died in their sleep after an early morning blaze spread swiftly through AC ducts. Reportedly, the hotel owner had, apparently, carried out unauthorized construction/ modification in the building, after obtaining the clearance from the Fire Department.

The Commission has issued notices to the Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi, Commissioner of Police, Delhi and the Commissioner, North Delhi Municipal Corporation calling for a detailed report in the matter along with action taken against the errant officers/ officials along with relief and rehabilitation provided to the NOKs of the deceased and the injured persons.

The Commission also expects from the Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi to immediately form a committee of experts to look into the matter relating to violation of norms by the hotel owners/ shopkeepers and other individuals/ firms who are conducting commercial activities in the residential colonies and encouraging encroachment of public roads by recourse to illegal parking. The Committee should examine all the issues thoroughly and submit a report along with their suggestions to streamline these areas, making them safe and worth living for the citizens. The response is expected, within six weeks.

The Commission is of the opinion that it seems the authorities have not learned any lessons from the tragic incidents occurred in the recent past; no one appears to be bothered about the rules/ norms to be followed by the building owners and local residents. This painful incident could have been avoided if the hotel management and the authorities concerned would have acted sincerely. This is indeed a very serious case of violation of human rights.

The Commission has also observed that recently, several workers had died at clothes ironing workshop in Karol Bagh area of Delhi after a steam boiler caught fire and the victims got trapped due to cloth piles blocking the entrance. Suo-Motu cognizance of the tragic incident was taken by the Commission and a report was called for from the Commissioner of Police and the Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi of Delhi which is yet to be received.

The Commission has observed some common facts pertaining to both the incidents. In both the incidents, the victims could not come out of the premises due to blocked fire exit. Both the incidents have occurred in the Karol Bagh area which has become highly congested due to commercialization of buildings in the vicinity, in a reckless manner. These incidents raise several issues regarding working of the civic authorities in the National Capital as well as police authorities particularly, in the Karol Bagh and Paharganj areas where huge clusters of hotels have come up and they are often found flouting the prescribed rules in spite of procurement of fire safety clearance. Most of these hotels have installed wooden floorings and fiber glass ceilings in the buildings as emerges from the news report.

The Commission has also noticed that in the instant case, the fire tenders could not reach in time as there was no U-turn on the road for traffic and the vehicles had to drive all the way to Jhandewalan Chowk for a U-turn. The road was also blocked by vehicles parked on the road. In the earlier incident too, the fire tenders could not reach the congested Beadon Pura area in Karol Bagh due to narrow roads and traffic congestion.

Reportedly, it took almost four hours for the police and the firemen in mounting the tough rescue operation at the fateful hotel. The fire, as mentioned in the news report, was reported to the fire brigade around 4:35 AM and 26 fire tenders were immediately sent to the spot which brought the fire under control by 7:30 AM. Later, the cooling operation was launched at 8:00 AM which continued till noon after which the survivors were allowed to enter their rooms to collect their belongings. About 40 of the 45 rooms of the hotel were occupied by the guests, many of whom were from an extended family in Kerala who had come to attend a wedding in Ghaziabad.

According to the media reports, two senior HPCL officials have also died in the fire as six company officials who had come to attend the Petro-tech conference were accommodated in the hotel. The police personnel have reportedly seized the record pertaining to the details of the occupants of the hotel, to identify the deceased and the injured persons. Out of panic some of the guests jumped from the hotel windows to save their lives. One IRS officer who jumped out of a window died in the hospital due to fracture and head injuries.

It is also mentioned in the news reports that the Fire Department had given a Safety Certificate to the hotel on the 28th December 2017, which is valid for three years. The hotel owners have reportedly claimed that the “Arpit Palace Hotel” was a guest house, which as per rules, cannot have an operational kitchen for cooking but the firemen found a fiberglass structure on the rooftop which could be a Bar or Restaurant, the police is yet to investigate the matter. It is also stated further that the fire officials in the year 2014 had found a permanent structure on the roof of the building and orders for its demolition were issued. The demolition was mandatory to obtain safety clearance from the Fire Department. The hotel was also running a bar in the basement which has not been mentioned in the fire audit.

Reportedly, as the fire broke out, most of those who suffered burn injuries tried to make their way down the main staircase but unfortunately, the fire exit door was also locked. The “Water Hydrants” were present but not functional. The Mayor of the North Delhi Municipal Corporation has reportedly stated that electrical wiring was faulty and the fire exit seemed not have been used, for years.


Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Bench of Sunil Gaur, J. refused to invoke the inherent extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.

Petitioners, represented by Akshay Bhatia and Avinash Das Advocates, had prayed for quashing of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for dishonour of cheque). The quashing was sought on merits.

N.K. Aggarwal and Priya Pachouri, Advocates appeared for the respondents. It was informed to the Court that notice under Section 251 CrPC had been already framed and petitioners had also given their defence.

