Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT):  Aradhana Johri, Member (A), partly allowed the instant application whereby the applicant had sought for issuance of directions for the release of gratuity and leave encashment which had been illegally withheld by the respondent.

The applicant was appointed to the post of Constable with the respondents on 31-07-1975. A CBI case was registered against the applicant under PC Act and he was suspended with effect from 09-11-1995. However, the suspension was subsequently revoked vide an order dated 28-03-2000. On 02-08-2001, the applicant was convicted by the Trial Court and, consequently, was dismissed from service. Again, the applicant was subsequently reinstated and superannuated on attaining the age of retirement on 31-08-2015. Though the applicant was paid provisional pension, his gratuity and leave encashment for 278 days leave which stood to his credit had been illegally withheld.

As per Rule 69 of the Central Civil Services (PensionRules1972

“(1)(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon.”

The Tribunal relied on Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindranath Choubey, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 470, wherein the Supreme Court had held that it was permissible for the employer to withhold the payment of gratuity even after the employee had attained his superannuation from service because of the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him in view of Rule 34.3 of the Rules, 1978, the employer had a right to withhold gratuity during pendency of disciplinary proceedings.

Further, the Tribunal observed that 39 (3) reads as follows:

“(3) The authority competent to grant leave may withhold whole or part of cash equivalent of earned leave in the case of a Government servant who retires from service on attaining the age of retirement while under suspension or while disciplinary or criminal proceedings are pending against him.”

Consequently, the Tribunal ordered that leave encashment of 286 days should be paid to the applicant since the plea of money becoming recoverable had not been taken by the respondents. However, the demand of the applicant for release of gratuity and interest had been rejected.[Baldev Singh v. Union of India, O.A. 879 of 2020, decided on 02-03-2021]


Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT): The Division Bench of Justice Umesh Chandra Srivastava (Chairperson) and Vice Admiral Abhay Raghunath Karve (Member) allowed an application for disability pension filed under Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

The applicant was enrolled in Army on 28-02-1994 and was discharged on 29-02-2016 in Low Medical Category on completion of service limits under Rule 13 (3) Item III (i) of the Army Rules, 1954. The Release Medical Board (RMB) assessed his disabilities (i) Obesity (E-66) at 5% for life, (ii) Type II Diabetes Mellitus (E-11) at 20% for life, (iii) Dyslipidemia (E-78.0) at 5% for life and (iv) ACL Tear Complete (RT) OPTD (S-83.5) at 20% for life, composite at 40% for life and opined the disabilities to be neither attributable to nor aggravated (NANA) by service. The applicant approached the respondents for grant of disability pension but the same was rejected.

The questions before the Tribunal were of two-fold:

(a) Whether the disabilities of the applicant were attributable to or aggravated by Military Service?

(b) Whether the applicant was entitled to the benefit of rounding off the disability pension?

The Tribunal, while relying on Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 316, held that reasoning of RMB for denying disability pension stating that injury (i) to (iii) were lifestyle disease and injury (iv) occurred when the applicant was on leave, was not convincing and did not reflect the complete truth on the matter. Since, injury (i) to (iii) started after the applicant had served 20 years of service the benefit of the doubt should be given to the applicant and second and third disabilities of the applicant should be considered as aggravated by military service. Regarding injury (iv), the Tribunal observed that applicant suffered an injury while going to join on permanent posting, hence, it should be treated to have causal connection with military service and the same should be considered attributable to or aggravated by military service.

On the point of rounding off of disability pension, the Tribunal cited Union of India v. Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 1761, wherein the Supreme Court held that, “an individual, who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or on completion of his tenure of engagement, if found to be suffering from some disability which is attributable to or aggravated by the military service, is entitled to be granted the benefit of rounding off of disability pension.”

