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Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) had sought 14 days Judicial Custody of Actress Rhea Chakraborty for being involved in the procurement and distribution of Drugs.

According to the media reports, She has been allegedly charged for Sections 8(c), 20(b) (ii), 22, 27(A), 28 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Her Bail plea was also rejected.

Rhea was summoned and her voluntary statement was recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act on 06-09-2020, 07-09-2020 and 08-09-2020.

NCB states that Rhea is an active member of the drug syndicate connected with drug supplies.


Here’s an explainer for the Sections under which Rhea Chakraborty has been charged:

Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act:

8Prohibition of certain operations.—No person shall—

(a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or

(b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or

(c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance,

except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation:

Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

1[Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes.]

Section 20(b) (ii) of NDPS Act, 1985:

Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis.—Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,—

(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or

(b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable,—

1[(i) where such contravention relates to clause (a) with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; and

(ii) where such contravention relates to clause (b),—

(Aand involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2[one year], or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both;

(Band involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees;

(Cand involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.]

Section 27(A) of the NDPS Act:

Punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders.—Whoever indulges in financing, directly or indirectly, any of the activities specified in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of clause (viii-a) of Section 2 or harbours any person engaged in any of the aforementioned activities, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.]

Section 29 of the NDPS Act:

29Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracyand notwithstanding anything contained in Section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.

(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which—

(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or

(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India.


Image Credits: Hindustan Times

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Division Bench of S.S. Shinde and N.B. Suryawanshi, JJ., dismissed a petition whereby the petitioners sought their release by invoking the writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground that their judicial custody was authorised beyond a period of 15 days he designated court, which is contrary to the mandate of Section 309(2) CrPC.

The petitioners were accused in a criminal case registered under various provisions of IPC and the MPID Act, 1999. The main ground pressed in to service by Subhash Jha and Harekrishna Mishra, Advocates for the petitioners, was that the proviso to Section 309(2) CrPC provides for remand of the accused of a term not extending 15 days at a time. In the present case, from time to time, the judicial custody of the petitioners was extended beyond 15 days, which according to them was in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Per contra, M.M. Deshmukh, APP for the State, opposed the writ petition.

Perusing Section 309(2) along with its first proviso, the High Court noted that the proviso to Section 309(2) CrPC carves out the exception to the general provision thereby imposing restriction that no Magistrate shall remand the accused persons to custody under Section 309(2) CrPC for a term exceeding 15 days at a time.

However, applying the settled principles of interpretation of statutes, the Court went on to observe: “In our considered opinion, the restrictions imposed on the Magistrate by this proviso are not applicable to the Court of Sessions.” It was further stated: “…on plain reading of section 309(2) of CrPC and its proviso, we are of the considered view that the said provision is clear and unambiguous and the distinction enshrined in provision cannot be read in the main provision of section 309(2) of CrPC to put limitation on the power of the trial Court while exercising the powers under section 309(2) of CrPC”

Also, relying on Saurabh Kumar v. Koneila Jail, (2014) 13 SCC 436 and State of Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, (2018) 9 SCC 745, the High Court reiterated that writ of Habeas Corpus is not maintainable against the judicial order remanding the accused into the custody and appropriate remedy is to seek bail.

The High Court, therefore, held that the petitioners were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus and their remedy lie elsewhere. Resultantly, the instant petition was dismissed. [Harshad Dinanath Bari v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5701, decided on 18-12-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench comprising of Rekha Palli and Siddhartha Mridul, JJ. dismissed an appeal filed against the order of a Single Judge of the High Court whereby he allowed the petition of the respondent-employee against the order of his dismissal from service.

