The tension between textual fidelity and purposive interpretation, between doctrinal rigour and institutional pragmatism, is inherent in the design of Section 29-A.
Introduction
Section 29-A, inserted by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 3 of 2016) with retrospective effect from 23 October 2015, was a watershed reform. Its manifest object was to introduce temporal discipline in arbitral proceedings by prescribing a mandatory 12-month timeline for the making of an arbitral award, extendable by six months with the consent of the parties, and beyond that only upon an order of the “Court”. The section was enacted against the backdrop of India’s ranking of 178 out of 189 nations in contract enforcement, as noted in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (2015 Amendment Act). The Law Commission’s 246th Report (2014) had specifically recommended judicial oversight over arbitral timelines to combat endemic delay.
However, the seemingly straightforward provision spawned a protracted controversy over the identity of the “court” empowered to extend the mandate under Section 29-A(4). Two divergent streams of judicial opinion emerged across the High Courts, producing uncertainty that persisted for nearly a decade. The Supreme Court’s intervention in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule1 was, therefore, both necessary and long overdue. The question, however, is whether the Court’s resolution is doctrinally satisfying and practically efficacious.
Factual matrix and procedural history
The dispute arose from a memorandum of family settlement (MFS) dated 11 January 2021 executed between members of the Chowgule family. Following the invocation of arbitration on 18 May 2021, an Arbitral Tribunal of three members was constituted by the parties themselves under Section 11(2) of the Act. Successive resignations of presiding arbitrators complicated the proceedings. On 5 August 2023, an application for extension under Section 29-A was filed before the Commercial Court at Vasco, Goa. Meanwhile, owing to the resignation of the second presiding arbitrator, an application under Section 11 was filed before the Bombay High Court at Goa, which was allowed on 31 October 2023, appointing Justice U.U. Lalit (Retd. CJI) as presiding arbitrator.
The Commercial Court allowed the Section 29-A application on 2 January 2024. This order was challenged by Respondent 1 before the High Court on the ground that the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction to extend the duration under Section 29-A, given that the presiding arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court under Section 11. The Single Judge (Justice Bharat P. Deshpande) in Sheela Chowgule v. Vijay V. Chowgule2 noted divergent views of co-equal Benches within the Bombay High Court itself — Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast Ltd.3 on the one hand, and K.I.P.L. Vistacore Infra Projects J.V. v. Municipal Corpn. of the city of Ichalkarnji4 on the other, and referred the matter to a Division Bench.
The Division Bench gave a nuanced but bifurcated answer: Where the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6), applications under Section 29-A(4) would lie before the High Court; where constituted by consent of parties under Section 11(2), such applications would lie before the Principal Civil Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). This dual answer was challenged before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s approach: Reformulating the question
At the threshold, the Court reframed the question. The Division Bench had split the inquiry into two — one for Arbitral Tribunals constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) and another for those constituted by parties under Section 11(2). The Supreme Court rightly observed that this bifurcation was the root cause of the error, noting at para 6:
6. We are of the opinion that there was no need to split the questions into two, one for a situation when the High Court constitutes the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11(6) and the other, when the parties themselves constitute it under Section 11(2). Perhaps by asking the wrong questions, the Division Bench arrived at wrong answers.5
This reformulation is significant. It correctly identifies that the duality in the appointment process — whether by the court or by the parties — had given rise to the divergent streams of the High Court opinion, and was, in fact, a false distinction for purposes of Section 29-A.
The divergent streams of High Court jurisprudence
1. The contextual interpretation: “Court” means the appointing authority
A formidable body of High Court decisions had adopted a contextual interpretation of “court” in Section 29-A, departing from the definition in Section 2(1)(e). This line began with the Gujarat High Court in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel6, was followed by the Bombay High Court in Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.7, the Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co.8, the Calcutta High Court in Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak Prasad9, and the Kerala High Court (Division Bench) in Lots Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Cochin Port Trust.10
The foundational concern animating this stream was what may be termed the “jurisdictional anomaly” argument: If the expression “court” in Section 2(1)(e) were applied to Section 29-A, it would empower the Principal Civil Court — a court subordinate to the High Court — to substitute an arbitrator appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11(6). As the Gujarat High Court observed in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel case (para 15), such a reading would render Section 29-A(6) “non-operatable” and “otiose” in cases of court-appointed arbitrators. The Patna High Court (Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran) in India Power Corpn. (Bodhgaya) Ltd. v. South Bihar Power Distribution Co. Ltd.11 adopted identical reasoning, holding that the jurisdiction to extend the mandate had to be exercised by the High Court under Section 29-A.