In view of the above, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order holding that benefit of rounding off of disability pension at 40% for life should be rounded off to 50% for life and be extended to the applicant from the date of his discharge. The disabilities of the applicant were held as aggravated by Service and the respondents were directed to comply with the order within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Further, the interest of 9% per annum was awarded for default till actual payment. [Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, O.A. No. 14 of 2019, decided on 09-12-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Division Bench of R.K. Deshpande and N.B. Suryawanshi, JJ., while addressing an issue with regard to the deduction of pension by the Bank without any confirmation from the employer, observed that,

“The pension payable to the employees upon superannuation is a ‘property’ under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and it constitutes a fundamental right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”

“Pension cannot be deducted without authority of law.”

Petitioner a retired assistant foreman had a basic pension of Rs 1,334 as on 01-10-1994, consequent upon an increase in the pension and dearness allowance, the basic pension of Rs 25, 634 was fixed, for which the petitioner was entitled to and accordingly he was paid.

Right to Information Act, 2005

In the month of August, 2019 petitioner’s pension was reduced without consent or knowledge of the petitioner and thus he filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to know the reason for deduction and details as to the revision of the pension during the period 2015-16 and 2016-17.

Excess Payment of Pension

Respondent stated that there was an excess payment of pension to the petitioner.

Petitioner in view of the above approached the Court challenging the action of the respondent and sought a further direction to the respondents to restore the position in respect of payment of pension, prevailing prior to the deduction which commenced from 01-08-2019.

Excess Payment by SBI

State Bank of India-respondent stated that an amount of Rs 872 per month was erroneously paid in excess to the petitioner due to technical error in the system.

Reserve Bank of India

According to Circular No.RBI/2015-16/340-DGBA.GAD.No.2960/45.01.001/2015-16 dated 17-3-2016, clause (c), the bank claims to have an authority to recover the excess payment to the petitioner.

“c) In case the pensioner expresses his inability to pay the amount, the same may be adjusted from the future pension payments to be made to the pensioners. For recovering the over-payment made to pensioner from his future pension payment in installments 1/3rd of net (pension + relief) payable each month may be recovered unless the pensioner concerned gives consent in writing to pay a higher installment amount.”

Employer’s stand is very clear in the present case that the fixation of the petitioner’s pension was correct and proper.

Further, the employer has supported the claim of the petitioner and has no role to play in the matter of reduction of pension or its recovery.

Bench states that it is not the authority of the Bank to fix the entitlement of the pension amount of the employees other than the employees of the respondent-Bank.

Hence the action of the Bank to reduce the pension of the petitioner is unauthorised and illegal.

Furthermore, the Bank has failed to demonstrate any technical error in the calculations.

With regard to the RBI clause as stated above, Court stated that “once we hold that in fact there was no excess payment made to the petitioner, the question of applicability of the instructions issued by the RBI or undertaking given by the petitioner does not arise.” 

Principles of Natural Justice

Without following the principles of natural justice in the manner of either carrying out correspondence with regard to the correctness of the pension or an explanation in respect of the deduction, the said action on the part of the Bank is arbitrary, unreasonable, unauthorised and in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice.

Breach of Trust

Bank is the trustee of the pensioner’s account and has no authority in the eyes of the law to dispute the entitlement of the pension payable to the employees other than those who are employed in the bank.

To tamper with the account is nothing but a breach of trust.

Court directed Bank to refund the amount of Rs 3,26,045 to the petitioner by crediting it in his pension account with interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of deduction.

Further, the bank is required to be directed to pay the costs of Rs 50,000 to the petitioner towards the expenses of this petition.

Unfortunately, the time has come to tell the Bank that the aging is natural process, which leads to weakening of the body and mind.

Adding to its conclusion, Court stated that the Bank officials must realize that tomorrow it may be their turn, upon superannuation, to fight for the pension or post-retiral benefits. The thought process, therefore, to be adopted should be of a person in a situation like the petitioner.

Respect, dignity, care, sensitivity, assistance, and security would automatically follow.

Senior Citizens

It is a high time for the Banks to create a separate cell and to device a method to provide personal service through the men of confidence, at the door-step to the old aged, disabled and sick persons who are the senior citizens.