Since petitioners had an efficacious remedy to assail the notice framed under Section 251, the High Court refrained from invoking its inherent extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482. The petitioners were given liberty to assail the notice before the Revisional Court within a period of four weeks. The petition was disposed of accordingly without commenting on merits. [Anand and Associates v. Jugal Kishore Jain, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6708, Order dated 15-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: A Single Judge Bench of A.K. Rath, J., quashed the impugned order and allowed the petition which was filed to challenge the order passed by the trial court wherein it returned the plaint for non-compliance notice under Section 80(1) CPC.

The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs-petitioners had instituted the suit for eviction of the defendant from the suit house and delivery of possession. Sri Sri Jagannath Mahaprabhu bije, Sri Jagannath Temple, Puri, had been arrayed as proforma defendant.

The main contention here by the defendants is that notice under Section 80 CPC was not complied with.

The counsel for petitioner Mr. A.P. Bose submitted that neither the State nor its functionaries were parties to the suit and The Administrator of Sri Sri Jagannath Mahaprabhu is a creature of the statute. That the Trial Court had committed manifest illegality in holding that notice under Section 80 CPC has not been complied with. The cardinal requirement under this section is that either the State or any public officer has to be a party to the suit to attract the provision of Section 80(1) of CPC.

The Court placing reliance on the case of Bihari Chowdhary v. State of Bihar, (1984) 2 SCC 627, upheld the above-mentioned contention of the petitioner and quashed the impugned order and allowed the petition. [Anupama Jena v. Bansidhar Jena,2018 SCC OnLine Ori 431, decided on 14-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: A Single Judge Bench of Sanjeev Kumar, J., allowed a writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking directions upon the respondent authorities to allow him to discharge his duties as sweeper in SBI Branch, Prem Nagar.

The main issue that arose before the Court was whether the respondents were justified in replacing petitioner from his post of sweeper without any justification.

The Court observed that the petitioner was performing his duties in the capacity of a sweeper since a very long time on daily wages; however, he never sought regularization to the said post. He was being replaced by the respondent authorities without any justification and he was not even given an opportunity of being heard. In case if petitioner was not performing his duties diligently, then the respondent authorities should have served a notice upon him and must have given him a reasonable opportunity to explain his situation, rather they have simply decided to replace him with another person and this act on the part of respondents is simply arbitrary.

The Court held that the petitioner being a part-time worker cannot be regularized to his current position but he cannot be arbitrarily removed from his position. Such an exercise of power on the part of respondents is contrary to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and as such vexed with arbitrariness. Resultantly, the petition was allowed.[Mohd. Abdullah Bhat v. SBI,2018 SCC OnLine J&K 891, order dated 30-11-2018]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): A Bench comprising of Justice A.I.S. Cheema, Member (Judicial) and Balvinder Singh, Member (Technical) dismissed an appeal filed against the order of National Company Law Tribunal (Mumbai) whereby it had admitted application filed by Operational Creditor under Section 8 read with Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against Corporate Debtor.

Appellant was the Managing Director of Corporate Debtor. His submissions as to existence of dispute as contemplated under the code were not accepted. The main point considered by the Appellate Tribunal was regarding the non-observance of the provision of serving of notice by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) before admitting the application. It was argued by the appellant that absence of service of notice by the Adjudicating Authority itself violates principles of natural justice. Reliance was placed upon Starlog Enterprises Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine NCLAT 13 and Mass Metals (P) Ltd v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine NCLAT 504. It was also an admitted fact that the appellant received the notice sent under Section 8 of I&B Code but Veritas Legal, Advocates & Solicitors of operational Creditor but it was contended that Veritas Legal was not the filing authority of the application in NCLT and nor was it authorised by any Board Resolution to act on behalf of Operational Creditor.

The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that Corporate Debtor and appellant had knowledge of the legal proceedings and also of the notice. It observed, “When advocate sends the notice, it is on instructions from the client and the same cannot be ignored by saying that the advocate should also forward authority and Resolution of the Company.” In regard to the requirement of notice to be sent by Adjudicating Authority, the Appellate Tribunal observed that the appellant had sufficient notice and still chose not to appear before NCLT. In such a case, the non-observance of the requirement was not fatal to the appellant’s case. Resultantly, it was held that the appeal was sans merit and was thus dismissed. [J.B. Tiwari v. Biostadt India Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 563, decided on 30-11-2018]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): A Two-Member Bench comprising of S.J. Mukhopadhaya(Chairperson) and Bansi Lal Bhatt (Member-Judicial), JJ. set aside an order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (New Delhi) for being violative of principles of natural justice.

NCLAT had admitted the application filed by the respondent (operational creditor) under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The appellant submitted that the said application was admitted without any notice to the corporate debtor. It was contended that the order impugned was passed in contravention of rules of natural justice.

The Appellate Tribunal, after perusing the record, noted that admittedly the order impugned was passed by NCLT without notice to the corporate debtor which was indeed in violation of principles of natural justice. Furthermore, the parties had already settled the matter between themselves. in such view of the matter, the Appellate Tribunal was the view that in effect, the order impugned passed by NCLT and allotter orders passed pursuant thereof were illegal and therefore were set aside. The application preferred by the respondent under Section 9 was dismissed and NCLT was directed to close the proceedings. The appeal was, thus, allowed. [Rajesh Arora v. Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, 2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 837, dated 05-11-2018]