The High Courts of Delhi, Bombay, Patna, Allahabad, and Kerala had taken the view that where an Arbitral Tribunal was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, it was only the High Court which would have the power to grant a time extension under Section 29-A. It is to be noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV12 had opined that the power under Section 29-A(4) vests in the court as defined in Section 2(1)(e), but the issue of inconsistency between Sections 11 and 29-A(4) remained “unaddressed” by the Supreme Court in that decision.13 The Jagdeep Chowgule14 decision now squarely addresses this definitional lacuna.
2. The textual interpretation: “Court” means Section 2(1)(e) court
The contrary stream, represented by Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast Ltd.15, A’Xykno Capital Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.16, and V.V. Subbarao v. Appa Rao Mukkamala17, held that the text of the legislation was unambiguous. The expression “court” in Section 29-A was the court as defined in Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of who appointed the Arbitral Tribunal. This stream relied on the principle that once an arbitrator is appointed, the appointing court becomes functus officio and retains no residual supervisory jurisdiction.
Doctrinal analysis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning
1. The rejection of the “conflict of power” thesis
The most significant doctrinal contribution of the judgment lies in paras 17—20, where the Court repudiates the “conflict of power” or “jurisdictional anomaly” rationale that had sustained the contextual interpretation for nearly a decade. The Court holds, in emphatic terms at para 17:
17. …We have no hesitation in holding that interpretation based on a perception of status or hierarchy of courts is opposed to the fundamental conception of Rule of Law.18
The Court invokes Dicey’s celebrated dictum — “however high you may be, the law is above you” — to underscore that “law, and law alone is the source of power”. This is a forceful restatement of the principle in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak19 that jurisdiction of courts derives solely from the law of the land and cannot be assumed on the foundation that a court is “higher”.
The reasoning is doctrinally sound. The concern that a Principal Civil Court would be “substituting” an arbitrator appointed by a “superior” court proceeds on a misconception of the nature of the power under Section 29-A(6). Substitution under Section 29-A(6) is not an exercise in appellate or revisional jurisdiction over the High Court’s order under Section 11. It is a distinct statutory power, conferred by Parliament on the “court” as defined, to ensure the timely conclusion of arbitral proceedings. The power is remedial in character — akin to, as the Court observes (para 23, citing Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels Ltd.20), the power under Section 14 relating to termination of mandate.
2. The functus officio principle
The Court’s analysis of the scope of the referral court’s jurisdiction under Section 11 is particularly illuminating. Drawing upon SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd.21, the long line of precedents including Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd.22, SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg.23, and A.P. Power Generation Corpn. Ltd. v. TECPRO Systems Ltd.24, the Court holds at para 15 that:
15. Exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 stands exhausted upon the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. There is no residual supervisory or controlling power left with the High Court or the Supreme Court over the arbitral proceedings after appointment is made.25
The Court’s vivid metaphor — that the referral court does not keep watch “like the Orwell’s ‘Big Brother is watching you’ ” — effectively dispels the notion that Section 11 creates an enduring jurisdictional nexus between the appointing court and the arbitral proceedings. This is consistent with Kamal Gupta v. L.R. Builders (P) Ltd.26, which prohibits the conflation of appointment with supervision.
3. The reliance on Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV
The Court relies heavily on its earlier decision in the case of Chief Engineer27, which had held at para 2 that “[t]he power under sub-section (4) of Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e)”. That decision had been distinguished by the contextual-interpretation stream on the basis that the original appointment was not by the Court. The Supreme Court in Jagdeep Chowgule28 rejects this distinction, clarifying that “Section 11 will have no bearing on the working of the provisions in Chapters V and VI, where Section 29-A is located”.