Bench directed registry to forward the copies of the Judgment to the Centralized Processing Pension Centres of all the Nationalized Banks and also to the Reserve Bank of India and the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, to consider the question of the constitution of separate cell and release of appropriate guidelines so as to attain the constitutional goal of providing respect, dignity, care, sensitivity, assistance and security to all the pension account holders in the Banks.[Naini Gopal v. Union of India, LD-VC-CW-665 of 2020, decided on 20-08-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a 2:1 verdict, the 3-judge bench of Arun Mishra, MR Shah and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has held that the disciplinary authority has powers to impose the penalty of dismissal/major penalty upon the employee even after his attaining the age of superannuation if the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while the employee was in service in view of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules.

Issues before the Court

The Court was deciding the below mentioned issues and while all 3-judge agreed on the answer to the first Issue, Justice Rastogi, disagreed with the majority ruling in the second issue.

  • Issue 1: Whether is it permissible in law for the employer to withhold the payment of gratuity of the employee, even after his superannuation from service, because of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him?
  • Issue 2: Where the departmental enquiry had been instituted against an employee while he was in service and continued after he attained the age of superannuation, whether the punishment of dismissal can be imposed on being found guilty of misconduct in view of Rule 34.2 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (CDA Rules) made by Mahanadi Coalfield Limited?

Issue 1:

All 3 judges unanimously held it is permissible for the employer to withhold gratuity even after retirement/superannuation during pendency of the disciplinary proceedings as per Rule 34.3 of the CDA Rules.

Rule 34.3 of the CDA Rules permits withholding of the gratuity amount during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, for ordering recovering from gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the company if have been guilty of offences/misconduct as mentioned in subsection 6 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 or to have caused pecuniary loss to the company by misconduct or negligence, during his service. It further makes clear that Rule 34.3 for withholding of such a gratuity would be subject to the provisions of Section 7(3) and 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 in the event of delayed payment in the case of an employee who is fully exonerated. There is no inconsistency between sub-section 6 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act and Rule 34.3 of the CDA Rules.

Also, once it is held that a major penalty which includes the dismissal from service can be imposed, even after the employee has attained the age of superannuation and/or was permitted to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, provided the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while the employee was in service, sub-­section 6 of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act shall be attracted and the amount of gratuity can be withheld till the disciplinary proceedings are concluded.

Issue 2:

Justice Shah, for himself and Justice Mishra

The punishment which is prescribed under Rule 27 of the CDA Rules, minor as well as major, both can be imposed. Apart from that, recovery can also be made of the pecuniary loss caused as provided in Rule 34.3 of the CDA Rules, which takes care of the provision under  sub­section (6) of Section 4  of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The recovery is in addition to a punishment that can be imposed after attaining the age of superannuation. The legal fiction provided in Rules 34.2 of the CDA Rules of deemed continuation in service has to be given full effect.

Considering the provisions of Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules, the inquiry can be continued given the deeming fiction in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and appropriate punishment, including that of dismissal can be imposed apart from the forfeiture of the gratuity wholly or partially including the recovery of the pecuniary loss as the case may be.

“Several service benefits would depend upon the outcome of the inquiry, such as concerning the period during which inquiry remained pending. It would be against the public policy to permit an employee to go scot­free after collecting various service benefits to which he would not be entitled, and the event of superannuation cannot come to his rescue and would amount to condonation of guilt. Because of the legal fiction provided under the rules, it can be completed in the same manner as if the employee had remained in service after superannuation, and appropriate punishment can be imposed.”

Further, various provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 do not come in the way of departmental inquiry and as provided in Section 4(6) of Gratuity Act and Rule 34.3 of CDA Rules in case of dismissal gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially, and the loss can also be recovered. An inquiry can be continued as provided under the relevant service rules as it is not provided in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 that inquiry shall come to an end as soon as the employee attains the age of superannuation.