The respondent was removed from service by the appellant-bank. He was working as a Chief Inspector, Inspection and Control Division with the bank. He was removed after conducting an inquiry in which he was found guilty on the charge of committing irregularities and not discharging his duties with utmost integrity while working in the Credit Department of the erstwhile New Bank of India. The fulcrum of articles of charge was that he recommended to the Board of the bank for a grant of loan to a party regardless of the shortcomings involved in it. The respondent’s appeal against the order of removal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Thereafter, he preferred a writ petition against the same before the Single Judge who modified the order of removal to that of compulsory retirement. The appellant contended that in case the Single Judge was of the view that the penalty imposed on the respondent was inappropriate, he should have remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority. It was submitted that the Single Judge overstepped his powers.

The High Court gave due consideration to the contentions made by the parties. The Court noted that the loan concerned was initiated by the officers junior to the respondent and finally approved by the Board. Even the Board failed to notice the alleged shortcomings in the loan proposal which was approved. The case against the respondent was only on account of procedural irregularities and not for any misconduct, financial irregularities or misappropriation. Furthermore, the chargesheet was issued after an inordinate delay of more than 7 years. The fact that respondent rendered unblemished service for 29 years remained uncontroverted. The Court was of the view that considering the time period which had already elapsed and only with the aim to shorten the litigation for a senior citizen, the Single Judge took upon himself the task of modifying the penalty. The only effect would be that in the evening of his life, the respondent would at least get some retiral benefits. It was observed that there may be situations where the writ court considers it unfair harassment or otherwise unnecessary to direct fresh inquiry by the competent authority and may pass a considerable order itself. Holding thus, the contention put forth by the appellant was rejected. The appeal was, thus, dismissed. [Punjab National Bank v. M.L. Bansal,2018 SCC OnLine Del 11385, decided on 20-09-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Tripura High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Arindam Lodh, J. disposed of an appeal filed under Section 54 of Land Acquisition Act 1984 and directed the appellant to file his claim before the LA Judge.

The appeal was filed against the decision of the LA Judge who dismissed the reference filed by the appellant (land loser) as he was not able to file claim statement despite repeated opportunities and six adjournments. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant could not take appropriate steps at the appropriate time due to inadvertence of the previous counsel.

The High Court, after due consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, opined that a litigant should not suffer due to the conduct of the counsel. A counsel is an officer of the Court. Placing reliance on the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”, which means that a litigant should not suffer due to act of the court, The High Court held it just and proper to remand the matter back to the LA Judge while directing the appellant to file claim statement. Lastly, it was observed that legislature has enacted the Land Acquisition Act for the benefit of land losers who are to be compensated in a just and fair manner. [Swapan Gope v.  ONGC Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Tri 102, dated 30-05-2018]

 

 

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Dealing with the question as to whether after transfer of a disciplinary proceeding, as per the mandate enshrined under Section 36B(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 to the Bar Council of India (BCI) from the State Bar Council, can the BCI, instead of enquiring into the complaint and adjudicating thereon, send it back to the State Bar Council with the direction to decide the controversy within a stipulated time, the Court held that the legislature never intended a complaint made against an Advocate either from the perspective of the complainant or from the delinquent to be transferred to BCI, again to be sent back. It was held that BCI, while exercising original jurisdiction on transfer of a complaint, cannot exercise the appellate jurisdiction.

The Court, however, took note of the fact that on many occasions disciplinary authority of the State Bar Council does not dispose of the complaint within the stipulated period, as a consequence of which the proceeding stands transferred to the BCI. Looking down upon such practice, the Court said that once a complaint is made by a litigant, it has to follow a definite procedure and is required to be dealt with as per the command of the Act to conclude the disciplinary proceeding within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council. Not to do something what one is required to do, tantamount to irresponsibility and the prestige of an institution or a statutory body inheres in carrying out the responsibility.

The bench of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ, hence, directed the State Bar Councils to take a periodical stock of cases in each meeting with regard to the progress of the Disciplinary Committee, find out the cause of delay and guide themselves to act with expediency so that the Council, as a statutory body, does its duty as commanded under the Act. [Ajitsinh Arjunsinh Gohil v. Bar Council of Gujarat, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 351, decided on 06.04.2017]