4. Section 42 and its inapplicability
The Court completes its analysis by considering Section 42 of the Act, which provides that the Court before which the first application under Part I is made shall have exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent applications. The Court holds, relying on the Constitution Bench decision in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.29 and State of W.B. v. Associated Contractors30, that Section 42 does not apply to applications under Section 11, since the Chief Justice or his designate exercising power under Section 11 is not a “court” as defined by Section 2(1)(e). Consequently, the filing of an application under Section 11 before the High Court does not attract Section 42 so as to vest exclusive jurisdiction for subsequent Section 29-A applications in the High Court.
Critical appraisal: The unaddressed concerns
1. The efficiency deficit: District Courts and the promise of expeditious resolution
While the judgment is doctrinally coherent, it raises significant practical concerns that merit examination. The primary legislative objective of Section 29-A, as discernible from the Law Commission’s 246th Report and the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the 2015 Amendment Act, was to ensure expeditious resolution of arbitral disputes and to minimise judicial intervention. Section 29-A(9) itself mandates that applications under sub-section (5) “shall be disposed of by the court as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days”.
The question that the judgment does not address is whether the routing of Section 29-A applications to the Principal Civil Court (or Commercial Court) at the district level is consistent with this objective. Indian District Courts and Commercial Courts are notoriously burdened with pendency. As per the National judicial Data Grid (NJDG), district and subordinate courts across India have over 4.5 crore pending cases. The Commercial Courts, established under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, were intended to be specialised and expeditious, but empirical evidence suggests that they are equally plagued by delay, lack of infrastructure, and insufficient judicial strength.
The contextual interpretation, whatever its doctrinal infirmities, had the pragmatic virtue of channelling Section 29-A applications to High Courts, which generally dispose of arbitration-related matters more expeditiously. The 60-day timeline prescribed by Section 29-A(9) is aspirational in the context of district-level courts, where even urgent commercial matters may languish for months. By contrast, the High Courts, with their established arbitration Benches and greater institutional capacity, are demonstrably better equipped to handle such applications within the statutory time-frame.
It is pertinent to note that the contextual interpretation was not merely a product of hierarchical deference — it also served the legislative purpose of declogging the overburdened district judiciary. As the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court observed in the Lots Shipping case31, the powers under Section 29-A are “clearly akin to the powers conferred under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act” for appointment, termination of mandate, and substitution of arbitrators. The absence of any provision for an appeal against orders under Section 29-A further indicated, as the Kerala High Court reasoned, that the power was not intended to be exercised by the Principal Civil Court. This reasoning, while now overruled, reflects a genuine concern about institutional capacity.
2. The substitution power and its practical implications
Section 29-A(6) empowers the Court, while extending the period, to “substitute one or all of the arbitrators”. Under the regime established by the Jagdeep Chowgule case32, this power now vests in the Principal Civil Court or Commercial Court at the district level. This gives rise to a practical anomaly: A District Judge or Commercial Court Judge would now be empowered to substitute an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of a High Court or by the Supreme Court under Section 11(6). While the Supreme Court has held that perceptions of hierarchy cannot supply “context” for departing from a statutory definition, the practical implications cannot be gainsaid. The quality and calibre of arbitrators appointed by High Courts in exercise of Section 11 powers are typically of a higher order — the retired Supreme Court or High Court Judges, Senior Advocates, and domain experts. A District Court, in exercising the substitution power, may not have the same institutional vantage point to assess the suitability of replacement arbitrators.
Furthermore, the exercise of the substitution power under Section 29-A(6) is not merely mechanical. It requires an assessment of whether the delay is attributable to the Arbitral Tribunal [proviso to Section 29-A(4)], the imposition of fee reductions [proviso to Section 29-A(4)], the determination of “sufficient cause” [Section 29-A(5)], and the potential imposition of exemplary costs [Section 29-A(8)]. These are substantive judicial determinations that demand experience and specialisation in arbitration law.