The Gratuity Act does not deal with the matter of disciplinary inquiry, it contemplates recovery from or forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially as per misconduct committed and does not deal with punishments to be imposed and does not supersede the Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules. The mandate of Section 4(6) of recovery of loss provided under Section 4(6)(a) and forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially under Section 4(6)(b) is furthered by the Rules 34.2 and 34.3. If there cannot be any dismissal after superannuation, intendment of the provisions of Section 4(6) would be defeated.

Justice Rohatgi, dissenting

After conclusion of the disciplinary inquiry, if held guilty, indeed a penalty can be inflicted upon an employee/delinquent who stood retired from service and what should be the nature of penalty always depends on the relevant scheme of Rules and on the facts and circumstances of each case, but either of the substantive penalties specified under Rule 27 of the CDA Rules, 1978 including dismissal from service are not open to be inflicted on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment of forfeiture of gratuity commensurate with the nature of guilt may be inflicted upon a delinquent employee provided under Rule 34.3 of CDA Rules, 1978 read with sub­section (6) of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

[Chairman-­cum­-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited v. Rabindranath Choubey, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 470 , decided on 27.05.2020]

COVID 19Legislation UpdatesNotifications

In view of the unprecedented situation arising out of country-wide lockdown declared by the Government consequent to the outbreak of COVID-19, it is clarified that the central Government employees who are attaining the age of superannuation on 31st March, 2020 in terms of Fundamental Rule 56 and due to retire, shall retire from Central Government service on 31st March, 2020, irrespective of whether they are working from home or working from office.


Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions

[Press Release dt. 31-03-2020]

[Source: PIB]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jharkhand High Court: The Bench of Aniruddha Bose, C.J. and B.B. Mangalmurti, J. dismissed a petition claiming arrears of pension, post retrial benefits with statutory and penal interest.

In the present case the appellant was appointed as Chairman and later was appointed as Junior Account Clerk in Rural Works Department. After rendering a long length of service, he superannuated as Accounts Clerk. The respondents settled his pensionary benefits by paying his Government Provident Fund, Group Insurance amount, part of gratuity as per 5th Pay Revision Commission (old scale) and part of leave encashment as per 5th Pay Revision Commission (old scale). The appellant alleged that the respondent did not pay arrear and benefits of first, second and third financial upgradation under Assured Carrier Progression and the arrear of pay revision, gratuity and part of leave encashment as recommended by 6th Pay Revision Commission. And that he stands on equal footing with one of his colleague, Saryug Prasad, as when he approached the Court, the same was allowed and the respondent was directed to pay benefits of financial upgradation. The respondents controverted the claim as appellant did not pass a departmental examination which is mandatory and as such the case of this appellant is not similar to the case of Saryug Prasad. Moreover, after attaining the age of 50, the appellant did not approach his controlling officer for issuance of an order of waiver while he was in service.

The Court after considering the material facts and the papers attached therewith held that it was clear that the appellant did not pass the mandatory test which was a prerequisite. The Court relied on the case of U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 where the Court held that “…When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with this situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to persons similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement…”.

In such view of the matter, the Court held that no relief could be granted to the appellant.[Birendra Kumar Sinha v. State of Jharkhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 432, decided on 23-04-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: The Bench of Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J., allowed the writ petition filed with a prayer of expeditious disposal on the grounds that delay was being caused by the respondent in examining the witnesses and this was coming in the way of consideration of petitioner’s superannuation that was to be done taking into account his age.

The facts of the case were that the petitioner was working in place of his brother who died in 1988. He continued to work without any complaint but suddenly in the year 1994, on a complaint, a full-fledged departmental enquiry was held by the Railways in which he was ultimately exonerated. It was submitted that thereafter again complaint was made in 2013, for the same charges and on the one hand departmental proceedings were initiated and on the other hand, a criminal case was also instituted. In this criminal case, it was submitted that it was the authorities who were not cooperating as witnesses are not being examined on behalf of the prosecution. This would cause a delay in the superannuation which was due within a few weeks as the criminal case would come in the way of consideration. The prayer was to expedite and conclude the trial at the earliest.

The Court allowed the petition finding prayer to be reasonable. [Hoti Rai v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 307, Order dated 08-03-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: The Bench of Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. dismissed a petition being devoid of merit and also finding a gross abuse of process of the Court.

In the pertinent case the petitioner after his retirement from the service, filed for correction of his date of birth in the official order. The petitioner originally worked under the administrative control of Beas Control Board (BCB) where at the time of joining he got recorded his date of birth as 15-04-1950. The cases referred to by the Court were Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Chhota Birsa Uranw, (2014) 12 SCC 570 and Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 162 wherein the issue was expressly dealt with. The petitioner in return produced his school leaving certificate, where the date of birth according to him was 15-4-1954 and not 15-4-1950.

The Court noted certain material facts:

– if the date of birth was 15-04-1954 and not 15-4-1950, as is being vehemently claimed by the petitioner, then it is impossible to fathom as to how his services could have been engaged by BCB at the age of about 15 years and he being minor at that time, under no circumstances, he could have been legally appointed.

-the petitioner, while in service of BCB, did not take any steps  whatsoever to get his date of birth corrected and the reason for the same is obvious because in case his service record would have been corrected on the basis of date of birth, then obviously his services were bound to be terminated being a minor.

-after attaining the age of superannuation on completion of 55 years, was granted three successive continuations and even during this period, he did not object to the date of birth.

The Court found this to be normally a fit case where the criminal prosecution should have been ordered against the petitioner for tampering with the official record, however, it refrained from passing any order to this effect taking into consideration that the petitioner has not only retired from service of the respondents, but is currently a senior citizen of about 65 years of age. Thus the petition was dismissed.[Dhani Ram v. Bhakra Beas Management Board, 2019 SCC OnLine HP 251, decided on 05-03-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Shivaji Pandey, J. dismissed a writ petition for transfer owing to financial inconvenience and remaining superannuation period of the petitioner.

In this case, the petitioner through his counsel Kedar Jha has challenged his transfer order wherein it was stated that the petitioner has worked at Darbhanga for a very long time and now the respondents want to uproot him and plant him at Patna thereby causing great financial inconvenience to him as the cost of living was higher which would cause difficulties in running his families. It was also added that as per policy of the authorities class-III employees shall be treated as District Cadre Level employees in order to erode their difficulties.

The Court was of the view that it does not stand to the reason as to why the petitioner has been sent to Patna and thus Darbhanga district was convenient for the petitioner. Further as more than a year was left for his superannuation and that allows him to be given the choice of his workplace. Accordingly, this writ petition was allowed.[Wasi Ahmad v. State of Bihar, 2018 SCC OnLine Pat 2269, decided on 21-12-2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: A full court, speaking through A.M. Khanwilkar, J. for himself and Dipak Misra, CJ and Dr. D.Y.  Chandrachud, dismissed an appeal filed by the Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association against the decision of Kerala High Court which rejected the claim of the members of appellant association to be treated at par with Public Prosecutors in the matter of age of superannuation.

The appellant association claimed that the Assistant Public Prosecutors (APPs) who are officers of law courts should be treated at parity with Public Prosecutors in the matter of retirement age. It is worth noting that age of retirement of APPs appointed before 31st March 2013, is 56 years, while retirement age of Public Prosecutors is 60 years. Their claim was rejected by the Kerala High Court and therefore appeal was filed before the Apex Court.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court cogitated over the rival submissions of the parties and found no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. The concerned APPs are appointed on the advice of Kerala Public Service Commission, after clearing competitive examination. Whereas, Public Prosecutors are appointed by the Government under Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules 1978. Their method of appointment and conditions of service are different. The APPs are like any other government servants while the Public Prosecutors, appointed for a period of three years, are not government employees and do not enjoy service benefits like APPs. The Court held that merely because they perform similar functions, the APPs cannot be considered at par with Public Prosecutors to make provision for same retirement age. However, APPs were given liberty to approach the State Government to represent the alternatives as suggested by them. [Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association v. State of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine 551, dated 17.05.2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Order passed by the respondent, reducing the basic pay of the petitioner retrospectively after her superannuation, was set aside by a Division Bench comprising of B.R. Gavai and Bharati. H. Dangre, JJ.