3. The textual argument and its limits
The Court’s textual argument — that Section 2(1)(e) provides an exhaustive definition which must apply to Section 29-A in the absence of contrary contextual indicia — is sound as a matter of orthodox statutory interpretation. However, it merits noting that the qualifier “unless the context otherwise requires” in Section 2(1) is not otiose. The second stream of decisions had invoked this very qualifier to justify a contextual departure. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the contextual argument proceeds primarily on the ground that perceptions of hierarchy cannot constitute “context”. This is persuasive, but the Court does not fully engage with the argument that the substantive content of Section 29-A — particularly the substitution power under sub-section (6) and the fee-reduction power under the proviso to sub-section (4) — supplies a context different from the context of Sections 9 and 34, where the Section 2(1)(e) definition has historically operated.
The Meghalaya High Court, in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C & C JV33, had attempted a balancing approach, holding that a contextual interpretation of the term “court” under the Act would involve analysing the facts of the case and the legislative intent, while a textual interpretation would focus solely on the language of the provision. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court, while upholding that the term “court” in Section 29-A should be interpreted as per Section 2(1)(e), “did not delve into the detailed observations made by the Meghalaya High Court concerning the potential conflict of powers vested in courts under Sections 11(6) and 29-A(4)”.34 The Jagdeep Chowgule35 decision has now provided the definitive answer to definitional question, but the observation that “the issue of whether there is any inconsistency between Sections 11 and 29-A(4) remains unaddressed” continues to carry force, in the sense that the practical tension, even if not a jurisdictional anomaly, persists.
4. The absence of an appellate remedy
A further concern relates to the absence of any statutory appeal against orders passed under Section 29-A. Section 37 of the Act provides for appeals only against orders under Sections 9, 34, and 8 (as also certain interlocutory orders). No appeal lies against an order granting or refusing extension under Section 29-A. Under the contextual interpretation, this absence was explicable — orders of the High Court under Section 29-A would be amenable to challenge only by way of special leave to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the regime established by the Jagdeep Chowgule case36, however, an order of a District Court or Commercial Court refusing extension under Section 29-A — thereby terminating the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal — would have no statutory appellate remedy. The aggrieved party would be compelled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, which itself introduces delay and procedural complexity. This is a consequence that arguably undermines the legislative objective of expeditious resolution.
Comparative perspective and legislative intent
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, on which the Act is loosely modelled, does not prescribe automatic termination of the arbitral mandate upon expiry of a time-limit. Few jurisdictions impose what the academic commentary has described as an “automatic kill-switch”. Section 29-A is, in this sense, a uniquely Indian innovation, reflecting the domestic imperative to combat endemic delay.
The Law Commission’s 176th Report37, cited by the Supreme Court at footnote 29 of the judgment, envisaged that the court exercising power under Section 29-A would “continue to pass further orders till the time the award is passed”. This contemplates an ongoing supervisory role for the court extending the mandate — a role that is more naturally suited to the High Court, with its established institutional capacity for arbitration-related matters, than to the overburdened district judiciary.
It is also noteworthy that the Court in Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints (India) Ltd.38, clarified that extension applications may be filed “either prior to or after” the expiry of the stipulated period, and C. Velusamy v. K Indhera39 had held that such an application is maintainable even after rendering of an award and that no separate limitation period should be read into Section 29-A. Read together with the Jagdeep Chowgule case40, the position now is that a party seeking extension must approach the Principal Civil Court or Commercial Court, which must endeavour to dispose of the application within 60 days. The cumulative effect of these rulings — vesting jurisdiction in District Courts while permitting post-expiry applications — may, in practice, lead to protracted uncertainty about the continuance of arbitral proceedings or the award itself if passed, precisely the mischief that Section 29-A was designed to remedy.
The State of Jharkhand principle and its application
The Court’s reliance on the Constitution Bench decision in the Hindustan Construction case41, is both appropriate and compelling. That decision had held (at paras 66-67) that a superior court is not expected to assume jurisdiction merely because it is a “higher court”, and that the jurisdiction of a court conferred under a statute “cannot be allowed to shift or become flexible because of a superior court’s interference in the matter in a different manner”. The Jagdeep Chowgule42 decision applies this principle to hold that the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 does not transmute it into the “court” for purposes of Section 29-A.
This application of the State of Jharkhand principle is logically unassailable. The power under Section 11 and the power under Section 29-A are distinct statutory functions, located in different chapters of the Act, serving different purposes. Section 11 is concerned with the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal (Chapter III); Section 29-A is concerned with the making of the award and termination of proceedings (Chapter VI). To read an enduring jurisdictional nexus from the former into the latter would indeed be to conflate appointment with supervision.