The petitioner challenged the recovery of a certain sum on account of reduction in pay scale, ordered by the respondent. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Trained Teacher in 1970. She attained superannuation in 2010. The impugned order was passed in 2011 by the respondent on the ground that the basic pay was reduced as per the qualifications of the petitioner.

The High Court perused the record and found that the impugned order was passed after 18 months of petitioner’s retirement. The Court, referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sayed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 475, held that such a recovery at the far end of the career of an employee or after his superannuation was not permissible in law. Similarly, the impugned order of the respondent reducing basic pay of the petitioner was also found unsustainable. Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside and the petition was allowed. [Grace George Pampoorickal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1037, dated 20-4-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Court dismissed a service matter stating that the amended age of superannuation cannot be applicable to a retired employee even though the petition was pending during the term of his employment.

The petitioner was an employee of the U.P. Bhumi Sudhar Nigam. The Company proposed to extend the superannuation age from 58 years to 60 years. The petitioner superannuated during the pendency of the proposal. He challenged the retirement notice. Once the proposal was accepted and implemented, the petitioner filed for a writ of mandamus upon the respondents for the salary difference and pension along with a 12% interest from the date of his superannuation.

The Court did not accept the prayer of the petitioner stating that the amended operative age of retirement is applicable prospectively only after it is approved by the State Government. Before such approval, the Corporation does not have any jurisdiction to extend the age. If the employee has already superannuated before the amended rules have been approved, then the pre-amendment rules shall be applicable on him. The extension of age of superannuation shall not be retrospective in nature. [Shanker Dayal Singh v. State of U.P. 2017 SCC OnLine All 1898, decided on 03.07.2017]

Case BriefsHigh CourtsUniversities and Educational Institutions

Punjab and Haryana High Court: While deciding upon 68 writ petitions filed by various Professors and Assistant Professors of the Panjab University and its affiliated colleges, all seeking the writ of Mandamus directing the Central Government and the Panjab University to raise the age of superannuation from service to 65 years, the Bench of Amol Rattan Singh, J., dismissed the petitions stating that the matter of raising the age of superannuation is solely a matter of executive policy.

In the instant petitions it was contended that the respondent University is sui generis and is Centrally governed, controlled and funded and therefore a Central University, and relied upon Section 2 (b) of the Panjab University Act, 1947 and Section 72 of the Punjab Re-Organization Act, 1966, Section 2(d) of the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006, Article 248 of the Constitution read with Entry 97 in List I of the Seventh Schedule, and Article 254 of the Constitution, read with Clause 2.1.0 of the UGC Regulations 2010. It was contended that since the University is being funded by the Ministry of Human Resource and Development through the UGC, it would also be governed by Clause 2.1.0, per se, and the age of superannuation of its teachers should thus be raised to 65 years. In rebuttal the respondents contended that Panjab University was established by the Panjab University Act, 1947, and at that time, the ‘area of jurisdiction’ of the University covered the undivided State of Punjab. In 1966 upon the reorganization of the State of Punjab University was declared to be an Inter-State body corporate, as per Section 72 (3) of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966.

Upon perusing the contentions, the Court declined to accept the petitioners’ contention to that the plain meaning of the words contained in Clause 2.1.0 of the UGC Regulations must be given effect without any additions or subtractions whatsoever. The Court further perused the letter of the Director (U.II) MHRD, which clarified that the respondent University is not a Central University but an Inter State body; even the documents relied by the petitioners failed to prove the same. It was further added that an increased quantum of funding by the Central Government also does not render the respondent University to be a Central University. The Court thus concluded that it did not find the decision of refusing to raise the age of superannuation as arbitrary. [Bhura Singh Ghuman v. Panjab University2016 SCC OnLine P&H 6385, decided on 16.08.2016]