Conclusion and the way forward
The decision in Jagdeep Chowgule case43 is a welcome and necessary resolution of a decade-long controversy. Its doctrinal contribution is threefold: 1) it definitively holds that “court” in Section 29-A means the court as defined in Section 2(1)(e), 2) it rejects the thesis that perceptions of judicial hierarchy can supply “context” for departing from a statutory definition, and 3) it reaffirms that the referral court under Section 11 becomes functus officio upon the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.
However, the judgment leaves open significant practical concerns. The legislative objective of Section 29-A — expeditious resolution with minimal judicial intervention — may be compromised by the routing of all Section 29-A applications to district-level courts, which are demonstrably ill-equipped to handle such matters within the 60-day timeline prescribed by Section 29-A(9). The absence of a statutory appellate remedy against orders under Section 29-A compounds this concern.
While the doctrinal soundness of the judgment is beyond cavil, the practical exigencies — where district and Commercial Courts continue to grapple with staggering pendency — may warrant consideration of complementary measures by the legislature and the institutional stakeholders to ensure that the salutary object of Section 29-A is not attenuated in its implementation. In this regard, the following suggestions are offered with the utmost deference:
First, a legislative amendment to Section 29-A specifically designating the High Court as the competent court for domestic arbitrations, and the Supreme Court for international commercial arbitrations, would eliminate the practical difficulties identified above. Such an amendment would also bring Section 29-A into harmony with the scheme of Section 11, which deliberately vests the power of appointment in the highest judicial authority.44
Second, in the absence of legislative amendment, the Supreme Court may consider framing guidelines, in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, for the expeditious disposal of Section 29-A applications by Commercial Courts and District Courts, including mandatory adherence to the 60-day timeline and prioritisation of such applications.
Third, the establishment of dedicated arbitration Benches within the Commercial Courts, staffed by Judges with experience in arbitration law, would enhance the institutional capacity of district-level courts to discharge the functions now vested in them by the Jagdeep Chowgule case45.
The Jagdeep Chowgule decision settles the law; but the task of ensuring that the law as settled serves its intended purpose remains. The tension between textual fidelity and purposive interpretation, between doctrinal rigour and institutional pragmatism, is inherent in the design of Section 29-A. It is now for the legislature and the institutional stakeholders to bridge the gap that the judiciary, constrained by the text of the statute, cannot.
*Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India; BTech, LLB(Hons.) (IIT Kharagpur), LLM, CS (Executive); practising in Arbitration, Corporate Law and Commercial Litigation. Author can be reached at: rvprabhat9@gmail.com.
5. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
10. 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 21443.
13. Saurabh Bindal and R.V. Prabhat, Arbitration and Conciliation: A Commentary (Eastern Book Company, 2025).
14. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
15. 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11821.
18. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
19. (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372.
20. (2009) 17 SCC 313 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 385.
21. (2005) 8 SCC 618 : (2005) 128 Comp Cas 465.
22. (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764.
23. (2024) 12 SCC 1 : (2025) 3 SCC (Civ) 567.
25. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
27. Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801.
28. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
29. (2018) 2 SCC 602 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 242.
30. (2015) 1 SCC 32 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 1.
31. 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 21443.
32. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
34. Saurabh Bindal and R.V. Prabhat, Arbitration and Conciliation: A Commentary (Eastern Book Company, 2025).
35. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
36. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
37. Law Commission of India, The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2001, Report No. 176, Ch. 2.21.5 explains the purpose and object of vesting of this power.
40. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
41. (2018) 2 SCC 602 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 242
42. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.
43. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124
44. It must be acknowledged, however, that any such legislative recalibration would inevitably raise a cognate question: whether the substitution power under Section 15 of the Act, which presently vests in the “court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e), ought similarly to be realigned with the appointing authority under Section 11. The interplay between Sections 15 and 29-A(6) — both of which contemplate substitution of arbitrators, albeit in distinct contexts — would require careful legislative attention to avoid creating a fresh inconsistency in the very process of remedying the existing one. That question, however, merits separate and detailed consideration and is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
45. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 124.